How and why did MARS facilitate migration control?

Understanding the implication of migration and refugee studies (MARS) with the restriction of human mobility by UK state agencies

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This thesis makes two related arguments regarding the academic field of migration and refugee studies (MARS) and the control of migration by UK state agencies. The first, and more empirical one, is that the former facilitated the latter: the field's members provided symbolic, technical, and pedagogic assistance to two non-departmental public bodies in controlling migration. The second, and more theoretical, argument of this thesis is that MARS facilitated migration control because of culture, power, and structure. It is through the field's implication in the coercion of its human subjects by UK state agencies that MARS academics a) answered their calling, b) assisted class rule as ideologists, and c) separated sacred and profane by policing endogamy.

The introduction describes the existing literature on the relationship between MARS and migration control. The consensus is that the former facilitated the latter. However, these studies fail to provide detailed accounts of the ways in which it did so.

Chapter One defines the elements of my more empirical argument: MARS and migration control. An historical narrative outlines the institutional development of the field since its beginnings in the early 1980s. Then a new model for understanding migration control – i.e., migrant CODAR – is described. Chapter Two uses this model to trace the actor network through which MARS academics facilitated the restriction of their human subjects' mobility by the UK state agencies of the Advisory Panel on Country Information and the Migration Advisory Committee.

Chapters Three, Four, and Five use Weberian, Marxist, and Durkheimian anthropological approaches (respectively) to explain the implication of MARS and migration control that is described in Chapters One and Two. Finally, the conclusion of the thesis discusses its contributions to both more particular (i.e., the literature surveyed in the introduction on MARS and migration control) and more general (i.e., anthropology) scholarly fields.

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0. Introduction

This introductory chapter is divided into five main sections. First, I define my primary research object and provide a very brief description of my arguments. Second, I give a short personal account of the background of my thesis. Third, I review the relevant literature. Fourth, I discuss my arguments in greater detail, describe my overall theoretical approach, and outline the thesis. I end the chapter with a discussion of my methods.

0.1. Object and brief description of arguments

MARS is a shorthand identity that I ascribe[1] to a community of people who study and/or teach particular themes and/or are affiliated with particular institutions in universities in the UK.[2] They are students and research, teaching, and administrative staff who study primarily the themes of migration, forced migration, and refugees. Immigration, transnationalism, diaspora, and integration are additional topics with which they are concerned. Many, but not all MARS academics belong to research centres that specialize in these themes. The members of the field represent a wide range of disciplines within the social sciences, particularly sociology, development studies, anthropology, and geography. MARS has emerged recently relative to other academic fields of study such as development studies. Its first research centre was

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[1] MARS is solely an heuristic device; none of my research subjects identified themselves as being 'MARS academics'. MARS makes an object of a group of people who identify themselves academically (and otherwise, as well) in a variety of ways. My discussion in Chapter One describes these variations in self-identification, the ethnographic findings upon which I base my creation of MARS academics as a research object, and my interpretation of the field as a community.

[2] Here, and in the rest of this thesis, I substitute 'in the UK' for 'in the space claimed by the British state as its territory'. Although this reifies the British state (Herzfeld 1992) in a way that I find unsatisfactory, I have decided that this disadvantage is outweighed by this substitution's advantage of improved readability.

established in 1982, its first journal in 1986, and its first degree course in 1997. The field's faculty and students have produced[3] mainly studies on the behaviour of mobile people primarily from Africa, the Caribbean, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America and/or those who are identified as being their descendants.

These people whom MARS academics have tended to study were therefore the field's *targets*. They have been the targets, as well, of another project: the most restrictive migration controls by UK state agencies. This coincidence was the starting point for my investigation. I set out to determine if MARS and its research and UK state agencies and their migration controls were implicated as well as being coincident – and if they were indeed so, to explain why this was the case.

I make two related arguments in this thesis. The first is more empirical in that it relies primarily on my observations and inductive reasoning. I argue *that* something was the case and describe *how* it was so. The second argument is more theoretical in that it is less tied directly to data and makes use of more deductive reasoning.[4] I explain *why* it was that something was the case in the way that it was.

Very briefly, my first argument is that MARS and UK migration control were indeed implicated: the former facilitated the latter by symbolic, technical, and pedagogical means.[5] My second argument is that it did so in these ways because of *culture*, *power*, and *structure*. It is through the facilitation of UK migration control that the field's members a) answered their calling, b) assisted class rule as ideologists, and c)

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[3] I opt to not follow the convention of using the present tense when describing the written work of MARS academics because I use these products as historical data in my analyses and interpretation.
[4] I describe these two approaches in detail below.
[5] I could have found, of course, that the two phenomena were coincident, yet *not* implicated – i.e., that MARS *did not* facilitate migration control.

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separated sacred and profane through their policing of endogamy. Furthermore, in supporting my argument that MARS facilitated the migration control by UK state agencies because of power, I demonstrate (in Chapter Four) that the two phenomena were implicated, as well, through the facilitation of MARS research on the targets of UK state agencies' migration controls by these organisations.

0.2. Project background

My choice of MARS scholars as the subjects of my anthropological research is primarily the result of a process by which phenomena that were unknown to me before entering into a new socio-cultural context took on great importance; these were not what I expected. I spent three years (1996-1999) as a postgraduate student in the department of anthropology at the State University of New York, Albany, and I am unable to recall an occasion during my time in the programme during which the 'policy relevance' of academic research was discussed. I was aware of the existence of something called 'applied anthropology' and understood that it was research done on behalf of NGOs or the communities that were being studied, themselves. I had not interacted with government officials as part of my postgraduate education.

I found things to be quite different in my new department at Oxford. 'Policy' seemed to be everywhere. It was in scholarly essays and presentations at seminars in the form of 'policy recommendations' or 'policy implications', in the in-house training sessions of academic research institutes (i.e., 'How to make your research policy relevant'),[6] and in the title of the newly established research centre in the Institute of

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[6] I describe two such events below.

Social and Cultural Anthropology to which I was attached – the Centre on Migration, Policy, and Society (COMPAS). This centre was directed by a person who had previously headed the Transnational Communities Programme (TNCP) at Oxford, to which I had originally been attracted. I was surprised by what I saw as the high degree of involvement that my academic superiors had with government officials.

During my first year at Oxford, I perceived it to be the case that the majority of academic MARS scholarship in the UK did not challenge the restriction of human mobility across what are claimed to be boundaries of nation-states. Instead, I found these academics to be cooperating with governments and intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations in what they tended to refer to as the 'management of migration'. I was deeply troubled by these findings. I saw these practices as running counter to my own position (then and at the time of writing) concerning the politics of human mobility – one that argues for the abolition of legal restrictions on migration.

After one term in Oxford, I decided to change the topic of my thesis research from my proposed study on the adaptation of and notions of fairness held by Mexican migrants in the USA and Algerian migrants in France to a study that attempted to answer the question of – to quote from my transfer paper – 'Why do people participate in the migration control project of the EU and its member states?' I was unable to find a satisfactory answer in the ethnographic literature for why MARS scholars behaved in the ways that I had observed, so I set out to answer the question for myself using the theories, concepts and methods of anthropology. I have done my utmost to 'keep an

open mind' with regards to what and where to investigate and to report my findings accurately.

0.3. Literature review

My project is the first social-scientific work, as far as I have been able to ascertain, to contextualise explicitly and in great detail the phenomena of MARS and migration control. Other researchers – including some anthropologists – have, however, interwoven these more incidentally *en route* to bringing MARS into association primarily with other phenomena. That these researchers' contextualisations of MARS and migration control were incidental by no means relieves me of a responsibility to take these analyses seriously. Although often made in passing, vague, and unsupported by evidence – as will be seen below – these contextualisations do form a part of the literature on the subject with which my own must be compared.

Therefore, I devote considerable space in the first part of this section to the careful analysis of this existing literature. My discussion of these researchers' contextualisations includes not only a detailed description of what, exactly, they wrote, but also an analysis of the grammar that they used in doing so. These analyses are intended not to be 'niggles' about tenses, but rather to clarify as much as possible these authors' arguments. In addition to providing an accurate description of the existing literature, this exposition provides information that I subsequently use as ethnographic data. For example, in the conclusion to Chapter Four, I use the incidentality of the contextualisations of these authors (most of whom were MARS

academics) as evidence to support my argument that MARS facilitated migration control because of power.

My critique of the MARS and migration control literature in the second part of this section points out its lack of ethnographic detail. My thesis corrects for this absence by following both the methodological and conceptual leads of Asad et al.'s *Anthropology and the colonial encounter* (1973).

0.3.1. MARS and migration control

Social scientists who have contextualised MARS and migration control are – ordered chronologically– Malkki (1995), Chimni (1998), De Genova (2002), Black (2003), Peutz (2006), and Zetter (2007). Malkki (1995) related the academic field of refugee studies to the sealing of borders and the control of the movement of people. She wrote:

> The tendencies [of refugee studies] toward functionalism and essentialism […] have real consequences for the shape of interventions in refugee crises. For example, functionalist visions of an identity that can only be whole and well when rooted in a territorial homeland […] reinforce the assumption that state sovereignty […] is part of a natural or necessary order of things. This mutually reinforcing relationship, in turn, can naturalize other things: (*a*) It naturalizes and renders reasonable the sealing of borders against applications for asylum (as the United States is now doing with Haitian asylum seekers). (*b*) It makes obvious the need to control the movement of people 'out of place', and thus acts to naturalize technologies of power like the refugee camp, the transit camp, the screening or reception center, etc. (1995:511-512).

For Malkki, then, refugee studies facilitates migration control by reinforcing the assumption that state sovereignty is necessary, which then has the knock-on effects of naturalizing the state practice of preventing the entry of people seeking asylum and promoting the idea that the movement of people thought to be 'out of place' ought to

be controlled, which then naturalizes their internment. She used the present indicative tense in describing these cause-and-effect relationships throughout the passage above. In other words, refugee studies enables migration control by making it look reasonable to an audience (or audiences) that she leaves unspecified.

Chimni (1998) related the field of refugee studies to restrictive measures and exclusionary policies. Having stated that '[t]here are three traditional durable solutions to the refugee problem: resettlement in third countries, local integration, and voluntary repatriation' (ibid.:363), Chimni went on to write:

> A survey of the [refugee studies] literature reveals that voluntary repatriation is recommended as the best solution from two different perspectives. The first is the perspective of the Northern States whose favouring the solution of voluntary repatriation is clearly self-serving. The second is the more theoretical perspective […] which contends that the exile bias in traditional Northern thinking is not only unrealistic in view of the nature of the contemporary refugee problem, but also 'inhumane' (ibid.:364).

This second perspective, Chimni found, 'helps present the solution of voluntary repatriation as one which the refugees themselves desire most' (ibid.). 'What may be termed the *repatriation turn* in refugee policy was not then a product of extensive studies of the complex issues involved', he continued, 'but the outcome of a marriage between convenient theory, untested assumptions and the interests of states' (ibid., emphasis in original).

In sum, wrote Chimni, this 'new approach' in refugee studies

> became, thanks to the founding myth of difference, complicit in the strategy of containment pursued by the rich Northern states. Instead of calling on them to pursue a more liberal asylum policy, the 'new approach' articulated a set of policy proposals which justified restrictive measures. The proposals

> included the rejection of the exilic bias of international refugee law; a nearly sole reliance on the solution of voluntary repatriation; and an emphasis on the responsibility of the state of physical origin (ibid.:369).

Here, Chimni used the past indicative tense – or, *x* did *y* – in claiming that the proposals that were articulated by refugee studies justified restrictive measures.

'It has been the burden of this paper', he wrote, 'to argue that the 'new approach' needs to be replaced by a 'new new approach'' that 'will need to reject the positivist approach to international refugee law' (ibid.). 'But, unlike the proponents of the 'new approach', Chimni continued, 'the 'new new approach' will not use this rejection as a move to justify exclusionary policies' (ibid.). In this passage, the present indicative – or, *x* does *y* – is implied for the effect of the 'new approach'. Rather than write, 'unlike the way that the proponents of the 'new approach' did', Chimni used an abbreviated version of this phrase, implying that the proponents of the 'new approach' currently *do* justify exclusionary policies. For Chimni then, refugee studies facilitated and continues to facilitate restrictive measures and exclusionary policies by justifying these practices to unspecified audiences through the representation of voluntary repatriation as the reasonable solution to the refugee problem in both the field's theories and its policy proposals.

De Genova (2002) related social science scholarship of undocumented migration to the production of migrant illegality. Having defined 'illegality' as a 'social relation' (ibid.:422), he then wrote the following passage, which I quote at length:

> Migrant 'illegality' is produced as an effect of the law, but it is also sustained as an effect of a discursive formation […]. […] [T]he social science scholarship of undocumented migration is itself often ensnared in this discursive formation of 'illegality' […]. Indeed, across an extensive, multidisciplinary, social science literature,

one encounters a remarkable visibility of 'illegal immigrants' swirling enigmatically around the stunning invisibility of the law. […] Rather than investigate critically what the law actually accomplishes, much scholarship takes the stated aims of the law, such as deterring undocumented migration, at face-value and hence falls into a naïve empiricism. […] Furthermore, there is a subcategory of scholarship that is derivative of this naïve empiricism, whereby the overtly restrictive intent of particular laws is not only taken at face-value, but also supplied with a preemptive apology. Such commentators […] assert that the effects on particular migrations of changes in a state's immigration laws can be somehow presumed to have been inadvertent – unanticipated and thus unintended consequences. This show of 'good faith' toward the state, and its underlying belief in the law's transparency, does not even allow for the possibility that the law may have been instrumental in generating parameters of migrant 'illegality'. Still other researchers […] do identify crucial aspects of legal histories that result in the expansion or reconstitution of migrant 'illegality', only then to persist in treating 'illegal immigration' as a transparent and self-evident fact. There is, in short, an unfortunate taken-for-grantedness that bedevils much of this scholarship […]. In the best of cases […], the explanatory power of the work is dulled, and its critical potential is inhibited; in the worst scholars naturalize the category of 'illegality' (ibid.:431-432).

De Genova had already referred to this process of naturalisation, as well, in an earlier

passage:

[B]y constituting undocumented migrants (the people) as an epistemological and ethnographic 'object' of study, social scientists, however unwittingly, become agents in an aspect of the everyday production of those migrants' 'illegality' – in effect, accomplices to the discursive power of immigration law. […] Only by reflecting on the effects of sociolegal, historical contexts on research does it become possible to elaborate a critical anthropological perspective that is not complicit with the naturalization of migrant 'illegality' (ibid.:422-423).

In addition to these two passages regarding an effect that social science has on

migrant illegality, De Genova included a third that described a different effect of

scholarship. '[E]thnographic disclosure', he wrote,

can quite literally become a kind of surveillance, effectively complicit with if not altogether in the service of the state. […] In the case of undocumented migrants, the ethnographic documentation and exhibition of ['illegalized', in the author's terms] practices can have quite practical consequences (ibid.:422).

The author leaves these practical consequences unspecified.

In the first two passages, De Genova used the present indicative tense to indicate that *x* does *y*; or, that social scientists naturalise 'illegality'. In the third passage, he again used the present indicative to communicate that *x* can do *y*; or, that the former has resulted in the latter in the past, and that it will continue to do so in the future under certain, unspecified conditions.

For De Genova, then, the social science of undocumented migration facilitates the coercion of migrants that is an aspect of the social relation of illegality by naturalising this relation. These scholars do so by (a) presenting (to unspecified audiences) analyses that describe 'illegal immigrants' but not immigration laws, (b) representing the effects of laws on migrants as being unintentional, and (c) objectifying people as 'undocumented migrants'. He also stated that the communication of findings regarding the practices of people he identified as undocumented migrants has assisted states in 'practical' ways that he left unspecified and that it will continue to do so in the future, as well, under circumstances that he also left unspecified.

Black (2003) related studies on the movement of people he identified as migrants and asylum-seekers to their control by states. He wrote:

> Starting with a research agenda that asks 'How do migrants/asylum-seekers move when controls are so tight?' or 'How do human traffickers or smugglers manage to circumvent laws restricting movement?' risks that research on trafficking will simply seek knowledge that serves state interests in clamping down on 'illegal' migration, even if there might be some wider interest in some of the conclusions. Such is the case for work recently funded by the UK Home Office [not cited here by Black, but carried out by the author and his colleagues (Black et al.:2005)] to develop a survey of asylum-seekers coming to the UK, which would include information on how asylum-seekers' travel was financed and facilitated and the extent to which their movement was facilitated by smugglers. This survey was also expected to reveal information on geographical, occupational and educational backgrounds, patterns of movement and other factors (2003:45).

In this passage, Black identified a risk using the future indicative tense. The risk was (formulaically) that *x* 'will simply' do *y*. That *x* does *y* was presented as a certainty. Black's concern was that *x* will do *y*, alone, without having an additional effect. Here, *x* stands for the practice of producing knowledge that describes how people Black identified as migrants/asylum-seekers, human traffickers and smugglers evade migration controls; and *y* represents the serving of state interests in strengthening these controls. Therefore, Black's analysis was that the former does the latter, or, that studies describing how it is that people move serve state interests in controlling that movement.

In his conclusion, Black made the following observations:

> Of course, it could be argued that research on 'illegal' migration is not necessary or desirable at all. By revealing migrants' or asylum-seekers' strategies that lie outside defined legal limits, research might simply assist states in the process of controlling both individuals and groups and thus breach the accepted ethical guideline of doing no harm to those being researched (ibid.:49).

In this passage, Black again used a phrase that included 'simply'. Here, he produced a sentence with the following structure: *x* might simply do *y*. As with above, that *x* does *y* was presented as being a certainty. Black was indicating that *x* might also have other effects, as well. Thus, his analysis of the effect of studies that describe the mobility strategies 'that lie outside defined legal limits' of people he identified as migrants and asylum-seekers was that this research does them harm by assisting states in their migration control practices.

For Black, then, research that describes the sociological characteristics, strategies, and illegalized movement of people he identifies as migrants and asylum-seekers facilitates the control of such movement in ways he leaves unspecified. Thus, following his own logic, Black's Home Office-commissioned study, which he referred to but did not claim to be his own, facilitated state control measures that were

harmful to the human subjects of his research – people he identified as asylum-seekers.

Peutz (2006) related studies that show the rupture endured by people who are deported, their families and their communities to *both* (a) the reification of the category of the deported, *and* (b) resistance to the removal of the human subjects of such studies from academic and physical spaces. After describing one of De Genova's conclusions in his article summarized above as being that ethnographic writing about deportees 'mimick[s] and continu[es] the surveillance of already interrogated individuals and reif[ies] the category of the deported' (ibid.:219), Peutz stated, 'This critique *is* more than relevant to the subject of deportation and the deported' (ibid., emphasis added). 'From the perspective of the host state', she continued,

> the removal of 'illegal' or 'criminal aliens' and 'enemy combatants' or 'terrorists' brings a certain closure to their cases, allowing for a general lack of interest in what happens to them as soon as they are outside of its borders. A study that repudiates this easy closure by showing the continuing rupture endured by the deported, their families, and their communities *would* at the very least resist the removal of these individuals from academic spaces, if not from physical ones (ibid.:220, emphasis added).

Although Peutz's account of the effect of studies on the ways in which deportation is experienced by people who are deported appears to be contradictory at first glance (i.e., she accepts De Genova's conclusions but still advocates the study of people who are deported), a closer look at her use of grammar provides clarification. Peutz used the present indicative tense, which denotes fact, when stating that De Genova's critique *is* more than relevant. In doing so, she indicated that it is a fact that studies on the experiences of people who are deported *both* assist states in their deportation efforts by providing helpful surveillance *and* make 'the deported' into a real thing in the minds of an unspecified audience. Peutz used the future conditional tense when

describing the effect that these studies *would* have on what she called the removal of the studies' human subjects from (at least) 'academic' and (possibly) 'physical' spaces. In using this tense, Peutz indicated that this effect had not yet taken place and she left unspecified the circumstances under which it would indeed occur. There is, in fact, no contradiction in Peutz's account – only an ontological hierarchy of effects.

For Peutz, then, De Genova's critique *is* 'more than relevant' – i.e., his account of effect is not just appropriate to the matter at hand, but, indeed, accurate in the very matter under consideration. Studies of people's experiences of deportation facilitate it by *both* providing the state with surveillance it uses to further deportation *and* reifying the category of 'the deported'. These studies *would* have the effect of resisting physical deportation under unspecified circumstances, but this effect had not yet occurred at the time of Peutz's writing. Following Peutz's logic, her own study of the 'continuing rupture endured by' people she identified as Somali deportees facilitated their deportation.

Zetter (2007) related the labelling of people to their forcibly being kept at a distance. He made the following observations:

> [T]he [primarily bureaucratic] process of transforming the label 'refugee' [i.e., fractioning it into different categories of eligibility and entitlements] provides the impetus for the state to co-opt wider agency in its political agenda and reproduce social concerns as normalized policy and practice. Carriers' liability, fines for employers using asylum seekers or other 'illegal immigrants' debarred from working, fines for traffickers all exemplify the range of statutory provisions which extend the reach of the state beyond migrants to the citizenship as a whole. Simultaneously incorporating the wider community as agents of national immigration policies, whilst criminalizing our noncompliance, they further legitimize state agency in controlling immigration. We are all part of the political process of labelling (ibid.:185).

According to Zetter then, the bureaucratic fractioning of the label 'refugee' is the impetus for statutory provisions that bring all people – MARS academics included, presumably – into the labelling process. Furthermore, he claimed that the following was the case:

> In the past the label 'refugee' shed light on the often disturbing impact of altruism and charity presented as *humanitarian assistance*. Now labelling reveals a process of citizen *co-optation* in a wider, and possibly more pernicious, political project. In this way, the label is formed and reformed as part of a social compact between the state and its citizens so that we are all incorporated in the political project of making labels in convenient images, while keeping the refugees and other dispossessed people at a distance (ibid.:190, emphasis in original).

Here Zetter went beyond his earlier statement cited above to claim that 'we all' – which certainly included MARS academics – are not only part of the political process of labelling, but that it is through this participation – i.e., a compact between state and citizens – that 'we all' facilitate the social coercion of 'keeping the refugees and other dispossessed people at a distance'. He expressed both of these claims using the present indicative tense. How it is, exactly, that 'we all' – i.e., the people he identified as carriers, employers, and traffickers and those he did not, such as MARS academics – participate in this relation that was given impetus to by a bureaucratic process was left mostly undefined. Zetter identified the statutory means by which *some* people (i.e., 'carriers', 'employers', and 'traffickers') *might* be compelled to participate in the coercive project of keeping people at a distance, but did not provide evidence to demonstrate that this actually happened. Nor did he describe in significant detail how people other than the three types he identifies do so.

0.3.2. Summary and critique

In sum, the social scientific literature on the relationship between MARS and migration control shows that the former facilitates the latter by symbolic (naturalisation, reification, etc.) and technical (i.e., provision of useful surveillance on targets of control) means. This oeuvre is characterized, however, by a lack of detail. For example, none of the five authors (Malkki, Chimni, De Genova, Peutz, and Zetter) who found that MARS facilitated coercion via symbolic representation identified the audience(s) that received the messages. Also, not one of the three authors (De Genova, Black and Peutz) who found that MARS facilitated coercion by technical means described the process in any detail.

This literature succeeds, I think, in identifying at least two kinds of means by which MARS facilitated migration control. However, I find most of these accounts to be disappointingly vague. The actual processes by which the former and latter are said to be linked are not described in any detail. The state of the art of research on MARS and migration control is very similar to that which Marfleet (1973) described for research on the impact of anthropology on colonial rule prior to the publication of *Anthropology and the colonial encounter* (Asad et al. 1973). He wrote:

> The first argued response to the radical critics of [colonial] anthropology has come from Raymond Firth […]. […] Firth's reaction to the radical attack […] relies upon assertion rather than argument and example. So certainly do many of the articles to which he responds (1973:280).

I have shown that the literature on MARS and migration control likewise relies primarily upon assertion rather than on argument and example. In it there is an

absence akin to that which Ortner described as existing in anthropological studies of resistance – an 'ethnographic black hole' (1995:190), or that which academics commonly refer to as a 'blind spot'. This literature on MARS and migration control also has the characteristics of what Latour refers to as a bad textual account – i.e., one in which

> only a handful of actors will be designated as the causes of all the others, which will have no other function than to serve as a backdrop or relay for the flows of causal efficacy. They may go through the gestures to keep busy as characters, but they will be without a part in the plot, meaning they will not act. Nothing is translated from one to the other since action is simply carried through them. […] The report has not been produced in an ad hoc fashion to be *uniquely adequate* to the description of specific actors and for the eyes of specific readers. It is standard, anonymous, across the board; nothing happens in it (2005:130, emphasis in original).

One of the aims of my thesis is to follow the lead of Asad et al. (1973) in providing to the literature on MARS the ethnographic details that it currently lacks regarding the issue of the field's possible effect(s) on migration control. My more empirical argument that MARS facilitated migration control, which I describe in greater detail in the next section of my Introduction, is a well-grounded inference that surpasses the evidential standard of the existing literature. I support this argument in the first and second chapters of my thesis by using the approach of actor-network-theory (ANT).

Asad et al. provides me with not only this methodological lead to follow, but with one that is conceptual, as well. The authors of many of the book's chapters found that anthropology facilitated colonial rule in the same (i.e., symbolic and technical) ways that MARS has been shown to have done for migration control. But one of them also identified a means *not* found in the MARS and migration control literature that I reviewed above: pedagogical.

Faris found that the anthropologist S.F. Nadel was an enemy to the Nuba, his human research subjects, in two ways: 'He was serving an administration that not only physically attacked local societies, driving them from their homes, forcing migrations, imprisoning (and very frequently hanging) their men and women, and he was an apologist and defender of that system' (1973:160). According to Faris, colonial anthropologists 'only operated as they had been taught' (ibid.:162). Nadel's academic texts 'focused exactly where his application focused—on control and regulation' (ibid.:163). '[I]tems from his symbolic calculus became part of the everyday lexicon' and his 'critical elements in social structure [were] a part of the heritage' in Faris' graduate programme in anthropology (ibid.). 'And how could one dispute it?' Faris continued.

> It made such obviously good sense inasmuch as it appeared to describe well the situation in which we found ourselves. But good sense for *whom*? This was not the sort of question that was tolerated (or even considered) in my graduate student years (ibid., emphasis in original).

Thus, it was through the training of functionalist anthropologists that Nadel continued to facilitate colonial rule and played a role in 'creating, preserving, and implementing ideologies of oppression' (ibid.:170). In the first part of my thesis I answer not only the empirical question raised by the social scientific literature on MARS and migration control (Did the former indeed facilitate the latter by symbolic and technical means?), but also that suggested by Asad et al.: Did it do so by those that were pedagogical, as well?

0.4. Arguments, overall theoretical approach, and thesis organisation

My first argument concerns *that* and *how*. I argue *that* Malkki, Chimni, De Genova, Black, Peutz, and Zetter were right: MARS has indeed facilitated migration control by symbolic and technical means. I found that it also did so in a pedagogical way. I support this argument using actor-network-theory (ANT) because it is first and foremost an empirical approach well-suited to providing the '*how*' details that I showed to be lacking in the literature on MARS.

According to Latour, ANT is empirical. It 'should be able to reclaim an empirical grasp,' he wrote, 'since it travels wherever new associations go rather than stopping short at the limit of the former social' (2005:251). Rather than ending an analysis of the effect of one phenomenon on another by using well-worn sociological concepts such as naturalization, justification, or legitimisation – as do the authors surveyed above – a good ANT textual account instead goes beyond these limiting concepts in demonstrating precisely *how* it does so. In ANT,

> if any action has to be transported from one site to the next, you now clearly need a conduit and a vehicle. The full cost of every connection is now entirely payable. If a site wants to influence another site, it has to levy the means. […] Actors have become *accountable* (ibid.:174, emphasis in original).

A good ANT textual account, Latour wrote, '*traces a network*' (ibid.:128, emphasis in original). An example of the use of this approach is that by the anthropologist David Mosse (2005), which is a study of an academic field that is closely related to MARS – i.e., development studies. Mosse's monograph

takes a close look at the relationship between the aspirations of policy and the experience of development within the long chain of organisation that links advisers and decision makers in London with tribal villagers in western India. […] [I]t does not ask whether, but rather *how* development works. The approach is *ethnographic*; and this means examining the making and re-making of policy as well as the practices that policy legitimises as social processes (ibid.:2, emphases in original).

In Chapter One I describe – following Mosse – 'a long chain of organisation that links' people who engage in the direct physical coercion of others without British citizenship who attempt to enter into or exist within the UK with they who facilitate this control by other means. In Chapter Two I provide the best ANT textual account that I can of the role that MARS academics play in this actor network.

In addition to my more empirical argument regarding *that* and *how*, I make an additional one in this thesis that is more theoretical and concerning *why*. I provide interpretations of why it is that MARS facilitated migration control in the ways that it did. Before elaborating on this argument, I first describe how the literature surveyed above for MARS and migration control explained the field's facilitation of migration control. It did so consistently using Marxist social theory. However, the authors of these works did so mostly implicitly. Of these six surveyed authors, *only one* – i.e., De Genova – provided his audience with any details regarding the assumptions and genealogy of his theoretical framework.[7] The Marxist frameworks of these surveyed authors were as follows: three discursive, one structural, and two classical.

Three of the surveyed authors – Malkki, De Genova, and Peutz – explained the facilitation of migration control by MARS primarily in the same way that Said (1979) – building on Foucault – explained European scholarship on the Orient: a product or effect of a discourse. Malkki (1995) refers to refugee studies as a

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[7] (De Genova 2002:429)

'discursive domain' that has emerged as an effect of the international refugee regime. According to De Genova (and Peutz, in adopting his analysis), 'Migrant 'illegality' is produced as an effect of the law, but it is also sustained as an effect of a discursive formation' (2002:431). Furthermore, 'the social science scholarship of undocumented migration is itself often ensnared in this discursive formation' (ibid.:432).

Contrastingly, Zetter used Althusser's structural Marxism to explain the facilitation of migration control by MARS. Zetter's discussion of labelling[8] echoes Althusser's (1971) concept of ideological state apparatus. Zetter also utilizes Althusser's (1969) concept of the problematic, as in the following passage:

> Government immigration policies, notably across Europe, generate contradictory and conflicting political interpretations of the label [i.e., refugee]. The dominance of the refugee/asylum seeker *problématique* has tended to obscure the much larger challenge of international labour migration in an era of economic globalization (2007:186, emphasis in original).

Finally, two authors, Chimni and Black, explained the facilitation of migration control by MARS using the classical Marxist concepts of capital, ideology, and class interests.[9] In his article reviewed above, Chimni wrote:

> What I am propounding here is not a conspiracy theory, but first, the simple thesis that the thinking of international organizations is shaped by its more powerful members, especially if they control its financial lifeline. Second, that the dominant ideology tends to present itself as the common sense of the age and therefore often goes uncontested (1998:367).

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[8] See especially his discussion of the 'transformation' of 'labels' by 'bureaucratic processes which institutionalize and differentiate categories of eligibility and entitlements' (Zetter 2007:180).

[9] Malkki's framework included an element of classical Marxist analysis – i.e., capital provision – as well: 'Much social scientific research - whether resulting in policy recommendations, development reports, or academic articles - has been conducted in more or less formal connection with (and often funded by) these international organizations [i.e., the international refugee regime]' (1995:506).

Black's Marxist theoretical framework is evident in the following passage.

> As with emerging research on transnational migration more generally, there needs to be an acceptance that the issues and priorities for would-be refugees and asylum-seekers might not correspond with those of a primarily middleclass, elite and often white European research community, and that the claims of different migrant and refugee groups may themselves compete (2003:50).

The interpretation of why it is that MARS facilitated migration control that emerges from these passages is the following: the field's members were caught up in a discourse, problematic, or ideology that was an effect of the field's role within a wider, capitalist mode of production. This position was signalled by the field's financial dependency on governments and intergovernmental agencies.

0.4.1. Spectrum approach

My second, more theoretical thesis argument not only engages with these authors' Marxist explanations, but also proposes those that are more Weberian and Durkheimian in nature. I call this more inclusive interpretive strategy a spectrum approach. I get to grips with my research object of the relation between MARS and migration control by using an eclectic (D. Zeitlyn, pers. comm.) analytical procedure: I utilize equal parts of not only historical materialism, but also of symbolic interactionism and of structural functionalism. I consider the existential, political, and systemic dimensions of social life *ensemble*.

In the next section I make explicit the logic underlying *both* the distinction that I have made between my two main (more empirical and more theoretical) arguments *and* those among the approaches that I use to support my second (more theoretical)

argument in Chapters Three, Four, and Five. I begin by describing and critiquing the popular (among academics) dichotomous model for understanding social scientific approaches. Then I present archetypes for my alternative spectrum approach. Finally, I use this approach to make explicit the logic of the organisation of my thesis.

0.4.1.1. Dichotomous models

Of the three dichotomous models of social scientific enquiry that I have encountered, that which is proposed by Latour (2005) is described as having the most recent historical emergence. Latour writes that 'two widely different approaches have been taken' (ibid.:3) by social scientists to answer the questions of sociology. The antecedent approach he calls the sociology of the social (SOTS)[10]. The other he provides with the name of the sociology of associations (SOA)[11] – or, actor-network-theory (ibid.:9). Of his dichotomous model of social scientific enquiry, Latour wrote:

> I know this is very unfair to the many nuances of the social sciences I have thus lumped together, but this is acceptable for an introduction which has to be very precise on the unfamiliar arguments it chooses to describe as it sketches the well-known terrain (ibid.:9).

Turning to the historical emergence of the two approaches, Latour stated,

> [T]his distinction between two contrasted ways of understanding the duties of social science is nothing new. It was already in place at the very beginning of the discipline (at least in France) in the early [at the turn of the 20th century] dispute between the elder Gabriel Tarde and Emile Durkheim, the winner (ibid.:13).

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[10] My acronym.
[11] My acronym.

'Above all', wrote Latour of Tarde vis-à-vis 'his younger challenger' Durkheim, 'he considered the social as a circulating fluid that should be followed by new methods and not a specific type of organism' (ibid.).

In sum, the dichotomy posited for social scientific analysis by Latour is the following. On the one hand, there has been the empirical approach of Tarde. On the other, there has been the organic one of Durkheim. These 'widely different' and 'contrasted' approaches were established as early as the late 19th century, and the relations between their proponents have been antagonistic. Latour's dichotomous model of the social sciences has no place for 'the many nuances' that he claims to have 'lumped together' into one or the other approach.

The dichotomous model of social scientific analyses described by Harris (2007a) was said by the author to have emerged during a period that preceded the one to which Latour traces his model. Harris counterposed phenomenology and cognitivism and claimed that the two approaches to understanding knowledge were the current manifestations of the positions established by Vico (in the 18th century) and Descartes (in the 17th century), respectively (ibid.:20). 'On the one side', he wrote, 'lie the phenomenologists who argue that cognition and perception are social activities situated in the nexus of ongoing relations between the person and the world' (ibid.:20). 'On the other side', he continued, 'there are the cognitivists (the rationalists, we might say […]) who seek to understand what an individual needs to know to be culturally competent. Their focus is more on the 'what' rather than the 'how' of social life' (ibid.:21). Harris wrote that '[w]hile these rival positions may conceal other more nuanced arguments, the gulf between them is not only historic but continuing' (ibid.)

and went on to describe the book he was introducing (Harris 2007b) as being 'a continuation of the Vichian side of the debate' (Harris 2007a).

Harris wrote that the 'division' between Vico and Descartes 'has been transformed and reworked by many others, but its specific influence continues in the understanding of knowledge as shaped by the human mind whose nature is still much contested' (ibid.:20), citing Whitehouse's 2001 edited volume, *The debated mind: evolutionary psychology versus ethnography*. 'As Harvey Whitehouse (1999) [sic] shows', Harris continued, 'the debate is at the forefront of contemporary anthropology' (ibid.:21). I scrutinise these attributions that Harris made to Whitehouse below.

Harris' dichotomous model of social scientific approaches to understanding knowledge is the following: on one 'side' are Vico and phenomenology, on the other – Descartes and rationalism (or cognitivism). This 'division' is wide (i.e., a 'gulf') and the proponents of each approach are described as occupying 'rival positions'. Like Latour, Harris mentions approaches that do not fit neatly into this binary opposition using very similar terminology. For Latour, these are 'nuances of the social sciences'; Harris refers to 'more nuanced arguments'. But whereas Latour admits to marginalizing such approaches in his model, Harris blames the 'rival positions' for 'conceal[ing]' them.

The dichotomous model of social scientific approaches with the earliest historical emergence of the three that I discuss is that which was created by Graeber (2001). According to the author, social science approaches derive from one of two that emerged during the middle period of the first millennium B.C. 'Western philosophy,

after all', wrote Graeber, 'really begins with the quarrel between Heraclitus and Parmenides; a quarrel that Parmenides won' (ibid.:50). Heraclitus 'saw the apparent fixity of objects of ordinary perception as largely an illusion; their ultimate reality was one of constant flux and transformation' (ibid.). Contrastingly, Parmenides

> held that it was change that was illusion. For objects to be comprehensible, they must exist to some degree outside of time and change. There is a level of reality, perhaps one that we humans can never perceive, at which forms are fixed and perfect. From Parmenides, of course, one can trace a direct line both to Pythagoras (and thus to Western math and science) and to Plato (with his ideal forms), and hence to just about any subsequent school of Western Philosophy (ibid.).

However, according to Graeber, a 'Heraclitean strain has always existed – one that sees objects as processes, as defined by their potentials, and society as constituted primarily by actions. Its best-known manifestation is no doubt the dialectical tradition of Hegel and Marx' (ibid.:52). In sum, Graeber's dichotomous model of social science enquiry counterposes two lines (i.e., Heraclitean and Parmenidean), which emerged out of an original antagonism.

The dichotomous models of social science of Latour, Harris, and Graeber offer the potential user only two possibilities. Either an approach is one of the Tardian/Vichean/Heraclitean type or it belongs to that which is Durkheimian/Cartesian/Parmenidean. Those approaches – mentioned by both Latour and Harris, but not Graeber – that are not easily classified as belonging to one or the other type cannot be understood vis-à-vis other (i.e., classifiable) approaches using the dichotomous models of these authors. A more comprehensive model is therefore required, if we aim (as I do) to both understand the relatedness of all social scientific approaches and to explain the facilitation of migration control by MARS in the most

holistic way possible. The spectrum model of social science satisfies these requirements.

0.4.1.2. Archetypes for a spectrum model

Archetypes for my spectrum model come from the work of Whitehouse (2001), Ortner (2006), and Giddens (1971). Whitehouse's model for understanding a social scientific approach (i.e., cognitive anthropology) is continuous, *not* dichotomous, as described by Harris (see above). Whitehouse wrote that 'the so-called nature/nurture debate' is '[o]ne of the greatest controversies fuelling' what he judged to be the 'unproductive situation' in which social scientists and those in biology and cognitive science had been 'scornful of' and 'exasperated at' one another (2001:1). 'The debate which unfolds in this volume [that which was cited by Harris]', he continued,

> is rather more subtle. [...] At the 'nativist' end of the spectrum, some theorists [...] argue that the mind-brain is richly endowed with genetically specified mechanisms for the discrimination and processing of inputs. [...] At the other end of the spectrum, there are 'empiricists' who envisage the neonate as a *tabula rasa*, bombarded by a flux of inputs that can only be discriminated and conceptualized through experience and learning [...]. Between these two positions, cognitive science offers a vast array of competing perspectives, attributing varying degrees of importance to both genetic and environmental factors in relation to specific aspects of cognitive development (ibid.; emphasis in original).

What Harris presents as being a difference in kind, Whitehouse portrays as being one of degree. The former dichotomises social scientific enquiry, while the latter encourages the exploration of the many different kinds of approaches that may exist within it.

Ortner (2006) utilizes a continuous model for understanding the relatedness of different social scientific approaches, as well. According to her, one can understand the relatedness of the 'theorists' Williams, Foucault, and Scott by 'plac[ing] [them] along a spectrum that is defined by one of the central problematics of studies of power: the question of the pervasiveness or invasiveness of power' (ibid.:6). Furthermore, Ortner claims, 'The three founding practice theorists [i.e., Bourdieu, Giddens and Sahlins] can be interestingly seen to parallel the three positions [of Williams, Foucault, and Scott] on the spectrum of the psychological 'depth' of power' (ibid.:7). In sum, the same continuum can be used for understanding *not only* the intra-group relatedness of the founding practice theorists and those of power, *but also* the relatedness of all six of these scholars.

According to Giddens (1971), Marx, Weber, and Durkheim 'established the foundations of modern social thought' (ibid.:xvi) and their works 'are at the origins of modern social theory' (ibid.). He attempted to understand their relatedness *not* through 'two polar sorts of orthodoxy in terms of which the relationship between Marx's writings and those of' Weber and Durkheim 'is usually presented' (ibid.:243), but rather by 'formulat[ing] […] the leading themes in the writings of each author' (ibid.:xvi) to determine their similarities and differences. Giddens concluded that 'Marx's writings share a good deal more in common with those of Durkheim and Weber than was apparent to either of the latter two authors: […] the polemical foils of the three writers were the same' (ibid.:244).

Rather than classifying Marx, Weber, and Durkheim as belonging to one or the other type in a binary opposition, Giddens shows to what degree their writings differ

regarding a particular feature – i.e., the ways in which the authors explain the consequences of social differentiation in modern society. This strategy leaves open the possibility of understanding the approaches of the three social scientists using a spectrum model – i.e., positioning these approaches along a continuum according to how closely they approximated those of Vico/Heraclitus at one pole and Descartes/Parmenides at the other. I do so in the following section.

0.4.1.3. My spectrum model, in detail

I understand the relatedness of different social scientific approaches by placing these along a spectrum that is defined by epistemology and theme. At one pole are those that are most *empiricist* – i.e., following the 'doctrine […] that all elements of knowledge […] is derived from experience' (Colman 2009); *descriptive* – i.e., answering the question of 'How?'; and *existential* – i.e., studying 'human beings in their natural settings and in all their complexities, most importantly incorporating their brute bodies and feelings into the picture' (Scott & Marshall 2009a). At the other pole are those that are most *rationalist* – i.e., following the 'doctrine […] that it is possible to obtain knowledge by reason alone, that there is only one valid system of reasoning and it is deductive in character, and that everything is explicable in principle by this form of reasoning' (Colman 2009); *explanatory* – i.e., answering the question of 'Why?'; and *collectivist* – i.e., focussed on groups of people and/or the characteristics that are shared among the members of these collectives. I use the shorthand terms of *empiricist* and *rationalist* to represent these two poles. I am now in a position to use this model to demonstrate the relatedness of the different social scientific approaches I use in my thesis.

I have stated that I am making two arguments – one more empirical and the other more theoretical. I use the ANT approach in Chapters One and Two to support the former and utilise Weberian, Marxist, and Durkheimian approaches in Chapters Three, Four, and Five (respectively) to do so for the latter. The figure below displays this organisation visually using my spectrum model.

Figure 1: Spectrum approach

Argument:	More empirical	----------More theoretical--------------		
Chapter(s):	1 and 2	3	4	5
Approach:	ANT	Weberian	Marxian	Durkheimian
Pole:	Empiricist			Rationalist

Spectrum

This spectrum model is preferable to one that is dichotomous for both a general scholarly reason and also one that is specific to the existing literature on my research object. The former is that the spectrum model is less reductionist, and therefore better for use in comparison. It does not 'lump' – in Latour's terms – Whitehouse's 'vast array of competing perspectives' into one of two types. Also, it better enables me to make a scholarly contribution: to provide a more holistic understanding of the phenomenon of the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics than the exclusively Marxist one that is found in the existing literature on the subject. By conceptualising social scientific enquiry as a continuum I put myself in a position to exceed the holism of not only the theoretically monolithic existing literature on the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics, but also the popular dichotomous alternative.

In Chapters Three, Four, and Five, I support my more theoretical thesis argument that MARS academics facilitated migration because of a) *culture*, b) *power*, and c) *structure*. Here, I join up the empirical findings of my ANT analysis with these broad theoretical interpretations via the conceptual terrain of middle-range theory (Merton 1949). I use concepts that provide 'a logical link between relatively low-order empirical generalizations and comparatively high-order theories' (Raab and Goodyear 1984:257). Thus, in each of these latter chapters I explain the facilitation of migration control by MARS using a particular anthropological concept (culture, power, and structure) and from a specific theoretical perspective (i.e., belonging to one of the three in my spectrum approach).[12] I show that it was through the facilitation of UK migration control that the field's members a) answered their calling, b) assisted class rule as ideologists, and c) acted as part of a societal system and in accordance with their underlying mental structures. Now, having elaborated on my second, more theoretical thesis argument, explained my overall theoretical approach, and described the organisation of my thesis, I devote the remainder of this introductory chapter to a description of the methods that I used to gather information and present findings.

0.5. Methods

My spectrum interpretive approach requires a wide range of kinds of information, and therefore, a variety of information-gathering techniques. A symbolic interactionist interpretation that focuses on choice and meaning is facilitated by detailed observations on how informants behave in situations in which they must make

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[12] It is *not* an aim of my thesis to present an in-depth discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of any of the four primary or several more specific interpretive approaches that I utilize within it.

decisions and by records of informant exegesis, or self-reflection. Here, interview (primarily) and participant observation are needed. Notes made during the observation of people's behaviour in day-to-day activities and encounters – or, practice – also serve as part of the evidence base for an historical materialist interpretation. However, descriptions of the broader economic, social, and cultural context within which the community under study can be situated are vital here, as well. A functionalist interpretation makes use primarily of these contextual data. Here, archival research provides crucial information for analysis and interpretation. Thus, all three approaches require information gathered through interview, participant observation, and archival work, but in different proportions.

In the remainder of this thesis, I support my empirical and theoretical arguments by providing evidence that I gathered using a variety of techniques over a period of nearly six years. This sub-section provides a general description of my information-gathering and analytical research methods and my approach to the presentation of data. I present more detailed accounts of my methods while discussing my research findings in later chapters.

0.5.1. Information-gathering methods

In this subsection I discuss my access to informants and the techniques that I used to gather information, describe the temporal phases of my research, and summarize the materials from which I selected information that would become the findings of my thesis.

0.5.1.1. Access and techniques

I attempted to gain access to informants through both direct requests to individuals and more circuitous institutional avenues. I attempted to recruit respondents during face-to-face encounters and via email. I provided two documents for potential respondents: a description of my research project, which included my statement of ethics, and a consent form (Appendix 0, Item 1 and Appendix 0, Item 2).[13] Responses to my formal, written requests for permission and support for my research from academic MARS centres ranged from refusal, to indifference, to facilitation. My access to students and staff in Oxford were facilitated, in general, by my membership of the University of Oxford, my residence in the city, and by the facilitation of my work by one of the University of Oxford's research centres. At the other extreme, I succeeded in interviewing only a handful of students at a research centre at the University of Sussex, where a 'gatekeeper' responded to my request for help with hostility.

I gathered information through participant observation, interviews, archival work, and formal requests for data from institutions. I lived with MARS students in college housing and interacted socially with both MARS students and staff on an almost daily basis. I attended lectures, seminars, tutorials, formal meetings, and informal gatherings of students and staff as a participant observer. I recorded the proceedings of many of these events with a digital audio recorder. I made handwritten notes at nearly all of them. When I judged that it was not possible to do so at the events, I wrote down my recollections as soon as I could once I was alone. I took digital

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[13] Items in appendices are identified from this point forward by appendix number and item number – i.e., 0.1 and 0.2.

photographs of my surroundings and gathered objects such as flyers, as well, *en route*
to these events.

I interviewed my informants in a wide range of settings. We met in pubs, cafés, their
offices, their homes, in public areas of universities, and at my office. Nearly all of
these interviews lasted at least an hour and took place out of earshot of my
informants' institutional colleagues. I asked nearly all of my interviewees if I could
make an audio recording of our discussion, and almost all of them agreed. In a few
cases I recorded information during the interview only in the form of handwritten
notes. As with my participant observation, I often recorded information *ex post facto*
in my field notes.

In most interviews I asked my interviewees to tell me how they came to be MARS
academics. I requested that they describe the interaction that they and their colleagues
had engaged in (if any, at all) with state agencies. I asked what they thought of their
interaction and that of MARS academics, in general. I also asked if they thought that
there should be interaction between universities and state agencies, and if so, what its
nature should be. Interviews tended to be semi-structured.

I also collected information from published sources. Online resources that I mined
included the websites of state agencies, academic MARS research centres, and
universities. A final way in which I collected the data upon which I base my thesis
argument was through requests to universities for financial records and student
enrolment information under the Freedom of Information Act. These were very time-
consuming but mostly productive efforts. On a number of occasions, when the

response did not provide me with the information I requested, I proceeded to file requests for administrative reviews by the universities in question.

The approach I took to gathering information has much in common with that which Gusterson calls 'polymorphous engagement' (1997). It has been my experience that access to research subjects becomes more difficult when one begins 'studying up' in terms of social status; it has been more challenging for me to get access to MARS students and faculty than it was for me to do the same during a past project with people in a relatively poor neighbourhood in a small city in Nicaragua. Gusterson proposes polymorphous engagement as a research strategy for coping with what he calls the 'Roger and Me syndrome in ethnography' of difficulty of gaining access to doing participant observation with relatively elite actors.

In describing his approach to fieldwork in one of his projects on elites, Gusterson writes that, in addition to participant observation, his '[p]olymorphous engagement also involved an eclectic mix of other research techniques: formal interviews of the kind often done by journalists and political scientists; extensive reading of newspapers and official documents, and careful attention to popular culture' (ibid.:116). My thesis exemplifies this eclectic approach. Chapters One and Two are based primarily on official documents. Chapter Three relies on interviews and participant observation. Chapter Four includes newspapers, official documents, and 'popular culture'. Chapter Five synthesizes information from all of these kinds of sources.

0.5.1.2. Temporal phases

The information-gathering process for my thesis can be divided into three temporal phases. The first was the period from the autumn of 2003 – the beginning of my DPhil – until the summer of 2005. Early in this period, I collected information unsystematically and unselfconsciously as a MARS student at the University of Oxford. The second phase of my research began with official departmental approval of my project in the autumn of 2005. From then until the end of the spring of 2007 I systematically gathered information through participant observation, interviews, and the review of published sources. The majority of my fieldwork took place at the University of Oxford, but I also attended a series of lectures at another university and conferences at several others. The third phase of my thesis research began in the summer of 2007 and lasted until the spring of 2008. I conducted interviews primarily with MARS students at the universities of East London, Sussex, and Kent and I continued to gather information from published sources. It was also during this phase that I collected data via Freedom of Information Act requests.

0.5.1.3. Summary of materials

My information-gathering activities generated, of course, a large amount of material in both digital and paper forms, and can be classified as belonging to one of four classes. One is written and audio recordings from participant observation and interviews. In addition to the field notes that I wrote after the many, many hours that I spent interacting with MARS students and staff in domestic and public (i.e., pub, café) settings in Oxford, I produced written and audio recordings during my

participant observation at over 150 academic events, such as conferences, workshops, seminars, and lectures both in Oxford and in other locations in the UK. I also produced 54 written and audio recordings of interviews with students and staff in MARS and other, closely related fields, as well as employees of UK state agencies. Appendix 0.3 contains a table that displays the number of recordings that I have from interviews with a wide range of informants.

A second class of materials that I gathered is digital photographs, digital scans of documents that I found posted in academic settings, and paper objects that I collected such as promotional materials, newspapers, and magazines. I have gathered many dozens of examples of this type of material. The third class of materials that I compiled is published materials, including websites, event reports, and academic literature. A final class of material that I have gathered is the responses that I received to my FOIA requests for financial data and student records from 13 MARS research centres at 11 universities.

The majority of the materials that form the empirical base of my thesis were thus produced in Oxford through my interaction with students and staff at its University of Oxford. This information is supplemented by that which I have gathered during interviews with MARS staff and students at other UK universities and at events that were attended by MARS academics from a wide range of MARS academic centres and dozens of UK universities. Thus, the empirical base of my thesis is thicker for the University of Oxford, but it extends with varying degrees of thickness under its research object of the entire academic field of MARS in the UK.

0.5.2. Analytical methods

The analysis was mostly qualitative: I judged the relevance of material on the basis of its semiotic utility (i.e., Did it help me to understand some aspect of the questions I was asking?). In addition, my thesis contains passages in which I apply this interpretive or, hermeneutic approach to analysis of my informants' behaviour and of the material and socio-cultural environment that they inhabited. I also analysed my materials using quantitative methods: I searched for patterning in the information that I had gathered regarding MARS faculty publications, state agency commissions, MARS centre income, and MARS student enrolment. The analytical methods that I employ in this thesis therefore range from hermeneutics to statistics. This variety enables me to support my theoretical argument on the utility of interpreting academic MARS in the UK with an equally wide spectrum of theoretical approaches, based as they are, on different kinds of information.

0.5.3. Presentation of findings

This final section of my introduction deals with the ways in which I present my findings in this thesis. I discuss two issues: how I identify MARS academics and how I quote my informants. Both of these characteristics of my thesis are heavily conditioned by the approach that I take to the anonymity of the people whom I have studied.

I gathered much of the information that I present, analyse, and interpret in this thesis from people who had read a letter describing my project and code of ethics and had

signed a consent form agreeing to allow me to either interview or observe them as a participant in their activities. I guaranteed these informants that I would not 'name you as the author of any statements or actor responsible for any actions' that I recorded in interaction with them and might use in my future writing. I also promised them verbally that I would do my absolute best to anonymize in my writing any of the material that I collected with them. In this thesis I have kept these promises to the best of my ability and, when in doubt, have tended to err on the side of caution regarding the identities of my informants. While I am obliged to anonymize my writing by the commitments that I made to informants in these cases, in others the choice not to name them is voluntary.

It became clear to me that including the names of MARS academics in my descriptions of their interaction with state agencies in my thesis – even when these were in the public domain – ran the risk of encouraging my readers to perceive such inclusion as an unprofessional and personal attack. I received an angry email from a prominent MARS academic at the University of Oxford, in which this person stated:

> You did not have the courtesy to send me, or discuss with me, a highly tendentious paper you delivered in [a particular location] which made unprofessional ad hominem accusations about my (and other colleagues') work.

The paper this person referred to (Hatton n.d.) accused no one. It described the work that MARS academics – whom I named – had done as members and commissioned researchers of a body established by the UK Home Office (described in Chapter Two). It is to avoid encouraging an accusation of my thesis such as the one above that I have chosen to depersonalise as much as possible what some audiences perceive as an unflattering account of the academic field of MARS in the UK.

In order to anonymize the part of my research findings for which I am obliged to do so, I have tended to identify individuals in the thesis using pseudonyms and either masculine or feminine gender on a random basis. Often, I further identify these individuals by status (student or staff) and institutional affiliation (research centre and/or university), and have identified some students on the basis of their degree course, as well. I have depersonalised my account by identifying people whose behaviour I am not obliged to anonymise on the basis of their institutional affiliation and rank. It will be possible, therefore, for some readers of this thesis to identify individuals and associate them with particular activities by using their existing knowledge of the people in the field and/or by performing a simple search of the internet. In most cases, this possibility of identification results from my presentation of information that comes from publicly available published sources (i.e., state agency and university or research centre websites, academic literature). The manner in which I quote my informants is also conditioned by my obligations of anonymity. Many of the direct quotations that I present in this thesis include bracketed words or phrases accompanied by an asterisk. These are the result of my substitution of more general information for that which I judge to be likely to identify my informants to readers.

These direct quotations and those for which I have not made such substitutions are, of course, products of a process of inscription that began with the interview or participant observation event itself. Following Duranti (1997), I have both selected and simplified. I have chosen to include mostly utterances alone (i.e., content and tone) in direct quotations, leaving out, for example, hand gestures. I have also edited out utterances such as 'um', 'uh', 'er', and repetitions. In addition to selection, I have

also simplified the materials I recorded. I represent my informants' utterances using mainly standard English orthography and descriptions such as [laughs]. I indicate short pauses in speech with a comma and longer ones with ellipses. The aim of my selection and simplification has been to present an account that is intelligible to a general anthropological and social scientific audience, rather than to the particular sub-fields of linguistic anthropology and socio-linguistics. I have done as Duranti recommends for transcription: 'What is important is to follow a criterion that is consistent with our priorities and that can be understood by our readers' (ibid.:142).

In sum, I have chosen to privilege the imperatives of readability and anonymity over that of ethnographic detail. I have sacrificed descriptive detail and the ability of my audience to carry out conversation analyses of my findings in order to make the quotations more readable for my audience and meet my obligations to my informants.

1. MARS and migration control

This chapter defines the objects of my more empirical argument, MARS and migration control. In it, I communicate as clearly as possible what it is that I mean when I use the terms. One of my aims in doing so is to enable my audience to have a good idea of the size and demographic composition of the community under study and therefore be able to judge the representativeness of my findings. In addition to describing some of my empirical findings, Chapter One also introduces a model for understanding migration control that I will refer to – along with these data on MARS – in subsequent chapters in which I support my more empirical (i.e., Chapter Two) and interpretive (i.e., Chapters Three, Four, and Five) arguments. I discuss MARS and migration control in two main sections, beginning with the former and ending with the latter.

1.1. MARS

My exposition on MARS has three sub-sections. First I discuss the notions of community and identity and the lack of isomorphism between my construction of MARS and the forms of academic belonging reported by my informants. Second, I provide an historical narrative of the growth of the field that includes a description of its centres, journals, courses, and associations. That which I offer for the field's courses is especially detailed, giving the number of enrolments and the sex/gender and nationality/country of origin that pertained to many of these. Third, I summarise my findings on these characteristics of the field and identify patterns in these data.

1.1.1. The community of MARS and the academic identities of its members

I identify as MARS academics those people who are students and faculty in universities in UK 'territory' *and* who also do one or more of the following: 1) address the themes of migration, forced migration, and refugees, or those of immigration, transnationalism, diaspora, and integration; 2) belong to research centres that specialize in these themes; 3) enrol in or teach on one of a number of postgraduate courses that has one of these themes; 4) publish in journals dedicated to these themes; and 5) belong to one of a limited number of professional associations.

My informants, however, identified themselves academically in other terms. The people I identify as MARS academics saw themselves academically mostly in one of three ways. They said (or wrote) that they belonged to 1) migration, forced migration, or refugee studies; 2) *both* one (or more) of these three fields *and* a discipline such as anthropology or sociology; or 3) *only* a discipline, *not* one of the three fields. I discuss the dissimilarity between these modes of identity self-ascription and my ascription of identity to (and objectification of) this community following a brief description of these three modes.

First, there was general agreement among the human subjects of my research who reported to me or others that they saw themselves as belonging to migration, forced migration, or refugee studies that they did so on the basis of the kinds of phenomena that they studied. Migration studies academics studied the process by which people moved voluntarily – i.e., primarily for economic reasons – between states. Academics in the fields of forced migration studies and refugee studies shared a focus on

involuntary movement, but the latter tended to limit their research to people who were

fleeing persecution. This 'textbook definition' vision of co-existing, bounded and

fixed professional identities that was shared to a considerable degree by the people

whom I studied is clear in the following statement that was made to me during an

interview by Dr Charriere, a faculty member in a centre concerned explicitly with

people identified as refugees. He said,

> Now, to write focussed pieces of academic work which are located within the
> migration studies field, and, you know, adjacent to the refugee studies field,
> without thinking about these things, these developments, as having an
> experiential dimension, I think is pretty alarming, at this point.

However, these identities were also portrayed as being malleable. For example,

Harrell-Bond and Voutira observed that, 'Today the field of refugee studies is being

gradually subsumed under migration studies' (2007:283). In another example of this

kind of depiction, MARS identities were described in such a way as to indicate their

flexibility. Roberta, a faculty member at Oxford's RSC, told me during our interview

that 'the world is awash with funding for migration studies. And it's really drying up

for refugee studies'. Her response – what she called her 'subjective observations' – to

my question of whether or not people were 'crossing over' or 'following the money'

from refugee studies to migration studies was the following:

> Under [the former director]'s leadership and directorship here, I think he saw
> the writing on the wall quite early on. And he was he was well positioned to
> do that. You know, he was a migration expert. And that was his interest. He
> already had his eye on that. So he seemed to be directing the RSC at a time
> when it made sense to move in that direction. […] So, under [the former
> director] there was definitely a pressure from him to go in that direction, and
> to see forced migration as a kind of subset of migration. Which, a couple of
> the sort of old guard felt quite threatening. Because there's still a sense within
> people who study refugees that refugees are not migrants. And there's a little
> bit of a sense among certain people within here that you know, that we'll be

kind of diluting ourselves within the broader migration field if we follow the migration route.

And my guess is that... it's still early days, so we don't really know, but with [a different person] coming in as director, he might change... shift the direction of the centre a little bit from the path that [the former director] had set it on. And retreat and kind of revisit the question of what is a refugee studies centre and how should we exist in relation to this growing field of migration studies. Because I think it is threatening, in a way. You know, there's a finite amount of money going around. Everybody's competing for the money. Everyone has to make their case. So my guess is that it's gonna... that the RSC is going to be examining, or situating itself in such a way that it looks different from the average migration studies centre. Or that it does something a little bit different, you know. If we could weather the storm of migration studies, I suppose, that might, you know, that might ensure the sustainability of the centre more than if we... if we just follow the money and follow the fashions... the intellectual fashions.

In her response to my question, Roberta indicated that the MARS identities were not fixed according to the academic subject matter, but rather that individuals and organisations could choose a public identity from a range of options on the basis of a judgement concerning which one would give the person or collective a competitive advantage in acquiring scarce resources.

Second, it was not uncommon for my interviewees to tell me that they saw themselves academically in terms of *both* a disciplinary identity *and* one of the MARS identities. The MARS fields were almost universally said to *not* be disciplines. The multi- and/or inter-disciplinary character of these fields was a commonly discussed topic at conferences and seminars and also features prominently in the literature of the fields (i.e., Brettell and Hollifield 2000, 2008; Voutira and Doná 2007). Several of my informants indicated to me that they had joined MARS centres only to carry out the work that they saw as being that of their disciplines. They saw their MARS identity as a means to an end.

Third, some of the people whom I identify as MARS academics saw themselves academically only as belonging to a discipline and not to one of the three MARS fields. Such was the case with Joan, a faculty member at Oxford University to whom I ascribe MARS academic identity on the basis of the content of her research and teaching, who told me the following narrative:

> I left refugee studies. I started off when I came to Oxford as being part of refugee studies. But I didn't like the way refugee studies was going. I didn't like the policy bit. Not that I'm against influencing policy. But it was almost… policy was prescribing [laughs] almost the sort of research that should be done [laughs] you know. […] Because I'd gone into refugee studies probably out of a commitment to an interest in wanting to understand the predicament of refugees. I felt that there were a lot of people who were in it for the money, basically. It had become like… it had become an industry in a way that I wasn't comfortable with. And yeah, I just backed off, really. So I'm not… I wouldn't say I'm a refugee studies person now.

Although my informants did not identify themselves academically as belonging to MARS, those to whom I presented my research findings while identifying them as such on many occasions *did not* object to being identified in this way or challenge the basis for the objectification of MARS.

The preceding discussion of MARS academic identity self-ascription has described processes that echo Barth's (1969) view of identity – in his case, ethnic – as being not primordial, but rather a dynamic creation of social interaction. I ascribe the identity of MARS to my informants for heuristic and rhetorical purposes mainly on the basis of social interaction, as well. In the next sub-section, I justify this ascription and my objectification of MARS as a social and territorial community by following Gupta and Ferguson's Barthian directive to 'examine how it was formed *as a community* out of the interconnected space that always already existed' (Gupta and Ferguson 1992:8, emphasis in original). The dissimilarity between the self-ascription of academic

identity of my informants and my ascription to them of one of MARS is thus treated here not as a problem to be solved, but rather as an expected outcome of different actors identifying groups on the basis of differing criteria for membership. The criteria I use for membership in MARS (i.e., interaction through particular academic centres, courses, journals, and professional associations) are present in the historical narrative of its emergence and development that I present immediately below.

1.1.2. A history of MARS

Existing descriptions of the MARS sub-fields of refugee (Black 2001; Skran and Daughtry 2007; the articles in the June 2007 Special Issue of *Journal of refugee studies*) and migration studies (Black 2003; Favell 2003a; ICAR n.d.; the chapters in Brettell and Hollifield 2000 and 2008) are inadequate for presenting a history of the community of MARS, as I have defined it. These analyses provide only some data that help to do so somewhat for my criteria of research centres, journals, and associations, and include little or no information regarding degree programmes. Below, I describe the organisation of MARS through an institutional history of the field using information that I gathered primarily through archival work (i.e., FOIA requests and a survey of materials published online). I tell of the research centres, degree programmes, journals, and other associations related to the themes of migration, forced migration, and refugees (and the related others that I listed above) in universities in the UK. This narrative serves as an historical context for the people, institutions, publications, and events that I describe in the remainder of this thesis.

For centres, I describe the institutional location and the number of members therein. For degree courses, I chronicle the number of enrolments and present these figures according to universities' bureaucratic categories of sex or gender and country of origin or nationality. For journals, I identify the institutions within which these are based and identify personnel. For associations, I do the same and also provide details regarding these organisations' activities. I have endeavoured to ensure that inconsistencies in my presentation of data are the effects exclusively of the availability of information – i.e., whether or not I was able to acquire it and/or the format in which it was provided to me – and not of my own error or lack of effort in acquisition. My account is as explicit as possible regarding the chronology of the data I present (i.e., precisely to which time period it is that data refer).

I describe the development of the academic field of MARS as being composed of three distinct phases: 'Beginnings', pre-1997; 'MARS rises', 1997-2002; and 'The age of migration (studies)', 2003-present. For 'Beginnings' and 'MARS rises', I recount the founding of academic research centres, degree courses, journals, and associations. Then, for 'The age of migration (studies)', I change the structure of my narrative from one based on feature (i.e., degree course) to one based on year. I do so because the increased level of activity during this period enables a year-by-year analysis that has, in general, at least one example for centres, courses, journals and associations; the lower level of activity in the first two phases required a 'period' rather than annual approach for greater readability.

1.1.2.1. Beginnings (pre-1997)

Four MARS academic research institutes, one journal, and a professional association – but no degree programmes – were established before 1997. I contend that the community of MARS first emerged in 1982. It was in this year that the Refugee Studies Programme (RSP – later to become Refugee Studies Centre) was established in the Department of International Development at the University of Oxford. 1982 is later than the starting dates that have been suggested for refugee studies by Black (2001:59) – i.e., the publication of *International Migration Review*'s 1981 volume; Skran and Daughtry (2007:15) – i.e., the production of research by academics during and immediately following the First World War on refugee movements during that era; and Adelman and McGrath (2007:380) – i.e., the mid-20th century work of Hannah Arendt. My contention is supported by Harrell-Bond and Voutira's observation that

> [i]t was only when an academic institutional base became available [at Oxford's RSP and at York and Michigan State Universities in North America] that a concerted effort to bring such disparate literature [i.e., 'studies of refugees throughout the twentieth century'] together as the basis for developing the multi-disciplinary field of refugee studies could begin (2007:283).

This beginning of a community-building process was not only that for the field of refugee studies, but also for MARS. Thus it was in 1982 when the first of my defining criteria for MARS – research centres in universities located in the UK – was met. Three additional MARS centres were established between 1982 and 1996. University College, London's Migration Research Unit was founded in 1988. The Migration Unit

was created in 1992 at the University of Wales, Swansea,[14] and the Centre for Study of Migration was founded in 1995 at Queen Mary, University of London.

Only one MARS journal was founded during this first stage of the community's development: the *Journal of refugee studies* at Oxford's RSP in 1987. A MARS professional association was established pre-1997, as well. Barbara Harrell-Bond, the founder and former director of the RSP, described at a conference in Cairo in 2008 (Forced Migration Online n.d.) the origins of this association of scholars.

She stated that she and Roger Zetter – then editor of the *Journal of Refugee Studies* – decided to start the International Research and Advisory Panel (IRAP), in order to 'bring together scholars from all over the world to advise the journal on its contents and to take ownership of the journal'. Vaughan Robinson's report on the first – i.e., 1990 – IRAP meeting states that the objectives of the meeting were to have the invitees provide advice for both the *Journal*'s editor and for the RSP (1990:3). 'The real business of the meeting, however, was to discuss the formation of an independent and international think-tank on refugee policy and practice' (ibid.). This then-not-yet-in-existence institution was imagined as being

> an International Advisory Panel made up of national representatives funded by their respective governments, heads of other centres specializing in the study of forced migration and linked to the RSP, and individual researchers renowned for their excellence in the field (ibid.).

After stating cynically (according to the author, himself) that the participants at the meeting assumed that 'governments and agencies' both desired and acted in

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[14] Founding date listed in archived documents on Swansea University's internal website search engine (University of Swansea n.d.a).

consideration of their findings and advice, Robinson reported that participants at one of the meeting's sessions 'discussed proposals to invite decision-makers to future IRAP meetings in order to lobby and challenge them' (ibid.:11).

Harrell-Bond recalled IRAP growing in attendance from sixty people at its first meeting in 1990 to about two hundred at its last meeting in 1994. She said it was run 'from' the RSP until a decision was made at an RSP 'strategic planning meeting' that the programme would 'divest itself' of the Panel. It was duly 'handed over to the association' at its 1994 meeting and the first 'independent' meeting of what was then renamed the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration (IASFM) took place in 1996.

1.1.2.2. MARS rises (1997-2002)

During this period, three academic research centres and seven degree courses (at five universities) were established, two new journals were published, and one existing periodical had its name and academic home changed. There was also a change in the status of a professional association.

Two centres were established in 1997 and one in 2001. One of those from 1997 was Oxford's Transnational Communities Programme (TNCP). It was located at the university's Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology (ISCA) and was run by its director and an administrator. The other centre established in 1997 was the (University of) Sussex Centre for Migration Research (SCMR). The SCMR reported having the following personnel in its 2004 Annual Report: two 'Co-Directors', 25

'Faculty', seven 'Research Fellows', four 'Research Officers', four 'MARTI Fellows', five 'Administrative Staff', two 'Visiting Research Fellows', and 33 'Doctoral students', for a total of 82 people. In the autumn of 2008, the centre reported having 27 'Academic Staff' (including two 'Co-Directors'), 19 'Research Fellows', 21 'Research Students', and 18 others, for a total of 85 people (SCMR n.d.). In 2001 the Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees (ICAR) was created at the School of Social Science and Public Policy of King's College, London. I provide details regarding its personnel below as part of my discussion of 'The age of migration (studies)'.

Postgraduate degrees in refugee studies and forced migration studies first appeared during 'MARS rises' – first, in 1997 as an MA in refugee studies at UEL. The university's records show that there were 142 enrolments in the course during the five academic years between 2003/04 and 2007/08 (continuing students for 2003/04 plus new students for that year through 2007/08). 70 percent were listed as female, 30 male. The global region of origin listed for 85 percent of the enrolments was Europe, with none of the others (i.e., Africa, Americas, Asia, Australia and Oceania, and Other) exceeding five percent. Appendix 1.1 contains a table displaying data for region of origin.

The MSc in Forced Migration was founded at Oxford in 1998. The one-year course had a total number of 119 enrolments for the 03/04 – 07/08 academic years, according to university records. Just over 80 percent were listed as female. Due to the way in which the university responded to my FOIA request for student records, I am unable to disaggregate the country of origin of enrolments in the Forced Migration course

from that of those in its MPhil in Migration Studies, which I discuss below. However, my extensive fieldwork exposure to both courses during this time period have left me with the impression that the courses have very similar country of origin profiles. Of the 141 new enrolments reported for these two courses (of which only twenty-two correspond with the Migration Studies MPhil), 44 are listed as U.S.A. and 26 as U.K. Nine are Canada, six Germany, and four each are listed for Brazil and Japan. The countries of origin with three or fewer new enrolments are displayed in a table in Appendix 1.2.

1998 was also the first year in which the University of Manchester offered its MA in Cultures of Migration, Diaspora, and Exile. There were as many as five, but perhaps as few as three enrolments on the course between the 2003/04 and 2007/08 academic years. Only three nationalities – United Kingdom, British, and Austria – are reported for the enrolments.

Sussex first offered its MA and DPhil courses in Migration Studies in 1999, and then added its MSc in Social Research Methods (Migration Studies) in 2002. The university reported a total number of seventy-seven new enrolments in the MA Migration Studies course from the 2003/04 through the 2007/08 academic years. Just over 80 percent were listed as female. The nationalities that are listed for the enrolments (only twenty-eight) are distributed as follows, in descending order: British (eight); Japanese (six); Italian (three); German and Spanish (two each); and Canadian, French, Icelandic, Irish, Mexican, Salvadoran, and South Korean (one each). The university reported a total number of 32 new enrolments in the DPhil Migration Studies course during these same academic years. Almost 90 percent were listed as

female. The nationalities that are listed for the enrolments (28) are distributed as follow, in descending order: British (seven); Dutch and German (four each); Albanian and Spanish (two each); Irish, Finnish, Italian, Romanian, Maltese, Ghanaian, Indian, Bangladeshi, and Japanese (one each). For the MSc in Social Research Methods (Migration Studies), founded in 2002, the university reported a total number of 16 enrolments. Just over 80 percent were listed as female. The domiciles (nationality is not listed for any) listed for the enrolments – all 16 – were England (13) and Germany (three).

Queen Mary, London's MA in Migration was also first offered in 2002. The university reported a total of 25 new enrolments in the course from the 2003/04 through the 2007/08 academic years. Just under 90 percent were listed as having female gender. The nationalities that are listed for the enrolments are distributed as follows, in descending order: United Kingdom (11); Finland and Japan (two each); Eire, France, Sweden, Italy, Slovakia, Greece, Mauritius, India, Thailand, and Australia (one each).

In 1998, a new journal was introduced and another had its name and academic base changed. *Forced migration review*, produced by Oxford's RSC, grew out of an existing newsletter when it received support from the Norwegian Refugee Council. *New community* was renamed *Journal of ethnic and migration studies* when its site of production was moved from the University of Warwick to the SCMR. Three years later, in 2001, a new MARS journal was introduced: *Global networks* at Oxford's TNCP.

According to a brief history of the association that was included in one of its newsletters, the IASFM saw two 'landmarks' during the 'MARS rises' period: 'formal registration as a legal entity' near the beginning of the period (1998) and the creation of its Secretariat (at Oxford's RSC in 2002 [IASFM n.d.]) (IASFM 2004:2). Having described the first two periods of the field's development, I now turn to MARS in its third and current period of growth.

1.2.2.3. The age of migration (studies) (2003-present)

During this period, six new MARS centres were established and two existing institutes were transformed considerably. 14 different degree courses at eight universities were offered for the first time or planned to be offered the following year during the autumn of 2008. One MARS journal was founded and three MARS professional associations were begun.

2003

In 2003 two new MARS centres were opened, two degree courses at two universities were offered for the first time, and an association of researchers formed. One of these new centres was the Centre on Migration, Policy, and Society (COMPAS), which was created within the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology at the University of Oxford. Its director and administrator had formerly been the personnel of the TNCP, which ended the same year. The five-year report published by COMPAS in 2008 lists 21 people as 'Current Staff', and 66 individuals are listed as having been part of the centre as 'Staff' or 'Associates' (COMPAS 2008:19).

Another new MARS academic centre that was established in 2003 was the Centre on Race, Ethnicity, and Migration (CREM), part of the Department of Sociology at City University. The centre was described to me by a member of its staff as being a 'letterhead centre' and as being a way for scholars already employed as lecturers within the Department to pool their resources and to search collectively for external funding. Four faculty members were listed on the centre's website in early 2010 (City University n.d.).

One of the two new degree courses to be offered in 2003 was the MA in Migration, Mental Health, and Social Care at the University of Kent. Student records obtained from the university show that by the 2007-08 academic year, 22 students had enrolled in the course. Five were men, seventeen women. 15 were listed as having British nationality. The remaining seven were listed as Nigerian, Ethiopian, Somalian, Rwandan, American, Mexican, and Greek.

The other new course for 2003 was the MA in Migration and Diaspora Studies, offered by the Department of Anthropology and Sociology at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) of the University of London. Student records obtained from the university show that by the 2007-2008 academic year, 50 students had enrolled in the course. 11 were men, thirty-nine women. 21 of the students – nearly half – are listed as having British nationality. Six are U.S.A., five France, and three Italy. Two each are listed as Canada, Netherlands, Japan, and Singapore. One enrolment is listed for each of Greece, Ireland, Jamaica, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland. One is unspecified.

The first meeting of a new MARS professional association – the Forced Migration Student Conference (FMSC) – was held in 2003 at the University of Oxford. The Conference programme begins with the following:

> In response to the growing number of students working in the field of Forced Migration, this conference represents a first effort in creating a forum for current students to share their research and experience with their peers. Students from universities throughout the UK have come together to drive this initiative, which we hope will become an annual fixture in Forced Migration studies (University of Warwick n.d.a).

The Conference website states that the event was implemented 'through a partnership between the Refugee Studies Centre (Oxford), University of Warwick-CRER, ICAR, University of East London and UNHCR' (University of Warwick n.d.b). The founders' hope for the conference to become an annual fixture has been mostly fulfilled, with conferences being held in 2004 (Warwick), 2005 (Oxford Brookes), 2006 (UEL), and 2008 (Oxford).

2004

MARS growth in 2004 consisted of the establishment of two centres at two universities and of two courses within a single university. The European Centre for the Study of Migration and Social Care (MASC) was founded within the School of Social Policy, Sociology, and Social Research at the University of Kent. In the autumn of 2008, the Centre reported on its website that it had eight members as academic staff and two as administrators. A second centre, the Refugee Research Centre (RRC) at the University of East London (UEL), was also established in 2004. Its website listed its personnel as being six 'Teaching and Research Staff' and five

'Teaching and Research Associates' in the autumn of 2008 (University of East London n.d.a).

It was in 2004 that London South Bank University's Department of Social and Policy Studies first offered two degrees: the MSc and PgDip (Postgraduate Diploma) in Refugee Studies. The MSc differs from the PgDip only in requiring students to write a dissertation (London South Bank University n.d.). University student records show that between the 2004-05 and 2007-08 academic years, there were no students on the PgDip course and 44 students first enrolled in the MSc. 14 were female, while 30 were male. Just under half of the students (18) are listed as having U.K. nationality. Three each are listed for Sierra Leone and Ethiopia and two each for Eritrea, Ghana, France, and Spain. One is listed for each of the following: Australia, Bangladesh, Cameroon, Egypt, Netherlands, Nigeria, Slovakia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

2005

MARS development in 2005 included the move by a centre from one university to another and the establishment of both a degree course and a journal. ICAR moved from King's College, London to the School of Social Science at City University. In October of 2008, the ICAR website indicated that the centre had four staff members and one intern. These numbers were significantly lower than the eight staff members and seven interns reported for 2005-06 (ICAR 2006), and the nine staff members and eight interns reported for 2006-07 (ICAR 2007).

2005 also saw the establishment of a MARS degree course, the MPhil in Migration

Studies, through the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology and COMPAS at

the University of Oxford. According to university records, 22 students enrolled in the

course in the 2005-06 through the 2007-08 academic years. 16 are listed as female, six

as male. Recall that the data regarding the country of origin of this course's new

enrolments was presented above as part of my description of the Oxford MSc in

Forced Migration.

Finally, it was also in 2005 that the *International journal of migration, health and

social care* was established at the centre whose name it (nearly) duplicates: the

MASC at the University of Kent.

2006

Five MARS degree courses at four universities were established during 2006. The

MSc in Comparative and Cross-Cultural Research Methods (Migration) was first

offered by the SCMR at the University of Sussex. This course, which is 'designed to

meet the most recent ESRC requirements for social science training' according to the

university's website (University of Sussex n.d.a), has had only four students in the

two years during which it has been offered, according to university records. All of

them are listed as female. Two are described as German and two Japanese.

London South Bank University first offered the PG Cert in Refugee Studies in 2006.

According to university records, only one student – a male with Sierra Leone

nationality – had enrolled in the course during the 2006-07 and 2007-08 academic

years. It was also in 2006 that the School of Law at SOAS first offered the MA in Migration and Ethnic Minority Law. According to university records, by the 2007-08 academic year, only two students had enrolled in the course. Both are listed as female and their nationalities are listed as UK and Austria.

Queen Mary, London offered two new MARS degrees in 2006. One was the MA in Migration and Law, taught jointly by the Departments of Politics and Law. 13 students had enrolled in the course in its first two years. Four were men, nine women. Just under half (six) are listed as having U.K. nationality, while two are reported as being from Zimbabwe. Only one student is listed for each of the following nationalities: Italy, Sweden, Lithuania, India, and Thailand. The other MARS degree first offered in 2006 by Queen Mary, London was the MRes in Migration through its Department of Politics. University records report that only one student – male with Swiss nationality – enrolled in the course in its first two years. Another MARS degree course begun in 2006 was the MA in Migration Studies from the Brussels campus of the University of Kent. I mention it here only in passing; I do not include it as part of my research object because it is not located in the UK.

2007

Three new MARS centres were established and one existing institute was renamed in 2007. One new degree course was founded and three existing courses at another university were renamed. Two new MARS associations were founded, as well.

The Identity, Citizenship, and Migration Centre (ICMiC) was established within the University of Nottingham's School of Sociology and Social Policy. According to its website, the centre is 'convened' by three people. The site's 'People' section lists an additional 14 individuals as 'School members (Staff)', five as 'Associate Members', and six 'Postgraduates' (University of Nottingham n.d.). Another centre that was founded in 2007 was the Centre for Migration and Diaspora Studies at SOAS. Its website lists eight people as its 'Committee Members' (SOAS n.d.). The Migration Studies Unit at the LSE was also founded – 'by research students and academics', according to its website – in 2007 (London School of Economics n.d.a). Its website's 'Who's Who' page lists the following positions and numbers of people: Academic Chair (1), Vice Academic Chair (2), Co-Directors (5), Undergraduate Liaison (1), and Advisory Council (3) (ibid. n.d.b). The Co-Directors and Undergraduate Liaison are students, while the other members are faculty. Activities listed on the unit's website include the hosting of seminars and conferences, a reading group, and a working papers series.

The Centre for Migration Policy Research (CMPR), part of the School of the Environment and Society at Swansea University, was officially opened on 11 September 2007 by the First Minister of Wales (University of Swansea n.d.b). I consider this centre to be a continuation of the university's Migration Unit (described above), largely on the basis of its personnel. The school's Research Student Handbook for 2006-07 states that its Migration Unit is 'led by' (University of Swansea 2006:15) two individuals who also appear on the CMPR's website – one as its Director and the other as one of its Research Associates. An Associate Director and seventeen additional Research Associates are also listed for the centre.

New developments also took place in the academic field of MARS in 2007 in the form of degree courses. The MSc in Population Movements and Policies was first offered by Swansea University's School of the Environment and Society. Also, Birbeck, University of London first offered the MSc, PgDip and PgCert degrees in Ethnicity, Migration, Policy in the 2007-08 academic year. Three men and five women – all UK nationals – are reported as first enrolling in the MSc course in 2007-08. University records report only one male UK national for the PgCert course in Ethnicity, Migration, Policy.

The London Migration Research Group is a MARS professional association that was founded in 2007. Its primary activity appears to be the hosting of a seminar series at its three member institutions: the LSE Migration Studies Unit, the SOAS Centre for Migration and Diaspora Studies, and the UCL Migration Research Unit. Also established in 2007, Oxford's Migration Studies Society is convened by Oxford postgraduates and a faculty representative from COMPAS. Its primary activity has been hosting a weekly graduate seminar.

2008 and beyond

Two new MARS degree courses were offered at two universities in 2008 and two additional courses were planned by one of these universities for the 2009-10 academic year. I have not acquired student records for these courses. The MA in Migration and Transnationalism was first offered in 2008-09 in the School of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Nottingham. The MA in Refugee Studies and Community

Development was first offered by the School of Social Sciences, Media, and Cultural Studies at UEL in 2008. Two additional MAs – 'Migration and Citizenship' and 'Refugees, Representation, and Performance' – were listed in the 2008 UEL Refugee Studies brochure as courses to be offered – pending approval – in the autumn of 2009.

1.1.3. Patterns

In this third subsection of my discussion of MARS, I identify patterns in its institutional characteristics and development. I begin with an inventory of the centres, courses, journals, and associations that emerged in the field. Then I estimate the completeness of the data set with which I am working and describe patterning in the number of the enrolments that were described above. I end this subsection with the presentation of a visual representation of the historical development of MARS.

1.1.3.1. MARS inventory

16 MARS centres were established at 11 universities. These are displayed in Appendix 1.3. Oxford was home to four, City and Swansea two, and the rest one each, as shown in Appendix 1.4. As seen in Appendix 1.5, 23 postgraduate courses had been offered at 11 universities by autumn 2008. In addition, two more were scheduled to be offered at one of these same universities the following academic year. The university of Sussex had offered the most courses – four. Birbeck, LSBU, and Queen Mary followed with three each. Oxford, SOAS, and UEL had created two each (with two more planned by UEL). Kent, Manchester, Nottingham, and Swansea had offered only one postgraduate MARS course, each. As shown in Appendix 1.6, five MARS

journals were established at three universities. Three of the journals were based at two centres at the University of Oxford. Finally, four MARS associations were formed. Two were based in Oxford (IASFM and Oxford Migration Studies Society), one in London (London Migration Research Group), and one shifted among institutions (FMSC).

1.1.3.2. Student records patterning

I was successful in acquiring data on *new enrolments* in nineteen courses at eight universities out of the 23 that had been offered at 11 universities. Appendix 1.7 displays those for which I did not acquire information (or that which was suitable) beyond that of the course's existence. I consider this sample to be highly representative because one of the four courses for which I have unsuitable data (the MA at Manchester, described above) had no more than five enrolments and the three courses for which I have no enrolment data were in only their first or second year, and therefore very unlikely to have received more than perhaps a dozen students, each (as was the case for nearly all of the courses surveyed). 17 courses at eight universities – out of the 19 courses at eight universities for which I have data – had at least one enrolment during the 2003/04 – 2007/08 academic years. These are listed in Appendix 1.8 and form the basis for the following analysis of the number of new enrolments and those that I present below in Chapters Three and Four on sex/gender and nationality/citizenship/country of origin, respectively, during this five-year period. My analysis of the number of new enrolments proceeds from the level of the field through that of the university to that of the course.

The total of new enrolments in MARS postgraduate courses was 514. When considered by university (see data displayed in Appendix 1.9), the four with the highest number of new enrolments were Oxford (141), Sussex (129), UEL (77), and SOAS (52). The four with the lowest were – in descending order of number of enrolments – LSBU, Queen Mary, Kent, and Birbeck, all with 45, or less. Thus, Oxford and Sussex, the two universities with the highest new enrolment totals, which were of similar quantities, accounted for over half of the field's total for new enrolments. As seen in the right-hand column in the table in Appendix 1.8, more than half (eleven) of the courses had a number of total new enrolments that was 25, or less. Those with the most were Oxford's MSc Forced Migration (119), UEL's MA Refugee Studies, and the MA Migration Studies at Sussex (77, each).

1.1.3.3. Visualisation of MARS' historical development

The chart below visualises the development of MARS described above. Appendix 1.10 presents the same data in tabular format.

Figure 2: MARS growth

Having defined the first component of my more empirical argument – MARS – I next do the same for its second: migration control.

1.2. Migration control

My treatment of migration control has four main sub-sections. First I summarise and critique existing models of the phenomenon. Then I discuss possible archetypes for a more useful model. Following that, I describe what I argue to be a more appropriate model that I call CODAR. Finally, I operationalise this model by providing a textual account and a visual representation of migration control.

1.2.1. Existing models are overly statist

When describing and analysing migration control, most scholars have done so by constructing models that use 'the state' as the primary element. In the following discussion I present a few examples of this preoccupation.

An ongoing debate that reflects this concentration is that in the pages of Joppke's (1998) edited volume (*Challenge to the nation-state*) and continuing in Giugni and Passy (2006) regarding the relative influence that the state exerts on migration politics. Favell characterises this debate as being one between a nation-centred perspective, on the one hand, and post-nationalist or globalist visions on the other (Favell 2006:45-46). Here the question that scholars seek to answer is What role does the state have (vis-à-vis primarily regional and global institutions such as the EU and UN and domestic civil society groups) in determining how its non-citizens are treated? For example, Freeman argues that '[l]iberal democracies have much more capacity to control immigration than most commentators seem to believe. The vitality of state sovereignty depends on the particular state, the type of immigration, and the aspect of immigration policy one is considering' (1998:86).

Another expression of a preoccupation with states among scholars of migration control is the body of literature that is less focused on answering more theoretical questions such as that posed by the *Challenge to the nation-state* debate than it is in describing, comparing, and modelling the phenomenon, itself. Representative and perhaps archetypical of this *oeuvre* is Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield's introduction (1994a) to *Controlling immigration* (1994b) – a book described by Guiraudon and

Joppke as 'the standard volume in the field' (2001:11) – and its second edition (2004), which, according to the authors of its introduction, 'systematically compares immigration control policies and their outcomes in […] advanced industrial countries' (ibid.:4). Likewise, Brochmann is explicit regarding the state focus of her co-edited book on immigration control (Brochmann and Hammar 1999):

> Whereas state policy is the dependent variable and the main *actor* in our system, a number of other actors in society […] serve to reinforce, maintain or obstruct state policies, thereby also influencing preconditions for control (Brochmann 1999:9; emphasis in original).

A third example of the preoccupation of scholars with the state in examining migration control is – again, painting with a rather wide brush – Marxist literature on the subject. De Genova, in the essay described above, states the following:

> Undocumented migrations are […] preeminently labor migrations, originating in the uniquely restless creative capacity and productive power of people. The undocumented character of such movements draws our critical scrutiny to regimes of immigration law and so demands an analytic account of the law as such, which is itself apprehensible *only* through a theory of *the state* (2002:423, emphasis added).

Thus, an understanding of migration control – or at least its legal aspects – can only be achieved through an analytical focus on the state. Similarly, Schuster describes the practices of dispersal, detention, and deportation in Europe as being 'state racism' (2003:245, 254).

This statist pattern of scholarship on migration control is identified as well by Wimmer and Glick-Schiller as being characteristic of 'mainstream social science' (2002:301). These authors argue that research for the sociologist/historian/anthropologist has become, essentially, looking at states and

making statements about human activity based solely on the information gathered from within them. They say that this is the case because social scientists are conceptually constrained by methodological nationalism – 'the assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political form of the modern world' (ibid.:302). Wimmer and Glick-Schiller identify three variants of methodological nationalism, the third being 'the territorialisation of social science imaginary and the reduction of the analytical focus to the boundaries of the nation-state' (ibid. 307). The problem with this, the authors claim, is that social science's overemphasis on the nation/state/society has resulted in analytical 'blind spots' (ibid.:325), thereby limiting understanding of the phenomenon of migration. Relevant entities are left out of analysis. I have presented evidence that supports the argument that the same is the case for scholarship on migration control.

A more complete understanding of the phenomenon of migration control can therefore be achieved by 'seeing beyond the state' (Connelly 2006). This methodological practice is one that both Favell and Herzfeld advocate. 'Instead of telling a story about how foreign objects (migrants) fit into or challenge the given (nation-state) narrative and institutional structures by which we recognize the world', writes Favell, 'we might instead look at […] the […] process by which collectivities manage movers by naming and counting them, […] thereby distinguishing them from nonmovers or residents' (2008:272). Focus not on states, but rather on collectivities that name and count movers. MARS is one such collectivity, or, as I am calling it, community.

Herzfeld cautions that an effect of 'paying more attention to state-theory' might be 'los[ing] sight of the agency without which neither the state nor theories about it could ever be supposed to exist at all' (2008:91). He 'suspect[s]', however, that what anthropologists who adopt this focus

> will learn by doing so is precisely what many political scientists would rather they did not discover – not only that such theories have little to say about the forms of agency that actuate the state, but that the fashion for them serves the interests of those who would prefer their agency […] to remain hidden (ibid.:89).

Herzfeld's methodological recommendation is 'to disaggregate the kinds of political relationship that blanket terms like […] 'the state' occlude' (ibid.), in order to make visible the agency of people who participate in making the state real. In Chapter Two I do so by describing the ways in which MARS academics facilitate the migration control practices of the officials of the agencies of the British state, among other actors. In Chapters Three and Four I show that there are indeed some MARS academics who prefer that their agency – their actuaction of the state – remain hidden.

The methodological alternative to a state-centered analysis for understanding migration control that is suggested by my analysis and these authors is thus to look not *at*, but both *within* and *beyond* the state. An alternative model or instrument – one in which 'the state' must not appear – is therefore needed in order to accomplish such a task. Clues to how such a model might be constructed come from the work of two archaeologists, Dunnell and Dancey, and from Foucault.

1.2.2. Constructing an alternative: siteless survey and panopticon

In this sub-section I discuss two models – one from archaeology (i.e., siteless survey) and another from Foucault (i.e., panopticon) – that I fuse in the next sub-section in order to create a stateless model for my analysis of migration control.

1.2.2.1. Siteless survey

Dunnell and Dancey's discussion of the archaeological concept of site parallels Wimmer and Glick-Schiller's analysis of the social science notion of state that I described above:

> The notion of *site* is as firmly established as any in archaeology, so much so that its meaning and use are almost invariably taken for granted. […] [T]hey are the basic entities of archaeological analysis. […] Archaeological data are seen as originating within naturally occurring units called *sites*, and the location and exploration of these units are usually the goals of field research (1983:271, emphases in original).

An example of such research is the following. Imagine an archaeologist who wants to find evidence for the human activity that took place upon a one million square meter section of land (one with 1000 meters on each side). The archaeologists (the work goes much faster with help!) systematically walk across the land at five-meter intervals and make a map of what they find. A look at their map (Map 1 in Figure 3, below) displays the locations of all of the artefacts they find during their sweep. The greatest artefact densities are clearly in the northeast and southwest corners of the survey area, but artefacts are distributed throughout most of the rest of the area at lower densities. If the archaeologist uses the notion of site to structure his or her analysis, then the next steps are to identify the areas of highest artefact density as sites

A and B (see Map 2 in the Figure 3), return to the sites to excavate artefacts and features, analyse these materials from the sites, and then publish a description of human behaviour within the one million square meter section of land that summarizes and compares the activities of people at site A with those at site B.

Figure 3: Site approach

Figure 7

According to Dunnell and Dancey,

> Most sites in a traditional sense represent domestic or activity loci from which the exploitation of the surrounding environment took place. Using *site* to structure recovery limits data collection to a small fraction of the total area occupied by any past cultural system and systematically excludes nearly all direct evidence of the actual articulation between people and their environment. As a result, we are forced to puzzle out the connection from the grossly incomplete, complex, multifunctional deposits called *sites* (ibid.:271-272, emphases in original).

As with the characteristic of the state-centric approach that Wimmer and Glick-Schiller describe as being an effect of methodological nationalism, relevant entities are left out. And as Herzfeld observes for such approaches, an understanding of the *relationship* between entities within the object of focus and those from without is

impossible to produce. The alternative 'basic recovery technique' that Dunnell and Dancey propose to the one just described – i.e., one based on site – is the 'systematic surface-collection directed toward producing distributions of artefacts within a carefully controlled space' (ibid.:280), or in the far less technical language that they use in the title of their article: the 'siteless survey'. They propose looking not for or at sites, but at artefacts both within and beyond these objectifications. My model of migration control must do the same for states, rather than sites; it must be stateless. It should allow me to abstract a network of relationships from the systematically gathered data of people and organisations within a particular social field, not states. Next, I discuss the potential utility of one potential model – that of panopticon.

I consider the utility of the model of panopticon for two reasons. One is that it is not inherently statist in the way that those such as Schuster's 'state racism' are. Another reason is that it has already been used in an attempt to describe and understand migration control – i.e., (Engbersen 2001). An opportunity to avoid a 'reinvention of the wheel' should not be missed.

1.2.2.2. Panopticon

Engbersen argues that 'Fortress Europe is turning into a panopticon Europe, in which not the guarding of physical borders is central, but far more the guarding of public institutions and labour markets by means of advanced identification and control systems' (2001:242). He goes on to write that the aim of panopticon Europe 'is not disciplining and correcting undesirable migrants' (ibid.). Citing Bauman, he claims that panopticon Europe is designed instead as 'a *factory of exclusion* and of people

habituated to their status of the *excluded*' (ibid.[15]). Engbersen also says that one of the 'unexpected effects' of panopticon Europe is that 'it generates its own crimes to subsequently combat these with advanced identification systems' (ibid.). Thus, according to Engbersen, panopticon is an arrangement for exclusion, it generates criminal activity, and it is just now emerging in Europe.

Engbersen provides enough information for the reader to develop an idea of what panopticon is, but not for the origins of the concept. In another significant omission (the others being those of the emphases that I referred to in the preceding paragraph – see footnote 15, below), Engbersen provides no citations to account for the origin of the concept. Presumably, he is implementing the well-known sociological formulation of Michel Foucault (1979). However, there are significant differences between the panopticons of these two scholars.

Although Engbersen claims that Europe is just now (very late twentieth century) becoming panoptic, Foucault demonstrates that it has been so since the 19th century. Engbersen claims that the goal of the panopticon is not discipline, but exclusion; while Foucault provides a detailed historical narrative to show how the panoptic arrangement combines the aims of both exclusion *and* discipline. Engbersen thinks that its aims are negative (to prevent access to social benefits) while Foucault demonstrates that the goals are positive (i.e., increases in productivity). Finally, Engbersen thinks that the panopticon generates (criminal) activity, while Foucault provides a detailed analysis of the way that panopticism combines power-knowledge to create not criminal activity, but the notion of criminal.

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[15] Engbersen gives no indication whether the emphases in the quote are his or if they belong to Bauman.

There is irony in Engbersen's chapter: he opposes the panoptic arrangement (his concluding paragraph offers a more 'rational' alternative to Panopticon Europe), but the majority of his chapter consists of descriptions of the residence strategies that 'illegal immigrants' use to circumvent state controls. One would be hard pressed to find a better example of surveillance (a disciplinary instrument and one of the primary mechanisms of panopticism) than Engbersen's chapter, itself: it provides detailed information on the subversive practices of the 'abnormal' and 'dangerous' individuals who are labelled as 'illegal immigrants'.

It is clear that Engbersen criticises panopticism but acts as its agent, that he misappropriates and waters-down Foucault's and Bentham's notions of panopticon, and that what he claims to be new can be seen as having quite a long history (at least one century old). Although I have little use for Engbersen's panopticon as a stateless model of migration control, that of Foucault holds greater promise. What might the utility of Foucault's panopticon be as a stateless model of migration control? Persons to whom the controls are applied can be thought of as the prisoners inhabiting the cells of the outer ring. In the central area would be the agents of migration control, engaging in observation and correction. Foucault writes that the director in the central tower supervises subordinate agents who are located in the space between tower and cells (below in Figure 4).

Figure 4: Panopticon

Foucault's panopticon does have great heuristic potential, which I hope to realize by integrating its attention to the organisation of control into my stateless model of migration control.

In Foucault's panopticon, the centre controls the periphery – i.e., people acting as directors control those acting as guards, social workers, and physicians, who in turn do the same towards those who are imprisoned – through '*encastrement*', which he defines as 'the spatial 'nesting' of hierarchized surveillance' (1979:170-171). What are controlled are the bodies of the prisoners: 'in our societies, the systems of punishment are to be situated in a certain 'political economy' of the body (ibid.:25). '[T]he body is', Foucault continues, '[…] directly involved in the political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it' (ibid.). Panopticon is thus a model for a system of punishment in which the people at its centre control the bodies of those at its periphery.

If this scheme is inverted or turned inside out, then the body that is the target of control is the centre and those of the people whose actions control the target are located in the periphery at increasing distances depending upon their kind of participation in the *direct physical coercion* of the targeted body. Those positioned nearest have the highest degree of participation in this mode of coercion, while those who are located further away contribute to the generation and maintenance of the preconditions for such practices. In the next subsection of the present chapter I build on the idea of such an arrangement in my discussion of my stateless model of migration control, which I call 'migrant coercion detecting and ranging' – or migrant CODAR.

1.2.3. Migrant coercion detection and ranging – or, CODAR

Radar – or, radio detection and ranging – provides a model for how an analysis of migration control using the 'inverted or inside-out panopticon' schema described above can be carried out. Radar is an

> electromagnetic sensor used for detecting, locating, tracking, and recognizing objects of various kinds at considerable distances. It operates by transmitting electromagnetic energy toward objects, commonly referred to as targets, and observing the echoes returned from them. The targets may be aircraft, ships, spacecraft, automotive vehicles, and astronomical bodies, or even birds, insects, and rain. Besides determining the presence, location, and velocity of such objects, radar can sometimes obtain their size and shape as well (Encyclopaedia Brittanica 2010a).

Furthermore, it is 'an "active" sensing device in that it has its own source of illumination (a transmitter) for locating targets' (ibid.).

Similarly, my CODAR analysis of migration control spreads outward from the active body of the person to whom direct physical coercion is applied to detect, locate, track, and identify the different people and organisations that play a role in the carrying-out of this practice. Using the method of ANT (and Mosse) that I described in my introduction, I trace empirically a continuous path (Latour 2005:193) from direct physical coercion – a 'local interaction' (ibid.:173) – 'to reach the places where the ingredients entering into [this interaction] appear to come from' (ibid.:193). I trace the actor-network of migration control in a textual account. Radar also provides a model for how I might represent this actor-network visually.

According to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 'A commonly used radar display is the plan position indicator (PPI), which provides a maplike presentation in polar coordinates of range and angle' (2010a). It describes PPI in a figure and its accompanying text (see Figure 5):

Figure 5: Plan position indicator

Reflected microwaves can be converted into visible images. The rotating antenna is tracked by the trace of an oscilloscope. A sweep starts at the center of the screen, left. It radiates outward at a constant rate. Reflected waves appear on the screen as a pattern of bright spots, center. On the indicator screen, right, the patterns form an image of the object' (Encyclopaedia Brittanica 2010b).

I model my visual representation of the actor network of migration control on the radar display of PPI. The CODAR 'display' presents the migration control actor network as a series of concentric rings in a way similar to the right-hand image in Figure 5. Each ring is an aggregate of the individuals and organisations whose activities have played a similar role in the process by which direct physical coercion and deterrence have been applied to the people targeted by migration control.

Having described the principles upon which my migrant CODAR model is based, its principal features, and the manner in which I will use it, I now employ it to produce textual and diagrammatic accounts of migration controls that are applied to people who attempt to (and sometimes succeed in) entering into and existing in the UK.

1.2.4. Operationalising CODAR

I begin this subsection with a textual account of migration control. I describe the actor-network within which arrest, imprisonment, forced migration and deterrence were effected. Physical violence and deterrence were applied to individuals made bureaucratically eligible for such treatment. These practices were authorized by primary and secondary legislation that was acquired by the Government. It was assisted in this task by two non-departmental public bodies: the Advisory Panel on Country Information (APCI) and the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC). The Government were assisted in the formulation of the bills that became such legislation by the Immigration Research and Statistics Service (IRSS) of the HO Research, Development and Statistics (RDS) organisation. After providing a detailed account of this actor-network, I then visualise it using CODAR.

1.2.4.1. Physical violence

Physical violence was applied to people without British citizenship by a range of actors, including arrest by police and UK IND/BA officers (in 'dawn raids' [Jones 2010]); imprisonment by the latter in 'detention centres' at airports and at asylum screening units; by UK IND/BA officers and the employees of private companies through forced migration (or, 'deportation' [Addley 2010; UK National Audit Office 2005:35]); and by the latter at 'detention centres' such as Campsfield House.

These interactions are made possible, in part, by prior bureaucratic decisions to target the victims of these violent acts. For example, UK IND/BA immigration officers screening passengers at airports and those at asylum screening units decided that some individuals should be detained on the spot. Also, UK IND/BA management decided to attempt to arrest some of the victims through workplace and dawn raids and to deport some of those whom the agency had already imprisoned in one of its 'detention centres'.

One of the reasons why these decisions were made by these actors is that they were following procedures that were in place for the treatment of people who had been classified bureaucratically as eligible for arrest. Victims became bureaucratically eligible for arrest through the rejection and certification of their asylum claims by UK IND/BA immigration officers. Claimants who were judged by these officials to be entitled to reside in one of the states that had been added to the Non-Suspensive

Appeal (NSA) list, [16] and to have submitted a claim for asylum that was 'clearly unfounded', had their claims certified by these actors as being such. The HO states that 'certification and the decision that the asylum/human rights claim is clearly unfounded (i.e. is bound to fail) is generally based on the objective country information' (ibid.), including documents called Country Reports. As a consequence, these claimants were prohibited from appealing the decision from within the space claimed by the UK as its territory. This process is referred to by the HO as one of 'non-suspensive appeal' because arrest, imprisonment, and deportation – or, 'removal' in the language of the HO – are not suspended by the refused applicant's appeal as they normally would be, but rather are obligatory.

People who suffered direct physical coercion and the threat of such actions were also made bureaucratically eligible for arrest through the rejection by personnel of the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) of appeals by rejected asylum claimants. These judges and adjudicators were presented with arguments for the rejection of claimants' appeals by Home Office Presenting Officers that relied primarily on the information in Country Reports. One common ground for dismissal cited by AIT officials was that the claims made by the appellant about his or her experiences contradicted the information contained within Country Reports. The reliance on and trust in the Country Reports by the UK appeals tribunals is posited by both Good, an ethnographer of the asylum process, and the agency's vice president. The former writes in *Asylum and expertise* that Country Reports have been 'accepted almost unquestioningly by the courts' and that 'judicial criticisms of *Country Reports* are

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[16] As of 26 January 2009 this list is made up of the following: 'Albania, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Ghana (Males only), India, Jamaica, Macedonia, Moldova. Mongolia, Nigeria (Males only), Serbia (Including Kosovo but not Montenegro), South Africa, Ukraine' (UK Border and Immigration Agency 2007).

now almost unheard of' (2007:215, emphasis in original). The latter was minuted as stating during one of the meetings of the Advisory Panel on Country Information (APCI – more immediately below) 'that he could not emphasise strongly enough how much the IAT[17] relied upon CIPU's [Country] reports' (APCI 2.M:§3.5).

In both of these processes by which actors made people bureaucratically eligible for arrest, Country Reports were an important factor. These documents were produced by a department within the HO – its Country of Origin Information Service (COIS – formerly its Country Information and Policy Unit (CIPU)), and were previously called Country Assessments. They were analyses of the human rights and security conditions in the states that appeared most frequently as the nationalities of people making claims of asylum with the British state. COIS was assisted in the production of its Country Reports by the APCI, an organisation described in its terms of reference as 'an independent body' that functions 'to review and provide advice about the country of origin information material produced by the Home Office, to help ensure that it is as accurate, balanced, impartial and up to date as possible' (APCI n.d.a). I describe this assistance in greater detail below in Chapter Two.

Both the NSA list and the APCI were created through a piece of UK state legislation – the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The Act authorized the HO to designate states or parts thereof as being generally safe. The Parliamentary consent for this action – required under the 2002 Act – was acquired by the HO (in part) by pleading its case and receiving approval in a Standing Committee of the House of Commons. The 2002 Act obliged the HO to convince the Committee that a) 'there is

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[17] The Immigration Appeal Tribunal was superseded by the AIT in 2004.

in general in that State or part no serious risk of persecution of persons entitled to reside in that State or part', and that b) 'removal to that State or part of persons entitled to reside there will not in general contravene the United Kingdom's obligations under the Human Rights Convention' (UK Office of Public Sector Information 2002: Section 94[5]). Once the HO received approval for such designations, it added these states to its 'Non-suspensive appeals' (NSA) list. By October of 2007 the HO had successfully added fourteen states to the NSA list.

On at least one occasion, the HO representative presenting the agency's case before the Standing Committee for adding a state to the NSA list argued that it should be added because the APCI had affirmed that the Country Report, which he said was used by the HO in determining the state's eligibility for inclusion, was accurate. In the following section I provide a brief narrative of this process.

APCI legitimation of eligibility for physically violent coercion

In a letter dated 16 September 2004 and addressed to the APCI's first Chair, the HO immigration minister wrote: 'I am writing to let you know that we are considering the possibility of making an Order to designate […] India for inclusion on the NSA list' (APCI n.d.b). He went on to invite the panel 'to examine and provide comments on the latest Home Office country information material produced on India' (ibid.).

The APCI met on 7 December 2004 (its fourth meeting) to discuss the analyses of the HO India Country Report and the HO Report on its Fact-Finding Mission (RFFM) to India that the panel had commissioned from the think-tank (and APCI member

organisation) Chatham House. The following excerpt from the minutes of the meeting illuminates the content of discussion.

> The Chair summarised by saying that the view of the meeting was that, despite some problems, the Country Report was generally a fair reflection of the country situation and source material. On the other hand, while there were no serious omissions in the RFFM report, the information it contained was presented in a way that made it inconclusive (APCI E1.M:§3.21).

On 8 February 2005, the HO immigration minister presented the Government case for adding India to the list of NSA countries to the House of Commons Fifth Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation (Hansard 2005). 'Why are we now adding India to the list?' he is recorded as asking rhetorically.

> We believe that it meets the legal test set out in the 2002 Act, but we also have considered the country information and the statistical evidence, which shows that there is a disproportionately high number of applications and that few claims are granted asylum.

Later, he is recorded as saying,

> We gave a commitment to consult the independent advisory panel on country information on the information being used by the Government before making an order to add a country to the non-suspensive appeals list. […] [W]e have done so with India.

After stating that the APCI had reviewed the India Country Report and the India RFFM, he is recorded as saying that

> [t]he panel had a few concerns about the way in which the country report was structured, but it concluded that it was generally a fair reflection of the position in India. […] [T]he independent advisory panel found that our country information on India was essentially sound.

After the minister rested his case, the Committee approved the designation order adding India to the NSA list.

This addition resulted in hardship for people whose asylum claims had been refused by the HO. The order adding India to the NSA list took effect on 14 February 2005. By 30 September, the asylum claims of 390 people who were identified as being Indian citizens (out of 470 people identified as such who had been refused) were certified by the HO as being 'clearly unfounded' (UK Home Office 2005:13, 4). Their presence in the 'territory' of the UK was criminalized and they were made bureaucratically eligible for arrest, imprisonment, and forced migration.

1.2.4.2. Deterrence

Another form of coercion – in addition to that which was direct and physical (i.e., arrest, imprisonment, forced migration) – that was applied to people attempting to enter into or exist in the UK was that of bureaucratic deterrence. One way in which these people were so deterred was through the rejection by the UK Visas state agency of their visa applications. People with citizenship of particular states were required by the HO to apply for visas in advance of their arrival at the 'UK border', if they wanted to avoid illegality. Several hundred thousand (i.e., 473,742) of these applications were rejected in 2005-06, alone (UK Visas 2006). Grounds for rejection were determined by the HO, with technical assistance provided by the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC).

The MAC first met in December of 2007. The HO describes it as 'a non-statutory, non-time-limited non-departmental public body, sponsored by the UK Border Agency of the Home Office' (UK Border Agency n.d.a). Its role, according to the agency, is 'to provide transparent, independent and evidence-based advice to the Government on where shortages of skilled labour can sensibly be filled by immigration from outside the European Economic Area' (ibid. n.d.b). The HO Immigration Minister Liam Byrne described its role thus in a 2007 press release:

> The Migration Advisory Committee gives Government and the public independent advice on where we need migration and where we don't. That's the advice we'll need when we introduce our Points System in the New Year as part of our sweeping overhaul of the immigration system. […] The Points Based System will make sure that only those that Britain needs can come to work or study (UK Home Office 2007a).

The MAC reported the final results of its research in September of 2008 (UK Border Agency 2008a). According to this report, the Committee had 'examined the entire labour market' and concluded that only certain occupations from among those that would fall under Tier Two in the Government's new Points-Based Scheme for entry into the UK for work purposes were especially dear to the UK labour market (due to shortage of supply) and could 'sensibly be filled by enabling employers to recruit migrants' (ibid.). A visa applicant with citizenship of a state outside of the European Economic Area holding an offer of employment in one of the occupations on this 'shortage list' received fifty points towards the minimum total of seventy needed for approval. Examples of these occupations included rail engineer, geologist, secondary education teacher within the subjects of maths and science, and skilled ballet dancer. The report described the remaining occupations from among those in Tier Two as

being 'not recommended for inclusion on the UK shortage list because the evidence did not meet our criteria' (ibid.:181). Examples included software professional; roofer, roof tiler and slater; and tailor and dressmaker.

On 9 September 2008 the HO reported on the presentation of the MAC report – what it referred to as '[a] strict new list of shortage jobs' – to the agency in a press release. It quoted the Border and Immigration Minister Liam Byrne as making the following statement:

> Our new Australian-style points system is flexible to meet the needs of British business while ensuring that only those we want and no more can come here to work. This tough new shortage occupation list supports that. This strict list means 30% fewer jobs are available to migrants via the shortage occupation route. Those that do come will need to work hard, play by the rules and speak English. We are grateful for the work the Migration Advisory Committee has carried out. We will be pressure testing their conclusions before publishing our final list in October, so that the points system can come online just as we promised - on time (UK Home Office 2008a).

The HO announced the new shortage occupation list on 11 November 2008. Its press release included the following statement:

> [T]oday's list is tighter than ever before and will see a reduction of more than 200,000 positions in occupations with shortages that need be filled by migrant workers. The number of positions available to migrants has been reduced from one million to just under 800,000, ensuring that only those foreign workers we need – and no more – can come here (UK Home Office 2008b).

As a result, the *Telegraph* then reported, 'thousands of foreign GPs, midwives and care workers will continue to find it far harder to come after such jobs were excluded from the list' (Whitehead 2008).

A second bureaucratic deterrent to people without UK citizenship was the criminalizing of their labour activity. An example of this process was the making illegal of work by people with citizenship of the states of Bulgaria and Romania outside of particular economic sectors. As of 1 January 2007 – the date on which these states were admitted to the EU – the work of people judged by the HO to be 'low skilled' with these citizenships in employment outside of 'existing quota schemes' in 'the agricultural and food processing sectors' (UK Home Office 2006a) was made illegal. A third means of bureaucratic deterrence was the criminalisation of work by people with citizenships of one of the EU states that joined in 2004 who had not signed up with the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS).

The HO secured and maintained parliamentary approval for these (and many other) deterrence measures despite Parliamentary opposition. For example, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock pressurised the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the HO to remove Macedonia from the list of states from which visa applications were required (referred to above) in the House of Lords:

> My Lords, my noble friend [the Under-Secretary] will be aware that, when they were citizens of Yugoslavia, Macedonians could come here without visas and, once they join the European Union, they will be able to come here without visas. In the interim, however, there is an anomaly, causing an adverse effect on both trade and tourism. I plead with the Minister to ignore the bureaucrat's brief in front of him, exercise the leadership for which he has become famous and go back to the Home Office and sort this matter out (Hansard 2008).

In another example of pressurisation, an MP of the liberal democrat party expressed his party's opposition to the criminalisation of the labour of people with citizenships of Bulgaria and Romania by the HO (referred to above) in the House of Commons:

[W]e, as a party, are in favour of the principle of extending freedom of movement for employment to all EU states, including Romania and Bulgaria, and we voted in favour of that at our last federal party conference in September 2008. I understand why the Government […] might seek to maintain the current restrictions. It is clear that the numbers are not in my favour today—I face the serried ranks of well-fed Labour Members who could easily outnumber me should I choose to push the matter to a vote later, so I will not do so (Hansard 2009).

MAC legitimation of deterrence

In this second case of pressurisation by an MP, the person presenting the Government's case for increasing or maintaining the coercion of people without UK citizenship (the Minister for Borders and Immigration) mentioned the findings and recommendations of an organisation called the Migration Advisory Committee as a justification for such practices. In doing so, he told the Committee that '[t]he Government have approached the question of labour market access with an open mind' (ibid.). The Minister recounted how, in 2004, the HO had taken a 'laissez-faire approach to accession workers' (ibid.), requiring only that people with citizenships of the new EU member states register with the WRS (see above). However, he continued:

[W]e decided to take a more gradual approach when Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU. We therefore maintained work permit restrictions, so that workers from those two countries—the A2—were subject to skills and labour market tests except when they came under the quota-based arrangements for low-skilled work in the horticultural and food-processing sectors. We have subsequently sought expert advice from the Migration Advisory Committee to inform the decision on whether or not to maintain the restrictions. The MAC gave very detailed consideration to the case for keeping them. Its advice was that the existing restrictions should not be lifted. A key element of its thinking was that as we entered an economic downturn, the possibility of larger flows from other countries would increase the risk of displacement of resident workers. As a result, we have announced that restrictions on A2 workers will continue (ibid.).

The Minister then moved on to the question of whether or not the WRS should be abolished. 'We have also asked the MAC', he stated,

for its advice on whether or not the worker registration scheme for A8 nationals should continue. Again, the advice was that it would be sensible for the scheme to continue on the basis that there may be modest, but adverse, labour market impacts if it were abolished. As has been said, we announced on 8 April that the worker registration scheme for A8 would, therefore, continue (ibid.).

Then the Minister pointed to an additional case (not mentioned above) of Parliamentary resistance to increasing coercion: 'I am aware', he said, 'that some have not welcomed that decision as they view the WRS as an unnecessary burden on business' (ibid.).

The Minister's description of the MAC's advice regarding the WRS was indeed accurate. The Committee's report, 'Review of the UK's transitional measures for nationals of member states that acceded to the European Union in 2004' (Migration Advisory Committee 2009), contained a section titled, 'Chairman's forward', which included the following statement: '[W]e [the MAC] recommend maintaining the WRS on economic grounds. This is because, if the WRS were to be ended, the labour inflow from the A8 countries would probably be a little larger than otherwise' (ibid.:4).

1.2.4.3. Legislation

These practices of arrest, imprisonment, deportation, and deterrence *and* the ability of the HO to extend such practices through secondary legislation were authorised by UK primary legislation, which had been given royal assent. These acts are the following:

Immigration Act 1971
Immigration (Carrier's Liability) Act 1987

Immigration Act 1988
Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993
Asylum and Immigration Act 1996
Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006
UK Borders Act 2007.
Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009

Having traced the actor network of direct physical coercion and deterrence in my textual account above, my next step is to visualise it using CODAR.

1.2.4.4. Visualising the actor network using CODAR

We can imagine the instrument processing the data presented in my account above and converting this information into a visual representation on a display screen. The trace of the oscilloscope (like my trace of the actor network) displays thousands of individual persons as it sweeps around the circular screen. Those who apply violence to the bodies of the people upon whom the instrument is centred are nearest to that centre; those whose behaviour assists in making this violent interaction possible – i.e., those who participate in the 'production of migrant 'illegality'' (De Genova 2002:425) – are at the screen's periphery. Specialised software enables the instrument both to identify the institutional membership of the human actors in the network and to group them according to the role they played within it. Having processed the textual information it received from my actor network trace, the CODAR instrument produces a print-out of its display (see Figure 6) and an accompanying explanatory table (Table 1):

Figure 6: Migrant CODAR

Table 1: Migrant CODAR

Ring	Role of actors	Actors
I	Apply physical violence to those who had been made bureaucratically eligible	IOs, Police officers, Guards at privately run 'detention centres', 'in-flight escorts' of people forced to migrate, Pilots and crew of airlines used in forced migration
II	Deter people who had been made bureaucratically eligible	UK Visas employees
III	Make people bureaucratically eligible for violence and deterrence	Marriage registrars, UK Visas employees, HOPOs, AIT personnel, APCI
IV	Manage I, II, III and propose new eligibility criteria	UK IND/BIA/BA 'civil servants', MAC
V	Authorize new eligibility criteria	UK IND/BIA/BA 'civil servants', Cabinet Ministers of Immigration, APCI, MAC, MPs in the Houses of Lords and Commons, the Queen

In my introduction I stated my more empirical argument that MARS facilitated

migration control. In the following chapter I use ANT and CODAR to describe the

ways in which the field's members did so alongside the actors just described in rings

III, IV, and V.

This chapter has served primarily to describe the two basic elements of the more empirical argument of my thesis – MARS and migration control. I defined MARS as a community on the basis of the social interaction of its members, not on that of their self-ascribed academic identities, which varied considerably. I narrated its institutional history through a tripartite periodisation: 'Beginnings' (pre-1997), 'MARS rises' (1997-2002), and 'The age of migration (studies)' (2003-present). I found that it grew very rapidly beginning with the 'MARS rises' period and that by 2008, the field had established 16 centres at 11 universities, offered 23 postgraduate courses with more than 500 enrolments, founded five journals, and formed four associations.

In this chapter's second section I discussed existing models of migration control and found them to be inadequate. I showed how these were overly statist and proposed an alternative, stateless model for understanding the phenomenon. I described my model – CODAR – and the principles upon which it is based. Finally, I used CODAR (and the ANT methodology) to produce a textual account and visual representation of the actor network through which migration controls were applied to people who attempted to enter into or exist within the space claimed by the British state as its territory. In the next chapter – Two – I support the more empirical argument of my thesis – i.e., that MARS academics facilitated migration control – by using CODAR to trace further this actor network.

2. How MARS facilitated migration control

The first (and more empirical) argument of this thesis is that MARS academics facilitated migration control through symbolic, technical, and pedagogic means. I demonstrate in this chapter that they did so through their involvement with two of the organisations that were identified by my migrant CODAR analysis: the Advisory Panel on Country Information (APCI) and the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC). This chapter traces further the actor network I described above using the CODAR model of migration control to include new people, institutions, and documents – specifically, those of MARS. First I discuss MARS academics and the APCI, and then do the same for the MAC. I begin each of these sections by recounting the role that the organisation plays in facilitating migration control. Then I describe the symbolic, technical, and pedagogic means by which MARS academics assisted it in doing so. My discussion of the APCI differs somewhat from that which I provide for the MAC in being structured as a critique of an existing account of the APCI. I end this chapter with a summary, a comparison of its findings with those of the studies surveyed in my Introduction on MARS and migration control, and a discussion o fthe evidence regarding the provision of surveillance by MARS academics to the HO.

2.1. MARS and the APCI

I described above the symbolic and technical means by which the APCI facilitated migration control in migrant CODAR rings III and V. It helped to make people bureaucratically eligible for violence and deterrence (the role of ring III actors) by assisting HO CIPU/COIS in the production of Country Reports, which were utilised

by the AIT to reject asylum appeals. Its ring V role of the authorization of new eligibility criteria for violence and deterrence was fulfilled through panel's provision of favourable evaluations of Country Reports, which were used by the Government to acquire parliamentary approval for adding states to the NSA list. The findings that I present in this section will show that the APCI played an additional, managerial role in migration control in migrant CODAR ring IV.

I am not the first anthropologist in the UK to describe and interpret the APCI. Professor Anthony Good considers the panel in a short passage in his monograph (2007). He identifies the 'ethnographic present' for his book as being 'early 1999 until the end of 2003' (ibid.:12) and writes that his book 'deals only in passing with the effects of the *Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002*' (ibid:13, emphasis in original), but utilizes information produced as late as September 2004 (see below) in his account.

In this section I critique his account by evaluating his description of the panel's history, personnel, activities, and impact. I find Good's account to be mostly accurate and – as a narrative – to echo both Weber's concept of modern bureaucracy and the UK Labour Government's mantra of 'evidence-based policy'. I present an alternative account of the APCI using primarily a) the same sources that Good used, and b) those that are commonly known to scholars and to which he would have had easy access. I conclude my critique by arguing that the differences between our two accounts are effects of our different approaches to the object: Good took the APCI's self-representation for granted, while I problematised it.

I gathered the materials that I use in my analysis through archival and ethnographic fieldwork methods. My sources were primarily the meeting minutes of the APCI and other documents that it has posted on its website (www.apci.org.uk); *Hansard*, the transcripts of the UK House of Commons; the UK Home Office (HO) website of its Research, Development and Statistics (RDS) division (www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds); and an interview I conducted with a member of the panel.

2.1.1. APCI history

Again, in its own terms, the APCI is 'an independent body' that functions 'to review and provide advice about the country of origin information material produced by the HO, to help ensure that it is as accurate, balanced, impartial and up to date as possible' (APCI n.d.a). Good (2007:214) writes that HO Country Reports (described above) were criticised in documents published by the NGOs Asylum Aid (in 1999) and the Immigration Advisory Service (IAS) (in 2003) for being overly optimistic regarding human rights conditions in the places in question. He continues his account, writing that '[t]he unpublished *Report of the Consultative Group on Country Information and Documentation Centre* (1998) highlighted the importance of reliable country information for sound decision making, and called for an independent documentation centre to be established' (ibid., italics in original). He concludes his account of the panel's founding with the following:

> [F]ollowing the appearance of that report [of the Consultative Group], and after assessing the uses made of CIPU materials by immigration officers, caseworkers, and HOPOs [Home Office Presenting Officers – officials who represent the HO in the AIT], the Home Office Research Development and Statistics Department (RDS) recommended the setting up of a user panel and an expert panel of topic and country specialists, to monitor the quality of CIPU's output [here Good cites two HO

publications]. On the day that research was published, IND announced the formation of an Advisory Panel on Country Information (ibid.:215).

Through my archival research, I have found his account to be accurate in the sense that the events that he mentioned appear to me to have taken place when he claims that they did. His primarily diachronic account is a narrative of rational bureaucratic efficacy. A failing of the asylum system was brought to the attention of the HO, which, as a response, conducted its own internal study to assess the situation. Then, having discovered evidence that confirmed that a problem did indeed exist, the HO took steps to repair the system's flaw.

Readers familiar with classical social theory will recognize this narrative; it is a version of Weber's description of modern bureaucracy as 'specializing administrative functions according to purely objective considerations' – meaning 'without regard for persons' – and as having as part of its nature the elimination 'from official business [of] love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation' (1948:215-216). Good's narrative echoes as well a discourse that was described in a House of Commons Committee meeting as being the Labour Government's 'mantra of evidence based policy making' with which it describes publicly the process by which it makes decisions (UK House of Commons 2006a:103). Having presented and analysed Good's account of the establishment of the APCI, I now use the same sources that Good either used himself or had easy access to in order to construct an account that is equally accurate, but results in a significantly different narrative.

The House of Commons First Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation heard, debated, and approved by a vote the Labour Government's request for adding seven states to the NSA list on Monday, 7 July of 2003 (Hansard 2003). The Home Secretary argued for the addition by saying that the HO had decided that the states met the conditions for designation prescribed by the 2002 Act (above) and that it had also taken

> account of other factors, such as the asylum grant rates, the outcome of appeals and the country information that we publish [i.e., Country Reports]. […] On that basis, the seven states that we have decided to include in the draft order are: Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Ukraine (ibid.).

After being pushed by an opposition party (Liberal Democrat) MP to justify the criteria by which the HO had decided to designate these particular states (see other examples of such pressurisation above), the Home Secretary continued:

> The Committee will be aware of the role that we have said that the advisory panel on country information will have in adding countries to the designated list. […] The advisory panel will provide advice on the full range of country information produced by the Home Office to help to ensure that it provides an accurate and balanced account of conditions in countries of origin (ibid.).

'We had hoped to have the benefit of advice from the panel on the country information produced by the Home Office before introducing the draft order', she continued, 'but that has not been possible because of some delays in responding to invitations' (ibid.).

A bit later in the session, a committee member from the Conservative party said that the HO had promised in November of 2002 to have an advisory panel on country information in place before adding any non-EU states to the NSA list. It was a 'major

disappointment', he said, that the panel was not in place when the Standing

Committee debated (and approved) the Government's request to add seven such states

to the list in March of 2003 (ibid.). He went on to recite the following statement that

he said was made the preceding week by the Labour Government's representative in

the House of Lords regarding the advisory panel:

> We have written to a number of organisations inviting them to submit nominations for the advisory panel and we have had a good response, but we have not finalised the exact list as yet because one or two organisations indicated that they thought that there might be a suspicion of a conflict of interest and that they would therefore not wish to take a position on the panel. We understand that and are therefore in the process of writing to further organisations (ibid.).

Further along in the meeting, the Liberal Democrat committee member described

above as pressurising the Home Secretary stated,

> We are opposed in principle to the white list, and we shall divide the Committee on the matter, as we will the House [of Commons]. We register in the strongest possible terms our opposition to the principle and the practice of such a list. […] The Government have been warned […]. We will not be so charitable if they try to put through an order such as this again (ibid.).

Near the end of the debate, the Home Secretary addressed the concerns that had been

expressed regarding the establishment of the advisory panel. She said that she

regretted that the panel was not yet established, and that she would see to it that the

membership was sorted. She would not, however, defer the order until the panel was

functioning. She proceeded to commend the order to the committee and the question

was put to a vote. Nine members voted in favour and two – both belonging to the

Liberal Democrat party – voted against the proposal. The order was thus approved by

the committee and the HO was therefore authorized to add the seven states to the

NSA list.

Another source that was available to Good and of which he was conscious at his time of writing – he refers to it[18] in his account (see below) – was the minutes from the first (September 2003) APCI meeting, which contains the following passage referring to the question of the panel's establishment:

> The Home Office commented that there had been some opposition to the addition of some countries to the NSA list. If the country information in relation to such countries had been considered by the Panel, this may provide some reassurance that the decision to designate a particular country had been made on a sound basis (APCI 1.M:§3.8).

An alternative narrative to that which is provided by Good of the founding of the APCI that emerges from a consideration of these data is the following. The Labour Government, which formed in 1997, had been under pressure from pro-migration NGOs since at least the second year of its existence to improve the quality of the reports that it used in the asylum system by forming an independent documentation centre to produce them. But it was not until five years later, in the summer of 2003, that the HO announced the formation of the APCI. The major impetus for this move by the HO was increasing criticism from opposition (Conservative and Liberal Democrat) MPs to – and therefore, greater difficulty in – expanding the NSA list, a provision of the 2002 Act. It was only after being threatened by opposition MPs (recall the Liberal Democrat's statement that the Government had been 'warned') that the HO formed the APCI. It struggled at first to find willing participants, but ultimately succeeded in recruiting committee members. Here the panel's establishment is narrated as a rather clumsy response by the HO to pressure from opposition parties in its attempts to erect further barriers to migration (i.e., expand the

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[18] The meeting minutes were easily accessible on the APCI's website, which he refers to in his account.

NSA list), rather than as Good's narrative of rational and effective bureaucracy.

Having considered the panel's history, I now move on to a discussion of its personnel.

2.1.2. APCI personnel

Good describes the personnel of the APCI, stating that it is an organisation

> comprising individual scholars and nominated representatives of relevant organisations. Perhaps surprisingly, the chosen academic members, while very eminent researchers, seem never to have acted as country experts and were certainly not listed in the ILPA [Immigration Law Practitioners' Association]'s *Directory of Experts* (2007:215).

Country experts are described by Good as people 'such as social anthropologists and political analysts' (ibid.:5) who provide reports or in-person testimony for asylum courts about the goings-on in particular places on the behalf of people who are appealing their refused asylum claims.

I have found Good's description of the panel's personnel as including scholars to be accurate. According to the panel's meeting minutes, by its tenth (March 2007) meeting, the Panel had had ten academics as members. A chronology of the membership of these individuals is visualised below.

Table 2: APCI academic members

Member ('C' for chair)	University	APCI meeting									
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1 (C)	Oxford	▨	▨	▨	▨	▨					
2	Wales (Swansea)	▨	▨	▨	▨	▨					
3	Sussex	▨	▨	▨	▨	▨					
4	Oxford		▬	▨	▨	▨	▨	▨	▨	▨	▨
5 (C)	UCL[19]		▨	▨	▨	▨	▨	▨	▮	▮	▮
6	LSE[20], Westminster				▨	▨	▨	▨			
7	UCL							▨	▨	▨	▨
8	City								▨	▨	▨
9	Oxford								▨	▨	▨
10	Reading									▨	▨

Key:

▨ Member and attended

▨ Member but did not attend

▬ Member, but I am uncertain of academic institute

▮ Member, but not academic

These ten academics were based at six different universities (only one academic was based at more than one university during the period of membership). Half of the panel's academic members and both of its chairs were based at either Oxford or UCL.

Good's (non-ironic, I think) claim that these scholars were 'eminent' is supported by online evidence on their administrative statuses. Half of them were directors of academic institutes at the time they joined the panel, as seen in the table below.

[19] University College London
[20] London School of Economics and Political Science

Table 3: APCI academic members directing institutes

Academic	Institute directed
1	Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford
9	Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford
8	Information Centre on Asylum and Refugees, City University
2	Migration Research Unit, University of Wales, Swansea
3	Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (DRCMGP), University of Sussex

Good alludes to a process of selection by the HO in using the adjective 'chosen' to refer to the panel's academic members. In order to choose, of course, a person must be conscious of options. My search of the HO RDS website produced evidence that prior relations with the HO were common among academic recruits to the panel. By the ninth (January 2007) meeting of the Panel, both of its chairs and at least three of its members – five out of the nine academics who had been members of the Panel by that point in time – had produced research under contract for the HO RDS Immigration Research and Statistics Service (IRSS) before joining. The ratio rises to six out of ten if both contractors and sub-contractors are considered. A future academic panel member – Dr Hammond – is credited at the end of an IRSS-commissioned report with having 'assisted in the research' (Gilbert and Koser 2004:4). I discuss interaction between MARS academics and the IRSS in greater detail in the last section of this chapter and again in Chapter Four.

Good's evaluation of his finding that none of the academic panel members had acted as country experts prior to joining as being surprising surprises me. Good's expectation must have been that the HO would choose panel members on the basis of their ability to evaluate Country Reports alone, regardless of their prior interaction with the agency. However, in his monograph that I have been discussing, Good

describes the often agonistic relationship in the asylum courts between adjudicators and HO representatives, on the one hand, and people appealing their refused asylum claims, their solicitors, and country experts on the other. In the same chapter that he describes the APCI, he refers to 'the difficulties posed [for judicial decision makers] when pesky expert findings stand in the way of conclusions reached on other grounds' (Good 2007:237). That Good would expect the HO to select academics wholly on the basis of their analytical skills, uninfluenced by their past history of antagonism points to an underlying Weberian assumption that the HO operates as a rational (i.e., functioning according to purely objective considerations) bureaucracy that is unaffected by personal grudges.

I have found Good's observation that academics were joined on the panel by the representatives of non-academic organisations also to be accurate (See Appendix 2.1). His evaluation of these organisations as being 'relevant', which he does not support with evidence, contributes to his Weberian narrative, as well. In calling the organisations that he does not identify 'relevant' and in failing to justify this characterisation, the reader is left with only Good's attribution of rational choice to the HO. Having considered the panel's personnel, I next move on to a discussion of its activities.

2.1.3. APCI activities

Good describes the APCI's activities in the following way:

APCI meets regularly and examines a selection of CIPU material. All its proceedings, discussions, received submissions, and reports are in the public domain

(www.apci.org.uk). One of APCI's earliest actions was to commission independent analyses of the CIPU *Reports* on Somalia and Sri Lanka, which came to very similar critical conclusions to those reached by IAS (ibid.:215, italics in original).

I have found that the panel did indeed meet regularly to examine CIPU/COIS material, that its meeting minutes and supporting documents were posted on the web, and that it commissioned analyses of Country Reports. The APCI met ten times between September of 2003 and March of 2007 (See Appendix 2.2). I have found that much of the meeting time was taken up by discussions concerning the analyses that the panel commissioned. Therefore, I describe them first.

The authors of panel-commissioned analyses claimed within them that they evaluated the Country Reports for accuracy, balance, and comprehensiveness. I was told by an academic member of the panel – Professor Reilly – during an interview that the panel copied the analytical approach that the IAS had used in producing its earlier analyses of Country Reports. 'We took over their methodology', she said. I am certain that the IAS study to which my interviewee – and Good, in his account above – referred was its 2003 report, 'Home Office Country Assesments: An Analysis'. The report's executive summary contains the following description of the methods used in its production: 'IAS and a team of volunteer researchers have examined the text of seventeen of the Home Office assessments and compared it with the sources used by the Home Office. This exercise is simple, if time-consuming' (Immigration Advisory Service n.d.:3). A bit further along, the report states that '[n]either the researchers nor IAS purport to be experts on these countries' (ibid.:5).

Three of the panel-commissioned analyses of three different Country Reports (i.e., Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iran) contain nearly identically worded passages in which

their authors similarly deny having expertise in the object of the Country Report that they evaluated. Typical of these was the following: 'It should be stressed that the authors of this commentary [panel member Prof Black and a colleague of his at his research institute] are not 'experts' on the current security situation in Somalia' (APCI 2.2:2).

My analysis of the minutes of the panel's first through seventh (March 2006) meetings found that the panel commissioned 37 analyses from 24 researchers (see Appendix 2.3). These analyses are described in tabular format in Appendix 2.4. Professor Reilly told me that the panel members did so without input from the HO. She told me:

> [Something] we insisted on, by the way, was controlling the research ourselves. So we actually appointed researchers for each country report we reviewed. The Home Office paid, but it was entirely under our control. That was how we could really get very critical reports.

Statements from the meeting minutes also indicate that APCI researchers were chosen by members of the panel (see, for example, APCI 5.M:§6.17).

The financial records that I acquired from the academic research centre to which one of the academic panel members belonged show that the centre received £4,935 from the HO for what is described as an 'Evaluation of CIPU Country Assessment'. Assuming consistency in the amount paid for the HO for such analyses, during the time between these meetings, commissioned researchers were paid a total of £182,595.

The figure below displays the distribution of APCI research contracts among think-tank, freelance, and university researchers (see Appendix 2.5 for the tabular data).[21]

Figure 7: Commissioned researchers and contracts by institutional affiliation

Academics were awarded contracts twice as frequently as were either freelance researchers or think-tank employees. Contracts were awarded to academics more than twice as frequently as they were to either freelance researchers or think-tank employees. Commissioned researchers tended to be either panel members, themselves, or their institutional colleagues. As seen in Appendix 2.6, more than half (i.e., 14 out of 24) were thus, and they were awarded just under two-thirds (23 out of 37) of the contracts.

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[21] I use the word 'freelance' in place of the word 'independent', which appears in the meeting minutes of the panel.

Two out of the 20 contracts that were awarded to university researchers were given to two academics at universities outside of the UK. The following figure gives a visual representation of the distribution of APCI contracts to individuals at UK universities.

Figure 8: Commissioned researchers and contracts by university in the UK

Seven out of the ten academics based at UK universities who produced work on behalf of the APCI belonged to two universities – Oxford and Sussex – and they were awarded 72 percent (13 out of 18) of the contracts given to academics at such universities. Relations between the academic members of the APCI and the panel's UK-based academic commissioned researchers were thus characterised by close collegiality – not in the sense of a spirit, but rather in terms of coincidence (see Appendix 2.7). Eight of the ten UK academics who were commissioned by the panel were either panel members (two) or institutional colleagues of academic panel members (six). They were awarded 15 out of the 18 contracts that went to UK academics. Therefore, one-third of the individuals awarded contracts by the APCI

(eight of 24) were either academic panel members or their institutional colleagues, and these recipients were awarded 15 of the 37 contracts that were distributed by the panel.

I find Good's use of the word 'independent' to describe the panel-commissioned analyses to be both inaccurate *and* to be an additional element in his Weberian narrative. I understand Good to mean that their authors were '[n]ot depending upon the authority of another, not in a position of subordination or subjection; not subject to external control or rule; self-governing, autonomous, free' (OED 1989). I have found evidence that contradicts this characterization; commissioned researchers were commonly related to panel members as subordinates.

As I showed above, 14 commissioned researchers (who received 23 contracts) were either panel members or their institutional colleagues. When the two academic panel members who commissioned themselves and their four commissioned projects are excluded, we are left with contracts being awarded to 12 individuals who belonged to panel members' institutions and the 19 projects that they did on behalf of the APCI. Within this collegiality, there is a hierarchical pattern (see Appendix 2.8). In the majority (nine out of 12) of the commissioned researchers, who accounted for 14 out of the 19 contracts, the administrative relation of researcher to panel member was one of subordination (see Appendix 2.9 for details of these relations). Therefore, a little less than half (i.e., nine out of 22) of the non-panel member recipients of APCI research contracts should not be described as being 'independent' of the panel. In characterizing the commissioned analyses as being independent, Good continues to build his narrative of impersonal bureaucratic practice. Rather than as contracting

researchers according to personal allegiances, the panel is represented as having commissioned reports from individuals who were free from power relations.

Furthermore, had the commissioning been independent, the distribution of contracts would have been much different that it actually was. Simply put: the people who were awarded contracts represented a very small fraction of the group of researchers who were capable of successfully carrying out the work. The relative simplicity of the production task (recall the IAS statement that its CR method of analysis, which was adopted by the APCI, was 'simple, if time-consuming') and the extremely limited requirements for expertise on the state of the art of research on human rights and security in the 'countries' in question (recall that both IAS and many commissioned researchers explicitly denied being experts on these phenomena) meant that the pool of qualified researchers included postgraduate students and faculty in a wide range of social sciences departments (including area studies) and researchers at many for- and not-for-profit organisations (such as Oxford Analytica and IAS) who had been trained to postgraduate level in these fields. These researchers numbered easily in the thousands, belonging to certainly dozens of organisations in the UK, alone. That contracting was conducted on the basis of personal allegiances rather than on the ability of the contracted scholars' ability to successfully carry out the work is indicated by the extremely non-random distribution of APCI research contracts described above.

I have found that many of the commissioned analyses – especially the early ones – did indeed criticise the Country Reports, as Good's account states. For example, panel member and future Chair Dr Koser and a graduate student at the institute directed by

panel member Prof Black found 'many examples of a lack of accuracy, representativeness and comprehensiveness' in the April 2004 CIPU report on Afghanistan (APCI 3.3a:5). These same authors reported having 'fewer reservations over the value of the current report as evidence in assessing asylum claims' in their commissioned analysis of the CIPU's revised Afghanistan Country Report (APCI 4.1:6). According to the minutes of the panel's seventh (March 2006) meeting, more positive evaluations of Country Reports than these examples were made by its members (see also evaluations of India Country Report and RFFM by APCI members above):

> The Chair agreed that with the consistently good standard of COI Reports now being produced, the issue of 'diminishing returns' would need to be considered by the Panel (APCI 6.M:§3.12).
>
> Mr Andrysek [of UNHCR] said that there has been a clear improvement in the Home Office's reports over the past couple of years, but that UNHCR has never thought there had been any bias in them. In general, it would always be possible to 'nitpick', but it seems that the time is approaching when they are running out of things to comment upon (ibid.:§3.11).

Another of Good's assertions regarding the panel's activities was that the panel suggested that the HO reorganise itself. The panel's meeting minutes show that the APCI did indeed advise the CIPU/COIS on how to become more professional in its research methods and on how to avoid the appearance of mixing 'policy' and 'analysis'. It recommended an administrative separation of the group that produces decision-making advice for immigration officers from that which produces Country Reports. Having discussed the panel's activities, I now proceed to discuss its impact.

2.1.4. APCI impact

In this sub-section I first discuss briefly the claim that Good makes regarding the APCI's impact and then proceed to describe in detail the symbolic, technical, and pedagogic means by which MARS academics contributed to the APCI's facilitation of migration control.

2.1.4.1. Good's analysis

Good claimed only the following regarding the panel's impact: 'In September 2004, in response to one of APCI's suggestions, IND announced the reorganisation of CIPU, and the setting up of a dedicated Country of Origin Information (COI) Service' (2007:215). I found that evidence from both the panel's meeting minutes and an interview that I carried out with one of its MARS academic members supported this assertion. In the transcript of this interview, which I present below at considerable length, Professor Jones described this migrant CODAR ring IV managerial impact (at the beginning and end of the passage) *and* two additional effects that I discuss in greater detail below: 1) the legitimation of the 'tightening up' by the Government of asylum legislation and 2) the improvement of the quality of CRs.

After I asked Prof Reilly what the 'role' of the APCI was, she responded,

> Prof Reilly (PR): Well, it has a number of roles. I mean, the official role is to monitor the country information reports prepared by the appropriate section of the Home Office.
>
> Joshua Hatton (JH): Which is… which has changed now, right?
>
> PR: It's… yeah… Well, it was one of our recommendations that it change. You know, so it's quality control and monitoring. That is the ostensible reason. The other reason

behind it all is that it has a legitimation function for the government. Because when they… when they were trying to tighten up on asylum policy, the opponents of that policy were pointing out that the country reports on which asylum decisions were often based were extremely low in quality. And there was a review done by the… the IAS, which went into great detail on mistakes and omissions in their reports. And it was actually raised in the House of Lords. And it was a condition made for support for the two… 2002 or two-thousand and three act.

JH: There's a 2002 act, I know.

PR: 2002. Yeah. That an independent monitoring body should be set up. So it was… it always had that legitimation function. And I think everyone who was asked to join realised that. And so, what we did was to make it very explicit. And say, we know that what the government wants out of us is legitimation. And we'll only do it if they really genuinely change things. And we could use that as leverage to insist firstly, that the whole thing be incredibly transparent. I mean, everything the committee produced is publicly available. Including all the minutes, all the critiques of the Home Office work and the Home Office responses. It's all on the web. It's really, really transparent. That was the first thing. And the second one was we wanted a genuine willingness to change and improve.

JH: That's probably even harder to get, I would imagine.

PR: No, no, it wasn't! The… the

JH: Really?

PR: The people within the Home Office knew their work wasn't up to standard. And they felt it was because they didn't have the resources or the time to do it properly. And they could use us as leverage to force their bosses to give them more resources and, you know, to modify the workload. Which happened. We reduced the number of countries done each six months from thirty-five to twenty. So to focus more on quality rather than doing a lot.

JH: Oh yeah. Greater depth.

PR: And we insisted that there be… well, we wanted professional researchers to be employed. Which isn't the case. But they did employ… they did put [COIS] into their research section. So at least there would be professional supervision.

Good's narrative of the administrative reorganisation of CIPU is consonant with that which he constructed for the founding of the APCI. Both recount a process of rational bureaucratic efficacy in problem solving. A flaw was identified. There was an inquiry into the problem. Corrections were made. Although one of the effects of the panel that Prof Reilly identifies in her statement above fits neatly within this Weberian

framework (i.e., an improvement in the quality of CRs), another does not; it is upon this impact – that which she refers to as 'legitimation' – that I next focus my attention.

2.1.4.2. Symbolic facilitation of migration control

As members of the APCI – and actors positioned in migrant CODAR ring V – MARS academics provided the Immigration Minister with favourable evaluations of CRs, which the latter subsequently used to acquire parliamentary approval for the intensification of migration control. The Minister's statement before a parliamentary committee (see above) that the CR on India had been judged by the APCI to be '*generally a fair reflection* of the position in India' (my emphasis) was nearly identical to that of one of the panel's Chairs, who was minuted (see also above) as 'saying that the view of the meeting was that, despite some problems, the Country Report was *generally a fair reflection* of the country situation and source material' (my emphasis).

It was standard practice for APCI discussions to include analyses of not only how well the CRs approximated the documents upon which these reports was based, but also of how accurately the CRs represented the actual conditions in the 'country' to which it referred. Chair Castles was minuted at the panel's second (March 2004) meeting as stating that 'when undertaking an evaluation of this sort [i.e., a commissioned CR analysis]' the 'fundamental question' to be answered is the following: '*Does the [Country] Report provide a correct, balanced and adequate picture of the situation in the country concerned, so that it can be an adequate information source for asylum decisions?*' (APCI 2.M:§4.4; emphasis in original).

The following words and phrases from only one panel-commissioned CR analysis (APCI 6.3) and statements by panel members in the minutes for only a few (i.e., three – its third, fourth, and seventh) of its meetings provided additional positive evaluations of the CRs:

- Accurate
- Adequate
- Good
- Fairly good
- Consistently good
- Thorough and extensive
- Helpful
- Fine
- Unbiased
- Not able to be faulted

These and other favourable written statements in commissioned analyses and spoken statements at meetings by APCI panel members (including MARS academics) were utilised on several other occasions by Government representatives to acquire parliamentary approval for adding states to the NSA list. This impact of MARS academic activity through the APCI is clear in the following excerpts from the statements made by the Lord Bassam of Brighton in the House of Lords on 10 July 2007 (Hansard 2007).

'This is now the fifth order', he said, 'that we have brought forward adding countries to the list of those countries to which the non-suspensive appeal provisions in Section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 apply' (ibid.). A bit later, Lord Bassam said the following:

> Since their introduction, powers to add countries to the list have been used on a progressive basis to ensure that the provisions work well and are successful in stopping people making unfounded applications for asylum and unnecessarily prolonging the appeals process. The evidence to date on the 14 countries already on the list demonstrates that this is indeed the case and that the powers have made a significant impact on reducing the number of asylum applicants from those countries (ibid.).

Later, he added:

> As a result of this process, we have been able to remove from the United Kingdom individuals whose asylum claims were established to be unfounded […]. In view of the successful operation of the provisions thus far, we have decided that the time is now right for us to add a further 10 countries to the list (ibid.).

Then, he described the process by which he claimed that the Government had identified new states to be added to the NSA list:

> In considering the 10 countries listed in the draft order, we took carefully into account our published country of origin information material which utilises a wide range of recognised and publicly disclosable governmental and non-governmental sources. We also consulted the independent Advisory Panel on Country Information on that material (ibid.).

'The panel', he went on to say,

> considered the country of origin information produced on the 10 countries produced in the draft order at its recent meeting and found it to be generally an accurate, balanced and comprehensive representation of the source material and country conditions. Following the panel's advice, additional information was added or amendments made as appropriate (ibid.).

Lord Bassam concluded by moving '[t]hat the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Asylum (Designated States) Order 2007' (ibid.). After a brief discussion, the motion was agreed to by the committee (ibid.). Having described the important role that MARS academics played in the APCI's facilitation of migration control by symbolic means – i.e., the 'legitimation function' of the panel

that was mentioned by its academic member Professor Reilly – I now continue with my discussion of their role(s) in the migration control actor network by considering the technical means by which they did so.

2.1.4.3. Technical facilitation of migration control

Above I stated that the APCI facilitated migration control as part of migrant CODAR ring III by assisting the CIPU/COIS in the production of its CRs. As mentioned by Professor Reilly in our discussion above, the panel improved the quality – i.e., accuracy and comprehensiveness – of the documents. In this subsection I provide details of this node in the actor network traced by CODAR, focussing on the participation of MARS academic members of the panel in the process by which CRs were produced.

The following is a diachronic description of the process of APCI knowledge production. The time period covered by this narrative is from the first meeting through the eighth (October 2006) meeting. At first, the Panel was meant to synthesise the comments made by civil society actors about the Country Reports and pass along this information to the HO. This was the 'two-tier' working method that was proposed by the HO (APCI 1.3) and agreed to by the Panel (APCI 1.M:§4.6). It had the following steps:

1. Publication of Country Report (CR) by HO
2. Consultees invited to comment on CR by Chair
3. Consultee and Panel member comments on CR sent to Secretariat (CIPU)
4. CIPU acts on comments and prepares summary of comments and actions planned or already taken for the Panel
5. Panel considers document from step 4.

6. Panel makes suggestions to CIPU

This approach was abandoned by the Panel at its second (March 2004) meeting, after only one Consultation Exercise. What developed next was the addition of NGOs of observer status (i.e., IAS) to the Panel and a network of financed knowledge production – described above – that extended directly from Panel members to independent, think-tank and university researchers. The minutes for second, third (September 2004), fourth (December 2004) and fifth (March 2005) meetings show that Panel members selected researchers, who then produced analyses of recently published Country Reports. The authors were paid for their labour by the APCI Secretariat. The UNHCR and IAS also submitted comments on the Country Reports. During the Panel meetings, the Country Report analyses would be presented by the author or a Panel member, and then the HO would describe the changes that it had made to the CRs in response to the analyses.

The Country Reports that were addressed at the sixth (September 2005) meeting were the following (listed using classifications contained in the minutes): two 'follow-up reports' (Nigeria and Zimbabwe); four 'new evaluations' (Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey); and two 'still in draft form' (Mongolia and Ghana) (APCI 5.M:§3.4). The panel's second Chair, a MARS academic like its first, is recorded as having indicated that between the fifth and sixth meetings the HO had requested of the first Chair that the Panel analyse the unpublished drafts of the Mongolia, Ghana and Pakistan country reports for the sixth meeting because these countries were being considered by the HO for NSA status (ibid.:§3.1, 6.7-6.8).The HO proposed that these – and future – reports of countries being considered for NSA

status be analysed by APCI-commissioned researchers in their draft form, not following publication.

The second Chair is recorded in the sixth meeting minutes as saying that

> [The first Chair] had agreed to this approach being taken with Ghana and Mongolia as a pilot for a possibly more efficient and integrated method of working with the Home Office. Rather than the current, somewhat long-winded, process (whereby the Home Office published a report, a researcher reviewed it, the Home Office responded and then amended the next version), an APCI-approved researcher would provide input directly at draft stage (ibid.:§6.8).

Panel members are described as debating this proposal, with three members expressing concerns. A representative of the AIT is recorded as saying that

> the APCI needed to be seen to be independent and that by becoming involved in editing drafts they were perhaps getting a little too close to the Home Office. He said that he was not rejecting the proposed approach, but wanted to flag up the need to maintain a clear distinction between the report writers and those commenting (ibid.:§6.11).

Then, the Panel member from the ICMPD is said to have 'agreed that the Panel's mandate in the process needed to be very clear' (ibid.). An official of COIS is recorded as countering that

> he did not think that the proposed process was conceptually different from the existing one, just more streamlined. He said there were clear points of separation in the process: the researchers providing input were not members of the Panel; the Panel would not necessarily endorse the researchers' findings; and the Panel would certainly not endorse the Country Report produced (ibid.:§6.12).

The minutes state that after asking how the proposed process would be more efficient, the Panel member from Chatham House – echoing Prof Reilly's statement in our interview regarding the transparency of the APCI – 'said that she thought that

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providing input at draft stage rather than after publication would make the process less transparent' (ibid.:§6.13). 'Regarding the transparency issue', the minutes continue, '[The AIT representative] felt that the proposed process would be acceptable provided the Panel refrained from editorial input; otherwise it could appear that the Panel was publishing the Report' (ibid.:§6.14). The minutes record the resolution of the debate in the following way: 'It was agreed that researchers would be commissioned to evaluate and provide feedback on the four new Reports at draft stage. The process would be reviewed at the March [2006] meeting' (ibid.:§6.16).

Four out of the five Country Report analyses presented and discussed in March 2006 at the seventh meeting were produced before the HO publication of the Reports. Again, the minutes record this approach as being referred to by the second Chair as 'a pilot' (APCI 6.M:§2.13). The analyses presented in the meeting contained the authors' evaluation, comments by the HO, and sometimes the response of the author to the HO's comments, as well. The 'pilot' was positively viewed by the HO officials, but was said in the minutes to 'not be feasible for the APCI evaluation of the 'top 20' asylum intake countries, as there simply will not be sufficient time within the publication schedules' (ibid.:§2.14). The minutes state that the HO would, however, 'set up formal consultation arrangements' (APCI 6.6) with and secure the 'direct input of academic country experts' (APCI 6.M:§5.3) for each of the 'top 20' asylum countries. The minutes and accompanying documents give no indication that these relationships would be regulated or monitored by the Panel.

At the eighth (October 2006) meeting, three 'follow-up' analyses (Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, and Pakistan) and one 'new evaluation' (Liberia) were

presented and discussed. During the meeting, an official of COIS is recorded as

giving a report on developments in the agency since June of 2005, when it was moved

to HO RDS following the APCI recommendation for the reorganisation of the

production of CRs referred to above. He is minuted as saying that

> COI Service was also looking to establish close contacts with academic country experts
> for each top 20 country. The experts would provide feedback on the COI Report and be
> a ready source of ongoing advice for COI staff to call upon. COI Service had entered
> initial discussions with suitable organisations to explore options for setting this up
> (APCI 7.M:§2.8).

A bit later, the minutes state that a Panel member from the University of Oxford

'praised the developments mentioned [above by the COIS official] and said that

country familiarisation visits and establishing contact with country experts in the UK

were both excellent ideas' (ibid.:§2.10). The COIS official is minuted as responding

to this academic's comments, and then a second Oxford academic, director of its RSC,

is recorded as having 'asked how updating COI Reports on a more frequent basis and

direct contacts with academic experts might impact on the work of the Panel'

(ibid.:§2.12). The COIS official is recorded as replying:

> The contacts and feedback from academic country experts was intended to enhance
> country officers' understanding of the country and the range of sources available. This
> was different from (but complementary to) the work of the Panel which acted as an
> independent monitor and reviewed the final products (ibid.:§2.13).

The following section of the minutes records the end of the discussion of the issue of

the direct contracting of country experts by COIS during the eighth meeting:

> The Chair asked whether there was a procedure in place for identifying suitable country
> experts. [The COIS official] said that there was no formal process for this but initial
> discussions were being held with [Panel member institution] Chatham House on a
> possible way forward, and other organisations may also be approached. [The Panel's

second Chair] said that it made sense for the Home Office to expand its contacts with academics and NGOs if this did not duplicate the work of APCI (ibid.:§2.14).

This narrative of the process of production of CRs by the APCI and CIPU/COIS has shown that MARS academics participated in two ways. First, as commissioned researchers (and panel members, in the cases of Professor Black and Dr Koser) they helped CIPU/COIS to make CRs more accurate. Second, as panel members they agreed to the CIPU/COIS requested change in the CR production process by which it was 'streamlined' and made more efficient. A third way (seen above) in which MARS academics participated was through the identification by MARS academic panel members of researchers (fellow MARS academics, in some cases) for the APCI secretariat to commission to provide analyses of CRs. As I showed above, these documents were subsequently used by HOPOs and AIT personnel to make people without British citizenship bureaucratically eligible for direct physical coercion. Having discussed the technical means by which MARS academics facilitated migration through their participation in the APCI, I now consider the third mechanism by which they did so – pedagogy.

2.1.4.4. Pedagogic facilitation of migration control

MARS academic panel members of the APCI contributed to the organisation's facilitation of migration control by training several students to engage with the HO as commissioned researchers. Two of these students were then members of the SCMR, which was then directed by a panel member. One of them was this panel member's

supervisee.[22] The third was then a student in Oxford's QEH (Queen Elizabeth House n.d.a), the department which housed the RSC – the institute directed by the panel's first Chair. This student was recruited – like the panel member and SCMR director's supervisee, by his supervisor, a faculty member at Oxford's QEH[23] – who had been commissioned by his QEH colleague, the panel's first Chair (APCI 4.M:2.17).

Although these students were listed as co-authors in six of the seven commissioned CR analyses that they produced, there is evidence that they did the lion's share of this work. The panel's second Chair is minuted as 'noting that most of the work' on the first CR analysis that he co-authored with her 'had been undertaken by [the supervisee of the panel member who was also the SCMR's co-director]' (APCI 3.M:5.5). The panel member and SCMR director is minuted as referring to one of the two SCMR students as '[t]he author of' (APCI 2.M:3.1) the first of two CR analyses that he is listed as co-authoring with her. The minutes of the panel's fifth (March 2005) meeting state that the QEH colleague of the panel's first Chair 'had arranged for' his supervisee 'to produce the' first of two CR analyses in which the two were listed as co-authors 'and had provided support and guidance' (APCI 4.M:2.17). It is this support and guidance – or, training – to which I turn next.

I have gathered information that suggests that this training was effective and ongoing. The last of the seven commissioned CR analyses that were produced by students was not co-authored (as were the six already mentioned), but rather was credited solely to the panel member and SCMR director's supervisee that I mentioned above. Her

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[22] Ms Oeppen's blog includes the following: 'I'm a British doctoral student at the Sussex Centre of Migration Research, University of Sussex, UK. My academic supervisors are Professor Richard Black and Professor Ron Skeldon' (University of Sussex n.d.b).

[23] Dr Mustapha is listed as his supervisor on the QEH 'Research Students' webpage (Queen Elizabeth House n.d.b).

commissioned report contained the following (mostly) positive evaluation in a section titled, 'Overall assessment':

> The COI reports have improved considerably since the author first wrote a commentary on the April 2004 CIPU report on Afghanistan. The areas where progress is particularly apparent are accuracy, use of abbreviations and cross-referencing. Also, the sources used are almost all from the last two years, which is an important improvement. Some attempts at highlighting conflicting information in sources have been made, which is a positive development, one that will hopefully continue in future reports. The selection of information remains a concern. […] Examples have been highlighted in the commentary where significant information has not been included. However, in some examples, it is a case of elaborating on things said too briefly, rather than identifying information missing entirely (APCI E.1:4).

Furthermore, not only was this commissioned researcher the only student out of the three who appears as the sole author of a commissioned CR analysis, she was also the only one to attend a meeting of the APCI. She presented her CR analysis to and engaged in discussion with panel members and observers at its ninth (January 2007) meeting.

In sum, MARS academic panel members trained two MARS students and one in the closely related (and sometimes overlapping) field of development studies to produce CR analyses under contract to the HO Secretariat of the APCI. The success of this pedagogy is apparent in one of the students' progression from co-author and meeting non-attendee to single author and meeting participant. MARS academic panel members therefore contributed to the APCI's assistance to CIPU/COIS by training MARS students to participate as CR analysis producers and meeting attendees.

2.1.5. Critique of Good's account

I have shown Good's account to be accurate for the most part, i.e., that what he said happened did happen when he said it did. I have also shown how his primarily diachronic account can be expressed as the following narrative. The HO corrected a flaw in its asylum system that had been brought to its attention by NGOs by first performing an internal audit to confirm that there was indeed a problem, and then by setting up the APCI as a response. Its academic members were chosen on the basis of their abilities and judgement, which were indicated by their success in their field. The non-academic organisations were selected because they were relevant. The analyses that the panel commissioned and that formed the basis of its assessments of the Country Reports were independent. The HO reorganised the CIPU as a response to a recommendation by the panel in order to ensure that its role was one of analysis rather than of policy. I have shown how this narrative is structured in the same way as Weber's concept of modern bureaucracy and the HO's rhetoric of 'evidence-based policy', which I discuss in greater detail in Chapter Three.

Contrastingly, my account narrates a process in which the HO established the panel rather clumsily in response to pressure from opposition parties in its attempts to expand the NSA list. Many of the academics who accepted the HO's invitation to become members were the directors of their research institutes and had proven their reliability to (and sympathy with) the HO in the past as its commissioned researchers. The panel spent nearly £200K of the HO's money for analyses of CRs that did not require expertise by their authors in the places that these documents described. These research contracts were distributed primarily on the basis of collegiality: nearly two

out of three analyses were commissioned from either the institutional colleagues of panel members or, in a few cases, from panel members themselves. The panel's positive assessments of the CRs were subsequently utilised by the HO to expand the NSA list, thereby criminalising the presence of people in the UK. The panel and its commissioned researchers provided technical assistance that resulted in an improvement in the accuracy of CRs. Furthermore, the APCI also trained students to provide these symbolic and technical services for the HO.

How should the discrepancy between our accounts and narratives be understood? First of all, Good and I clearly built our accounts using different materials. Good's appears to have been based on two HO RDS publications, two APCI-commissioned reports, and a HO press release – none of which were published after 2004. I used a wider range of sources – some of which were produced more recently. However, Good either used or was certainly aware of materials that were available in 2004 from which he could have selected information to produce a very different account. This was clear in the contrast between our histories of the founding of the panel. Good could have used *Hansard*. He could have scanned the minutes of the panel's first three meetings on its website and observed that it was commissioning its members and their institutional colleagues (including students) to produce what have been described as 'simple, if time-consuming' analyses that could have been produced just as effectively by many, many others (i.e., the 'volunteer researchers' who did so on behalf of IAS). Obviously, Good *could have* used these materials that were at his disposal to create an equally brief (recall that he devotes only a short passage to his consideration of the APCI), but very different – in terms of the nature of its content – account (i.e., the paragraph immediately above) than the one that he did.

Instead, Good appears to have taken the representations of the panel that were produced by the HO and the panel, itself, more or less at face value, without further investigation. This goes a long way, I think, in explaining the similarity between Good's APCI narrative, Weber's description of modern bureaucracy as being rational, and the Labour Government's mantra of evidence-based policy. In his account of the APCI Good represents bureaucracy the way it represents itself. A passage from the beginning of *Asylum and expertise* leads me to think that he did so because these representations mapped relatively neatly onto his own values regarding the restriction of immigration. In the first sentence of its first chapter Good writes,

> It is by no means self-evident that people's movements should be restricted by the boundaries of nation states […], but as such restrictions do actually exist it is important to assess critically how they are applied, to help ensure that this is done fairly (2007:5).

Thus, according to Good, states should restrict people's movements fairly because states restrict people's movements. More than just a tautology, Good's statement can also be seen as a restrictionist manifesto that in its wording and spirit nearly matches the APCI's definition of its aims on its website – i.e., 'to help ensure' that the HO's Country Reports are 'accurate, balanced, *impartial* and up to date as possible' (APCI n.d.c, emphasis added). For Good, the HO and the APCI, then, migration controls should not (for example) be abolished, but rather be implemented fairly – whatever that might mean. I think it reasonable to say that through its championing of restrictionism and its portrayal of the APCI using what amounts to the panel's (and the HO's) own ostensible and humanitarian narrative of ensuring the fairness of the asylum system, Good's *Asylum and expertise* strengthens barriers to migration in one of the ways that the APCI does; it legitimises restriction in the eyes of an audience. I

have shown that the APCI does so for MPs as part of migrant CODAR ring V; I posit that Good's monograph does the same for academics. I develop this interpretation further in Chapters Three and Four. But before moving on to answer the '*why*' of the facilitation of migration control by MARS, I continue with my '*how*' CODAR analysis.

2.2. MARS and the MAC

I begin this section by recounting the role that the MAC plays in the actor network of migration control. Then I describe the interaction between MARS academics and the MAC. Finally, I discuss the symbolic, technical, and pedagogic means by which MARS academics assisted the MAC in controlling migration.

2.2.1. MAC facilitation of migration control

Above, I described the process by which the MAC provided technical and symbolic assistance to the HO in migrant CODAR rings IV and V. The MAC played the ring IV role in coercion by assisting the HO in proposing new criteria by which people were made bureaucratically eligible for deterrence. It helped the HO to determine for which of the so-called 'highly skilled' occupations there was a surplus of labour *or* a shortage that could not be 'sensibly' filled with 'immigrant workers' from outside of the EEA. The HO used this analysis in its deterrence efforts; it became more difficult for people with citizenships of states outside of the European Economic Area to acquire a UK work visa for these occupations. Furthermore, the MAC participated in the ring V role of authorizing criteria for making people bureaucratically eligible for

arrest, imprisonment, forced migration and deterrence. It provided the HO with legitimation for its deterrence activities – specifically those that targeted people with citizenship of the 'A2' and 'A8' member states of the EU. MARS academics played a role in both of these migrant CODAR ring IV and V processes.

2.2.2. MARS and the MAC

MARS academics participated in the MAC in two ways: as a member of the committee and as its commissioned researchers. The HO describes the MAC as being 'comprised of five leading economists plus an ex-officio member from the UK Commission for Employment and Skills and an official from the UK Border Agency' (UK Home Office 2008c). Four of the five economists held academic positions in the autumn of 2008. One of these four – the Committee's chair – was Professor of Industrial Relations at the LSE. Another was a Professor in the Economics Department at Royal Holloway College, University of London. A third was a Professor at the University of Warwick's Institute for Employment Research. The fourth was a MARS academic: a member of Oxford's COMPAS.

The MAC commissioned 'seven sectoral review papers on staff shortages and immigration' from 13 authors, one of whom was a MARS academic at the University of Sheffield, and an 'overview paper' (Anderson and Ruhs 2008:3) from two members of Oxford's COMPAS (one of whom was also a member of the MAC at that time) that synthesized the findings of the sectoral reviews. COMPAS received

£37,250 to carry out the project (Economic and Social Research Council 2008).[24]

Anderson and Ruhs described their commissioned report in the following way:

> This paper is part of a research project that was commissioned by the MAC to provide an independent analysis and assessment of the nature and micro-level determinants of staff shortages and the employment of migrants in key sectors and occupations of the UK economy (Anderson and Ruhs 2008:3).

There is evidence that two additional MARS academics assisted in the production of the overview paper. The MAC-commissioned 'sectoral review paper' written by Geddes includes the following statement regarding the process by which it and the other six sector papers were produced: 'All papers in this research project were coordinated by Bridget Anderson and Martin Ruhs, with the assistance of Rutvica Andrijasevic and Karin Heissler (all at Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) at the University of Oxford)' (Geddes 2008).

2.2.3. Facilitation of migration control

MARS academics facilitated migration control through their engagement with the MAC in the same kinds of ways as they did with the APCI, described above – by symbolic, technical, and pedagogic means.

2.2.3.1. Symbolic assistance

I described above how the Minister for Borders and Immigration claimed before MPs in the House of Commons that the Government approached the question of labour

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[24] The project is referred to in this source as 'Employer demand for migrant labour: a project for the Migration Advisory Committee - Bridget Anderson and Martin Ruhs'.

market access with 'an open mind' and that its decision regarding restrictions on people with citizenship of EU accession states had been 'informed' by 'expert advice' from the MAC. Membership in the MAC was not confidential, as my findings above indicate. The 'expert' status of its members was demonstrated through the publication of their identities on the MAC website and in the committee's reports.

2.2.3.2. Technical assistance

There is evidence that the two MAC-commissioned studies that were produced by MARS academics Geddes, Anderson, Ruhs, Andrijasevic, and Heissler were used by the MAC and the HO to determine to whom (i.e., to which people with citizenship of states other than those in the EEA) greater deterrence measures would be applied. The information contained within the 'sectoral review papers' that were 'coordinated' by Andrijasevic and Heissler were included by Anderson and Ruhs in their synthesis (2008) of the sector reports. For example, they cited the findings in the paper by Geddes (2008) that 'nearly 90 percent of agency workers employed in second stage food processing businesses were migrants' and that 'only nine percent of the […] gangmasters registered with the Gangmasters' Licensing Authority […] employed only British workers in comparison with 23 percent employing only migrants' (Anderson and Ruhs 2008:18).

The COMPAS MAC-commissioned report was one of several others that were brought together[25] in the production of the MAC's 'Skilled, shortage, sensible' report

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[25] The UKBA website includes a page that lists the Anderson and Ruhs paper as being one of the pieces of commissioned research that was taken into account by the MAC '[i]n considering which occupations to include on the lists' (UK Border Agency n.d.c).

described above that the committee submitted to the HO in September of 2008.

Chapter 8 – titled 'Is it sensible?' – of this report begins with the following:

> If a shortage of labour in a skilled occupation or job category is identified, we need to consider whether it is sensible to fill that shortage with immigrant workers from outside the European Economic Area (EEA). This chapter sets out our understanding of 'sensible' in relation to the shortage occupation list, the criteria we use for assessing the evidence on this question, and some issues and next steps. We draw heavily on Anderson and Ruhs (2008), which was commissioned by us and is published on our website alongside this report (UK Border Agency 2008a:135).

As described above, the HO published its official shortage occupation list, which was nearly identical to that which was included in this MAC report, shortly thereafter in November 2008.

2.2.3.3. Pedagogic assistance

I have gathered information that indicates that MARS academics assisted the MAC in a third way in the organisation's facilitation of migration control – by training the field's students to be able to produce documents that would provide the symbolic and technical assistance to the MAC that I described above. One of the co-producers of the COMPAS MAC-commissioned 'overview paper' is identified by the COMPAS website as being one of its 'associates' (COMPAS n.d.a) and is described as being 'a doctoral student in Development Studies' who 'is researching why young people in Bangladesh migrate to cities ['in developing countries'] for work and the conditions they feel are necessary for them to move' (COMPAS n.d.b). As a DPhil student, she

was the lowest-ranking member of the COMPAS group that produced the paper. Another member of the group was an early career researcher.[26]

2.3. Summary and comparison with surveyed literature

This third and final section of Chapter Two has two subsections. In the first, I summarize briefly my findings regarding the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics and use my migrant CODAR model to position them vis-à-vis the other members of the actor network through which people are targeted and coerced. In the second subsection, I relate my findings that I have presented in Chapters One and Two to the MARS and migration control literature that I described in the introduction to my thesis. Like these surveyed authors, I found *that* MARS academics facilitated migration control by symbolic and technical means. I showed that MARS academics did so, in addition, by those that were pedagogic. My account differed, however, in significant ways from those that I surveyed. I end the second subsection of this chapter with a discussion of the evidence that relates to the question of whether or not MARS academics facilitated migration control by providing the HO with surveillance on migrants that the agency subsequently used in its arrest, imprisonment, forced migration, and deterrence activities.

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[26] Her Open University profile states the following: 'Rutvica Andrijasevic joined the Open University following her three-year post-doctoral research at the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) at the University of Oxford where she worked first as an ESRC and later as an EC/Marie Currie Research Fellow on issues of sex trafficking, gender, and EU citizenship' (Open University n.d.).

2.3.1. Summary

In this chapter, I traced the actor network of migration control further than I did in Chapter One to include MARS academics. I described the symbolic, technical, and pedagogic means by which they assisted two non-departmental public bodies – the APCI and the MAC – in controlling migration. MARS academics assisted the APCI by 1) providing it with favourable (written and spoken) evaluations of CRs in commissioned analyses and at APCI meetings; 2) improving the accuracy of CRs; and 3) training students to do 1) and 2). MARS academics did so for the MAC by 1) providing the HO with recommendations that supported the agency's deterrence measures, 2) analysing the labour market to identify occupations for which there were either surpluses or shortages that could not be 'sensibly' filled with workers with citizenship in states outside of the EEA, and 3) training a student to do 1) and 2).

We can represent this now-extended actor network using the migrant CODAR instrument. MARS academics are located in CODAR rings III, IV, and V. They assisted the HO in managing the processes by which people were a) violently arrested, imprisoned, and forced to migrate; b) deterred from attempting to migrate in the first place; and c) made eligible bureaucratically for a) and b). They also contributed to the HO's formulation of new criteria by which people were made bureaucratically eligible for violence and deterrence. Finally, they assisted the HO in acquiring authorisation for these new criteria for eligibility.

2.3.2. Comparison

My account includes both of the kinds of means of facilitation of migration control that were identified by the authors I surveyed and proposes one that they did not include. Like Malkki, Chimni, De Genova, and Zetter, I found that MARS facilitated migration control by symbolic means. Like De Genova, Black, and Peutz, I found that it did so as well by those that were technical. In addition, I traced the actor network by which MARS academics facilitated migration control through pedagogic means.

The symbolic means I identified were similar to, yet far less vague than those proposed by the surveyed authors, who found that MARS academics facilitated migration control by reinforcing an assumption (Malkki), justifying practices (Chimni), naturalizing a relation (De Genova), and objectifying people (Zetter). Similarly, I showed how the analyses and recommendations of MARS academics justified migration control. I went beyond the surveyed authors, however, in describing precisely *to whom* it was justified – i.e., to opposition MPs.

The technical means I identified were quite different from those found in the literature I surveyed in my Introduction. The network that I traced using migrant CODAR did not include the exact means which De Genova, Black and Peutz identified: the provision of surveillance on migrants that is subsequently used for their control. I did not omit this specific technical means from my account on the grounds that I found no evidence for its existence, but rather because my findings in this regard were exceedingly equivocal: the high empirical standards (i.e., degree of certainty) that I had established for my ANT account and migrant CODAR analysis were not met. In

other words, I gathered information during fieldwork that supported *both* the interpretation of De Genova, Black, and Peutz *and* that which claims that MARS academics did not facilitate migration control through surveillance.

This ambiguity and the lack of isomorphism between my findings and those of these three surveyed authors merit a detailed discussion. It is only through such close examination that I might fulfil my aim that I set forth in my Introduction of following the lead of Asad et al. in providing to the literature on MARS the ethnographic details that it currently lacks regarding the issue of the field's possible effect(s) on migration control. The remainder of this second chapter is dedicated to carrying out this task.

In addition to helping to meet this goal, the following discussion also introduces findings from my fieldwork that I make reference to again in the chapters (i.e., Three, Four, and Five) in which I provide support for my more theoretical argument. My descriptions of *both* the consciousness of MARS academics regarding the effect(s) of their contract research relationship with the HO *and* the nature of this relationship, itself, form part of the evidential basis for the more theoretical arguments that I make in Chapters Three, Four, and Five – i.e., that MARS facilitated migration control because of *culture*, *power*, and *structure*. I begin my discussion of the issue of surveillance and migration control with evidence that supports the conclusion of De Genova, Black, and Peutz.

2.3.2.1. Evidence *for* facilitation via surveillance

There is evidence that supports the argument of De Genova, Black, and Peutz that MARS academics facilitated migration control through the production and provision of surveillance. I present this case in four subsections. First, I show that MARS academics' descriptions of the behaviour of people who were the primary targets of migration control reached the Immigration Research and Statistics Service (IRSS) of the Research, Development and Statistics (RDS) division of the HO via the reports that the IRSS commissioned from members of the field. Then, I describe the processes by which IRSS-commissioned MARS academics were successful in overcoming resistance from their human subjects to their gathering of such information for their reports. Finally, I discuss the evidence that indicates that the information contained within these reports was subsequently used by the HO to arrest, imprison, force to migrate, and deter.

Surveillance provision to the IRSS

Descriptions of the primary targets of migration control were provided to the IRSS by MARS academics. I found that this was the case when I analysed the interaction between the HO agency and its commissioned researchers. I constructed a sample of research produced and commissioned by the RDS IRSS for analysis by searching the RDS website (UK Home Office n.d.a) for migration-related publications. I searched all of the series that were listed on the website: Development and Practice Reports, On-line Publications, Home Office Research Studies (from 1996), Findings, Statistical Publications, Miscellaneous Publications, and Discontinued Publications.

This search – completed on 25 January 2006 – produced forty-two publications. In March of 2007, the HO released information in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request regarding commissioned research that it had not published on its website (to be discussed in detail in Chapter Four). Six of these reports could be seen by their titles to deal with migration. But of these six only four were released to the public. Thus, I am absolutely certain of the authorship of only four of these six released titles. For a fifth, I know which organisation produced it, but not which particular authors.

Appendix 2.10 classifies the 48 reports commissioned and/or produced by the RDS IRSS by type of author. Of the 46 reports for which I am certain of the type of authorship, close to two-thirds are produced by academics alone and three-fourths include academics as authors. For commissioned reports (those not authored solely by state researchers) of known type of authorship (39), these ratios rise to almost three-fourths for the former and more than 90 percent for the latter.

Appendix 2.11 displays the 28 IRSS migration-related reports that were produced – to the best of my knowledge – solely by authors who worked in universities. These data will be the basis of the description and analysis that continues immediately below and throughout my thesis; I will refer to this corpus of work as 'the sample'. Since none of the publications in the sample has a publishing date earlier than 2000 – the year of the founding of RDS IRSS, I assume with confidence that they are the result of projects commissioned and monitored specifically by the organisation. Appendix 2.12 displays the RDS-commissioned reports in which academics were co-authors with individuals from the other organisations.

I do not possess the original research contracts between academics and the HO, but I think that the sample is a useful proxy. In my analysis, I deduce the number of contracts from the available evidence. For example, when an author (or set of authors) appears on two reports with similar dates, titles, methods, and findings in two different series, I assume that both of the reports were produced under the same research contract.

The reports in the sample can be classified based on content – i.e., the kind of knowledge they provide. Here I mean the most common type of information that is provided in the text of the report. Each report in the sample contains many different kinds of information. I have abstracted from each document the theme that characterises the majority of its content. The knowledge typology that I have constructed (and will describe in greater detail in Chapter Four) has five classes. One of these – the behaviour of migrants – includes 14 reports that were produced by MARS academics under 11 research contracts. Appendix 2.13 displays these reports.

36 individuals are listed as authors of 'behaviour of migrants' reports. Only one of these academics (i.e., Dr Shields) is identified as *not* belonging to a university in the UK. These authors were affiliated with nine universities – seven of which were located in the UK (i.e., Sussex, UCL, Leicester, Queen Margaret, Edinburgh, Wales (Swansea), and Oxford). I mentioned several of these authors in my discussion of the APCI above. Professors Robinson and Black were members of the panel. Professor Castles and Dr Koser were its first and second Chairs, respectively. Professor Black and Dr Koser were also two of its commissioned researchers. Professors Black,

Robinson, Castles, and Dr Koser were commissioned to produce their 'behaviour of migrants' reports for the IRSS *before* September 2003, the month in which the APCI first met. APCI member Professor Zetter's production of research under contract to the IRSS will be described in Chapter Four.

In these 14 reports, MARS academics described the behaviour of the primary targets of migration control in two ways. First, they either repeated or summarized existing accounts. For example, Robinson and Segrott (2002) summarized in considerable detail the findings of six studies on 'the decision making of asylum seekers', including an article in one of the publications that I mentioned in my narrative in Chapter One of the development of the field of MARS: the *Journal of ethnic and migration studies* (Böcker and Havinga 1999). Black et al. (2005) provided descriptions of existing research on 'illegally resident migrants both in the UK, and more particularly in neighbouring European countries' (ibid.:3) that were less detailed than those of Robinson and Segrott, citing studies by MARS academics (and future colleagues at Oxford University) Dr Franck Düvell[27] and Dr Matthew Gibney.[28] Castles et al. (2002) summarized similar descriptions in their IRSS-commissioned state of the art report on MARS research produced between 1996 and 2001 on people identified as 'immigrants' and 'refugees'.

The second way in which MARS academics described the behaviour of the primary targets of migration control in IRSS-commissioned reports was through the

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[27] From footnote text at bottom of page 3: 'Jordan, B. and Düvell, F., Undocumented immigrant workers in London: issues for public policy. Paper prepared for IPPR conference on immigration policy and markets for unskilled labour, 15 March 2002, London'.
[28] Footnote text from bottom of page 4: 'Gibney, M.J., *Outside the Protection of the Law: The situation of Irregular Migrants in Europe*. Jesuit Refugee Service-Europe and Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, December 2000'.

presentation of original findings from new fieldwork. Having stated that their report

had the objectives of 'explor[ing] how and why a sample of asylum seekers in the UK

had chosen to migrate to this country in preference to other possible destinations' and

'incorporat[ing] in the explanations those values, attitudes and expectations that were

subliminally held by asylum seekers, but which nevertheless informed their decision-

making' (Robinson and Segrott 2002:vii) went on to describe in detail the mental and

physical processes by which people with citizenship of Sri Lanka, Iran, Somalia, and

Romania – 'approximately 80 percent of the [63] respondents were sampled from the

four nationalities specified by the Home Office' (ibid.:12) – succeeded in arriving in

the UK. Included as well was an account of the ways in which '[a]gents […]

channel[ed] the migration of asylum seekers' (ibid.:22).

Similarly, Black et al.'s IRSS-commissioned report (2005) included chapters on 'why

respondents chose the UK (if indeed they made a choice), how they travelled to and

entered the UK, and how they then became illegally resident' (ibid.:16) – Chapter

Four – and 'how respondents had supported themselves in the UK, and especially

their experiences of employment' (ibid.:26) – Chapter Five. In Black et al.'s fourth

chapter, the authors describe how people who had been 'illegally resident in the UK'

(ibid.:iv) had entered the UK. Black et al. reported finding that

> all except one Albanian, and four of the six Ukrainian interviewees had travelled to the
> UK hidden in the back of a lorry. This was also the route of entry for the majority of
> Sri Lankan asylum-seekers interviewed in the pilot phase of the study (ibid.:20).

On the next page, a table lists the number of Black et al.'s interviewees by 'region of

origin' who entered via the following other-than-legal routes: 'With agent', 'False

docs', 'Hidden in lorry', and 'Hidden on ship' (ibid.:21). Having established that

descriptions of the primary targets of migration control were provided to the IRSS by its MARS academic commissioned researchers, I next turn to a discussion of the process of production by these academics of the commissioned reports.

Surveillance gathering by MARS academics

It appears that IRSS-commissioned MARS academics provided a service for the agency in overcoming the resistance of the people who were the primary targets of migration control to divulging information about their behaviour. Reports from three of the (at least) five IRSS-commissioned 'behaviour of migrants' projects that were based on interviews included descriptions of resistance to the project by organisations and individuals. For example, Black et al. (2004:7) state the following:

> There was also a particular problem in organising a multinationality [sic] group of women, as a result of a reluctance to co-operate [in focus group research] on the part both of women's organisations and also of individual women. The reasons for this reluctance were not clear. An all-female group was eventually convened, attended by 11 women, but dominated by Somali women […]. The Algerian woman, and two Somalis who declined to provide basic information about themselves were excluded from analysis. It was also not possible to arrange a Chinese focus group, due to resistance from the Chinese community associations contacted.

One fieldwork context within which the researchers carrying out these projects sometimes met with resistance from potential informants was in what they refer to as 'detention centres'. Three projects involved the collection of data from human subjects who were being held in HO-administered prisons (Harmondsworth, Tinsley House, and Campsfield). The commissioned researchers reported that they were aided in their task by 'detention centre' officials; Robinson and Segrott express their gratitude to Tinsley House personnel in the acknowledgements section of their report (2002:i).

Researchers appear to have met with less resistance from their human subjects in the prison context than in non-prison settings. Robinson and Segrott reported that only one of the 14 prisoners at Tinsley House that they approached in the following manner refused to participate in the research:

> Centre managers provided a list of those being detained, their nationality, gender and native tongue. A sample was then selected from the list of detainees and staff brought detainees individually to an interview room where they were left to participate in the research without supervision. The research project was then described and detainees asked whether they would be willing to be interviewed (ibid.:11).

Black et al. (2005:7) wrote that they carried out 60 interviews at Tinsley House during what they called the 'pilot phase' of the project. Their statement that 'the pilot phase demonstrated that it was relatively unproblematic to arrange and conduct interviews with detainees' (ibid.) contrasts with the significant difficulties that Black and his co-authors reported in recruiting participants for their focus group research in a non-prison setting (see above). Black et al. did, however, report that some potential respondents did refuse to participate during the main phase of the 'detention centre' fieldwork project (ibid.:8). These authors provided the following detailed description of their interaction with their imprisoned research participants that sheds light on their method of (and possibly their success in) recruitment:

> In practice, it proved cumbersome and unworkable to require written consent for each interview, and the taping and transcription of each interview. Instead, interviewers adopted the practice of explaining in full the research purpose and nature of the interview, and then asking orally (and separately) whether the interviewee (a) consented to the interview, and (b) consented to it being taped and used in anonymous form, including lodging in a public data archive. In principle, every respondent was given a sheet (in English, as translation to the wide range of languages of the detainees proved impractical) explaining the purpose of the research and giving contact details for the research team. [Footnote text: Administrative oversight led to a failure to hand this sheet to a small number of respondents. However, respondents were encouraged to

show the sheet to other detainees, and to their legal representatives, in order to publicise the existence and purpose of the research] This was translated orally where necessary […]. […] Additionally, a leaflet was left at each of the detention centres, to be distributed to legal advocates and other groups with access to the detainees, to inform them of the nature and period of research (ibid.).

Although descriptions of these kinds of difficulties do not feature in the methodology sections of the IRSS publications that are based on his two interview-based projects, Koser did refer to these issues in his paper for a conference that was organised by IRSS, which was titled 'Bridging the Information Gaps'.

One of the first messages we got when we went to speak to representatives from migrant and refugee community organisations was an unwillingness, a reluctance, to speak to us, and a reluctance to speak about information dissemination [by the HO about UK asylum policy to potential 'asylum seekers' in their 'countries of origin']. I think in part this arises from a distrust of the Home Office. […] We tried our best to overcome what was clearly an obstacle by portraying information dissemination as a positive policy intervention, not as a negative thing that needs to be avoided, and we had some success. (UK Home Office 2001:27)

Koser's paper continued: 'I think information [dissemination by the British state] can be spun as a positive intervention' (ibid.). A later passage about resistance is quoted here at length:

The reluctance of asylum seekers and asylum advocates to be involved in Home Office research combines with a very important ethical imperative for researchers not to conceal their funding. There is a real dilemma here: you can't conceal who is funding research, but often your respondents are not willing to speak to you because of who is funding your research. The way you might overcome this is by working on this idea of stakeholders, by trying to convince people that policy recommendations are [not][29] preordained, this is a genuine effort, a genuine attempt for you to have an input into the research process. One way to do this is to try to involve representatives from migrant refugee community organisations from the very beginning of the research process when aims and objectives are being mapped out, when methods are being worked out, and that's a criticism that I have of some of the research which is being commissioned by the Home Office (ibid.:28).

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[29] Here I have inserted 'not' where I think it was erroneously omitted by Koser or the publication's editor(s). But alternatively, there is no contradiction between 'preordained' policy and 'input' by human subjects into the *research* process.

In his paper, Koser criticised the HO for not involving 'representatives from migrant refugee community organisations' (not 'refugees' or 'asylum seekers', themselves) in the determination of the design of commissioned research, while at the same time providing the HO and its (actual and potential) commissioned researchers at the conference with suggestions on how to (what he refers to earlier in the paper as) 'spin' HO policies to migrants and their 'representatives' in order to overcome their resistance to becoming the subjects of IRSS-commissioned research. I have shown that IRSS-commissioned MARS academics did for the agency what its employees were ill-equipped or unable to do: produce information on the behaviour of the people who were the primary targets of migration control by – to use Dr Koser's term - *overcoming* these people's resistance to the gathering of such data. Next, I turn to a discussion of the third and final element that I consider in the case for the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics via the provision of surveillance – i.e., the use by the IRSS of such information.

IRSS use of surveillance to facilitate migration control

I have gathered three kinds of evidence that indicate that the IRSS used the surveillance on the people who were the primary targets of migration control that had been provided to the agency by the MARS academics that it had commissioned. One is statements made by the IRSS and its employees. Another is those made by MARS academics who had interacted with the IRSS and other governmental organisations; I use them in this section as proxy ethnographers. A third kind of evidence presented here is that regarding trends in the intensity and effectiveness of the control of migration by British state agencies during the time of the IRSS' existence.

According to the IRSS

The IRSS was founded as part of the HO Research, Development and Statistics (RDS) organisation in the year 2000 (UK Home Office 2001:7). The RDS website included the claim that its immigration and asylum '[r]esearch provides the evidence we need to develop policy and our knowledge base on key areas in enforcement including: compliance; deterrence; detection; detention; deportation' (UK Home Office n.d.b).

The director of IRSS described its objectives and *modus operandi* to an audience composed of state agency employees, researchers (consultant, think-tank, and academic), and workers in charities at the 2001 'Bridging the information gaps' conference. He described the organisation's first two research themes as being '[t]he changes arising from the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 and White Paper' and '[t]he major expansion of enforcement capability and detention capacity in the coming year' (UK Home Office 2001:8). 'Research', the director continued, 'will help address how well the changes are meeting their objectives, and can inform future policy or operational development. This will supplement management's own appraisals and what the management information is showing' (ibid.). 'There is a policy requirement', he stated, 'for information about the illegal population. What are their circumstances and motivations; how do they support themselves; how large a population is it and, in such a diverse grouping, what are the main sectors of the population?' (ibid.:9).

The aim of IRSS' collection of such information was made even more explicit in the agency's official description of its aims and activities, which was also published in the 'Bridging the information gaps' conference report. 'Measuring the size and describing the characteristics of the illegal population', the document reads,

> is intended to provide information on the numbers, characteristics and motivations of the illegally resident population. The research is needed to inform the development, implementation and evaluation of policies designed to tackle aspects of illegal entry and illegal residency (ibid.:93).

The IRSS director also informed his 'Bridging the information gaps' audience of the agency's need for information related to asylum. One area of need was information on 'the characteristics, circumstances and motivations of asylum seekers' and 'what influences their decisions and choices in particular the effect of policy and operational factors; what are their sources of information about conditions and entitlements in receiving countries?' (ibid.:9). He also communicated the agency's desire to acquire information on the following:

> Are the support arrangements [for people who have filed asylum claims] achieving their policy goals – support for otherwise destitute asylum seekers; dispersal to regions; and relieving pressure on the South East; *contribution to deterring unfounded claims*; containing support costs?' (ibid.:9, emphasis added).

Above, I showed that these kinds of information were precisely those that were provided by IRSS-commissioned MARS academics.

Additional statements made by an IRSS employee provide further evidence that suggest that the MARS academic-produced surveillance was indeed used by the British state to control migration. This person made these statements (that I

paraphrase[30] immediately below) in 2005 while addressing an audience made up primarily of MARS students.

> *I sit between researchers and policy makers. I'm an interpreter who tries to procure the kind of research that the latter need. [...] What type of policy question are you addressing in your research? Does it seek to influence what policy should be? It's the most difficult thing to do. It's very difficult to guide policy by research because policy is so politically aimed. Sometimes you can do it, but it's a big task to get down to what the policy should be. Like the question, 'Should we have a quota for refugees, or not?' You're going to find it difficult to answer that question with research because it's so influenced by political ideology. A related question is 'Why should policy be like that?' Here, you've got a slightly better chance. Suppose that a minister wants to pursue a policy, but lacks the evidence and you can provide the evidence. Then you've got a strong connection because you're providing evidence that supports something that somebody already wants to do. That's slightly easier. Other questions are 'When should it be changed?' and the related question, 'Where?' These are questions you can influence through research: the cases in which it's a timing issue, a matter of where or for a particular group or industry. You could look at a policy that's been decided and you look at how to do it. An example would be doing research on how to integrate refugees into society. You're not doing research that determines policy; you're doing research on how to execute policy effectively. And often that's the best stuff to do in terms of actually having influence.*

In this IRSS employee's experience, then, the IRSS research that had influenced policy most effectively had been that which had provided to people the employee identified as policy makers findings that assisted them in implementing policies upon which they had already decided. I think it reasonable to classify the 'behaviour of migrants' reports provided by MARS academics under contract to the IRSS as belonging to this type of research. As seen above in the IRSS employees' statements at the 'Bridging the information gaps' conference, arrest, imprisonment, forced migration, and deterrence had already been decided upon; what was needed (and subsequently supplied by MARS academics) was research on how to execute these policies effectively. Nine of the conference attendees[31] supplied the IRSS with commissioned 'behaviour of migrants' reports after receiving the notification at the

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[30] I was not granted permission to quote this person directly.
[31] Black, Dustmann, Korac, Koser, Pinkerton, Robinson, Salt, Vertovec, and Wheatley-Price.

conference from IRSS employees of how these studies would ultimately be used – i.e., to 'tackle aspects of illegal entry and illegal residency' and deter 'unfounded claims' of asylum.

According to MARS academics

The written and spoken statements of five MARS academics who had interacted with the IRSS indicate that the former expected the latter to use surveillance to strengthen migration control. These academics had interacted much more closely and for much longer with the agency than I have and therefore had been in positions to make observations on the use of IRSS-commissioned reports that I was unable to record. Two of these five statements were by MARS academic authors of 'behaviour of migrants' reports under contract to the IRSS. One was the one by Professor Black that I discussed in my literature survey – i.e., that studies describing how it is that people move serve state interests in controlling that movement. Another was made to me during an interview by APCI member, Professor Reilly:

> [T]he Home Office sought tenders on developing a methodology for identifying undocumented workers. Well, we wouldn't do that. Because that's directly part of a strategy for repression or deportation. You know, it's not something that we'd do. I mean, we might help them with a methodology to try and understand the numbers, because that might influence policy. But not to identify people.

This IRSS-commissioned researcher's experience with the agency (and those of her colleagues, presumably) led her (and them) *not* to bid to do this research. She (and they) believed that the information would be used by the HO to improve the efficacy of (what my informant called) its deportation programme.

A third MARS academic who had been commissioned to do research by the IRSS made statements to me during an interview that shed light on the utility of IRSS-commissioned reports. He told me that he discovered early in the process of doing commissioned research for the IRSS that the HO didn't want research-based policy; it wanted policy based research. He said that when he started doing IRSS-commissioned work, 'it was about describing the knowledge base […] which would inform policy […] but not be instrumental'. But it 'became more instrumental' when the HO started to commission 'uncritical work', such as studies on people who were residing in the UK illegally. Like my interviewee above, this MARS academic with experience of interacting with the IRSS judged that the surveillance it commissioned was 'instrumental' – i.e., would be used not to 'inform policy', but to implement more effectively controls against illegal residence.

A fourth MARS academic, Dr Stoker – who had far less experience of interaction with the IRSS than these three academics whom I just quoted – described a process similar to that recounted above, in which an invitation by the HO (presumably the IRSS) to bid on a research project was considered by a group of MARS academics.

> So, recently there was a project ... that the Home Office wanted to commission ... and put out a competitive tender, which was to research sustainable deportation for failed asylum seekers. And they wanted the project to be conducted ... tracing those deported to Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan. The project was sent round to a number of people asking if anyone in the university was interested in this. And a meeting was convened. And it was agreed that we did not want to conduct that research on the terms set out by the Home Office and that the project was in many ways unethical and we weren't prepared to do it.

My interviewee claimed that the group had decided *not* to bid for the project because she and they believed that the descriptions of the behaviour of people who were

'deported' would be used by the HO to improve the effectiveness – i.e., sustainability – of the process.

Finally, I present a statement made by a MARS academic at an afternoon seminar at a MARS centre who – like two of my interviewees above – had produced 'behaviour of migrants' knowledge under contract to the IRSS. Having stated that she and her colleagues interacted frequently with HO personnel, the centre's director, Professor Merritt, went on to say that 'front line people' at the HO are

> against a lot of the [immigration and asylum] policies. They want to come up with alternatives. But what can you do when, you know, the commander in chief, effectively, is saying, 'I want numbers brought down by two-thirds by next year... I don't care how you do it'?

Her rhetorical question about the commander in chief demanding a reduction of numbers was a reference to UK Prime Minister Tony Blair's public commitment in September 2004 that the HO would – per month – remove a greater number of people whose asylum claims had been rejected than the number of new asylum applications received by the HO. What this MARS academic's statement indicates is that even if IRSS employees did oppose some of the more coercive practices of the HO – i.e., the forced migration of people whose asylum claims were rejected – their subordinate position within the UK state bureaucracy would result, ultimately, in their assisting in the implementation of these policies. In other words, even if they did not *want* to provide the surveillance that they had commissioned from MARS academics that would assist the HO in controlling migration, IRSS employees would be obliged to do so in order to stay employed by the agency.

Trends in migration control

The third kind of evidence that I have gathered that supports the argument that the surveillance provided by IRSS-commissioned MARS academics to the agency facilitated migration control is that of the intensity and effectiveness of practices of migration control before and during the existence of the IRSS. There is ample evidence that the existence of the IRSS has coincided with the intensification and greater effectiveness of migration control.

In their analysis of New Labour asylum policy, Bloch and Schuster (2005) found that 'New Labour inherited a system that already left some asylum seekers without benefits and unable to work legally' and went on to build 'on Conservative attempts to separate asylum seekers from mainstream social security provision' (ibid.:116). They concluded that 'a major negative consequence of New Labour's policy […] has been the marginalisation of asylum-seeking individuals and families through the incremental curtailment of social support, dispersal and lack of legal access to the labour market' (ibid.:117). Similarly, Somerville wrote that between 1997 and 2005, 'There has been fundamental reform in the way that asylum seekers are treated by the [British] state' (2006: 13). He goes on to describe the many policy changes in the area of asylum that have taken place and refers to Prime Minister Tony Blair's commitment that I mentioned above. Somerville concludes: 'Labour's policy on asylum can therefore be seen through a prism of increasing control and reducing numbers' (ibid.:14).

Another source of information – HO data (UK Home Office 2007b:88-89) – indicates that British state agencies were more effective in ensuring compliance with UK immigration law and in detecting, arresting, imprisoning, and forcibly migrating people without UK citizenship after the founding of the IRSS in 2000. In 1999, the HO reported that nearly 38,000 people judged to be in violation of UK immigration law had been 'removed' or had 'departed voluntarily'. According to the HO, this number rose to almost 69,000 in 2002, then fell slightly and hovered at about 60,000 until 2007, when it was reported as being just over 63,000.

In sum, there is considerable evidence that supports the argument that the surveillance provided by IRSS-commissioned MARS academics to the agency facilitated migration control. IRSS employees gathered from MARS academics precisely the kinds of knowledge that would have enabled the HO to control migration more effectively. MARS academics with experience of interaction with the IRSS believed that this surveillance would be used for migration control. These controls were intensified and made to be more effective during the period in which the IRSS was in existence. Having described this evidence that supports the conclusion of surveyed authors De Genova, Black, and Peutz, I next turn to that which contradicts it.

2.3.2.2. Evidence *against* facilitation via surveillance

In this section, I describe the evidence that suggests that the 'behaviour of migrant' knowledge that was produced by IRSS-commissioned MARS academics *did not* facilitate migration control. One kind of evidence is that which has been provided by

UK state agencies. Another is that which I have gathered either directly or indirectly from MARS academic proxy ethnographers. I begin with the former.

According to UK state agencies

State agency-produced documents indicate that the IRSS had not provided a) useful surveillance to enforcement agencies struggling to force people to migrate, nor b) value for money. Having 'visited six local Enforcement Offices where we interviewed staff, reviewed case files and observed enforcement operations' and 'conducted work at the [Immigration and Nationality] Directorate's central teams responsible, for example, for overseeing the use of the detention estate, obtaining travel documentation and managing escort contracts', the UK National Audit Office (2005:11) made no mention of the IRSS in describing the processes by which state agency personnel attempted to locate, arrest, imprison, and forcibly migrate people whose asylum claims had been rejected.

UK state agency-produced documents also indicate that the IRSS was dissolved in 2006-07, a period during which HO agencies related to immigration were under intense scrutiny concerning their role in the enforcement of immigration law. In 2006, following what was called the 'foreign prisoners scandal' in the national media, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee reported that

> [f]ragmentation and lack of communication is a systemic problem not just within the IND but within the entire immigration system which ought, ideally, to work as a whole. It is not only computer databases which should be encouraged to talk to each other but people, at all levels in all the immigration authorities. (UK House of Commons 2006b:129)

The HO reply (UK Home Office 2006b) to this report's findings made no mention of the IRSS – i.e., as an example that would counter this allegation. Pages describing the activities and organizational structure of the IRSS were removed from the RDS website, which produces no document under a search for 'immigration research and statistics service' with a date later than the first quarter of 2007. Finally, the UK Border Agency (2008) business plan for 2008-11 mentions neither the IRSS nor any other research-producing (or commissioning) division. Evidence that MARS academic-produced surveillance was not used by the IRSS to facilitate migration control was provided, as well, by the statements of MARS academics, themselves.

According to MARS academics

MARS academics' descriptions of the social relations between IRSS personnel and their HO superiors indicate that these were not only antagonistic – as suggested by Professor Merritt's statement above that HO front-line people were against the agency's policies – but also bureaucratically dysfunctional. For example, MARS academic Heaven Crawley, director of the University of Swansea Centre for Migration Policy Research and formerly Principal Research Officer in the IRSS between 2000 and 2002 (University of Swansea n.d.c), is quoted in an interview as saying of her time at the Home Office that she had no desire to be a career civil servant and 'be shouted at by [Home Secretary] David Blunkett' (Taylor 2007).

Further evidence of a dysfunctional relationship between the IRSS and the HO was provided to me by an IRSS-commissioned MARS academic interviewee. She told me that a person she referred to as her 'line manager' at the IRSS resigned a short time

after the completion of her commissioned research. 'Now she is working for an

NGO',[32] she continued. 'I met her, actually,' she told me,

> when there was this big thing in London. She was there, was working for one of the NGOs. And she was telling me, 'You know, I couldn't do this job any longer'. She was a kind of a research officer for the IRSS. And so there was this strange thing. In a way, you knew that you were working on a kind of sensitive issue and then probably the impact of what you were doing was almost nothing. At the same time you had these people that were very sympathetic with me. So a kind of, the contrast between the personal level and the kind of, the institutional level. That you know that basically, she was sympathetic. And so probably that's why they were asking for someone working, in order to reinforce some points into this debate. I was playing a bit the stupid guy, so I was trying to push for, I mean, to show some sort of incongruences in the way that they were operating, the way that they were accepting some things and not other things. At the end of it, I didn't know any… I mean, I don't think they have done anything with the [data and analysis*] that I generated. This was my… I mean, I didn't have any feedback from commenting on the work. They just accepted. […*]. But then the project… because there was while we were doing the project… And this is another big issue in this kind of policy research… While I was doing that, at the same time they were starting a new kind of policy trajectory. […]. So in a way, before the end of a research project, that was already old. And this is something that affects you also as a researcher because you feel how useless is your work.

Now that I have presented the evidence that I have collected that both supports and

contradicts the interpretation of De Genova, Black, and Peutz that IRSS-

commissioned surveillance by MARS academics facilitated migration control, I next

offer a brief discussion of these findings and explain why I do not use these to support

my more empirical argument regarding the facilitation of migration control by MARS

academics.

2.3.2.3. Discussion

I have presented evidence that indicates that MARS academic research was

instrumental in the carrying out of migration control. The IRSS commissioned MARS

academics to produce instrumental research. MARS academics did so aware that their

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[32] The gender of 'line manager' is chosen here and below at random.

reports would be used to facilitate migration control. Migration controls intensified

and became more effective during the period during which the IRSS was in existence.

These data do provide some support for De Genova, Black, and Peutz's interpretation.

However, I have *not* collected information that demonstrates that the IRSS-

commissioned reports with instrumental knowledge of the behaviour of migrants was

indeed used by state agency personnel involved in either the formulation of legislation

or in its enforcement. And I have found some evidence that indicates that the

relationship between IRSS personnel and the employees of administratively superior

UK state agencies was characterized was socially antagonistic and bureaucratically

dysfunctional.

Therefore, I have not included in my more empirical argument the provision of

surveillance by MARS academics as being one of the technical means by which the

field facilitated migration control. I have gone beyond De Genova, Black, and Peutz –

who provide no evidence whatsoever for their claim – to investigate the matter

empirically – i.e., using ANT. Using Latour's terms from his statements quoted above,

I have chosen not to include the provision of surveillance by MARS academics,

because although I have observed a potential *vehicle* – i.e., 'behaviour of migrants'

reports – I have not located a *conduit* for the transportation of action from this

provision to the coercive practices of arrest, imprisonment, and forced migration.

Although the account I presented above is more empirical than those of the three

surveyed authors just mentioned, it is *inadequate* for inclusion in migrant CODAR –

based as it is on *good* textual accounts.

Having summarized my findings in support of my more empirical argument that MARS academics facilitated migration control *and* compared these with those in the studies on MARS that I surveyed in my Introduction, I am now in a position to move on to a discussion of my more theoretical thesis argument. I have shown *that* and *how* MARS academics facilitated migration control. In the next three chapters I use middle-range anthropological and broader sociological theories to explain *why* they did so.

3. The efficacy ethic and the spirit of MARS

In this chapter I support my Weberian argument that MARS academics facilitated migration control because of culture. I do so in three sections. First, I describe the Weberian approach in detail, position it vis-à-vis the other two (i.e., Marxian and Durkheimian) that I use in this second half of my thesis, and introduce Latour's criticism of my use of the three. My summary of Weber's assumptions and methodology forms the basis of my response to Latour's critique. In the chapter's second section I explain the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics as does Rabinow – i.e., as the outcome of their mostly conscious decisions. In the third section of the chapter I do so as does Geertz – i.e., as being intelligible in terms of the meanings shared by these actors with others mostly unconsciously in their cultural context. In my conclusion I offer a classical Weberian interpretation of the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics and offer my rejoinder to Latour. In defending my use of Weberian, Marxist, and Durkheimian approaches to support the more theoretical argument of my thesis against Latour's criticism, I further contextualise the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics.

3.1. A Weberian approach

Weber's assumptions about social reality are Heraclitean, as demonstrated in the following statement:

> The stream of immeasurable events flows unendingly towards eternity. The cultural problems which move men form themselves ever anew and in different colours, and the boundaries of that area in the infinite stream of concrete events which acquires meaning and significance for us, i.e., which becomes an 'historical individual', are constantly subject to change (quoted in Giddens 1971:141).

Weber's statement above demonstrates the appropriateness of using the middle-range theoretical concept of culture to characterize his approach: 'cultural problems […] move men'. His explanation of social phenomena is cultural: he seeks 'to illuminate the conceptual and affective configurations within which [people] are operating' (Ortner 1995:181) from an actor's perspective.

Weber's well-known argument from *The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism* is that

> [o]ne of the fundamental elements of the spirit of modern capitalism, and not only of that but of all modern culture: rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling, was born […] from the spirit of Christian asceticism (2001:180).

His aim was to 'understand the connection between the fundamental religious ideas of ascetic Protestantism and its maxims for everyday economic conduct' (ibid.:155) by investigating what it was that people thought and felt.

The methodology that Weber recommends for studying 'the cultural epochs of the Reformation' is 'inquiring as to whether and in what points definite elective affinities between certain forms of its religious faith and its work ethic are discernible' (quoted in Howe 1978:368). According to Howe, Weber uses elective affinity in an informal way in his *oeuvre*: 'The term appears as a factor in causal propositions, but no definition is given, and neither syntax nor context lends it any special weight' (1978:368). Weber's usage of the concept is also diverse, ranging 'from the elective affinity of concrete forms of social action with concrete economic forms to the elective affinity of similar ideals' (ibid.:382). He discusses the elective affinity of

Calvinism for capitalism, of a class for a lifestyle, 'of missionary prophecy for a conception of a personal god' (ibid.:368-369), 'of the religiously demanded life-style with the socially conditioned life-style' (quoted in ibid.:369), and of the Center party's 'authoritarian mentality with the authoritarian state' (quoted in ibid.:369).

Weber's only attempt at an explanation of elective affinity, Howe found, is the following:

> [S]omething universal can […] be asserted concerning the degree of elective affinity of concrete structural forms of social action with concrete economic forms, that is, concerning whether and how strongly they mutually favor one another's continuance or, conversely, hinder or exclude one another – are 'adequate' or 'inadequate' to one another (quoted in ibid.; my bracketed ellipses).

Overall, I consider Weber's social scientific approach to be less empiricist than that of ANT and less rationalist than that of Marx (or Durkheim).

In using Weber's approach (and those of Marx and Durkheim, as well) to explain the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics I use what Latour (2005) refers to as the sociology of the social (SOTS) and contrasts in his dichotomous model of social scientific research with ANT – the sociology of associations (SOA). He urges social scientists to abandon the former and adopt the latter. Such suggestions are of course commonplace in the literature of anthropology and other social sciences. For example, both of the works containing the other two dichotomous models that I described in my introduction (i.e., Harris 2007a and Graeber 2001) included similar calls and it has been claimed that both Weber and Durkheim were writing against Marx (Giddens 1971).

As I stated in my Introduction: it is *not* an aim of my thesis to present an in-depth discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of any of the four primary (ANT plus the three of my spectrum approach) or several more specific interpretive approaches that I utilize within it. However, there is a feature of Latour's recommendation that is shared by MARS academics and that can – from a Weberian cultural perspective – consequently help to explain their facilitation of migration control. Therefore, I present his critique and recommendation in the following section before moving on with my own analyses. I return to these in the concluding section of this chapter, where I use my rejoinder to support further my argument that there are cultural reasons for the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics.

3.1.1. Latour's critique

Latour recommends that social scientists refrain from using Weberian, Marxian, and Durkheimian approaches – i.e., the SOTS – because these are not real, scientific, or useful in our time. He asks, rhetorically, 'Has the recent history of the social sciences not been in large part a painful oscillation between two opposite poles, one more structural and the other more pragmatic?' (2005:169) The usual strategy of social scientists for coping with this oscillation, he says, is

> […] carving up some cozy place in what is supposedly an academic debate by imagining some reasonable compromise between the two positions. But if you discover some happy medium between two non-existing positions, what makes you so sure that this third position has not even less claim to existence? Should we try to strike a compromise between actors and system, or should we go somewhere else? (ibid.)

He describes as 'queer' the 'attempts done throughout the history of the social sciences to […] negotiate perhaps some subtler 'middle way' between 'actor' and

'system'' (ibid.:203). 'These projects', he continues, 'make about as much sense now as the Renaissance compilers who tried so earnestly to calibrate the dates of Greek mythology over those of the Bible. The midpoint between two mythologies is still a mythology' (ibid.). At another point in his critique, Latour likens both of these more structural and more pragmatic approaches (those I identify with Durkheim and Weber, respectively) to 'once formidable castle[s] now in ruins' (ibid.:76) and claims – contra-Marxian approaches such as the practice theory of Ortner (1995) – that these are 'divisions one should never try to bypass, to go beyond, to try to overcome dialectically' (ibid.).

Furthermore, according to Latour, the SOTS is politics, not science. He writes that '[t]he actor/system quandary is the unwanted projection onto the plane of social theory of the paradoxical relations citizens entertain with their republic' (ibid.:170). For him, 'society, this 19th century invention, is an odd transitional figure mixing up the Leviathan of the 18th century and the collective of the 21st' (ibid.:162). 'Sociology', he writes, 'has been involved, very early on, in *social engineering*' (ibid.:40, emphasis in original). 'Since the beginning', he continues,

> there has been a sort of confusion of duties. By deciding that their job was to define what the social world is made of, sociologists in the middle of the 19th century took upon themselves the task of politics (ibid.).

His SOA, in contrast, is 'faithful to the project of a *science of a social*' (ibid.:161, emphasis in original).

'Some sociologists', his historical narrative continues, who were

tired of the revolutionary period, found a way to shortcut the slow and painful process of composition [of collective life – Latour's definition of politics] and decided to sort out by themselves what were the most relevant units of society. The simplest was to get rid of the most extravagant and unpredictable ways in which actors themselves defined their own 'social context'. Social theorists began to play legislator, strongly encouraged in this endeavour by the state that was engaged in the ruthless task of modernizing. […] Without this strong obligation to play the legislating role, sociologists would not have limited the first obvious source of uncertainty, cutting all the links with the explicit and reflexive labor of the actors' own methods. (ibid.:41).

Latour claims that

the political agenda of many social theorists has taken over their *libido sciendi*. They considered that their real duty was not so much to inventory active agencies in the world as to clean out the many forces that, in their eyes, are cluttering the world and that maintain people in a state of alienation […]. (ibid.:49, emphasis in original)

For Latour, the 'units of society' that were omitted and the 'cluttering forces' that were 'cleaned out' by sociologists were non-human actors. In sum, sociologists of the social have, according to Latour,

strictly limited the set of agencies 'really acting' in the world so as to free actors from their delusion, prepare the ground for social engineering on a grand scale, and smooth the path toward modernization (ibid.:51).

There is, I suggest, tremendous irony in Latour's critique of the SOTS: he uses in it one of the very same approaches that he criticizes. He supports his argument for the abandonment of the SOTS (and its Weberian component) by using a *cultural*, Weberian analytical approach. Latour's historical narrative of the development of SOTS that I presented above echoes very strongly those of Weber that I described earlier. Both are actor-centred. While '[t]he Puritan wanted to work in a calling' (Weber 2001:181), Latour's 19th century sociologists of the social were 'tired of the revolutionary period'; felt obliged to take 'upon themselves the task of politics'; and

'considered that their real duty was […] to clean out the many forces that, in their eyes, [were] cluttering the world and that maintain[ed] people in a state of alienation'.

Furthermore, Latour's vague causal propositions echo Weber's use of elective affinity to explain relations between (and among) different phenomena. The thoughts and feelings of 19th century sociologists of the social were '*encouraged* by the state' and both '*prepare[d] the ground for*' and '*smooth[ed] the path toward*' the state projects of 'social engineering' and 'modernization', respectively. The sociologist of the social's theoretical framework (i.e., the 'actor/system quandary') is 'the unwanted *projection*' of the 'relations citizens entertain with their republic'. Weber's concept of elective affinity seems perfectly consonant with Latour's manner of attributing causality. An apt summary of these statements by Latour can be presented in the same way that Weber posited the existence of an elective affinity between the authoritarian mentality of the people in a political party and the authoritarian state: the modernizing mentality of sociologists and the modernizing state favoured one another's continuance and were adequate to one another. Having demonstrated clearly the Weberian nature of the analysis with which Latour supports his argument for abandoning the SOTS, I am now in a position to discuss briefly the implications of this similarity.

Latour's argument against the use of SOTS is unconvincing – in part – due to a glaring logical contradiction. He supports his argument that Weberian approaches should be abandoned by *not* using the SOA (i.e., ANT), but rather a Weberian approach. For this reason alone I will not follow his advice, but will rather continue to

use the approaches of the SOTS (in this and subsequent chapters) in addition to that of the ANT (Chapters One and Two) in this thesis.

Above, I stated that a detailed discussion of Latour's argument for adopting one of the approaches in his dichotomous model of social scientific practice would enable me to understand better the cultural reasons for the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics. I now explain how it will do so. I have shown Latour to be arguing that the feature of the SOA that makes it more scientific than – and therefore superior to – the approaches of the SOTS is the relatively low degree of elective affinity (vis-à-vis that of the SOTS) among its theoretical framework, the mentality (or ethic) of today's social scientists, and the dominant political philosophy of the larger collective of which they are a part. In the conclusion to this chapter I use my fieldwork findings to support the opposite – but still Weberian – interpretation that there is, in fact, a high degree of elective affinity between the social theory of Latour's SOA, the ethic of today's social scientists (*including* MARS academics), and the most salient idiom in which political maxims are expressed. Having addressed the matter of Latour's critique of the spectrum approach that I use, I now move on to a discussion of the two Weberian approaches that I utilize in this chapter's second and third sections.

3.1.2. Specific Weberian approaches

Within the broad class of anthropological approaches that I consider to be Weberian, or *cultural*, in nature, there are those that are more empiricist and those that are more rationalist (see also Linger 2004 for 'psychological anthropology'). Examples of the former are Barth's transactionalism (1981), Rapport's cosmopolitanism (2010), and

Rabinow's approach to the study of scientists (1996). Those of the latter include

Jackson's existential anthropology (2005) and Geertz' thick description (1975).

Figure 9: Weberian approaches

ANT ├─────────────── Weberian ─────────────┤ Marxian

Barth/Rapport/Rabinow   Jackson/Geertz

I understand the primary concern of these more empiricist authors to be with

individual consciousness. According to Barth, 'Human acts are predominantly shaped

by cognition and purpose, asserted through awareness and voluntary behaviour, i.e.

through decision and choice' (1981:122). For Rapport, an understandable (but very

dogmatic) response to 'the threat' of deterministic social theory (i.e., Marxism or

Structuralism) 'to the personal preserve' is to 'insist, together with Jacques Monod,

that: 'I am entirely aware of my motives and entirely responsible for my actions. They

are all conscious' (Rapport and Harris 2007:320; see also Rapport 2010). Rabinow's

study of scientists in the biotechnology industry (1996) likewise focuses on the

consciousness of his human subjects. 'A significant omission from the by now classic

laboratory studies [i.e., by scholars using ANT]', he writes,

> has been the representation of science as a practice and a vocation – *by its practitioners*.
> Such representations must be elicited, for there are few other contexts in which they
> might be produced in a formal manner, i.e., given reflective form. Once elicited and
> given, they must be framed in the light of larger forces at play (forces whose impact
> many *scientists are acutely aware of* in the course of their daily lives, even if they are
> rarely called upon to analyze them) (ibid.:17; emphasis added).

I model the first part of the next section of this chapter on Rabinow's approach. I

present the ways that MARS academics, themselves, represented their practices that

facilitated migration control. I elicited some of these representations during interviews

and participant observation. However, unlike Rabinow's biotechnologists, my

informants *did* produce such representations in a formal manner and were frequently

called upon to analyse the forces that impacted on their daily lives. I include, therefore,

these written and verbal statements that I have gathered during fieldwork, but did not

elicit from informants, myself.

More rationalist Weberian anthropological approaches are those of Jackson and

Geertz. I understand these authors to be concerned more with sub- or unconscious

mental phenomena than are their more empiricist colleagues. Jackson

> reject[s] the idea […] that our humanity consists in our individual will-to-be, a striving
> realisation or authenticity, for most human action is less a product of intellectual
> deliberation and conscious choice than a matter of continual, intuitive, and
> opportunistic changes of course – a 'cybernetic' switching between alternatives that
> promise more or less satisfactory solutions to the ever-changing situations at hand
> (2005:xii).

One of the issues that Geertz addresses is that of 'how it is that we perceive qualities

in things […] that we do not feel we can assert literally to be there' (1975:444). His

interest in other-than-conscious mental phenomena is clear in another one of his

statements that the Balinese cockfight 'brings to imaginative realization a dimension

of Balinese experience normally well-obscured from view' (ibid.). I model the second

part of the next section of this chapter on Geertz' approach. In it, I interpret *both* the

representations by MARS academics of their practices *and* other kinds of

ethnographic data in order to ascertain dimensions of their experience that they,

themselves, do not – and perhaps cannot – make explicit.

3.2. Mostly conscious mental phenomena

In this section I present my findings on the thoughts and feelings – of which MARS academics were mostly conscious – that influenced their decisions to participate in either the APCI or the MAC, primarily in their own words. First I describe both the awareness of participants of the harmful effects of their activities and what this participation meant to both MARS academics and to the members of the broader network of researchers, social workers, and activists within which they circulated. In the next part of this section I discuss the psychological phenomena of division and dissociation and the effect that these appear to have had in enabling participants who were conscious of the damage caused by their activities to choose to do and carry on doing so. Then I describe the aims of making money, benefiting the field's human subjects, assisting government, and being effective, which appear to have motivated participants, regardless of their awareness of the harmful effects of their practice. Finally, I provide a summary of these findings.

The order in which I present my findings in these sections is as follows. I begin with the thoughts and feelings of APCI and MAC MARS participants. Then I discuss those on these phenomena for MARS academics, in general. I continue by doing the same for other fields and disciplines in the UK social sciences and the British academy, in general. I conclude by including my own personal thoughts and feelings as a one-time MARS academic and postgraduate student when these can provide insight into those of my informants through similarity or contrast. The logic underlying this organisation is that of more empiricist Weberian analyses: actors themselves know best what they are doing and why they are doing it; begin with them.

As I mentioned above, the APCI and MAC MARS participants with whom I interacted and whose written work I read were unlike Rabinow's biotechnologists in that they did indeed produce representations of MARS as a practice and a vocation in a formal manner (I found them to do so informally, too). For example, Dr Hurley, a MARS participant in one of these organisations, answered my question of what he thought he might be doing professionally if he weren't an academic doing migration studies by saying, 'I do ask myself if I would be better off' as a researcher in an international organisation or an NGO. 'I do think about these things', he assured me. The information I present in this section's analysis includes other, similar examples, which demonstrate that for these participants and their MARS academic colleagues, giving reflective form (i.e., in spoken and written form) to their representations of their academic activities and vocation was relatively standard practice.

3.2.1. Awareness and meaning(s) of effects of participation with APCI and MAC

Unfortunately, I did not ask my informants to answer the question: 'Why did you or your MARS colleagues facilitate migration control?' I only became certain that they had indeed done so during the 'write-up' stage of my research. Nor have I encountered statements by these participants in which they answer this question directly and verbatim. Although I am unable to describe how the MARS academics who joined the APCI or the MAC or produced commissioned reports for these agencies would have answered this question, I can demonstrate that many of them were indeed aware that their participation would have such an effect. Evidence for this consciousness comes from the meeting minutes of the APCI, an interview I

conducted with an APCI member, a published scholarly article of an APCI member, and a HO press release regarding the establishment of the MAC.

The APCI meeting minutes contain ample evidence that panel *members* were fully conscious of the way in which their analyses facilitated migration control, but that the panel's *commissioned researchers* were much less so. For example, a panel member (and its future – i.e., second – Chair) was minuted as making explicit the possible effects of the panel's analyses at its third (September 2004) meeting:

> [He] said that if the Panel confirmed that the information [in Country Reports] was generally accurate and up to date, it could lead to the perception that the Panel was supporting the decision to include a country on the list. Conversely, if the Panel expressed the view that the material was not accurate and up to date then it may stop an error from being committed (APCI 3.M:6.10).

Commissioned researchers appear to have been far less conscious of the use to which their analyses would be put. On at least several occasions (and at the request of the HO), they were not informed by the panel members who commissioned them that the state for which they were evaluating the Country Report was then under consideration by the HO for NSA designation (APCI 6.M:2.8). It was only at the seventh (March 2006) meeting that panel members decided officially (and against the wishes of the HO) to inform commissioned researchers 'if the country concerned was being considered for NSA status' (ibid.:2.10). Although several commissioned researchers were minuted as claiming that they had not been informed about the NSA context of their reports (ibid.:2.8), they could have discovered this information for themselves – as the panel's second Chair was minuted as noting at the seventh meeting (ibid.:2.3) – had they simply taken a very quick look at the prior meeting minutes that had already been posted on the APCI website.

The awareness of APCI members of the symbolic means by which the panel's activities facilitated migration control is demonstrated, as well, in the statements that were made to me by panel member Professor Reilly regarding the 'role' of the panel, which I quoted above in Chapter Two. Recall her statement that one of the reasons 'behind it all is that it has a legitimation function for the government' at a time when it was 'trying to tighten up on asylum policy'. 'Everyone who was asked to join realised that', she also said. Professor Reilly told me, as well, that she and her panel member colleagues were explicit in saying, 'We know that what the government wants out of us is legitimation'.

Further along in our interview, I asked Prof Reilly what she saw 'the state – university relationship' to be. In part of her answer she again demonstrated her awareness of the panel's symbolic role in migration control:

> [T]he reason policy bodies want outside advisors is partly, outsiders can be more critical than their own research sections. And they realise they need that sometimes. And the other reason, it can be that they… their policies aren't working and they need to understand why. Now these are opportunities when you can try to improve their understanding of the issues at hand. And, *obviously, they're going to use that* either as I said, *for legitimation purposes*, which is very common with research. *Or*, they're going to use it for … *improve*, you know, *surveillance and control policies*, or whatever.

The published scholarly article of an APCI member indicates, as well, that they who joined were well aware that the panel facilitated migration control. Panel member Professor Zetter, who joined the panel in October 2006 (and remained a member until the panel's dissolution two years later), wrote the following concerning the NSA process in an article published in 2007:

> Across the developed world, decreasing numbers of people are afforded full refugee status. Instead they are increasingly subjected to the transformed label 'asylum seeker' which is demarcated by *the wholesale withdrawal or reduction of established rights*: *examples* here *are* fast track appeals and deportation, limited judicial review, more detention, *so called white lists of countries presumed not to persecute*, European conventions preventing multiple applications in EU Member States. *The purpose* of this new temporary protection label and the associated instruments *is*, of course, to enable the bureaucracies to manage and, I would argue, *to decline refugee claims* (2007:181-182; emphasis added).

As I showed above, as a member of the panel, Prof Zetter knew that it assisted the HO in adding states to the NSA 'white list', thereby tightening migration controls. In this published analysis he demonstrated his consciousness that this process harmed people he identified as being refugees, specifically.

For MAC members, there is ample evidence that they were aware that their analyses would facilitate migration control by symbolic and technical means. For example, the coercive role that the committee would play was set out clearly by the Minister of Immigration in a September 2007 HO press release to which MAC participants had easy access (quoted above in Chapter One's discussion of MARS technical assistance for deterrence). Having established that the members of both the APCI and of the MAC, and at least some of the former's commissioned researchers were fully aware that their participation on or with the panel facilitated migration control in at least one of the ways – i.e., legitimisation – that I described in Chapters One and Two, I now continue with a discussion of the ways in which MARS academics saw the provision of assistance by themselves and their colleagues to the HO in controlling migration.

The information I have gathered indicates that most – if not all – MARS academics find both the idea and the actual practice of academics assisting the HO in coercing people through migration control to be reprehensible. For many MARS academics,

any cooperation with the HO for any purpose whatsoever was seen as being unethical. A UEL student who had done the MA in Refugee Studies, Ms Herbert, expressed this view in reaction to my describing for her the extent to which MARS academics produced commissioned research for the IRSS and the content of these reports (see above). 'I would never, never ever accept money from the Home Office', she said. 'Never!'

> Because for me it will be just total collaboration, you know. There's just no way! Just no way. They could give me thousands or thousands of thousands. Never ever. You have to have some, you know, moral principles, I think. You know, in that way it's a very dirty field, you know… just like, very dirty when you kind of enter that kind of…

An IRSS-commissioned MARS academic, Ms Lawrence, similarly told me in an interview that although it had its benefits (see below), 'the publication of a Home Office report' was 'also not that good'. 'I mean', she continued,

> having [laughs] worked for the Home Office, in a sense. I mean, in, especially in some groups, you almost have to find … excuse yourself for having been working for the Home Office. In a sense, saying… trying to explain why you were doing that.

However, some MARS academics saw at least *some* interaction by themselves and their colleagues with the HO as being good. For example, Frances, a MARS student who was trying to develop her interest in 'asylum seekers and housing' into an MA dissertation lamented during our interview that 'the Home Office is horribly underfunded, has no money for social research, and yet has not made any kind of attempt to connect with refugee studies students and say, "Here's something for your masters"'.

In similar examples, the very public online professional biographies published by the

of APCI members Professors Black and Zetter that were published by their home

academic institutions mentioned their commissioned research interaction with the HO

in a matter-of-fact tone. Black's biography included the following passage:

> Building on studies conducted for the UK Home Office, ESRC and the European
> Commission on return to the Balkans, and for DFID on return to West Africa, he is
> developing a framework to understand how return affects different stakeholders in
> 'sending' and 'receiving' countries, and to promote the sustainability of this return in
> terms of poverty reduction and post-conflict reconstruction (University of Sussex n.d.c).

Zetter's biography included the following:

> In recent years his research, consultancy and publications have focused on Europe and
> the UK where he has been exploring the causes and consequences of European
> deterrence and restrictionism, [sic] the asylum-migration nexus and refugee integration
> (funded by UK Housing Corporation, UK Home Office, European Commission,
> Economic and Social Research Council and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, Paul
> Hamlyn Foundation) (Refugee Studies Centre n.d.).

Although many MARS academics did not see work by themselves and their

colleagues for the HO as immoral per se, some indicated that there were particular

services that they would not provide to the agency on moral grounds. Recall Dr

Stoker's description (quoted above in Chapter Two) of a meeting of Oxford MARS

academics to discuss an invitation to do a commissioned research project for the

HO. 'It was agreed', he said, 'that we did not want to conduct that research on the

terms set out by the Home Office and that the project was in many ways unethical

and we weren't prepared to do it'. They refused the invitation not on the grounds

that it came from the HO, but rather because of 'the terms set out by' the agency.

Recall, as well, Professor Reilly's statement (also quoted in Chapter Two) that

although she and her colleagues would not help the HO 'to identify undocumented

workers' because it was 'directly part of a strategy for repression or deportation', they 'might help them with a methodology to try and understand the numbers' of such people.

Perhaps the best evidence I have that most – if not all – MARS academics find both the idea and the actual practice of academics assisting the HO in coercing people through migration control to be reprehensible is the way in which MARS academics reacted to my making these practices public. In the autumn of 2007 I responded to a call for papers from the organizers of an ESRC-funded workshop to be held at the University of Edinburgh, titled 'Migration Control and Narratives of Societal Steering'. Following the instructions of the organizers, I submitted a draft of my paper several weeks before the workshop so that it could be circulated – along with those of the other participants – among those of us who would be presenting our work. My essay was an early draft of part of Chapter Two. In it, I described the personnel (whom I referred to by name) and activities of the APCI and the use of its analyses by the HO to add states to the NSA 'white list'.

I have been informed that even before the workshop took place in mid-December, my draft essay had been sent to MARS academic APCI members who were not participants in the workshop. The refusal of my request for financial data and student records that I was sent by an APCI member and director of a MARS research centre (quoted above in the 'Presentation of findings' section of my Introduction) included the claim that the paper that I presented at the workshop was 'tendentious' and also made 'unprofessional ad hominem accusations about my (and other colleagues') work'. Then, at a chance meeting I had with Dr Greene – a MARS colleague of the

sender of this rejection email – I was asked if there had been any repercussions as a result of my workshop presentation. This of course surprised me, as I had never discussed the matter with him before. A bit further along in our conversation, Dr Greene opined that what had angered his colleague about my paper was its inclusion of her name.

What was it exactly in my draft essay that incited a workshop participant (or organizer) to send it along to an APCI member, who then forwarded it to a colleague at her research centre? According to these two MARS academics with whom I 'discussed' the matter, it was my *identification* of one of them (and others) as being people who had been members of the APCI and/or its commissioned researchers. Why should this have been upsetting for MARS academics? As I showed above, it was common practice for MARS academics (including APCI members Professors Black and Zetter) to include their commissioned research relations with the HO and other research funding agencies in their online professional biographies. Although some MARS academics considered any interaction by researchers with the HO to be unethical, for many it was tolerable (or even good), depending on the impact of the engagement on the field's human subjects. That which worried the workshop participant who 'leaked' my draft essay, the APCI member, and her colleague was *not* the identification per se, but rather that with a process that the field's members deplored both in abstract and in reality. Although knowledge of their participation with the APCI was *available* to their colleagues via the panel's website, I noticed that the members did not tend to include this information in their online professional biographies. I posit that what upset (at least) the first two of these three people was that I showed that one of them and some of their colleagues were complicit in the

coercion of the field's human subjects through their participation in the APCI *in front of their peers*.

There is ample evidence in the APCI meeting minutes that participation in the panel was held in low esteem by the members of organisations that have explicit welfare remits regarding the human subjects of MARS academics. Recall that a HO representative was minuted at the panel's first (September 2003) meeting that 'various organisations had been invited [by the HO] to take part in the Panel, but had declined because of concerns about being perceived as compromising their independence or creating a conflict of interest' (APCI 1.M:3.12). Furthermore, it was reported at the panel's second (March 2004) meeting that Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Refugee Council had rejected the invitations to join the panel as members.

In sum, APCI and MAC members and commissioned researchers engaged in an activity that was nearly universally seen in a negative light by themselves, their MARS colleagues, *and* the members of NGOs with human rights remits. How then, can this apparent paradox be explained? I return to this question below, once I have presented my findings on the mostly conscious mental phenomena that were factors in the decision making of MARS academics who interacted with the APCI and the MAC.

3.2.2. Selves and dissociation: 'hats' and 'schizophrenia'

I begin by discussing psychological phenomena that appear to have assisted in making it possible for participants who were conscious of the damage caused by their

activities to choose to do this and carry on doing so. I have encountered evidence during fieldwork that suggests that APCI and MAC participants are able to engage with these organisations being fully conscious of the harmful effect of this activity because they divided up their personality and subsequently dissociated themselves from this engagement. My findings for these phenomena come from an interview that I conducted with Dr Parrish, a MARS faculty member and from my experiences of participant observation among MARS and other academics.

I begin with a transcript of the interview.

> Joshua Hatton (JH): Some of the work I've done, especially my first year [in Oxford as a MARS student and government agency commissioned researcher]… And I found that sometimes the things I was writing just didn't match with my, with my politics. And I felt, I think I felt, started feeling a bit cynical. But I wonder … the long-term effects of engagement … in which what one writes and what one says doesn't match with what one believes … I mean, do you sense … I don't know, in colleagues, or anything like that … or in yourself, I mean. How do you … when things don't match up?

> Dr Parrish (DP): I don't even think this is the correct approach. As I said earlier, I believe in having different hats on. I'm… I can be a lover, which has nothing to do with my work. I can be a gardener, which has nothing to do with my work. I can be an activist campaigning against deportation. I can be an academic. I can be a policy advisor. And in each of these capacities, I may go as far as possible. But in order to stay in these capacities, I also have to accept maybe the ground rules. And I have to have a feeling for what is possible. And what I can't say as an academic or as a representative of my institute, I can still say as an academic. But then I'm representative of a campaign. And here I'm representative of maybe this institution. And then I'm representative of another institution. It doesn't mean that … with my name I can't say things. I just need to be careful which hat I'm wearing. So, I don't think it is a matter of the personal and the political. It is a matter of which hat I'm choosing and which arena I'm choosing to say what. Also, in different audiences … or addressing different audiences I have to choose different languages, anyway. So why shouldn't I choose slightly different politics? It's not completely different politics. No. It's specific aspects of politics. I'm rather suggesting to abstain from the most holistic sort of concept of the private is political, the political is private. And to sort of develop … and I think that's what most people do … develop a more pragmatic approach to what can be said where.

Only a short while later in our conversation, we continued as follows.

JH: I experience this [tension] every time I go home. But I … it's a real struggle for me. I'll be in a situation where I really don't agree with what's being said around me, but in order to engage… to maintain sort of the family or social contacts, I can't speak my mind. It drives me crazy.

DP: I think people can dance to different musics. It doesn't need to be only one sort of framework. I think people can actually engage in different frameworks without really compromising too much. It's not that I'm indicating some sort of a schizophrenic approach. I mean, by presenting only one aspect out of your own individual politics you are maybe compromising, but you are not sort of schizophrenic in terms of saying 'A' here and saying something else somewhere else. I know there are such people who are certainly contrasting or contradicting themselves by saying 'A' in one meeting and 'Z' in another meeting.

For Dr Parrish, then, his 'work' has '*nothing to do with*' his different 'capacities', among which he shifts by choosing different 'hats'. 'Compromising' is unavoidable in this process (and 'approach'), but not so much so as to be 'contradicting' oneself, or 'schizophrenic'. On several occasions I have heard other MARS academics and those in other fields using the concepts of hat and schizophrenia in the same ways that Dr Parrish used them and without eliciting questions from their audiences such as 'What do you mean by that?' or 'Could you please clarify what you mean by that?' In other words, Dr Parrish used these concepts in ways not unlike those of at least some of his colleagues in the field of MARS. I think it reasonable to interpret these findings as indicating that at least some of the MARS academics who participated in the APCI and MAC being conscious of the harmful effects of their activity did so – in part – because they divided up their personality and were therefore able to dissociate (i.e., *x* 'has nothing to do with' *y*) themselves from their stigmatised participation with these organisations.

Above, I described the phenomenon of APCI and MAC members and commissioned researchers engaging in an activity that was nearly universally seen in a negative light by themselves and their professional peers as being an apparent paradox in need of

explanation. The transcript above shows clearly that I did indeed perceive it to be a paradox. When I have found myself in similar circumstances (i.e., when I was producing surveillance that I thought might be used to facilitate people's deportation – a process that I opposed) I felt extremely ambivalent, to the point of feeling 'cynical' and 'crazy'. Dr Parrish, however, perceived no paradox. He could be both a 'policy advisor' providing governmental agencies with knowledge such as that on the behaviour of 'irregular migrants' and an 'activist campaigning against deportation'. Whereas I was more 'holistic' in associating my academic practice and my politics, Dr Parrish – and his MARS colleagues who participated in the APCI and MAC with an awareness of the harm that would ensue, I posit – was (and were) more 'pragmatic' in dissociating his (and their) academic and activist 'capacities'. I return to the issues of personality and dissociation below in my more Geertzian explanation of the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics.

3.2.3. Motivations

My findings indicate that members and commissioned researchers of the APCI and MAC participated as such – whether they were aware of the harmful effects of the activities, or not – because they were motivated to achieve four ends of which they were indeed conscious: to make money, benefit the field's human subjects, assist government, and be effective. I make no claim to comprehensiveness here (i.e., including all possible members of the set), but rather present data for the features that my analysis has led me to perceive as being those that are shared to the highest degree by participants. Although I found that individuals tended to be motivated by some of these more than others, all were motivated to some degree by each of the four.

As a way of introducing these four motivations, I begin this section by showing a statement – some of which I included earlier in this chapter and above, in Chapter Two – that APCI member Professor Reilly made to me during an interview in which she demonstrated that she was conscious of all four of these. Following a brief discussion of this information, I then go on to present findings that show that the other APCI and MAC participants were motivated by these four ends, as well.

Professor Reilly answered my question of 'What do you see the state – university relationship to be?' in the following way:

> We work with all sorts of government departments, with foundations, international organisations. I mean, you can't avoid it. Because, the dilemma is if you only criticise from outside, you can have a very pure critique. But it's not going to have any practical effects. If you actually want to achieve change, you have to take opportunities when people are willing to listen to you. And I mean, the reason policy bodies want outside advisors is partly, outsiders can be more critical than their own research sections. And they realise they need that sometimes. And the other reason, it can be that their policies aren't working and they need to understand why. Now these are opportunities when you can try to improve their understanding of the issues at hand. And, obviously, they're going to use that either as I said, for legitimation purposes, which is very common with research. Or, they're going to use it for … improve, you know, surveillance and control policies, or whatever. So it's a balancing act. I mean, you have to think, can you actually achieve some genuine improvement. I mean, it's never going to be a fundamental change. And if … it varies. It depends who you work with. I mean, we've worked a lot with DfID. And of course, DfID now gives quite good funding to [her MARS centre]. And on the whole, we've been able to do that in a critical way. And we have the impression that at least sometimes, though not always, they're listening to, you know, the advice and information that we're giving them. The Home Office is much more difficult… very hard to work well with the Home Office.

A motivation to 'work with' government departments that was apparent in her statement was that of making money. It was a matter 'of course' that the awarding of funding to her and her colleagues by DfID followed a period during which they had 'worked a lot' with the state agency. Another one of her motivations was to benefit the human subjects of MARS. 'Work with' agencies like the APCI was justified if

'some genuine improvement' in the condition of the people who are the targets of migration control could be 'achieved' alongside the suffering that they would also experience (i.e., as an effect of an improvement in control policies) as a result of the activity. A third motivation was to assist government. One of her aims was to 'improve' the 'understanding of the issues at hand' of the members of 'policy bodies' like the APCI. Another statement that she made to me that indicated that she had this motivation was that she and her colleagues might help the HO 'with a methodology to try and understand the numbers, because that might influence policy'. A fourth motivation was simply to be effective. One 'can't avoid' assisting agencies like the APCI because one wants to have 'practical effects' and 'achieve change' which, incidentally, is 'never going to be […] fundamental'. Her characterization of the decision-making process regarding whether or not to 'work with' an agency like the APCI as 'a balancing act' indicates that she found it to be both difficult and dangerous.

I posit that MARS academic APCI and MAC participants were motivated by a desire to achieve the four ends that I have identified because I have found that these were expressed by not only some of these participants, but also by many faculty and student members of the field. In the following discussion I present a representative sample of my findings for these phenomena and demonstrate their specificity – when it is possible for me to do so – by describing the variation that I encountered within the field of MARS, among different disciplines and fields in the British academy, and between my experiences as an academic in the UK and in the USA.

3.2.3.1. Make money

That financial gain was a motive for the participation of MARS academics in the APCI and MAC is suggested both in the statement of Professor Reilly, above, and also those that were made in published articles by APCI panel members Professor Castles and Black. According to the former, 'many migration sociologists have become dependent on government consultancies and policy-linked funding just because the topic is still seen as rather marginal within the discipline' (Castles 2007:363). Similarly, the latter writes that the growth of the academic field of refugee studies has involved 'a close and fundamental interaction' by its 'centers and programs' with 'policymakers' (Black 2001:61). This

> policy-orientated research within University settings has implied a constant battle to maintain academic independence and intellectual rigor, while simultaneously producing research of relevance to policy concerns, which is capable of attracting funding from major government and private donors (ibid.).

MARS faculty and students explained their acceptance of invitations to do commissioned research for the IRSS as being motivated by financial need. I was in the audience at one of the FMSCs when a MARS faculty member, Dr Woodard, explained his rationale for doing so by stating bluntly that his 'university needs money'. In a similar example, MARS student Ms Lawrence told me the following during an interview regarding the time when she received her invitation to do work for the IRSS.

> At that point I was completely without money. So I went to talk with a friend of mine who was an [academic*], asking for advice. […] Her… of course, was saying, 'No', you know… 'Of course you're becoming part of the … helping them and doing these sorts of things'.

I mentioned to Ms Lawrence that I had heard Dr Woodard make the statement above in justifying his doing commissioned research for the HO. We then had the following conversation:

> JH: I mean to some degree, I think… This is what I sense sort of the way it's looked at [by MARS academics] is: 'Well, it [the IRSS-commissioned research] doesn't have much of an impact either way. I or my institution needs the money. Why not do it?'
>
> Ms Lawrence (ML): 'Hmm …'
>
> JH: I mean… It seems like this is kind of …
>
> ML: Yeah. It's not just the money. It's the prestige. I mean … Just… If you look when you are asked to submit for a new proposal. What do they ask you? They ask you how much money you generate and which were your commissioning bodies. I mean, so if you have been working for the Home Office and the European Union that makes a point. They never ask you about the value of what you… your research.

Again, the overriding motivation for 'working for' governmental agencies was financial gain – i.e., the prestige gained through doing so would increase the likelihood of success of future funding proposals.

Consciousness among MARS faculty, in general, of an urgent need to acquire funding is clear in the statements of Roberta and Joan that I included in my discussion of identity in Chapter One. The former saw the faster growth of migration studies vis-à-vis that of refugee studies to be threatening because 'there's a finite amount of money going around. Everybody's competing for the money'. The latter said that she had left refugee studies because she 'didn't like the way' it 'was going' – i.e., 'the policy bit'. 'Policy', she told me, 'was prescribing almost the sort of research that should be done'. She 'felt that there were a lot of people who were in it for the money, basically'. 'It had become like… it had become an industry in a way that I wasn't comfortable', she said.

I found that – in general – MARS students expressed their short-term financial needs on a fairly regular basis. The MARS students whom I found to be the least likely to mention their short-term financial needs were those who were enrolled in the one-year MSc in Forced Migration at Oxford. Rather, these students tended to mention their longer-term financial issue of student loan debt and their need to secure high-paying employment as soon as possible after completing the course.

The financial motivation (i.e., as a means to gaining employment) for students to join MARS – as well as that of helping the field's human subjects (to be discussed below) – is made explicit in the comic strip below that was created and provided to me, unelicited, by a female friend from North America, who was a student on the Oxford MA in Migration Studies.

Figure 10: Comic strip by MARS student

I found the salience of the financial motivation for action to be no less among the

faculty and students of other fields and disciplines of the social sciences with whom I

have interacted during the past seven years than those of the MARS academics upon whom I focused in my research. For example, on more than one occasion I observed people who were then the heads of departments in the social sciences at UK universities tell workshop and seminar audiences that they felt that it was their professional responsibility to channel funding streams to their departmental colleagues, thereby ensuring the financial well being of these organisations. There is evidence that suggests that some of the MARS academic panel members of the APCI were similarly motivated to join and remain on the panel.

As I demonstrated above, five of the ten MARS academics who joined the APCI during the period of the panel's existence that I studied were directors of academic institutes at the time they did so. I also showed above that panel members commissioned their colleagues (including postgraduate students in their academic departments) or themselves roughly two-thirds of the time. Furthermore, a colleague of the RSC's director indicated to me that the latter's joining of the panel was one of his institutional responsibilities. When I mentioned that I had noticed that the director had joined the panel, this colleague said,

> Yeah, but that was [the former RSC director's] job before. And actually, I remember how it was… The… how… I mean, before, or also, the appoint …, almost at the… in parallel with the appointment as director of the Refugee Studies Centre, there was also this offer to take on… In some sense, because of your position, you have some tasks that go… that matter what you do. I mean, really. You are there. You have to do this. You are an institution in a way. You are … So in a sense you have all of these layers I think of… expected behaviours'.

Also, a statement made to me by a supervisee of one of the MARS academic APCI panel members throws light on the faculty-student relationship in MARS. This student

described for me during an interview a pledge that her supervisor made to her when she began her PhD:

> The agreement was… with him… informal agreement was: 'Well, I will try to get jobs for you inside… like research and things like that so that you can support yourself and at the same time you can do this… your own research'.

These data indicate that the directors of MARS institutes were motivated to join and stay on the panel by a desire to fulfil their role as providers of funding opportunities for their institutional subordinates.

Finally, I found that the financial motivation for action was an extremely important one not only for MARS and social science academics in the UK, but for academics in all fields. Scholars reported feeling increasingly pressurized by financial constraints during chats at conferences, in pubs, and in the pages of academic and industry publications. An example of this expression is the following cartoon that appeared in the *Guardian* (Simmonds 2004), which I found hanging on a bulletin board in one of the main gathering areas of ISCA in March 2006.

Figure 11: Simmonds comic strip

The 'tired member of the history faculty' lamented the reduction in both the time
dedicated to teaching and the quality of academic production that were effects of the
primacy of an avoidance of further funding cuts. There was sufficient financial
pressure being felt by academics across the UK for a) the cartoon's maker to produce
it, b) the Guardian to print it, and c) a member of ISCA to hang it in a very public
space.

3.2.3.2. Benefit the human subjects of MARS

My fieldwork and other experiences in the field of MARS have left me with little doubt that its members who participated in the APCI and the MAC did so because they *thought* that they would thereby help at least *some* of the field's human subjects. Many of them made public statements to this effect. Two of these participants used an idiom of servitude to express this motivation in their publications. Professor Zetter wrote: 'RSC has achieved remarkable impacts but, like the refugees *it serves*, it has always had a sense of restlessness, that there is more to be done' (2007:79; emphasis added). Similarly, Professor Black, asserted that it is

> arguably not the job of academic researchers to pass judgement on the legitimacy of any particular asylum claim. Rather, nonprejudicial research—or, indeed, action research that is placed *at the disposal of* the disenfranchised—can legitimately focus on process and lived experience *for* those whose lives have been placed on the edges of the law (2003:49-50, emphasis added).

Further evidence that they participated with this benevolent aim in mind is provided by my findings, which indicate that it was held not only by some of these participants, but also by members of the field, in general. Perhaps the clearest indication of the universality of this motivation among MARS academics is the frequency with which a published programmatic statement of it, which appeared at the beginning of the 'MARS rises' period, has been reproduced and endorsed in subsequent publications both during that era and in 'The age of migration (studies)'. The following passage, which I call the Turton Doctrine, was published in 1996 and subsequently affirmed to a greater or lesser degree by MARS academics in a large number of published works

(i.e., Bakewell 2008:434; Jacobsen and Landau 2003:185-186; Doná 2007:210;

Mackenzie et al. 2007:310). Turton wrote:

> I cannot see any justification for conducting research into situations of extreme human suffering if one does not have the alleviation of suffering *as an explicit objective of one's research*. For the academic, this means *attempting to* influence the behaviour and thinking of policy-makers and practitioners so that their interventions are more likely to improve than worsen the situation of those whom they wish to help (1996:96, emphasis added).

In sum, the Turton Doctrine requires that a MARS academic act with benevolent

intent. I found that this prescription applied not only to faculty, but also to students.

For example, an article in the *Guardian Weekly* about MARS postgraduate degree

programmes was titled, 'Migration learning to help' (Hoare 2008). This portrayal of

the field was so accurate and agreeable for at least one member of the University of

Oxford that she or he (or they) posted it on the notice board dedicated to a MARS

course in the main hallway of the department in which the course is based. It

remained there for at least a year. Yellow highlighter had been used to mark the body

text passages of 'Oxford University' and one that described ISCA's MPhil in

migration studies. Similarly highlighted was the caption of the photograph below,

which read, 'Field work…an Oxford student took this picture of a migrant in North

Africa, injured jumping a security fence' (ibid.).[33]

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[33] Due to difficulty in acquiring a clear image of the article, that which I include here is the same image from another document that was published by COMPAS (2008:14). The image is credited to 'Schuster', a former research officer at the centre, in the COMPAS publication, while the article credits 'an Oxford student'.

Figure 12: 'Migration learning to help' photograph

Another very representative example of this mindset among students in the field is the following statement, which was made to me by a MARS MA student at UEL whom I quoted above, Ms Herbert. 'The thinking behind' the field of refugee refugee studies, she said, is that it 'does have, you know… it does have a clear political stance. You just want to… you know, do something for those people'.

Although I found the motivation to benefit the human subjects of the field to be universal, it salience varied somewhat among the members of different research centres and universities. It was more salient in the statements of faculty and students at the universities of East London (i.e., Ms Herbert's comment, above) and Kent (i.e., The European Centre for the Study of Migration and Social *Care*) and less so among those at Sussex and Oxford – where it varied among this university's different centres, as well. A MARS student at Oxford repeated for me a statement made by a senior MARS figure that Oxford's COMPAS was like IOM (the International Organisation for Migration) and RSC was like UNHCR in that the former lacked the human rights remit that the latter had. Although this motivation was relatively less salient in the statements of the members of the Oxford centres, it was expressed subtly in the décor of the buildings in which these were housed. For years, public, high-traffic areas of

both COMPAS and RSC were adorned with photographs depicting the suffering of people who were understood to be the field's human subjects. Those by photographer Adrian Arbib that were displayed at the RSC are shown in the following images.

Figure 13: RSC hallway adornment

Although there was consensus among the field's faculty and students regarding their aim of benefiting the human subjects of their research, few stated that it did so successfully as unequivocally as Professor Zetter did in his published statement cited above – i.e., that the RSC 'serves' people he identifies as 'refugees'. Most were much more uncertain regarding the field's success in accomplishing this goal. One very representative example already given is the text in the right-hand column of the third row in the cartoon by a MARS student, displayed above: 'And maybe I'd even help the people I'm writing about by drawing attention to their problems and needs, and by giving the world a better understanding of their situation and perspective… Maybe'.

Another example of this uncertainty regarding the effect(s) of the field on its human subjects is that of Carol – a MARS DPhil student at the SCMR's – statement that she made to me about one of her preoccupations as a researcher. 'You think of the possible implications of your study, obviously', she said to me during our interview. Implications for whom?, I asked. She responded in the following way:

> When I'm thinking about audience, I'm thinking about… Cos I'm not writing it for any policy makers or any kind of… I don't have any set audience in my mind. I'm just concerned that if I'm describing irregular migrants coming to [a Western European state], for instance, taking certain paths, I'm concerned that there would be more immigration control, which is what I don't want. For instance, I mean, those kind of… very… someone is… would read… or find that, 'Oh. Okay… they're using this way of coming to… or they've used these ways of…' Obviously, those are known. But if there's someone who's like… whatever, could be… sort of… Or, I'm thinking now that [another Western European state]… I have a grant from [this state]. I'm thinking, 'Why would someone be interested in financing this kind of… funding this kind of research?'. I'm afraid that they are funding it because they think it's an answer to the care deficit and… aging population in [this state]. So that… yeah… kind of, think that 'Okay. We'll fund this so that maybe we can adopt this kind of model to our system'. So, obviously, those are my questions.

Carol concluded her answer to my 'for whom?' question thus: 'So my audience is…
could be whoever. But those are, obviously, the ethical questions that one is
constantly thinking about when one writes about migration'.

The degree to which the end of benefiting the human subjects of research motivated
academics varies, I found, among fields in the social sciences in the UK. That it did so
for MARS more than for others (i.e., medical research) is evinced by the title of one
of the articles cited above: 'Beyond 'Do No Harm': The Challenge of Constructing
Ethical Relationships in Refugee Research (Mackenzie et al. 2007). But I found that it
did so less for MARS academics than for the members of the field of social work.

My experiences as a MARS academic and ethnographer of the field have shown me
that the motivation is largely taken for granted by its members. It was rarely made
explicit during normal academic day-to-day activities. To do so would have been
perceived as being terribly awkward and only stating the obvious. The motivation
became apparent primarily in its absence, as described for me by a student on the
MARS course at Kent. Judith told me that she and her classmates were 'shocked' that
'not everyone' at a conference that they attended outside of the UK 'agreed that
migrants should be accepted. Not everyone agreed that migrants should be allowed to
work or access health care for free'. 'I'd be surprised, I think', she said, 'when I come
across somebody who's, well… not pro-migration' in an academic setting.

What surprised me – at first, about MARS in Oxford, and then later about the other
institutes that I was studying in the UK – was that this motivation wasn't *more* salient.
I suppose I expected my new academic community to prioritise the well-being of its

human subjects in the way that my former ones in the US had. Like Judith and her fellow students, I was shocked by what I perceived to be the weakness of the motivation to benefit the human subjects of MARS. In addition, I was (and still am, to some degree) also puzzled and disturbed by the dominance among MARS academics of another motivation, which I will next discuss: to assist government.

3.2.3.3. Inform policy/assist government

I found ample evidence to support the argument that MARS participants in the APCI and MAC were motivated, like panel member Professor Reilly, by a desire to assist government. At least two other MARS participants in these organisations made statements to me during interviews that echoed her sentiment. Dr Hurley told me that academia should be a place where 'government' can turn to for research, for evidence for things that it needs to address. It is, he continued, 'a huge resource that could be tapped into'. 'Obviously', he informed me, 'you don't want the government setting the agenda'. Similarly, Professor Grimes said that when she began doing commissioned research for the IRSS, 'it was about describing the knowledge base, which would inform policy but not be instrumental'. I have found that when MARS academics make general references to 'policy' such as this one, they mean government – i.e., the regulatory activities of formal legal entities commonly thought of as existing at local, regional, national, and international levels. For example, a MARS panel member of the APCI once answered the question that he put forward to his MARS audience – 'What is policy?' – with the following definition: 'something that governments do'.

Louise, a first-year MARS MA student provided me with both a similar definition of policy and an indication of the degree to which she had reflected on the term – one that I found to be representative of those of the field's members, in general. After I asked her to define the term for me, she replied,

> To me, it's kind of specifically related to the government and how it… it's what… Policy is what the government thinks it's doing and says it's doing. It's about how the government manages civil life, I suppose, I think… Hmmm… Kind of about ideas about where we're going and what we're doing and what the outcome's going to be, I guess.

When I asked her if there were alternative definitions of policy she answered, 'I don't know. I… I mean, until you said that I'd never really kind of thought about it'.

Bakewell's observation that

> the protagonists [i.e., forced migration researchers] in [published] debates on the relationship between research and policy often appear to be talking at cross purposes as they fail to make it clear what they mean by policy and policy relevant (2008:434).

supports my claim for the general taken-for-grantedness of the term's governmental meaning by MARS academics. Although I am aware of statements being made by MARS faculty (including Bakewell, *op. cit.*) that policy *can* refer to the practices and official approach of non-governmental organisations, my findings overwhelmingly support the interpretation I set forth above, that in general, when MARS academics speak, write, see, or hear the word 'policy', they understand it to mean 'government'.

There is additional evidence that the decision by MARS academics to participate in the APCI and MAC knowing full well of the harmful effects of their actions was neither a simple nor tranquil process (see Professor Reilly's 'balancing act' and

Black's 'battle', above). Panel member Professor Zetter's paper that he presented at the HO-organised Bridging the Information Gaps conference in the middle of the 'MARS rises' period included a statement on how he saw his being asked by the HO to describe and evaluate his relationship with its IRSS at the event:

> I have been passed a slightly poisoned chalice. If I am too critical of the relationship we have had with the Home Office, then we may well exclude ourselves from any future tendering! On the other hand, if I suggest the relationship has been very compatible and effective, as indeed it has, then my academic colleagues will berate me for being co-opted into the Home Office agenda and not retaining my independence as a researcher (UK Home Office 2001:21).

Near the end of his paper, Professor Zetter mentioned he and his co-authors' governmental motivation and summarized their experiences as HO IRSS-commissioned researchers:

> I believe we have steered an objective course between *informing policy* with professionally grounded research, and preserving our independence and integrity in respecting the human rights and needs of asylum seekers by being fully aware of the implications of our findings (ibid.:25, emphasis added).

Similar to Professor Reilly's 'balancing act' and Black's 'battle', APCI participant Professor Zetter described his engagement with the HO (i.e., his decision to speak at the conference and he and his colleagues' experience of doing HO IRSS-commissioned research) using metaphors that indicated it was lived as being both difficult (i.e., *steering* an objective course) and dangerous (i.e., a slightly *poisoned* chalice).

There is also evidence that the students who assisted in the production of commissioned research for the APCI and MAC were motivated by a desire to assist government, as well. For example, Marilyn, a first-year MARS MA student told me

that 'one of the things I admire most about migration studies' is its engagement with 'policy'. She went on to identify Sarah Spencer and MAC-commissioned researcher Bridget Anderson at COMPAS in Oxford as being academics who write 'policy papers'. Further support for this motivation existing generally among MARS students comes from the Forced Migration Student Conference (FMSC – see Chapter One). The student organizers of these events placed 'policy' at the centre of their discussions and attendees chose to attend a 'policy'-related workshop over others on offer having different themes. The first day of the 2005 FMSC closed with a panel discussion titled 'Policy-driven research or research-driven policy? Challenges to, and dilemmas for, forced migration studies', in which two of the five MARS faculty members who gave presentations (students participated only as chairs of this panel) were APCI members (i.e., Professors Castles and Zetter). In a second example, the four workshops that attendees at the 2008 FMSC could choose from were the following:

- How to make your research policy relevant
- Refugee status determination (RSD): the process of identifying refugees
- Copying strategies for forced migration fieldwork
- Stereotyping as a method of mass destruction: what are technologies the media uses to construct and present refugees and asylum seekers?

One of the student organizers of the conference, Mr Hurst, told me that he and his colleagues intended for the afternoon workshops to be 'more hands-on' and 'more practical' than the panel sessions that took place earlier in the day. 'The most popular workshop', he said, 'was turning research into policy. How do you… how do you do that?' The question with which he ended this statement was not rhetorical, but rather a description of the content of the workshop that he delivered in the same tone as the

earlier part of his statement – i.e., one that was matter-of-fact rather than of shock or disbelief.

I found that the salience of the motivation to assist government varied institutionally. It did so conversely vis-à-vis that of benefiting the field's human subjects – i.e., it was stronger where the other was weaker, and vice versa. The governmental motivation was strongest at Oxford's COMPAS and RSC. The 'P' in COMPAS stands for 'Policy' and Sarah Spencer – one of the MARS academic admired by Marilyn – led a workshop for its researchers on 'how to make your research policy relevant' during its first year of existence. RSC introduced its 'Policy programme' and added the term 'policy' to the title of one its senior members in 2006-08. In addition, one of the students in its MSc course in Forced Migration, Ms Hicks, responded to my request that she describe for me the course's curriculum by suggesting (in a sarcastic tone) that I would find all I needed to know about it in the UNHCR publication, *The state of the world's refugees*, which she and her cohort had been assigned to read, and which included many members of the centre as authors. I found the governmental motivation to be weakest where that of benefiting the human subjects of MARS strongest: UEL, which was described to me – disparagingly – by Frances, one of its MARS MA students, as lacking a policy focus. 'From what I've heard', she said to me (echoing my own research findings), 'Oxford is so much more policy oriented'.

I found the governmental motivation to be present throughout the disciplines of the UK social sciences, but especially salient in (relatively) recently formed 'inter'- or 'multidisciplinary' fields such as ageing, development, and housing studies. My fieldwork has shown me that the motivation is – like the field of MARS – is in its

ascendancy, not decline. For example, a well-established social scientist wrote in a

paper for a workshop on the political economy of academic research that I attended

that

> at the height of the influence of Marxism in the social sciences in the late 1970s, the debate was about whether one did research funded by government departments or charities at all. The risks of ideological compromise were often seen as too great. More recently still there have been discussions on the policy relevance of academic research.

I have observed that mid- and late-career UK academics in the social sciences

perceive a change from a time when the motivation to assist government was openly

debated to one in which it has become more or less the consensus. As I mentioned

above (in the 'Project background' section of my Introduction), I was surprised by

what I perceived to be the high degree to which my new academic colleagues in the

UK promoted 'policy relevance' as a desirable end, in itself. I had been trained in

anthropology in U.S. departments at both the under- and postgraduate levels, where I

recall being encouraged to think of the application of my knowledge outside of the

academy generally, not to assist government specifically. The governmental

motivation of UK academics is therefore not only historically – as demonstrated

immediately above – but also geographically particular. Another indicator of the

cultural specificity of the 'policy relevance' imperative in the British academy is the

absence of a word that means 'policy' in Spanish. It is commonly translated by

academics for whom Spanish is their native language as 'política', which is the same

word that is used for another English word: 'politics'. A modest Whorfian (Kay and

Kempton 1984:75) interpretation of this difference is that the members of the

academy in the UK tend to imagine a de- or apolitical process that they should

facilitate, while those in that of Spain or in Latin America tend not to conceptualise such a process.

Some of the salience of this motivation in MARS is certainly the result – in part – of academics integrating the 'buzzword' of 'policy' into their grant proposals in order to increase their chances of funding from state and non-governmental agencies. I discuss this funding environment and the behaviour of MARS academics within it extensively in Chapter Four. That being said, I have found, however, that many – if not most – of the expressions of this governmental motivation were quite genuine. For example, on one occasion I stuck up a conversation in the ISCA lobby with a young woman who informed me that she was a student on the RSC Forced Migration MSc course. When Ms Floyd asked me to describe for her the topic of my thesis, I responded by saying that it was a study of the academic field of migration and refugee studies in the UK. She then asked me if I would bring my findings to the attention of 'policy makers'. Rather than answer Ms Floyd's question, I instead told her that I was studying how our minds relate our academic practices to actors outside of the academy and said that an example of this might be how those that she brought up first when asking about what I would do with my research were 'policy makers'. Sure, Ms Floyd said matter-of-factly, before stating that you want your research to 'make a difference'. Her expression of the motivation to assist government through research was spontaneous and off-the-cuff, not a marketing ploy. She showed herself to be preoccupied with this end in a genuine way. It is to a discussion of the second motivation that she mentioned – i.e, to make a difference – that I next turn my attention.

3.2.3.4. Be effective

The fourth aim that I found to have been a motivator for MARS participants in the APCI and MAC was that of being effective. In this section I discuss the seemingly vague statements in which my informants mentioned this aim as an end in itself – i.e., those in which they did not go on soon thereafter to specify *what*, precisely, the effect(s) might be or *how* it (or these) might occur. Above I quoted panel member Professor Reilly's statement in which he expressed his desire to both 'have […] practical effects' and 'achieve change'. Another MARS participant in one of these organisations, Dr Hurley, demonstrated to me during our interview that he, too, was motivated by a desire to be effective. After telling me that he did indeed think about whether or not he might be better off working outside of the academy (see above), he said that he remained in academic migration studies because he thought 'it could make a difference' and also because he was 'very interested in it'. At another point in our conversation, Dr Hurley told me that 'the only way' that research 'can make a difference' is if the researcher develops a personal relationship with policy makers. 'The last thing that people want', he claimed in reference to researchers, is that what they're working on won't be heard or taken seriously.

IRSS-commissioned MARS researcher Ms Lawrence indicated that she was motivated by a desire to be effective, as well. Above I quoted her statement in which she expressed her financial motivation for accepting an invitation to work for the HO. The project, she said, was related to the HO's consideration at that time of a new arrangement for managing the provision of services to people who were seeking asylum. According to Ms Lawrence, the HO 'wanted to… because it's part of their

sort of internal empirical approach, they had to invent an evaluation in order to see the impact of this, what was happening'. She went on to make the statement quoted above about her going to her colleague for advice on whether she should or should not accept the HO invitation and subsequently being told by this person that she should not do so. Ms Lawrence continued her description of her decision-making process thus:

> At some point, it was the possibility… I mean, the sense if you are defining the criteria for the evaluation of the project you can make some kind of impact, and in a sense, you have… I mean, unless you think that everything is completely useless, you have to hope that if you do something and they ask you for a specific thing, this can have some kind of impact. And that case was my way of justifying that… the fact that I did the job.

Ms Lawrence went on to describe for me her agreeable working relationship with her 'line manager' at the HO. 'At the end of it', she said,

> I didn't know any… I mean, I don't think they have done anything with all the products that I generated. This was my… I mean, I didn't have any feedback from them commenting on the work. They just accepted… […] But then the project… Because there was while we were doing the project… and this is another big issue in this kind of policy research…. While I was doing that, at the same time they were starting a new kind of policy trajectory. […] So in a way, before the end of the research project, that was already old. And this is something that affects you also as a researcher because you feel how useless is your work…
>
> Joshua Hatton: What's the point?
>
> Ms Lawrence: Yeah. What's the point?

According to Ms Lawrence, then, one of the reasons (in addition to her financial need) that she did this work for the HO was that she saw it as a way to 'make' or 'have some kind of impact'. She lamented the 'uselessness' of her work for the HO, echoing Dr Hurley's claim that such an occurrence is 'the last thing' that researchers want.

I gathered information that suggests that the motivation to be effective was generally part of the consciousness of the students of MARS, as well. For example, Mr Rowe concluded his answer to my standard 'Why do this with your life rather than something else?' interview question by telling me that his decision to come to Oxford to do the MSc in Forced Migration

> kind of jelled around this kind of idea of states' rights versus individual rights and kind of how you can make a difference through the practice of law and really kind of a/effect[34] something. And that's how it all… so it's a meandering course.

Dr Bradshaw, an instructor on Mr Rowe's course, used some of the same words to describe to me the motivation of its students. 'They want to make a difference', he told me.

To be effective was a conscious motivation of not only MARS students, but of faculty as well. MARS faculty member Dr Collyer's account of Barbara Harrell-Bond's opening keynote speech of the ninth IASFM conference included a reference to this motivation.

> The official opening keynote speech of the conference was given by Barbara Harrell-Bond, who spoke on 'The State of Refugee Studies'. Harrell-Bond was a founding member of IASFM and has provided one of the most consistently critical voices in refugee studies during her long career. She highlighted the growth of refugee studies as an academic discipline but also focused on the challenge to *make a difference* beyond academia. The need to develop a refugee-focused approach and recognize the contribution of refugees in the search for solutions were both highlighted in her introduction and became significant themes of the conference (Collyer 2005:248, emphasis added).

Further evidence of the salience of this motivation is found on the website of the SCMR's DRC. Just one click away from the centre's home page is one that is titled,

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[34] I cannot determine which word my informant used.

'Conceptual Background: Migration, Globalisation and Poverty'. The last sentence of text on the page reads as follows:

> Our primary aim is not to speak only to those who are convinced that migration is an important aspect of poor peoples' livelihoods, but to those who are not yet convinced, and to address areas where new research and analysis and dissemination of research findings can *make a real difference* (University of Sussex 2003, emphasis added).

My findings show that the aim of being effective was not particular to MARS, but rather widespread among the social sciences in the UK. Examples from institutes with very different focuses and politics demonstrate that this was the case. The websites of both the Skoll Centre for Social Entrepreneurship at the University of Oxford's Saïd Business School and that for SOAS (home of the MARS MA in Migration and Diaspora Studies) use the same phrase to describe their organisations. That of the former read in May 2007 that 'The Skoll Centre is committed to making a difference, being relevant, responding to real gaps in knowledge and expertise, and developing a strategic research programme' (See Appendix 3.1). That of the former had a header in September of 2007 that read, simply, 'SOAS. Making a difference' (see Appendix 3.2).

I found the desire to be effective to motivate students in the UK in general, not only those who were doing MARS postgraduate degrees. Some of the evidence for this phenomenon comes from students' statements. For example, a May 2007 article in *The Oxford Student* titled, 'Spare some change? The future of charity in Oxford' had the tagline: 'Oxford students have never been more active in their support for humanitarian causes. But are they really making a difference? Dex Torricke-Barton argues that it's time for an intellectual revolution' (Torricke-Barton 2007). Similarly,

the article announcing the '2006 Graduate of the Year' in a magazine distributed free to university students throughout the UK quoted the winner as stating: 'I want to make a difference to as many people as possible and by working as hard as I am I think that I have already started to do that' (Real World 2006:7). This motivation is also evinced in the statements included in recruiting materials left in public areas of universities throughout the UK. See Appendices 3.3-6 for examples from bulletin boards in common areas of Oxford's RSC in 2004 and Hertford College in 2006, Brookes University in the same year, and Manchester Metropolitan University in 2008.

In the introduction to this section in which I have explained the participation of MARS academics in the APCI and MAC as being influenced – in part – by their desire to 'be effective', I wrote that the statements in which the human subjects of my study expressed this desire were *seemingly vague* because they tended to do so without also describing exactly what that effect, change, or difference would be. At this stage in my research, I see these statements partly as being clichés in a way similar to that of the author of a passage from the satirical (and quite cruel, in my opinion) gossip column, 'The Librarian', in *The Oxford Student* weekly newspaper. An article titled 'Gloves off for Darfur' with the tagline 'Despair: Sudanese child loses faith in humanity after violence marred HUFD fashion show' read as follows:

> It was all going so well. The Hands Up for Darfur crew had fought off Max Seddon's jibes. They'd got Stella McCartney. They'd got Anna Wintour. They'd got emaciated women with glassy eyes in thin rags (I know, but you were thinking it too.) Yes, they were just one sashay down the catwalk away from mobilising the UN and making the Janjaweed fuck off home. Alas, it wasn't to be. Following an impassioned plea to *make a difference* by the show director who, it transpires, doesn't know where Darfur is, no fewer than two Balliol bruisers (one a failed Union hack, the other an infamous footballer) were ejected from Thirst Lodge for starting brawls amid a sea of wasted, but

very caring, rahs. Still, if it's for *charidee…* (Oxford Student 2008), emphasis in original).

However, after reviewing my notes that I made in 2002 while preparing the application materials for doctoral programmes, I became aware that although the 'be effective' statements that I presented above are seen as being vague by people who consider them to be clichés, they are not inherently ambiguous. In one section of my notebook, I began with the heading, 'SOPs' – i.e., Statements of Purpose. Below this I wrote four main headings, each begun with an asterisk: 'outline of proposed research', 'reasons for enrolling in Ph.D. program in x university', 'past work in field of study/preparation (experience) for proposed research/graduate study', and 'purpose'. Under this last heading, and slightly indented, I wrote, 'have an impact'. I – like Professor Reilly and Dr Hurley, other MARS academics, and those in UK universities, in general – wanted to be effective. Like my human subjects, I expressed (in my notes) a wide range of motivations for studying people I identified as Mexican and Algerian migrants, including – à la Zetter – 'better serve and advocate on behalf of immigrants and migrant organizations' and – approximating the Turton Doctrine, which I had not yet read at that time – 'dedication to decreasing suffering'. However, for both myself and for many of them, 'be effective' was an aim, per se. It only *seemed* vague to me later, after I had begun carefully to interrogate the stated aims of my MARS colleagues and had contextualised it using an anthropological approach – an analysis I present below as part of my Geertzian interpretation.

3.2.4. Summary

In this section I have shown that the participation of MARS academics in the APCI and the MAC as members and commissioned researchers is explained – in part – by the tendencies of these actors to think and feel in particular ways – mental phenomena of which they, themselves, were mostly conscious. Although I was not able to observe these phenomena directly, I used primarily statements and descriptions of other behaviour of these participants and their MARS colleagues (including myself, on occasion) from among those that I have compiled to indicate that these were indeed part of these actors' experiences. I posit that these participants engaged with these organisations in the ways that they did because they a) were able to divide up their personalities and therefore dissociate some of their selves from the socially stigmatised one (or ones) that did harm to the field's human subjects while wearing the hat of APCI or MAC participant, and/or b) judged that doing so would enable them to fulfil one, some, or all of their aims of making money, benefiting the field's human subjects, assisting government, and being effective. For those who were aware of the harmful effects of the activities, this would thereby offset or compensate for the damage that would result from their participation.

I found that there were patterns in the distribution of these thoughts and feelings among MARS academics. The experiences of APCI and MAC MARS participants were therefore likely to have varied according to their status (i.e., faculty vis-à-vis student) and institutional affiliation. Division and dissociation were likely to have been mental operations relevant to APCI participant decision making for faculty, but not for students. I have shown that the former were much more likely to have been

conscious of the harmful effects of their panel activities than were the latter: faculty were members who were privy to such information, while students participated only as commissioned researchers who were less likely to have had such access. My findings suggested that the four motives that I have identified were shared more or less equally by MARS faculty and students. At the level of the institution, I found the motivations of benefiting the field's human subjects and assisting government to vary conversely. The former was strongest at UEL and Kent while the latter was thus Oxford and Sussex, and vice versa. The motivations that appeared to have the most universal distribution among my human subjects were therefore those of making money and being effective.

Although these four motivations were shared more or less equally by younger and older MARS academics (i.e., students and faculty), I found that the latter tended to be conscious of the existence of another, which the former tended to not have in mind. This fifth motivation was to bring about a revolution. Many mid- to late-career MARS academics – some of them leading members of the field – had been motivated by revolutionary aims early on in their careers. This phenomenon came to my attention during a chat that I had over a pint at a MARS conference with Ms Jones, an IGO employee who presents regularly at MARS events and whose written work appears in MARS journals. She chuckled when she told me in a slightly incredulous tone of voice that she and another mid-career person who is a high-ranking MARS academic both set out as postgraduates with Marxist objectives.

Furthermore, the early publications of two additional high-ranking members of the field who were also APCI members (Castles and Kosack 1973; Zetter 1991) used

Marxist approaches. That revolutionary aims no longer motivate these mid- to late-career MARS academics is indicated by not only Ms Jones' expression of her and her colleague's naïveté, but also in the statement by Professor Reilly (herself a member of this age-set and whose early work was Marxist in nature) above at the beginning of this 'Motivations' section that 'it's never going to be a fundamental change'. The waning of the revolutionary motivation among these MARS academics was also apparent in the statement made by a high-ranking MARS academic of this age-set with a Marxist scholarly background following a presentation by an academic in the field of development studies at Oxford's QEH.

The presenter argued that capitalism produces poverty and that in order to do away with the latter we must seek alternatives to the former. The MARS academic was the first audience member to address the presenter after her talk. She said, 'As an old Marxist, I've been waiting for the system to collapse'. 'I've given up', she continued. Then she went on to ask the presenter why she thought that it wouldn't be possible to reform from within capitalism. In her reply, the presenter asked the MARS academic why the latter didn't envisage an alternative that transcends the capitalist model.

In another example, a well-established academic in a field of the social sciences expressed a similar defeatism during her presentation at a student-organised seminar on a MARS subject in Oxford. After telling the audience that when she was a student in the 70s, she and her colleagues were on the political left and they had an internationalist political utopia in mind. However, she went on to say: 'My utopia was stolen from me and my kind. It was stolen by Blair and Bush and the Davos meetings'.

In contrast, I found that younger MARS academics (both students and faculty) tended to neither be motivated by nor even have in mind these revolutionary aims. Not once during my seven years of interacting with these MARS academics did one of them express to me a desire to use research to bring about the end of capitalism. None referred to their human subjects as belonging to a new proletariat whose consciousness they would raise through their research. Having presented my first Weberian explanation – i.e., à la Rabinow – of the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics, I now turn to the second that I include in this chapter – that which considers mostly *unconscious* meaning.

3.3. Mostly unconscious mental phenomena

In this section I 'thicken' the description that I have presented thus far by relating these mostly conscious behaviours and processes to a cultural 'context' of 'a multiplicity of complex conceptual structures' of 'signification' that are, in contrast 'inexplicit' (Geertz 1975:1-14). Here I explain the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics as being not only a result of the conscious processes of division and dissociation and motivation detailed above, but also as a consequence of their doing these things 'in terms of' particular 'socially established structures of meaning' (ibid.:14). I relate MARS academics and their facilitation of migration control to the structures of meaning of larger collectives (i.e., Westerners, women, and Anglo-Americans) of which I can demonstrate that they were a part in a way similar to that in which Geertz associates a village in which a cockfight took place to those of 'the Balinese'. I posit that MARS academics were Western in evincing a post-modern subjectivity, being Orientalist, and having a governmentality. The women among

them acted in a way consonant with their femininity. Finally, MARS academics were Anglo-American in their efficacism – a neologism that I will define (and justify) below.

3.3.1. MARS academics as Westerners

Most MARS academics can be ascribed the identity of Westerner. Here I use the term as shorthand to identify people who are socialized or enculturated in the spaces dominated by the states of the Western European Peninsula (i.e, the EU-15, Norway, and Switzerland), North America (i.e., USA and Canada), and Australia and New Zealand. Evidence for the appropriateness of this ascription comes from the statements of long-time MARS academics, my own observations, and university student records.

Black has described sociologically the group of people who conduct research on ''illegal' migration' and 'transnational migration' as being 'a primarily middleclass, elite and often white European research community' (2003:50). Doná copies this description nearly verbatim (but does not cite it as a quotation) and uses it matter-of-factly to characterise 'forced migration research' in a later publication (2007:221). As I stated in the first section of my introduction, MARS is a shorthand identity that I have ascribed to people who are students or faculty at universities that are located in the UK. It can be considered to be a subset of the global community that Black and Doná appear to be objectifying. Neither specifies if he or she means faculty, students, or both of these.

Black and Doná's description of (at least some) MARS academics as being 'white European' is mostly supported by my observations of the field. I encountered very few faculty members during my time as a MARS academic and during my fieldwork who would be considered phenotypically to be 'brown' or 'black'. The vast majority of those whom I met whose nationality or citizenship I became aware of had spent the majority of their lives residing in 'the West'. Further evidence for the Western-ness of MARS students comes from my analysis of university records acquired through FOIA requests. The data set I acquired for nationality, citizenship, or country of origin[35] of MARS students during the 2003/04 – 2007/08 academic years (refer to Introduction for details) is 71 percent complete.[36] 270 of the 366 new MARS enrolments (74%) were identified as having nationalities of Western states (see data for universities and courses displayed in Appendices 3.10 and 3.11, respectively). Furthermore, eight of the nine nationalities with the highest frequencies of new enrolments were Western, as seen below in Table 4.

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[35] Below I use state name as a default. Most list country of origin. Sussex lists 'nationality' and gives 'British', whereas Queen Mary London reports for 'nationality' and gives 'United Kingdom'.

[36] As seen in Appendix 3.7, the data set I acquired for nationality/country of origin of new enrolments is incomplete – i.e., 71 percent complete. This same table shows that at the level of university, I have complete or nearly complete information for enrolments at six of the eight in the sample. My data set for Sussex is only half complete and I have only information on *region* of origin for UEL enrolments (Appendix 3.8). I received data for 15 of the 17 courses in my sample (see Appendix 3.9). I have no information regarding this characteristic for the 16 new enrolments in the Sussex MSc in Social Research Methods (Migration) and only have data on *region* of origin for the 77 new enrolments in the UEL MA in Refugee Studies. Furthermore, I received incomplete data sets for four courses. However, three of these are nearly or more than 90 percent complete and only one (Sussex MA in Migration Studies) is very incomplete – i.e., 36 percent. I am unable to disaggregate the Oxford MSc and MPhil courses and therefore present them in aggregate, as I received them.

Table 4: Nine highest frequency MARS student nationalities

State	Number of new enrolments
UK	122
USA	51
Japan	17
Germany	14
Canada	12
France	10
Italy	10
Spain	10
Netherlands	9
Total	255

Having established that most of the MARS academics whose statements and other actions I described in the first section of this chapter can be reasonably considered to be Western, I now turn to my discussion of how their behaviour can be understood as being related to a Western cultural context.

3.3.1.1. Postmodern subjectivity

One Western structure of meaning that helps to explain the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics is that of post-modern subjectivity. Recall Dr Parrish's statement (and similar ones made by his MARS and other academic colleagues) that I described above regarding selves and hats. He considered my experience of anxiety, which resulted from my consciousness of a contradiction between my work and my politics, to be overly holistic. In contrast, he told me that his work and activist identities had 'nothing to do with' one another and that he was not troubled in the way that I had been. This contrast between my experience and that of Dr Parrish mirrors Jameson's (1984) description of one of the differences between the high modern and postmodern subjectivities of Western society. According to Jameson, 'concepts such

as anxiety and alienation (and the experiences to which they correspond […]) are no longer appropriate in the world of the postmodern' (ibid.). 'The end of the bourgeois ego or monad', he writes, 'no doubt brings with it the end of the psychopathologies of that ego as well—what I have generally here been calling the waning of affect' (ibid.). Jameson claims that the 'liberation' of the postmodern, 'fragmented' subject

> from the older *anomie* of the centred subject may also mean, not merely a liberation from anxiety, but a liberation from every other kind of feeling as well, since there is no longer a self present to do the feeling. This is not to say that the cultural products of the postmodern era are utterly devoid of feeling, but rather that such feelings – which it may be better and more accurate to call 'intensities' – are now free-floating and impersonal' (ibid., emphasis in original).

Above I showed that MARS academics who participated in the APCI and MAC being aware of the harm that they were doing to the field's human subjects were likely to have managed this situation psychologically in the way the Dr Parrish did: through thinking of themselves as having multiple, unrelated selves from whose stigmatised behaviour it was possible for them to dissociate. I posit that I have found – like Strauss did in her anthropological fieldwork in New Jersey, USA – that Jameson's 'late capitalist psychological fragmentation […] coexists with some integration' (1997:395; see also Stauss 1990). Whereas Strauss located this coexistence in the cognitive schemas of particular individuals, I have done so between individuals (i.e., Dr Parrish and myself).

3.3.1.2. Orientalism

Above I showed that one of the reasons that MARS academics facilitated migration control was that – ironically – they were trying to help the human subjects of their field. As examples of evidence of this motivation I described the display in the public

areas of MARS centres of images of the suffering of the field's non-Western human subjects, which both identified the objects of their study and expressed the researchers' feeling of solidarity with them. These practices – and others that I will describe immediately below – can be understood as an expression of Western Orientalism. Said defines Orientalism as 'a way of coming to terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's special place in European Western experience' (1978:1). It is a 'dimension of modern political-intellectual culture', he writes, that 'has less to do with the Orient than it does with 'our' world' (ibid.:12).

Said identifies 'sympathetic identification' as being the 'third eighteenth-century element preparing the way for modern Orientalism' (ibid.:118). This 'identification by sympathy' was the means by which 'an eighteenth-century mind could breach the doctrinal walls erected between the West and Islam and see hidden elements of kinship between himself and the Orient' (ibid.). Then, according to Said:

> '[A]s far as the West was concerned during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an assumption had been made that the Orient and everything in it was, if not patently inferior to, then in need of corrective study by the West. The Orient was viewed as if framed by the classroom, the criminal court, the prison, the illustrated manual. Orientalism, then, is knowledge of the Orient that places things Oriental in class, court, prison, or manual for scrutiny, study, judgement, discipline, or governing' (ibid.:40-41).

The display of the images in MARS centres was Orientalist, both in its sympathetic identification (i.e., to express solidarity with non-Western human subjects) and in – literally – framing of an object in need of corrective study.

This practice and its meaning to MARS academics was very much in tune with those of the photographer who produced the images that were displayed at COMPAS in

Oxford (i.e., Salgado 2000:151). Salgado described his subjects as suffering and being

in need of corrective study in the following way:

> This book tells the story of humanity on the move. It is a disturbing story […]. […] For six years in forty countries, I worked among these fugitives, on the road, or in the refugee camps and city slums where they often end up. Many were going through the worst periods of their lives. They were frightened, uncomfortable, and humiliated. Yet they allowed themselves to be photographed, I believe, because they wanted their plight to be made known. When I could, I explained to them that this was my purpose (ibid.:7).

That his subjects were non-Western and that he identified sympathetically with them

in Orientalist fashion are clear in another statement by the photographer:

> I was probably drawn to this project by my own life on the move. […] It is not surprising, then, that I should identify, even feel a certain complicity, with exiles, migrants, people shaping new lives for themselves far from their birthplaces. The *Salvadoran* waiter in a Los Angeles restaurant, the *Pakistani* shopkeeper in the north of England, the *Senegalese* hard hat on a Paris construction site, all deserve our respect: each has traveled an extraordinary physical and personal journey to reach where he is, each is contributing to the reorganization of humankind, *each is* implicitly *part of our story* (ibid.:9, emphasis added).

In other words, both the production and consumption (i.e., display) of these images

are intelligible as expressions of Orientalism.

I found sympathetic identification to be quite common among my MARS informants.

Both students and faculty told me – unelicited – that they considered themselves to be

migrants. Another apt example of this Orientalist phenomenon is a performance by

members of the 2007-08 Sussex MA in Migration Studies course, in which they sang

alternate lyrics to the tune of Madonna's 'Like a virgin' (University of Sussex n.d.d).

'Like a migrant' draws an analogy between these students' experiences in the course

and those of their human subjects and evinces their Orientalist 'yearning for solidarity

and even identity with the other' (Ortner 1997:139). Below I reproduce the first three

paragraphs of the song's lyrics (see complete lyrics in Appendix 3.12).

> I made it through the MA
> Somehow I made it through
> Didnt know how lost I was,
> until i found the migration crew
>
> As a convenor, he was neat
> as a guy, he was super sweet
> and he made us feel,
> Oh he maa-aade us feel
> shiny and new!
>
> Like a migrant, HEY
> abroad for the very first time,
> like a migrant
> with your passport, next to mine.

In Chapter Four I discuss further the objectification of other-than-Western people by

MARS academics in their research. But before moving on to do so, I continue my

discussion of the symbolic structures of Westerners to which the facilitation by

MARS academics of migration control can be related: governmentality.

3.3.1.3. Governmentality

Above I described the motivation of MARS academics to assist government and

argued that this desire was a factor in the decision of some of these actors to

participate in the APCI or MAC. This motivation can be understood as an expression

of Western governmentality. I use the term governmentality to mean two things. First,

it is a sense that one has a duty to assist government, understood here to mean that

which Foucault claims that it has meant to the people of the West since the 16th

century: 'exercising towards [a polity's] inhabitants, and the wealth and behaviour of

each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods' (Foucault 1991:92). Dr Hurley's normative likening (above) of the academy to a 'resource that could be tapped into' by 'government' is one of the clearest examples of governmentality among APCI and MAC participants.

I also think of governmentality as a tendency to think of phenomena (i.e., people, processes) as being in need of government in a way similar to Martin: 'A set of processes and relationships have to be conceptualised as an economy which is amenable to management in order for management to take place' (1997:248). MARS academics expressed their governmentality in this second way, as well. I found that nearly all faculty and students share the belief that the movement of people across spaces claimed as borders by states should be governed. Nearly all of the MARS faculty who make public statements regarding the legitimacy of the migration control measures by UK state agencies – even those said by the members of the field to be its most 'critical' scholars – endorse the practices either explicitly or implicitly.

An example of explicit endorsement is the following passage from a journal article titled 'The ethics of labor immigration policy', which was co-authored by a MARS member of the MAC, Dr Ruhs: 'We exclude the cases of no (or zero) moral standing and full moral standing for noncitizens as unrealistic and untenable positions' (Ruhs and Chang 2004:84; see also Spencer 2003 and Düvell in ICMPD 2006). Even more common is implicit endorsement of UK state migration control practices. The 'policy recommendations' sections of responses to HO 'consultations' (i.e., Anderson 2006; Spencer et al. 2005), 'policy briefings' (i.e., Sussex DRCMGP 2006), working papers

(i.e., Andrijasevic 2006), and UK state agency commissioned reports (i.e., Castles and Van Hear et al. 2005) by MARS faculty criticise particular control measures and/or prescribe the enforcement or liberalisation of existing legal frameworks but *do not* recommend the abolition of restrictive migration policy.

I found this variant of governmentality to be expressed by most of the MARS students with whom I interacted, as well. The statement below that was made to me by James, a MARS MA student, was representative of those of MARS students, in general. Although he used a pejorative phrase – i.e., 'Fortress Europe' – to describe migration control by European states and indicate his opposition to this regime, the alternative he proposed was nonetheless still governmental:

> In terms of migrants where you have persecution, you have wars… where do they go? I mean fortress Europe is becoming a fortress. They're building walls all over the place. So these people are kind of looking for routes and ways of coming in, no matter what. I think the problem with that is… the stronger they try and build these walls, the harder those people are going to try to come in. Ok? So if you can't break the wall down, let's dig under… let's fly over. Whatever. I mean… they're going to come in somehow or the other. So, it just sort of… it makes sense that they actually formalise this and say, 'Wait. Whoa. OK. We'll let you in. There's no panic. But we have a process of allowing people in, and this is what… If you can go through this process, we'll let you in'.

I found MARS academics on occasion to express both of these modes of governmentality, simultaneously. Representative of this kind of behaviour is the following passage from the introductory essay to a special issue of the MARS journal *Ethnic and racial studies* on 'New directions in the anthropology of migration and multiculturalism' by guest editor and director of COMPAS, Professor Vertovec. In his conclusion, Professor Vertovec provides four answers to his question: 'In what other analytical directions does the anthropology of migration and multiculturalism need to go?' (2007:972). The first three are ''backward' into history', ''sideways' through

more comparative analysis', and ''towards' in the sense of more interdisciplinary engagement' (ibid.). The fourth he describes as being ''into' with respect to policy' (ibid.). 'That is', he continues,

> many anthropologists are still broadly reluctant to engage with the policy world (of states, international agencies, non-government organizations or civil society associations), whether to do with migration and multiculturalism or not. But as many of the contributors to this Special Issue suggest, policies often matter greatly since their conditioning structures directly affect migrants' lives, practices and processes surrounding them. Researchers should take policy into account; by doing so, moreover, their findings will already be policy-relevant. It is only a small step further to make policy evaluations and recommendations, and anthropologists should not be constrained to do so (ibid.:973).

Professor Vertovec's governmentality of the first mode described above – i.e., the duty of assisting government – is evident in his proposing 'into policy' as the only non-intellectual or explicitly political 'direction' in which anthropologists of migration 'need to go'. He could have, of course, suggested that they instead go 'into' or 'engage with' the 'world' of people opposing migration controls by calling for the immediate abolition of these regulatory practices. His governmentality of the second mode – i.e., thinking that phenomena require government – is also expressed in the passage. In encouraging anthropologists of migration to be 'policy-relevant' and 'make policy evaluations and recommendations', Professor Vertovec effectively demonstrates his view that migration should be governed. The only way to be relevant – i.e., apposite or suitable – to policy (i.e., government) is to write or say something about *how* that process can or should be effected. To claim, on the contrary, that migration 'policies' and 'their conditioning structures directly affect[ing] migrants' lives' should be abolished immediately is to be not only policy *irrelevant*, but also – and more aptly, perhaps – *contra*-policy. Professor Vertovec's governmental (and programmatic) call to arms above effectively forecloses on this latter possibility.

3.3.2. MARS academics as women

I estimate that the majority of MARS academics are women. For faculty, I found the ratio of men to women to be more or less one-to-one. Among students, however, university records show that women far outnumbered men. The data set I acquired for sex or gender of enrolments in MARS courses is complete. 377 enrolments were female, 177 male. Nearly 65 percent of the enrolments were female and the ratio of those that were female to those that were male was almost three (2.8) to one. When the sex or gender of enrolments is analysed according to university – as displayed in the Appendix 3.13 – LSBU is alone in having more male than female enrolments (at a ratio of more than two to one). The seven other universities in the sample all have higher female to male ratios for their enrolments. The highest is Sussex, with one of nearly five (4.9) to one. Queen Mary and Oxford follow closely with one of nearly four (3.9) to one. UEL and Birbeck have the lowest of these seven, with almost two (1.9) and a bit above one (1.3), respectively. Thus, just under 90 percent of the enrolments were at universities in which the female to male ratio was approximately two (1.9) to one or higher. For 75 percent it was more than three to one.

As displayed in the Appendix 3.14, five of the courses – none with total enrolments of more than four – had female or male enrolments only. As shown in Appendix 3.15, 11 of the remaining 12 – all with total enrolments of eight or more[37] – had greater numbers of female than male enrolments, with female to male enrolment ratios ranging from just under two (1.7, Birbeck's MSc Ethnicity, Migration, and Policy) to

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[37] A quantity I consider to be statistically significant in this case.

more than seven (7.3, Queen Mary's MSc Migration) to one. The last remaining course of the 12 with total enrolments of eight or more – the MSc in Refugee Studies at LSBU – was unique in having both a relatively high number of total enrolments (44, the fourth highest[38]) *and* a higher ratio of male to female enrolments – just over two (2.1) to one.

3.3.2.1. Femininity

The participation of MARS academic women in the APCI and MAC (and consequent facilitation of migration control) and in the field of MARS, itself, can be understood as being expressions of their femininity. I posit that the women who joined MARS fulfilled one of their gender roles – i.e., to be caring and/or nurturing – in doing so. Evidence for this includes statistics on the academic fields to which women tend to belong and statements from my informants that show that the overrepresentation of women as MARS students was taken for granted or relatively unproblematic for the members of the field.

The ratio of women to men enrolled in MARS courses was more like that of courses of study that had caring and/or nurturing as explicit aims (i.e., Nutrition and Nursing) than those that did not, such as Economics and Politics. The following table shows the percentage of female enrolments for MARS along with selected other fields in UK higher education (undergraduates and postgraduates in 2003-04 academic year, in which 57 percent of all enrolees were female) (Higher Education Statistics Agency n.d.).

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[38] The Sussex and UEL MAs in Migration Studies and Refugee Studies tied for second with 77, each.

Table 5: Female enrolment in selected UK universities

Subject of Study	Female enrolment
Economics	36%
Politics	44%
Law	59%
Social policy	69%
Anthropology	71%
Sociology	72%
MARS	73%
Training teachers	74%
Social work	80%
Nutrition	88%
Nursing	89%

The percentage of women enrolled in MARS was much closer (i.e., a difference of 16 percentage points) to that in nursing, with its almost exclusively female enrolment, than it was to that in politics or economics (i.e., differences of 29 and 37 percentage points, respectively), which had primarily male enrolments. One of the patterns that is visible in these data is that as the explicit aims of the subjects change from government to care or nurturing, the percentage of female enrolments increases.[39] Here, the difference in percentages of those (i.e., 11 points) between 'Social policy' and 'Social work' are illustrative.

The mental association of MARS degree courses with caring and nurturing professions – especially nursing – was manifested in an image and its caption that were included in the article in the *Guardian Weekly* that I described above. In its title, 'Migration learning' was said to 'help'. Its central image depicted a seated person from the thighs down with bandages wrapped around his or her feet and shins. The

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[39] See Colley and Comber (2010) for evidence of gender-based patterning in subject preference at school level.

caption for this image, which was highlighted in the copy of the article that had been posted on the ISCA Migration Studies bulletin board, began with the phrase 'Field work…' and went on to identify the image's subject as a 'migrant' who had been 'injured'.

I found my MARS academic informants to be conscious of the overrepresentation of women among the field's students. The Sussex MA in Migration Studies performers' acknowledgement of this phenomenon is representative of the statements that were made to me by several female students. Another one of the verses in 'Like a migrant' was the following:

> There was Ben,[40] but few men
> Loads of girls,
> yea girls on girls.
> They made us feeel
> Yea they made us feel,
> we've got nothing to hide

The ratio of women to men on their course, which according to my analysis was just over four to one for the 2003/04 – 07/08 academic years (see Appendix 3.13), was judged by the performers to be high, seen to be significant enough to be mentioned, and felt to be benign enough to be joked about. In this particular case, the humour was hetero-normative: with 'few men' with whom to have sex, the '[l]oads of girls' had to resort to having sex with one another – i.e., 'girls on girls'.

Further evidence that the joining by women of MARS was an expression of their femininity is the absence of criticism of the overrepresentation of women on MARS courses in public MARS forums within which other critiques of the field's social and

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[40] He was the course convenor.

cultural composition were voiced. For example, I observed or became aware of statements being made by MARS academics at a feedback session for the Oxford MSc in Forced Migration and at an FMSC in which the under-representation of students from places like Africa and Asia and that of 'refugee' participants at the conference, respectively, were noted and criticised. In contrast, the under-representation of men on the course, which had a female to male ratio of over four (i.e., 4.2) to one (see Appendix 3.15), and at the conference was neither mentioned nor denounced.

3.3.3. MARS academics as Anglo-American

Nearly half of MARS students and by my estimate, approximately the same percentage of its faculty members, can be ascribed the identity of Anglo-American. By this I mean a subset of the collective I identified above – i.e., Westerners. They are people who were socialized or enculturated in the spaces dominated by the states of the UK and USA. Like my analyses above regarding nationality and sex for the field, I am only able to estimate from my observations that at least half of MARS faculty are Anglo-American – but much more of the former than the latter. In fact, I only met a few MARS faculty whom I understood to have USA citizenship. My analysis for students is much more precise. University records show that during the 2003/04-2007/08 academic years, 173 out of 366 – or, 47 percent – of new MARS enrolments were from either UK or USA. While UK enrolments are more or less evenly distributed among the universities, 44 of the 51 USA enrolments are reported for Oxford and six more for SOAS.

3.3.3.1. Efficacism: 'make a difference'

Above I explained the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics as being – in part – a result of their being motivated by a desire to be effective. This desire, in turn, can be understood as being an expression of Anglo-American efficacism. This socially established structure of meaning is expressed most clearly in the use in a wide range of social settings of the phrase 'make a difference'. Above I described the claims of MARS academics that they were (at least) intending to make a difference. In this section I contextualise these statements by providing descriptions of the history of the phrase's use in the USA and UK and its uses that I observed during fieldwork from 2003 until the present in Oxford, throughout the UK, and in the USA.

History

I have gathered information that indicates that the motivation to 'make a difference' among Anglo-Americans is a relatively recent phenomenon that is coincident – in the UK – in fact, with the emergence of the field of MARS. I used the Nexis UK, Proquest Historical Newspapers, and the Times Digital Archive 1785-1985 databases to locate instances of the phrase or one of its variants[41] in the titles of articles in the Guardian (from 1959-2009), the Observer (1901-2003), the Times (from 1785-2009), and the New York Times (from 1851-2009). The earliest instance of the phrase is in a sub-heading 'Distance makes a difference' in an article titled, 'The rebel finances' in the *New York Times* of 2 February 1864 (NYT 1864:1). There followed many titles of *NYT* articles in which x, y, or z – none of which were people – make or made a

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[41] I searched for 'make a difference', 'makes a difference', and 'made a difference'.

difference in one way or another. The phrase makes its first appearance as a desirable personal aim – but joined with an impersonal entity – in 1969 in the *NYT* in an article titled, 'The draft: new director and system will make a difference' (Beecher 1969). The earliest appearance of the phrase as only a desirable personal aim is found in the 16 July 1972 *NYT* in an article titled, 'Will McGovern make a difference?' (Finney 1972) By 1976, people in New York and the USA were using the phrase in precisely the same way as it is now used by MARS academics and others in the UK and USA, as evinced by the title of a *NYT* article published in that year: 'One hundred black men intend to make a difference' (Lopez 1976).

The earliest instance of the phrase in any of the UK newspapers I surveyed is 1933, in a *Times* review of a play titled 'Money makes a difference' (Times 1933). It appears once more in the *Times* in 1975 in an article in the sport section with the title, 'Why a good finish by Oosterhuis should make a difference' (Ryde 1975). In its third appearance in the *Times* – in 1982 – the phrase has the meaning of a desirable personal aim. A 16 April article in the *Times* titled 'Ardiles makes a difference' claims that '[t]he inclusion of [Mr Osvaldo] Ardiles helped Argentina recapture the level of performance they achieved in winning the 1978 World Cup' (Times 1982). The first appearance of the phrase in either the *Guardian* or the *Observer* is as a desirable personal aim, in a 1989 article titled 'How volunteers can make a difference' (Guardian 1989).

These data show that the phrase 'make a difference' is a 19th century Americanism that was originally applied to inanimate objects and was first used to mean a desirable personal aim much later – i.e., in the late 1960s. It appeared only rarely in the UK in

its earlier meaning until the 1980s, when it emerges with its later meaning. The
following chart shows the frequency with which the phrase appears – with any
meaning – in article titles in the *Guardian*, the *Times*, and the *NYT* between 1982 and
2009 (See Appendix 3.16 for table upon which it is based).

Figure 14: 'Make a difference' in selected UK and US newspapers

The use of 'Make a difference' in the *NYT* is relatively steady (i.e., between two and
six appearances per year), suggesting the continuation of an earlier trend. In the UK
newspapers, in contrast, the frequency with which the phrase appears only begins to
increase significantly in the mid- to late 1990s. It then evinces another period of
accelerated growth again beginning in 2003/04.

This pattern is in many ways isomorphic with that of the growth of the field of MARS. 'Make a difference' first appears in a sampled UK newspaper article title as a desirable personal aim in 1982 – the year in which the field's first centre was established. The jumps in salience that are apparent for the phrase correspond with similar periods of growth in the field of MARS, which I represented in a chart in section 1.1.3.3. Both increased slowly during the 'Beginnings' period before 1997, then grew more quickly during the 'MARS rises' period of 1997-2002 and even more so from 2003 on during the 'Age of migration (studies)'. MARS and efficacism are thus coeval.

Oxford, UK, USA 2003 to the present

The desire to be effective that I have shown to have been a motivation for both MARS participants in the APCI and MAC and for faculty and students in the field, in general, is not limited to the UK academy. As I showed above, it is an Anglo-American structure of signification. In this section I describe the several ways in which this desire was expressed in the primary site of my fieldwork (Oxford), other UK locations, and in the USA. In particular, I focus on *how* or *in what way(s)* it was thought that a person could 'make a difference'. Rather than display and describe all of the examples that I have gathered, which would require separate book-length treatment, here I describe only one (or two) example(s) for each kind of use of 'make a difference' as a motivation that I have identified. These are the following, which I address in decreasing order in terms of the frequency with which I encountered them: volunteering or contributing to a charity, ethical consumption, political activism, and work. I begin with examples that I encountered in the UK.

I found that the most common way in which people could make a difference was through volunteering with or contributing to a charity. An example of an expression of this mode was a poster that hung behind the till at one of the Oxfam bookshops in Oxford in May 2007 (below). A person could make a difference by donating funds for Oxfam projects in Latin America, Africa, and Asia on behalf of another person as a gift.

Figure 15: Oxfam poster

I found that the second most common way in which people could make a difference was through 'ethical' consumption. One example of this type was the brochure that I acquired from the Threshers wine and beer shop in Oxford in February of 2007. Its

front page announced: 'Wines that make a difference'. Subsequent pages described the company's 'Fairtrade wines' from 'South Africa' and 'South America'.

The third most common way of making a difference that I observed was via political activism. An apt example of this type was a passage in an article titled 'Activism on campus: Students with a conscience are finding increasingly creative ways to influence major decision-makers' in the winter 2008 edition of *FD*, a freely distributed magazine intended for university students. The last page of the article includes a horizontal text box that leads off with the following: 'The modern face of student campaigning: You can make a difference' (Defries 2008:4).

The fourth and least common way that I found that people could 'make a difference' was through labour. An example of an expression of this meaning is the poster (below) that was displayed at the Swindon rail station in February of 2006. Tom Hewitt was making a difference by managing the station.

Figure 16: Train manager 'Making a difference'

I found many examples of these modes of making a difference in the USA during my brief (i.e., one-month per year) stays there between 2003 and the time of writing. Here I describe only one that I see as being an epitome of this Anglo-American structure of signification. I encountered this example, a book, in a house in the United States in February 2004. Its title is *One frog can make a difference: Kermit's guide to life in the '90s* (Riger 1993), and it is pictured below.

Figure 17: 'Make a difference' book

Thus, in both this title and in the broader Anglo-American cultural context of which both this book and MARS were a part, a very salient aim of *life* during the 1990s (and also the 2000s) was to *make a difference*. Having explained the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics à la Rabinow and Geertz, I can now move on to the final section of this chapter – a brief classical Weberian explanation of the phenomenon that further conceptualizes it with a) the efficacism already mentioned, b) the social theory of Latour's SOA, and c) the dominant political philosophy of the UK and USA.

3.4. Conclusion

Weber found that Christian asceticism gave birth to the Protestant ethic of 'rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling', which, in turn, became '[o]ne of the fundamental elements' of the spirit of capitalism (2001:108). There was an elective affinity between a religious ethic – i.e., an obligation to fulfil worldly duties by the

will of God – and an economic spirit – i.e., 'the idea of a duty of the individual toward the increase of his capital, which is assumed as an end in itself' (ibid.:51). The two were ''adequate' […] to one another' – i.e., 'they mutually favor[ed] one another's continuance' (quoted in Howe 1978:369).

In this chapter I showed that MARS academics who facilitated migration control through their participation in the APCI and MAC – i.e., a concrete structural form of social action – did so, in part, because they judged (and found) it to be a way to achieve their personal aim of assisting government – i.e., being policy relevant. The governmentality in which I showed this desire to be culturally embedded can be thought of as a maxim for everyday academic conduct – or, the spirit of MARS: the idea of a duty of the individual academic to assist government, which is assumed as an end in itself. I posit that this academic spirit had its continuance favoured by a not *exactly* Protestant, but rather a mostly secularised Protestant ethic of rational conduct on the basis of the idea not of the calling per se, but instead of its current manifestation – i.e., make a difference. An ethic of efficacy was adequate to MARS academics' facilitation of migration control through the APCI and MAC and to their governmentality in a way that alternatives such as egalitarianism – i.e., struggle for equal rights for all people – were not: while the improvement in the quality of Country Reports that resulted from the efforts of the ACPI's members and commissioned researchers satisfied the demands of the former, the harm that came to the field's human subjects as a result of the panel's activities clearly would have violated the latter.

Life in the 1990s and in the new millennium (recall the title of Kermit's book) for Anglo-Americans had become primarily a matter of efficacy. Ethics had changed. And this transformation was evinced not only in a change from academics debating whether or not to work for the state at all to their discussing primarily *how* to do so (see above). It can also be seen in both mainstream political rhetoric and the waxing popularity of a particular social theory.

'Anglo-American' political rhetoric in the 1990s and 2000s has become increasingly pragmatic. Salient examples include New Labour's mantras of 'What matters is what works' and 'Evidence-based policy' and Obama's campaign messages of 'Change we can believe in' and 'Yes we can'. All of these slogans are based in an idiom of efficacy. I can demonstrate that the ascendant social theory of Latour is, as well.

In the introduction to this chapter I described Latour's criticism of the SOTS: it 'strictly limited the set of agencies 'really acting' in the world' (2005:51) by limiting action 'a priori to what 'intentional', 'meaningful' humans do' (ibid.:71). He argues that agencies should be defined otherwise, and that these in fact are, by his SOA. '[T]he questions to ask about any agent', he claims, 'are simply the following: Does it make a difference in the course of some other agent's action or not?' (ibid.). '[A]*ny thing* that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor', he states (ibid., emphasis in original). 'Remember', Latour exhorts his readers, 'that if an actor makes no difference, it's not an actor' (ibid.:130).

MARS academics facilitated migration control through their participation in the APCI and MAC in part because it was a way for them to feel that they were assisting

government. I have shown that in doing so, they were responding to their calling to make a difference. The development of this Anglo-American efficacy ethic was historically (and culturally) coincident with that of both mainstream political rhetoric and social theory that were increasingly being expressed in an idiom of efficacy. All can be considered to have had an elective affinity for one another. The facilitation of migration control by MARS academics can thus be understood in cultural terms – à la Weber – as a connection between the efficacy ethic and the spirit of MARS – i.e., governmentality.

What then should be made of Latour's critique of my spectrum approach, which – in his terms – must be classified as the SOTS? I have already shown his critique to be unconvincing – in part – because it is based in a logical contradiction. Another reason for rejecting his suggestion to replace the SOTS with his SOA is that I have shown that the feature of the former that he claims to invalidate it is also a property of the latter. Latour argues – in effect – that the feature of the SOA that makes it more scientific than – and therefore superior to – the approaches of the SOTS is the relatively low degree of elective affinity (vis-à-vis that of the SOTS) among its theoretical framework, the mentality (or ethic) of social scientists, and the dominant political philosophy. I have shown that there is, in fact, a high degree of elective affinity between the social theory of Latour's SOA, the ethic of today's social scientists (*including* MARS academics), and a dominant political maxim (the idiom of mainstream political rhetoric). Therefore, the aptness of the approach that I have taken in this thesis of *including* both more empirical and more interpretive analyses – i.e., both the SOA (Chapters One and Two) and the SOTS (Chapters Three, Four, and

Five) – rather than *substituting* the former for the latter as Latour advocates, is not

negated by his critique.

4. The MARS ideology

In this chapter I support my argument that MARS academics facilitated migration control because of *power*. I do so in five sections. First, I describe the Marxist approach in detail and position it vis-à-vis the other two (i.e., Weberian and Durkheimian) that I use in this second half of my thesis. I also introduce the specific Marxist analyses that I utilize. Second, I explain the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics as does Davis – i.e., as an exchange in which they were able to collectively 'save face'. Third, I do so as does Bourdieu – i.e., as a strategic move in a game. Fourth, I do the same as does Wolf – i.e., as a consequence of their being part of a particular mode of production. Finally, I conclude this chapter with a classical Marxist interpretation of the MARS facilitation of migration control – i.e., as an effect of ideology – and relate these four analyses to the Marxist ones of MARS and migration control that I described in my literature review.

4.1. A Marxist approach

I understand Marx's approach to be less empiricist than that of Weber, but more so (and less rationalist) than that of Durkheim. It combines Weberian and Durkheimian concerns (i.e., actor and system, respectively) in explanation: 'circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances' (Marx and Engels 1974:59). The focus of a Marxist approach is the middle-range theoretical concept of *power*. 'As soon as the distribution of labour comes into being', Marx and Engels argue,

> each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is *forced* upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman, or a critical

critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood (ibid.:54, emphasis added).

'This fixation of social activity', they continue,

> this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective *power* above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now (ibid., emphasis added).

Within the broad class of anthropological approaches that I consider to be Marxist, or those that are concerned primarily with *power*, there are some that are more empiricist and others that are more rationalist. These can be positioned using my continuum model (see below).

Figure 18: Marxist approaches

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Weberian  ┠---------------- Marxian  ----------------┨  Durkheimian
             Davis           Bourdieu          Wolf
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
At the most empiricist end of the Marxist spectrum is the approach of Davis (1992), which is focussed on the relationship between power and meaning in exchange (see also Herzfeld 1992; Ortner 1997). Less empiricist is that of Bourdieu (1977), which concentrates on the exchange practices of individuals within a context of relations of domination. At the most rationalist end of the Marxist section of the continuum is Wolf's analysis (1997), which addresses the operation of power in modes of production. Having introduced and positioned the Marxist spectrum of approaches, I now use the three that I have mentioned – beginning with that of Davis – to interpret the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics.

4.2. Power and meaning

I begin this section with a description of Davis' operationalisation of his power and meaning approach to exchange. Then I use this approach to interpret both data that I have already presented above and research findings that I introduce for the first time. I show how the MARS academics who facilitated migration control through their participation in the APCI did so, in part, because they were able to do so while collectively saving face.

4.2.1. The approach and its application to Trobriand exchange

Davis writes that 'what underlies exchanges is a morally, legally and ritually sanctioned classification scheme' (1992:44) and that the meanings that he assumes people to 'load' onto their actions (i.e., exchange) 'are real and variable and allusive, slippery, evocative' (ibid.:81). Davis claims that 'people use the ambiguity and complexity of exchange in a creative and adventurous way' (ibid.:60). He writes that they do so through 'category-play' (ibid.:58) and the 'manipulation of categories' (ibid.:59). Davis states that 'we have available to us a range of different kinds of exchange – a repertoire of socially acceptable practices which are culturally, morally and even economically distinct' (ibid.:11). His discussion of the exchange repertoire utilizes the game metaphor and demonstrates the Marxist interest that he shares with Bourdieu and Wolf (described below) in the effects of power that are assumed to follow from social and economic conditions: 'A repertoire is a set of pieces which a population may play. They are not all equally available to each person, partly as a result of the exercise of social power' (ibid.:45).

Davis mines data from Malinowski and other anthropologists who followed him in studying the Trobriand Islanders to operationalise his approach (ibid.:30-55). He writes that the Trobriand exchange repertoire consists of 80 distinct types, one of which is called tribute. 16 of the 80 are associated with marriage. One of these is called urigubu and involves the annual giving of yams from a man to his married sister and her husband. The practice is thought by ethnographers to be a way in which men secure their authority over or access to their sisters' children, which also implies the subordinate status of men vis-à-vis their sisters and their sisters' husbands. Davis retells Malinowski's narrative of a Trobriand chief who (in 1918) – in an attempt to 'restore some prestige and harmony' (ibid.:55) – demanded that his subordinate villagers honour and show their allegiance to him by giving him yams in an exchange that the chief called tribute. Of the 77 men who gave the chief yams, most called their action urigubu and only two of them referred to it as tribute.

Just under half of these yam givers were either a brother of one of the chief's wives, or closely related to such a man. But over half of the men who gave the chief yams and called it urigubu had no such close relation to him. Davis writes that these men 'stretched their genealogical definitions so that their relationship to the chief became one in which urigubu became proper and appropriate' (ibid.:55). In doing so, they satisfied both the chief – by engaging in an exchange that implied their subordination to him – and themselves – by refusing to recognize publicly the chief's claim to authority that 'tribute' implied. Davis refers to this general satisfaction as being 'achieved […] by exploiting the ambiguities of categories: the same action meant

different things to different people, and […] they avoided conflict by tacitly accepting that the chief and commoners interpreted the [exchange] in different ways' (ibid.).

4.2.3. The APCI and MARS academic 'category-play'

In this section I use Davis' approach to interpret information that I gathered from the first (September 2003) through tenth (March 2007) APCI meeting minutes, APCI-commissioned reports, and my interview with MARS APCI member Professor Reilly on the ways in which panel members and commissioned researchers described their engagement with the HO. First, I identify and describe the elements in their exchange repertoire. Then I present a narrative of events that describes discursive interaction and makes explicit power relations and the interests of actors. Finally, I present an overall interpretation of this process and discuss briefly that of metaphorisation.

4.2.3.1. Exchange repertoire

I see three kinds of exchange that are available to the participants in the APCI and to the others who are part of the network of state agencies, academics, and NGOs that is concerned with migration politics in the UK: advice, legitimation, and rubber-stamping.[42] Advice is essentially a technical, mechanical, and intellectual matter. It involves first, an intellectual operation of analysis, and then, the reporting of results. The most obvious expression of this kind of exchange is that of the name of the panel, which includes a modification of 'advice' (i.e., Advisory). Other words and phrases that are used to indicate the performance of advice in the minutes are 'consider',

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[42] That these practices are comprehensible as exchanges will be shown below, where I demonstrate that these occur as part of a process of giving, receiving, and reciprocating.

'comment on', 'evaluate', 'examine', 'identify', 'review', and 'make suggestions and recommendations'. One of many examples of expressions of this kind of exchange appears below in the minutes of the ninth (January 2007) meeting, in a response by the HO manager of the APCI to a question by a MARS academic panel member, who was attending just his second meeting.

> [The MARS academic] asked whether the Panel could endorse COI products which were not up to date. [The HO official] noted that the Panel had always been clear that it did not endorse Home Office products – it simply *commented and offered advice* (APCI E.M:§3.18, emphasis added).

In contrast, a second kind of exchange – i.e., legitimation – is understood to combine technical and symbolic operations. Like advice, it involves first, analysis. Legitimation differs from advice, however, in the second step, which is referred to as endorsement (see two instances in the passage immediately above), giving one's imprimatur to a Country Report (APCI 6.M:§2.17), assuming responsibility for the content of Country Reports (APCI 4.M:§1.17), and vetting the final version of a Country Report (APCI E1.M:Appendix A). Recall Professor Reilly's statement above that she and her fellow panel members knew before joining that legitimation is what the HO wanted from them.

A third kind of exchange available to APCI members, their colleagues and associates – rubber-stamping – means legitimation without advice, imprimatur *sans* analysis. In the following passage from the minutes of the seventh (March 2006) meeting, the panel's second Chair mentions both this kind of exchange and that of advice.

> The [second] Chair said that when the Panel was first set up, some were sceptical about its value, fearing that it might be just a *'rubber stamping' exercise* for the Government and that it would not have a genuinely independent voice. However, given the

membership of the Panel and with Professor Castles as the Chair, this was never likely. Professor Castles knew that the Panel's credibility relied upon it being seen to be effective. Fortunately, Ministers also understood this and the Home Office had been very receptive and responsive to the Panel's *advice*. (APCI 6.M:§1.14, emphasis added)

In sum, advice was only technical; legitimation was technical and symbolic; and rubber stamping was only symbolic. Thinking – as Davis suggests we do – of these kinds of exchange as a range, or, as being related to one another – produces the following diagram of the exchange repertoire that I have just described. It locates the three exchange types on a continuum with analysis and technical operations at one end and approval and symbolic operations at the other.

Figure 19: APCI exchange repertoire

| Advice | Legitimation | Rubber Stamping |

Technical Analysis   Symbolic Approval

4.2.3.2. Narrative

The subordinate status of the panel vis-à-vis the Government is clear in the Minister for Citizenship and Immigration's description during Parliamentary debate in July of 2003 of the role that it would play in the NSA designation process (Hansard 2003:column 022). The Panel could make 'suggestions' that would be 'considered' by the Government, but it would have no say in the process of deciding which countries would be added to the NSA 'white list'. This operation would remain the privilege of the Government. Further evidence of the panel's subordinate status was the financial dependency of its MARS academic members on state agencies, which was described

by Professors Castles and Black (see above). One of my MARS MA student interviewees, James, provided support for these faculty members' analysis. He told me that he and the other students on his course 'do understand that policy plays a lot… a big part, rather, in research work in this country… because most of it is funded… government-funded'. 'It's policy that pushes everything', he continued. 'They're the ones that fund all the research work in this country'. I describe this dependency in detail below in the fourth part of this chapter. A look at the annual reports of the Refugee Council, IAS, and the Refugee Legal Centre showed me that the same relation of financial dependency obtained between state agencies and many of the non-academic panel member organisations.

HO personnel can be seen as having invited subordinate actors to participate in the APCI in an attempt to restore prestige and harmony. As I described in Chapter Two in my history of the panel, NGOs had made public the (embarrassing – for the HO) claims that Country Reports were heavily biased and opposition MPs had threatened to create dissonance in Parliament by blocking Government's attempts to create and enlarge the NSA 'white list'. But the HO called publicly for a kind of exchange that was other than that which they really needed. The kind of exchange that Government ministers chose to call for from the exchange repertoire that was available to them was *advice*. But the type that they were really requesting was *legitimation* – not just technical assistance, but also that which was symbolic. What they required was the *approval* of suitable actors, which would bring both a restoration of their standing in the eyes of the personnel of NGOs with a strong public image, such as the Refugee Council; and harmony vis-à-vis their political opponents. This interpretation is consonant with that which was provided to me by Frances, the MARS MA student I

quoted above, in the way she responded to my telling her that MARS academic

Professor Castles – with whom she had become familiar by reading his *Age of*

migration book and one of his articles – had chaired the APCI. 'Oh yeah', she said,

matter-of-factly,

> For sure. I mean… he's a great. He has to. If he hasn't said it, no one will
> believe the numbers. I mean, if I was looking for someone to be authoritative on
> the number of refugees in the UK, he'd be the first person to call.

The majority of the APCI members, observers, and commissioned researchers who

accepted the invitation to provide advice called it that, or used other words or phrases

from among the advice lexicon that I described above. I encountered only two

occasions on which APCI participants used the legitimation lexicon to describe their

exchange with the HO. In one of these, a panel-commissioned researcher gave a

Country Report his imprimatur (see above). In the other – i.e., that by the MARS

academic panel neophyte, above – he was minuted as asking if the panel could

endorse COI materials that were not up to date. On all of the other occasions that

panel members – including MARS academics – used the legitimation lexicon, they

did so in order to state what it was that they *were not* doing through their engagement

with the HO. One of these occurred immediately following the panel neophyte's

query in the passage above. A member of the APCI's HO secretariat quickly corrected

the MARS academic, informing him that the panel did not engage in legitimation

exchange, but rather that of advice. Representative of the many other instances of the

denial by panel members that they were participating in legitimation exchange with

the HO through the APCI was the following, from the minutes of the first (September

2003) meeting:

> Members stated that, while they would be happy to consider and comment upon CIPU's products, they would not be prepared to *endorse* Home Office country information material. Some members stated that their participation was conditional upon them not being expected to do so. The [first] Chair confirmed that the Panel would not, in any circumstances, *endorse* Home Office country information material (APCI 1.M:§3.9, emphasis added).

I found that the only use (shown above) by panel members of the rubber stamping kind of exchange to describe their participation involved negation, as well.

It was logical, of course, for the MARS academic panel neophyte to refer to the panel's activities using the legitimation lexicon at his second meeting. At that point in time he had surely seen and been told enough about how the panel engaged with the HO to call its giving of positive evaluations ('fine', 'good', etc. – see above in Chapter Two) of HO-produced materials endorsement. He had a very good reason to word his question about the panel's approach to not-up-to-date research products of the HO in the way that he did. To use an Americanism usually applied to the umpire's judgement of pitches in the game of baseball, he 'called it like he saw it'. That the way he saw it is that in which most speakers of English would do so, as well, is indicated by the figurative meanings that the OED gives for the word endorse: 'To confirm, sanction, countenance, or vouch for (statements, opinions, acts, etc.; occasionally, persons)' and 'To declare one's approval of'. I interpret the HO officer who corrected the panel neophyte immediately afterwards to be telling him, in effect, 'Yes. You're right: what the panel gives the HO is legitimation. You're new to the panel; it's understandable that you'd call it that. But we've all decided already that we're going to call it advice, instead'.

The APCI participants – like MARS academics in general (recall Chapter Three's findings about the views held by the field's members of interaction with the HO and

statements by Professor Vertovec and Dr Hurley in favour of the autonomy of academics) – wanted to avoid being perceived by their peers as being subservient. The frequent and repetitive negative descriptions of their engagement using '-endors-'that were made by panel members are clear evidence of their aversion to an appearance of subordinate complicity. More than half (14 out of 20) of the instances in the minutes in which '-endors-' indicates what it is that the panel *does not do* are part of statements of how the its practice should be represented to others. A passage from the minutes of the first (September 2003) meeting is representative of these uses.

> [A MARS academic panel member] welcomed the proposal that the Panel should provide feedback on CIPU's material after publication as this made it less likely that the Panel's input would be misconstrued as a process of *endorsement*. [The IAT representative] mentioned that several NGOs had indicated to him that they would be wary of becoming involved with the Panel's work in case they were seen to be *endorsing* CIPU's products. The letter from the [first] Chair inviting participation would need to make it explicitly clear that this was not the intention (APCI 1.M:§4.8, emphasis added).

According to the minutes, Panel members discussed and agreed to add what they called 'disclaimers' to both their analyses of Country Reports and to the Panel's official Terms of Reference (both of which were posted on its website) that would 'clarify the Panel's role' (APCI 4.M:§1.17). Additionally, the second Chair's minuted eulogy for his predecessor, in which he denied the panel's having been a rubber stamping kind of exchange (see above), included the following statement: 'Professor Castles knew that the Panel's credibility relied upon it being seen to be effective' (APCI 6.M:§1.14).

4.2.3.3 Overall interpretation and discussion of metaphorisation

In sum, the APCI panellists were – like the Trobriand villagers in Davis' study – 'faced with a demand to acknowledge political dominance' (1992:55). Both groups took discursive steps to save face and to ensure that, as Davis puts it, 'all parties were more or less satisfied' (ibid.). That both APCI participants and the Government were more or less satisfied with this face-saving exercise was evinced by the length of the period of the panel's existence – i.e., just over five years (September 2003 to October 2008) – in an especially volatile area of politics. Further evidence for this general satisfaction were the statements by panel members (shown above in Chapter Two) in the minutes of its seventh (March 2006) meeting that 'with the consistently good standard of COI Reports now being produced, the issue of 'diminishing returns' would need to be considered by the Panel' and that 'it seems that the time is approaching when they [i.e., panel members] are running out of things to comment upon'. The denial of endorsement was 'secular theodicy': it provided the panel members with a 'social means of coping with disappointment' (Herzfeld 1992:7).

While the Trobrianders 'stretched' their definition of urigubu to fit a relation that did not exist between themselves and their superior, the MARS academic panel members 'trimmed' the meaning of endorsement so that it would not cover a relation that existed between themselves and the HO. A less metaphorised, more literal meaning implied only a technical operation of 'writing upon the back of' – a definition much more appropriate for the advice type of exchange that they *claimed* to be engaged in. The second Chair's grandiose eulogy of his predecessor in which he claimed that the

Panel was not a 'rubber stamping' type of exchange was extremely telling: the Chair doth protest too much, methinks.

In the following diagram I have visualized the processes referred to in this section. Its central feature is what I see to be one of the primary assumptions of the power and meaning approaches of Davis, Herzfeld, and Ortner – that categories are ambiguous and that meaning is constrained, but malleable.

Figure 20: Literalisation and metaphorisation

concrete etymology	literal tired metaphor		abstract figurative metaphorical

← literalisation (trimming)

metaphorisation (stretching) →

indorsare to put something on the back of something else	endorse to write on the back of something	endorse to evaluate	endorse to sanction to approve of

Having interpreted the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics using the most empiricist of the three Marxist approaches that I utilize in this chapter, I next do so with one that is relatively more rationalist, which I have gleaned from the work of Bourdieu.

4.3. Power and practice

I begin this section with a description of Bourdieu's 'power and practice' approach to exchange. Then I use this approach to interpret information that I have gathered on exchange between MARS academics and UK state agencies. First I describe in detail the exchange activities of two MARS academics. Then I compare these two cases, presenting both the similarities and differences. Following this comparison, I address the issue of the representativeness of the experiences of these two MARS academics for those of the field's members, in general. Finally, I provide an overall interpretation of the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics using Bourdieu's approach.

Bourdieu considers exchange behaviour to be practice – i.e., 'the *intentionless invention* of regulated improvisation' (1977:79, emphasis in original). Furthermore, these practices – i.e., 'the exchange of gifts, words, or women' – 'fulfil a political function of domination' (ibid.:14). His analytical focus (ibid.:30-71) is on the 'series of moves' (ibid.:73) made by actors in the 'game' (ibid.:58) of matrimonial exchange, which 'tend to reproduce the relations of production associated with a determinate mode of production' (ibid.:70). This regularity allows the sociologist to predict 'the interlocking of actions and reactions' (ibid.:9) with considerable accuracy. However, 'uncertainty remains as to the outcome of the interaction as long as the sequence has not been completed' (ibid.). An expression of this uncertainty in exchange at the level of individual consciousness is 'the unceasing vigilance one needs to exert so as to be "carried along" by the game, without being "carried away" *beyond* the game, as

happens when a mock fight gets the better of the fighters' (ibid.:10, emphasis in original).

In the following section I follow Bourdieu's lead by explaining the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics as practice – or, exchange moves by these actors that I have found to tend to reproduce the field's subordinate position vis-à-vis UK state agencies. I describe and compare two series of exchange moves by two MARS academics, which exemplify the uncertain trajectories of being 'carried along' by the game and being 'carried away' beyond it. Following this analysis, I discuss the representativeness of these case studies and demonstrate that these are indeed examples of the field's general relations of knowledge production.

4.3.1. Case studies: MARS academics' exchange moves

Authorized by the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, the HO 'dispersal' programme ruled that people who filed asylum claims were obliged to enrol in a resettlement programme (the National Asylum Support Service (NASS)) in order to receive state benefits. During 2002, the right of the person seeking asylum to do paid work was withdrawn. More people, therefore, enrolled in NASS to acquire the subsistence and accommodation that they and their families needed to survive. Over 45,000 people had been 'dispersed' by NASS – 2300 of them to the city of Manchester – by the end of March 2002 (Zetter et al. 2002:13, 17).

This section presents two detailed case studies about the exchange moves of MARS academics who were commissioned to do research projects about the HO's 'dispersal'

programme: one on each side of the boundary between the cities of Manchester and Salford. The first case study involves Professor Roger Zetter – then of Oxford Brookes University. The second concerns Dr Rhetta Moran – formerly of Salford University – and is a narrative written by her, which I have edited.[43]

I compare these two processes of commissioning, researching, and suppressing findings and demonstrate that although these MARS academics were commissioned by different state agencies (the HO and the DCLG SRB, respectively), they both studied essentially the same phenomenon (i.e., the same people in the same place), recorded more or less the same findings, and did so within the same system of relations of knowledge production – i.e., they both had their findings suppressed by state agencies. These MARS academics differed significantly, however, in their moves – i.e., the ways that they disseminated their findings – and, subsequently (and to some degree, I argue, consequently), in their career trajectories. Professor Zetter was 'carried along' by the game: he kept the most unflattering (to the HO) findings to himself and eventually became the director of Oxford University's RSC and a member of the APCI. Dr Moran broadcast such findings to a nationwide audience and was eventually 'carried away' beyond it – i.e., dismissed from her academic post.

4.3.1.1. Professor Zetter and the HO IRSS

In August of 2001 Professor Zetter's team began an IRSS-commissioned research project. Aiming to '[e]xplore the impacts of the current dispersal programme on asylum seekers and local communities' (Zetter et al. 2002:3,13), the researchers

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[43] Dr Moran also provided editorial assistance for the subsequent comparison.

interviewed 44 people seeking asylum – seven of them in Manchester (ibid.:60).

Among Zetter et al.'s findings were the following:

> 'Although most asylum seekers knew where to go or who to phone in order to make a complaint [about their accommodation], they had learnt from experience that there was little point in doing so' (ibid.:65).

> 'Hostility from the local population was more commonplace in the North-west [than in the West Midlands] […]. In Manchester, all the Kurdish asylum seekers interviewed in M9 reported that they had experienced serious verbal harassment and a significant number reported physical harassment. […] [A]ll the respondents reported inaction by the police' (ibid.:70).

The HO did not publish Zetter et al.'s report, entitled 'Dispersal: facilitating effectiveness and efficiency', on its website following its submission in the autumn of 2002. Four years later,[44] in response to a Freedom of Information Act request, the HO finally made the report available with the following caveats:

> The research was conducted between 2000 and 2002 so its results reflect the views of respondents at that time. There are a number of limitations to the report including unclear methodology and recommendations that are sometimes not linked to research evidence (UK Home Office 2006c).

My interviews with IRSS-commissioned MARS academics and the HO, itself, indicate that research contracts with the IRSS contain the condition that commissioned authors may not publish the findings of the project in other publications when the HO chooses to not publish their reports. The sixth edition of the HO's guide to house style includes the following in a section titled, 'Reasons for non-publication': 'Once research we have commissioned is published by RDS, contractors are then usually free to publish elsewhere, but are obliged to inform us when this is

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[44] 16 October 2006

about to happen. We reserve the right not to publish work' (UK Home Office 2008d:4).

It appears that Professor Zetter did not comply with such terms, if these were indeed agreed upon. He and his co-authors cited the 'Dispersal' report three times in two academic articles (Zetter et al. 2005; Griffiths et al. 2006) that were published before its release by the HO. Absent from, but certainly relevant to the research questions of both of these publications, are the findings of the 'Dispersal' report on the hardships faced by people enrolled in NASS. Zetter et al. state that their article studies 'the impacts of *asylum-seeker* dispersal on the formation of *refugee community organizations*' (2005:169, emphasis in original), while Griffiths et al. similarly wrote that their focus was on 'the effects of dispersal on refugee community organisations' (2006:881). Both criticised 'dispersal', but only vaguely and at a programme level: 'Endemic logistical and organizational weaknesses have been persistent features of the dispersal programme' (Zetter et al. 2005:171); 'The efficiency and effectiveness of dispersal have both been subject to sustained criticism' (Griffiths et al. 2006:882). The details of the hardships experienced by the programme's human targets, though relevant, were omitted.

As described above, Professor Zetter continued to engage with the HO following the 'burial' of his two reports. Having had no prior interaction with the APCI, he attended his first panel meeting – its eighth – as a member at the end of October 2006, only a few weeks after succeeding the panel's former chair Stephen Castles as the director of the RSC at Oxford. He remained a member of the panel until its October 2008

dissolution, attending its ninth (January 2007), tenth (March 2007), and twelfth (May 2008) meetings.

4.3.1.2. Dr Moran and the ODPM

In 2002, Salford City Council approached the NGO Refugees and Asylum Seekers Participatory Action Research (RAPAR) to develop a proposal for a research project to be funded through Salford's 'Integrating and Sustaining Communities, Salford' (ISCS) programme. The ISCS was funded through the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) that was managed by the North West Development Agency (NWDA), a subordinate agency of the UK cabinet-level Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). Dr Rhetta Moran, a founder of RAPAR and an academic employed at the Revans Institute of the University of Salford, led the bid development. The SRB appraisal panel approved the proposal and the Salford RAPAR contract was signed by RAPAR and Salford City Council in October 2002.

As contributions in kind, several agencies nominated staff to join the Salford RAPAR Steering Group. These included Salford's largest state agencies, the City Council and the UK Department of Health-administered Salford Primary Care Trust (SPCT), which also contributed financial services[45] to the project. RAPAR provided in kind steerage of four hours per week and Dr Moran's time for delivering the project's monitoring returns. The University of Salford's in kind contribution was Dr Moran's management of the project. Its Revans Institute was also contracted to enable action-

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[45] The research grant was awarded retrospectively, every three months, following the City Council's acceptance of the monitored returns that were compiled and signed off by Dr Moran. RAPAR could not afford to advance three months worth of funding to this single project, so SPCT agreed to administrate that funding stream as one of its contributions in kind.

learning sets. A core management group dealing with the day-to-day running of the project was formed with representatives from RAPAR, Revans and the SPCT.

Project methodology, findings, dissemination, and evaluation

Salford RAPAR's contract specified an action research methodology that mandated the dissemination of emergent project findings to stimulate action through advocacy with a wide range of governmental and private sector organisations, events, and the media. The project proposal (Salford Partnership SRB5 2002) was explicit about its action aims in both the title of the project and its summary. The former was 'Developing evidence about needs *and action* in services with refugee and asylum seeking communities' (ibid., emphasis added) and the latter was the following:

> A community development team works with refugee and asylum seeking communities, the indigenous population and communities of practice to establish *and address* the health, social, educational, housing, personal safety, integration and well-being needs of these highly vulnerable and socially excluded people (ibid., emphasis added).

The research subjects were a combination of people who had been granted refugee status and those who had been relocated through the 'dispersal' programme to Salford. They learned about Salford RAPAR through word of mouth and came to the office to make their presentations on their own accord.

Salford RAPAR generated descriptions of experiences that were lived by its human subjects over a 16-month period. Among these were overcrowding, security problems, and insufficient furniture in housing; physical attacks; verbal abuse; inaction by the police; racism at school; refusal of passage on local busses; and evictions into

destitution. Dr Moran and her co-researchers used this information to construct case studies of the interaction between the people who had presented their experiences to them and the employees of institutions such as NASS, private housing providers, health agencies, schools, criminal justice organisations, and local government.

For example, 'A Learning Opportunity with RAPAR', which was hosted by the Revans Institute at the University of Salford in June 2003, disseminated findings from one case study involving a mother and her two sons (all of whom had Iranian citizenship). RAPAR personnel and high-ranking officials and frontline practitioners from a number of agencies with whom the family had been interacting, including NASS, SPCT and Salford City Council, participated. Participants (including the family) were handed a visual narrative analysis of a case study that showed that a number of agents – including a Member of Parliament, the Director of NASS in the North West and Salford RAPAR– had interacted with the family and among themselves, and that it was through this process that the family avoided eviction from their home into destitution and secured appropriate health interventions.

Project findings – including those of the hardships of 'dispersed' people – were also communicated through academic media[46] and via two newspaper articles. 'A cold shoulder for Saddam's victims' was published in the *Guardian* newspaper in March of 2003. The article mentioned two men whom it identified as 'community leaders for Salford and Manchester's homeless Iraqi Kurdish refugee communities' and stated that they had begun 'to build a social network after meeting through Dr Rhetta Moran,

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[46] Dr Moran presented a paper titled 'From dispersal to destitution: dialectical methods in participatory action research with people seeking asylum' at the 'Policy and Politics in a Globalising World' conference at the University of Bristol in July of 2003.

a sociologist from Salford University's Revans Institute, who has developed a research project with Salford's refugee community' (McFadyean 2003). The project also publicized its findings on the hardship experienced by people enrolled in the 'dispersal' programme in an article published in March 2004 in the *Observer* newspaper titled, 'Living in fear: my week with the hidden asylum seekers'. The article read as follows:

> 'People have been dumped in Salford, but without resources,' says Dr Rhetta Moran, a senior research fellow at the Revans Institute with overall responsibility for the Salford Rapar project. 'There was no additional support for local practitioners. There is not one immigration solicitor in the whole city. And it leads to bitterness because this is a place where locals have been making their own demands on the council for years.' Moran thinks that adjusting to this situation is as hard for those seeking asylum as the indigenous population. 'They are the most vulnerable people in the country,' she adds. 'It is a waterfall of suffering and we just see a tiny part of it. Again and again we see feelings of isolation, loss and anxiety' (Asthana 2004).

In July 2003 the project was visited by the SRB verification team from Salford City Council to check the validity of its returns and to appraise its monitoring systems. After this visit the SRB accountant at Salford City Council wrote to Dr Moran:

> May I congratulate yourself and your team on the tremendously hard work that has obviously gone into producing excellent systems for monitoring the outputs, outcomes and milestones and other records of the Refugee and Asylum Seekers project. Having such good systems has helped in this being the first SRBV project having a verification visit to have no action points, which is quite remarkable - because nobody's perfect.

Project takeover and Moran's dismissal

The sequence of actions that followed these research and dissemination activities mostly came to light through documentary disclosures compelled by formal internal organisational grievance procedures and FOIA and data protection subject access requests. These data reveal how the University of Salford – the academic institution

that employed Dr Moran – cooperated with Salford City Council and the local,

regional, and national state agencies of the SPCT, the NWDA, and the ODPM to shut

down the participatory action research activity of Salford RAPAR and, ultimately, to

stop the dissemination of its findings as a whole.

In late February 2004, claiming concerns about the management of the project that

were left unspecified, the SPCT informed Dr Moran that it had removed two

people from the project's Core Management Committee, both of whom were

RAPAR members who had contracts of employment with the SPCT. The spurious

nature of this justification is indicated by the glowing evaluation that had been

received by the project from Salford City Council (see above). Dr Moran

responded by writing to the SPCT, advising the agency that its unilateral action

had necessitated the emergency co-option of alternative help from the Revans

Institute to manage the project and confirming the date for a Core Management

Committee meeting at which the agency would be free to discuss its concerns. No

one from the SPCT attended this meeting.

Immediately following this meeting, which took place shortly after the *Observer*

publication about Salford RAPAR's work in March 2004, the SPCT wrote separately

to Dr Moran and to the rest of the Salford RAPAR team, informing them that Dr

Moran had been removed from the management of the project by the agency and that

it would manage the project from then on. On the same day that this letter was written,

the Chief Executive of SPCT wrote to the Vice Chancellor of Salford University,

advising him that due to the agency's (unspecified) concerns about Dr Moran's

management of Salford RAPAR, the SPCT would be taking away the project's

supervision from her. This letter was copied to Salford City Council and to the Pro-Vice Chancellor at Salford University with responsibility for leading on the University's 'Enterprise' work.

After a series of meetings with the Salford RAPAR staff and with the NGO's own management committee, RAPAR's Chair responded by formally protesting against the takeover of the project by the SPCT. In that same week that this protest was made, the contractual bases underpinning the posts occupied by the staff of the Salford RAPAR project and, separately, Dr Moran's academic post, were simultaneously undermined. The employees of the Salford RAPAR team received a letter from an official of the SPCT stating the following:

> I am instructing all employees of Salford Primary Care Trust who are working on the Salford RAPAR Project that they must not associate with the RAPAR Forum/RAPAR limited or any similar organisation that may be formed, unless prior permission is obtained… In the light of the above, I would advise you that any such association might constitute gross misconduct and could result in immediate suspension, pending investigation. Any such activity must cease immediately by 5pm on Tuesday 1st June.

Then, without any prior communication regarding the matter, Dr Moran received a letter from the University of Salford informing her that its management had decided that her 'research was no longer compatible' and that her contract with the university would therefore not be renewed.

An unequivocal rejection by the Salford RAPAR team of all claims that any work was being done to undermine the SPCT was sent to the agency and copied to the employees' union, Unison. This prompted the following written response from the SPCT: 'The sands that shift around us are forcing the need for changes and sometimes there is not time for as full a period of discussion as we hoped for'.

Without the knowledge of RAPAR or the Revans Institute, the Social Inclusion Executive Meeting of Salford City Council met less than a week after the SPCT takeover to support retrospectively and note the transfer of management and control of the Salford RAPAR project to the SPCT. On that same day, a participant at the SRB Executive Meeting that was chaired by NWDA representation recorded that the organisation RAPAR was not authorised to receive SRB funds. This was not accurate: it was both eligible (i.e., as a legal entity – a registered charity) and authorised by contract. An attendee noted: 'university accept the PCT actions'. Two days later, in a fax from the Salford City Council representative to the SPCT representative, Salford City Council made reference to 'the contract that Rhetta signed'. 'What we need to do', it continued, 'is issue a new one with PCT's name and signature on it and a file note explaining the changes'. RAPAR and the Revans Institute remained unaware of both these discussions between the City Council, the SPCT, the NWDA and the Salford University administration, and of the decisions that emanated from them. Rather, RAPAR and the Revans Institute continued to seek out explanations for the project takeover, which stimulated an investigative process by a member of the Local Strategic Partnership.[47]

In early July 2004 the director of the Revans Institute formally expressed its concerns about the SPCT takeover in a letter to the funder, the ODPM. Shortly thereafter, the NWDA repeated the inaccurate statement, in writing, to Salford City Council that RAPAR was not a legal entity and admitted that the SRB partnership did not have a contract or a service-level agreement with the SPCT. The ODPM categorised the

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[47] Local strategic partnerships exist in nearly all local authority areas in England. They bring together representatives from the local statutory, voluntary, community and private sectors to address local problems, allocate funding, discuss strategies and initiatives.

complaint from the director of the Revans Institute as a 'Treat Official', which necessitated the production of an official response. Responsibility for constructing this response was passed from the ODPM via the Government Office North West (GONW) to the NWDA, which then allotted the task to the *very same* officer who had already participated in and endorsed the SPCT takeover of Salford RAPAR. This official response was based upon internal NWDA correspondence, which repeated the inaccurate information regarding RAPAR's legal status that had been used to justify the takeover.

Evidence points to cooperation among these same bodies to disable Dr Moran's academic position. After receiving no explanation for her forthcoming dismissal from the university manager who had signed the letter that informed her of the action, Dr Moran lodged a formal grievance against unfair dismissal. Within a week of this lodgement, and by then over two months since the project takeover, two letters were authored by the Chair of the SPCT, an academic who is now Professor of Health and Social Care at Manchester Metropolitan University, to the Vice Chancellor of Salford University. The first confirms that the head of Salford University 'Enterprise' had spoken to the Vice Chancellor about Dr Moran and RAPAR and the second characterises Dr Moran as abusive and bullying.

Over the next few months, as RAPAR continued to try to restore the project to its original ownership and Dr Moran pursued her formal grievance, an informal agreement was reached between the Vice Chancellor of Salford University and SPCT to not invoice for any of the Revans Institute work that was budgeted for inside of the SRB project. When Dr Moran discovered this and questioned University senior

management about this action in the November of 2004, the university's 'enterprise lead' almost immediately authored an internal memo to another Pro Vice Chancellor claiming that Salford PCT's Director of Public Health had told him that Dr Moran was 'intimidating people in the area… what is the university going to do about the situation?'

The University finally dismissed Dr Moran in January 2005. Two months later, the University emailed Dr Moran's union (the Association of University Teachers, now UCU) to negotiate a settlement of £20,000 with her. According to the Vice Chancellor, this offer was made 'with a view to resolving all your outstanding disputes against the university'. Dr Moran never asked for money, but for reinstatement. Dr Moran's Employment Tribunal did not uphold any of her claims and the University of Salford pursued her (unsuccessfully) for £10,000 in court costs (Kealing 2007).

4.3.1.3. Case comparison

These MARS academics were both dominated by UK state agencies following their production of similar findings regarding the experiences of people living under the same control regime in adjacent communities. The primary difference between the cases of the two academics was in the kinds of moves that they made in their exchange relations with their UK state agency exchange partners. I begin with a discussion of the similarities.

Similarity: relations of knowledge production

A clear similarity between these cases is that both Professor Zetter and Dr Moran were engaging in their academic work through hierarchical relations of production: they were dominated by the members of state agencies that commissioned their research projects. Another similarity is that both projects gathered information through interviews with people seeking asylum about their experiences of 'dispersal' in the Greater Manchester area. The findings of both projects were similar: the researchers recorded dissatisfaction with NASS-managed services (i.e., accommodation, information), descriptions of harassment from locals (i.e., verbal abuse, physical attack), and reports of inaction by police following their being notified about these issues. The findings of both projects painted a negative picture of the government dispersal programme based on first-hand experiences of people 'dispersed' by it.

In both processes, attempts were made by state agencies to justify the suppression of findings using spurious claims. In their statement that accompanied the release of Zetter et al.'s 'buried' report, the HO explained non-publication as an effect of the report's 'limitations' of 'unclear methodology' and 'recommendations' that were not 'linked to research evidence'. An article in *The Observer* newspaper reported that a 'spokeswoman for Salford Primary Care Trust […] said that it had had 'significant concerns' about shortcomings in the management of Rapar and so removed Moran' (Asthana 2006). These assertions are both easily challenged. The HO later accepted Zetter as a member of the APCI, where, according to the organisation's terms of reference, he provided advice that 'helps to ensure' that the 'content of the country of

origin information […] material' and 'the sources, methods of research and quality control used by COI Service' are 'as accurate, balanced, impartial and up to date as possible' (APCI n.d.d). How could he be trusted by the HO to provide this kind of advice if he, himself, had previously produced work for the HO with a muddled methodology and recommendations that were not evidence-based? As for the claims against Moran, she had been given a glowing management evaluation of the Salford RAPAR project prior to her removal (see above).

My research findings indicate instead that the findings of both Zetter et al. and Dr Moran were suppressed by UK state agencies because it could be used by opposition MPs and NGOs to embarrass and challenge the HO in the same way that reports on the inaccuracy and bias of HO Country Reports and the asylum decision-making process had already been used by MPs and the NGOs Asylum Aid and the IAS (see description above in Chapter Two). The similar actions of suppression taken by different UK state agencies in response to nearly identical commissioned research findings that were produced in studies conducted essentially at the same time and in the same place indicate that the explanation for these responses lies *not* in the shortcomings of the commissioned MARS academics who carried out the work, as these organisations claim, but rather in the political threat that the information posed to the Government in general, and the HO in particular.

Difference: exchange moves

Although MARS academics Professor Zetter and Dr Moran were embroiled in the same relations of knowledge production (i.e., they were both dominated by UK state

agencies – as evinced by the suppression of their findings), both the nature of the exchange moves that they made *and* – consequently – their career trajectories differed significantly. The two MARS academics disseminated their findings of hardship in different ways. Zetter's appear to have only made it into print in his 'buried' 'Dispersal' report to the IRSS. In contrast, Moran and RAPAR communicated findings as they emerged to a wide range of private and public agencies and to the general public through national newspapers.

Zetter and Moran appear to have reacted differently, as well, to the suppression of their findings by the HO and ODPM, respectively. Possibly in violation of the terms of his contract with the HO, the former both presented findings from and cited 'Dispersal' in two academic publications prior to its release by the HO. Nor did Zetter et al. keep the suppression of findings to themselves. I heard it mentioned by MARS academics (not including Professor Zetter) at conferences in 2004 and 2006. Moran and her colleagues resisted the take-over of Salford RAPAR by the SPCT by informing the project's institutional partners of Salford City Council, Salford University, the NWDA and the ODPM that the Trust was taking improper actions, and by initiating legal proceedings. The difference between Zetter's and Moran's reactions to suppression was more a matter of degree than of kind, with the latter having taken a much more public, transparent and detailed approach.

The academic trajectories of Professor Zetter and Dr Moran differed significantly as well. The former subsequently ascended to arguably the most prestigious post in the academic field of MARS – the directorship of Oxford's RSC. The latter's contract with the University of Salford was not renewed.

In Bourdieu's terms, Professor Zetter was 'carried along' by the game of exchange with the HO, while Dr Moran was 'carried away' beyond it – out of the academy, in fact – when the mock fight got the better of her and the officials of the state agencies with whom she was engaging. These professional trajectories resulted largely from the differing series of moves that the two MARS academics made in the game. Both made moves that were not expected by their partners in exchange. Zetter strayed slightly from the agreement with the HO by publishing somewhat unflattering (for the HO) findings from and citing the report that the agency had buried, while Moran 'worked to rule' by taking the participatory action research methodology that had been agreed upon by the officials of the ISCS, SRB, and NWDA further than they had imagined that she would go. Both landed punches in an interaction in which their socially superior exchange partners expected to be just sparring without any significant contact. Zetter's was only a 'love tap' that did not merit retaliation. Moran's, however, was a solid 'punch', which left her exchange partner with an embarrassing 'black eye', and enough pain, anger, and resentment to respond by 'knocking her out'.

4.3.2. Representativeness of case studies

I found that the relations of knowledge production that are described in both of the case studies above were also those within which MARS academics laboured, in general. The exchange moves of the members of the field approximated those of Professor Zetter much more closely than they did Dr Moran's, and therefore tended to reproduce the domination of MARS academics by state agencies.

4.3.2.1. Relations of knowledge production

The 'gag rule' terms of commissioned research contracts, suppression of findings by commissioning agencies, and punishment and intimidation of commissioned researchers that were described in the cases above were also common for exchange between MARS academics and state agencies and IGOs, in general. The suppression of MARS academic commissioned research findings by UK state agencies that I described in the cases above is quite common. The IRSS practice of refusing to publish commissioned findings is relatively well known within the MARS academic community; I heard it described in two academic conferences during participant observation (in 2004 and 2006) and in three interviews. For example, Dr Charriere, an academic at UEL's RRC who claimed to have not done commissioned research for the HO at the time of our interview, described the HO burial of reports to me – without my eliciting the narrative – and judged MARS academics engaged in commissioned research with the HO in the following way:

> You publish the stuff and they… and they… basically, they suppress it. They don't put it on the website. So you can't be a self-respecting academic, even… you know, in the liberal sense, with a very small type of L, [laughs] you know, if you play that game.

The HO website contains evidence of burial, as well. A HO response on 14 March 2007 to an FOIA request listed sixteen reports – one of which being Zetter et al.'s 'Dispersal' – that had been commissioned but not released by the HO (UK Home Office 2007c). Six of these were related to migration issues. Of the six, two were named but not released to the public. These were 'Study of flows of irregular migrants across Europe', and 'Public Perceptions and Migration: Facilitating Social Cohesion

in Local Communities'. I believe the former to be the same report as that which is listed on the 'Current Research' page of the UCL MRU website and likely to have been produced by John Salt and/or Khalid Koser: 'Irregular migration flows in Europe, Home Office/IOM, 2001-02' (University College London n.d.). The four migration-related reports that were released following the FOIA request are displayed in Appendix 4.1.

Furthermore, a report in the *Guardian* described the successful delay of publication by the UK Department of Work and Pensions of a report that had been commissioned by the International Labour Organisation and the UK Trades Union Congress from two MARS academics (Pai 2005).

Additional evidence for the generality of the 'gag rule' in MARS state agency commissioned research was the report of the COMPAS Policy Day, held at the centre in January of 2004. It refers to the burial of reports by the Government in the following way: 'For commissioned work especially, if findings contradict the Government line, then it can heavily be negotiated which may lose its impact, lead to it being changed or even not published' (COMPAS n.d.c). Finally, the person credited by many with being the founder of refugee studies, Barbara Harrell-Bond, and another well-established MARS academic, Eftihia Voutira, described the commonality of the 'gag rule' in commissioned 'refugee research', as well (Harrell-Bond and Voutira 2007:292). That the 'gag rule' is usually a condition for academics receiving a commissioned research contract from state agencies in the UK, in general, is suggested by findings similar to those above by Panayiotopoulos (2002) for the anthropology of development and Hillyard and Sim (1997:56) for socio-legal research.

There is evidence that the punishment and intimidation by UK state agencies described above in the case of MARS academic Dr Moran were not uncommon phenomena. Recall Professor Zetter's statement (quoted above in Chapter Three) in his paper that he presented at the HO-organised Bridging the Information Gaps conference in 2001 in which he reflected on being invited by the agency to publicly (i.e., at the conference, itself) describe and evaluate his commissioned research interaction with it: 'If I am too critical of the relationship we have had with the Home Office, then we may well exclude ourselves from any future tendering!' He expected to be punished by the agency for being '*too* critical' of it – i.e., for giving a presentation that went *beyond* a 'love tap'. Also, Harrell-Bond and Voutira (2007) observed that commissioned researchers who violated the 'gag rule' could expect to be punished by the agency that funded them in the same way – i.e., by its refusing to award them research contracts in the future.

Also, MARS faculty used an idiom of violence to describe their relations of production with UK state agencies. For example, Professor Vertovec – then director of the ESRC-funded TNCP at Oxford – included the following in his presentation at the 2001 HO-sponsored 'Bridging the information gaps' conference:

> [O]ne of the ESRC's real sticks that they are always hitting us with is that all of this research [produced by the TNCP] must get back into the public domain and has to reach the groups that would use it most. It can't just stay within the academic sphere (UK Home Office 2001:32).

In a similar example, I was present in an audience of mostly MARS students when a senior MARS academic at Oxford's RSC likened the centre's multimillion pound funding relationship with DfID to 'having your hands tied behind your back'.

Finally, a MARS academic described to me the way in which an employee of an IGO that had commissioned a piece of research from her warned her not to 'leak' the findings. The IGO was not publishing it because of pressure from a UK government department. Dr Becker told me that she received a phone call at work from someone she knew who worked at the IGO, who said that the aforementioned UK government department had contacted him and told him that it would 'trash' her if she were to make either the report's findings or the suppression of these public. He sympathised with her position, telling her that this would mean that she would never work again as an academic, and asked rhetorically, 'You know who pays [your research centre], don't you?'

4.3.2.2. Moves

I found no examples of 'black eye' exchange moves by MARS academics other than those by Dr Moran that I described above. In the great majority of cases that I have encountered, MARS academics only gave 'love taps', if they made any contact at all.

For example, a MARS academic whom I interviewed told me that after his[48] UK state agency commissioned report was buried, 'the only thing that we could do at that point was to not do any other… apply for any other things. In a sense, also, if, even if

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[48] Here name is omitted and gender is chosen randomly in order to maintain informant's anonymity.

invited we didn't apply'. Here is evidence of a 'love tap' exchange move: the refusal by MARS academics to engage in a particular exchange with the agency that buried their report. But there is evidence that this refusal did not mean an end to the play fighting. After telling me in our interview that he and his colleagues had declined an invitation from the IRSS to do a commissioned research study (see above), Dr Stoker told me that

> [t]he way of evaluating whether projects are accepted [by MARS academics] is on a project-by-project basis. So, even if it's coming from the same government department where there may be a big problem in you saying, 'No. I'm not doing that one', it doesn't mean the next one won't be considered. It doesn't mean the institutional relationship won't continue.

Here, the 'institutional relationship' – i.e., the play fighting – continued in spite of the hiatus initiated by the rejection.

Professor Zetter was not the only MARS academic to maintain his relationship in this way with the HO after having his IRSS-commissioned buried. He and at least one other MARS academic who had had his commissioned report buried – i.e., Professor Robinson of Swansea – subsequently joined the HO's APCI. Both of the MARS academics whom I have shown to have been the likely authors of the UCL-produced report – i.e., 'Study of flows of irregular migrants across Europe' – that was commissioned and subsequently buried by the HO, also continued to engage in exchange with the agency. Professor Salt went on to co-author an IRSS-commissioned report in 2004 and Dr Koser subsequently participated as a member, commissioned researcher, and then chair of the APCI.

I encountered another example of a series of exchange moves by a MARS academic that demonstrate this tendency of the field's members to act so as to be carried along by the game without being carried away beyond it. MARS academic (MA)[49] held posts at two universities during a nine-year period; the first was at one that was much less prestigious than the second. While at the first, MA produced a report under contract to a UK state agency that it subsequently buried. Later – but while still holding the first post – MA participated as a presenter in two public events with audiences composed primarily of MARS students at which the theme that was discussed was the relationship between MARS research and policy. At one she presented alongside an official in the same UK state agency that had buried her report. At the other she did so with other MARS academics. In both presentations she described and criticised certain aspects of her interaction with this agency as its commissioned researcher but *did not* mention its burial of her report. Several years later, when MA had taken up the second post at the more prestigious university, she again discussed her interaction with the state agency that had buried her report in front of an audience that included a considerable number of MARS students at a public event. In contrast to the first two events, this time MA *did* describe the burial of her report by the agency that commissioned it. This pattern of disclosure evinces MA's strategy of giving only 'love taps' until she was in a secure enough position – i.e., a more prestigious university with higher social status and greater access to funding – to make fuller contact with her exchange partner – i.e., when there was a much lower risk of being 'knocked out', as was Dr Moran.

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[49] I anonymise the account and choose gender randomly in order to fulfil agreements made during fieldwork.

Finally, many MARS academics told me that they saw as being accurate my observation that they and their colleagues tended to publish 'policy recommendations' that were more restrictive than those that they truly desired – if they wished that there be any at all (i.e., 'open borders'). Invariably, they explained this phenomenon as being the result of a strategy for accomplishing (at least) one of three out of the four aims that I described above: benefiting the field's human subjects, assisting government, or being effective. The findings that I have presented thus far indicate that these practices can be understood, in addition, as being 'love tap' exchange moves that MARS academics enact with the fourth 'end' of the field in mind: making money.

4.3.3. Overall interpretation à la Bourdieu

The MARS academics who facilitated migration control through their participation with the APCI and MAC – and possibly the HO IRSS (i.e., through the provision of surveillance) – did so in large part because *their jobs depended on it*. These exchange practices – or, moves – were preceded (and followed) by others in series over years that determined to a large degree the academics' differential success in the field of MARS. Most acted in ways such that they were carried along by the game, thereby contributing as well to the reproduction of the domination of the field's members by the UK state agencies and IGOs that funded its research. But these outcomes were always uncertain – as evinced by Dr Moran's excommunication, a rare case in which a MARS academic was carried away beyond the game. Having explained the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics using Bourdieu's power and

practice approach, I next do the same using the more rationalist one that Wolf takes to analysis.

4.4. Power and mode of production

Eric Wolf provides, according to the author, 'an analytic account of the development of material relations, moving simultaneously on the level of the encompassing system and on the micro-level' (1997:23). One of the key concepts that Wolf uses in this anthropological treatment of exchange is mode of production. Following Marx, he defines a mode of production as 'a specific, historically occurring set of social relations through which labor is deployed to wrest energy from nature by means of tools, skills, organization, and knowledge' (ibid.:75). 'The utility of the concept', he writes, 'does not lie in *classification* but in its capacity to underline the strategic relationships involved in the deployment of social labor by organized human pluralities' (ibid.:76, emphasis in original). Furthermore, it aims at 'revealing the political-economic relationships that underlie, orient, and constrain interaction' (ibid.). A mode of production can interact with others and its relationship with these can be described using the concept of 'dominance' (ibid.:76, 78-79) – i.e., several modes can exist at once with one being dominant vis-à-vis the others.

In this section I follow Wolf in moving simultaneously on both the micro-level and that of the encompassing system. Here, the focus is classically Marxist – to paraphrase Bloch (1983:22): it is on making a living together with other people. I consider MARS academics – following Marx and Engels (1974:47) – to be the producers of their research – real, active academics, as they are conditioned by a

definite development of their productive forces (i.e., means of production plus labour power) and of the exchange corresponding to these. I begin by analysing the changing modes of knowledge production of the APCI. Then I do the same for the field of MARS and academics in the UK, as a whole, as part of a global neoliberal capitalist mode of production. In the third part of this section I provide a brief overall interpretation of these data (and those presented earlier in the thesis) using Wolf's approach.

4.4.1. The APCI and the HO

It is possible to abstract from the APCI meeting minutes four successive modes of production for the panel from its first to its eighth (October 2006) meetings (see Chapter Two for an earlier discussion of this process). I diagram these modes in Appendices 4.2-5). The first was the Two-Tier Consultation Mode. This mode was dominant in the first meeting (September 2003) and co-existed with another in the second (March 2004). Unremunerated (in the case of one of the respondents and the IAS 'volunteer researchers') and paid labour by individuals who were part of consulted organisations and the HO contributed to the production of HO Country Reports.

The second mode, Post-Publication Commissioned Researcher, was in existence during the second (March 2004) meeting, and was dominant from the third (September 2004) through the fifth (March 2005) meetings. In this mode, HO-remunerated labour by academics, think-tank employees, and HO personnel produced the country reports. Panel members (especially academic and think-tank researchers)

had successfully constructed a patronage network that included themselves (and freelance researchers) and excluded others (i.e., workers for NGOs like IAS) from HO remuneration. The discussions recorded in the second (March 2004) meeting minutes document this exclusion.

The first Chair is recorded as having told the panel that the IAS, an NGO panel observer organisation, had asked for funding from the panel to enable it to produce its analyses of the Country Reports. The minutes then state that [the AIT representative on the panel] 'did not consider that it was appropriate to provide specific funding for NGOs to examine CIPU's Reports'. Then the minutes state that the MARS academic co-director of the SCMR 'supported [the AIT representative's] suggestion [sic] there should be an ongoing public consultation and agreed that if this approach was taken, there should be no need for any dedicated resources to be provided to NGOs' (APCI 2.M:§6.10).

This Post-Publication Commissioned Researcher mode of knowledge production's dominance was diminished beginning with events that took place during the interim between the fifth and sixth (September 2005) meetings. As shown above in Chapter Two, the second Chair is recorded as having indicated that between these meetings the HO had requested of the first Chair that the panel evaluate the unpublished drafts of the Mongolia, Ghana and Pakistan country reports for the sixth meeting because these countries were being considered by the HO for NSA status (ibid.:§3.1, §6.7-6.8).The HO proposed that these – and future – reports of countries being considered for NSA status be analysed by APCI-commissioned researchers in their draft form, *not* following their publication as had been the case up to that point.

APCI-commissioned researchers were thus integrated more fully into the production process by providing analysis before the HO publication of its country reports. I call this mode Draft Stage Commissioned Researcher. The sixth meeting therefore involved a mixture of the Post-Publication Commissioned Researcher and the Draft Stage modes of production. The Draft Stage mode was dominant, however, at the seventh (March 2006) meeting, at which four out of the five Country Report analyses that were presented and discussed therein were produced before the HO publication of the Reports.

The Post-Publication mode returned to dominance in the eighth (October 2006) meeting. Three 'follow-up' analyses (Democratic Republic of Congo, Iran, and Pakistan) and one 'new evaluation' (Liberia) were presented and discussed. It was also at this meeting that the panel discussed again (see above) – but this time in greater detail – what was then a hypothetical arrangement of labour for the future production of country reports in which the HO would remunerate researchers directly (extra-APCI) for their contributions to draft stage country reports. I call this imagined mode of production Consultancy.

This narrative of changing modes of production – these historical transformations in the way that labour was deployed for the production of Country Reports – reveals and underlines (using Wolf's approach) changing political-economic relationships. Initially, in the Two-Tier Consultation Mode, the APCI acted as a 'middle man' or broker for providing COIS/CIPU with analyses of its CRs that had been produced primarily by people who were employed by other organisations. CRs and CR analyses

were produced more or less independently. In the second, Post-Publication mode, the producers of CR analyses moved closer to the CR production process by becoming commissioned researchers of the APCI. Whereas during the Post-Publication mode the interaction of the APCI panellists and its commissioned researchers with the HO involved only the editing of published CRs, later ones saw these individuals participating in earlier stages of – i.e., more integrated into – the CR production process. The political-economic relationship between the APCI, its commissioned researchers, and the HO changed from one of mostly patronage (i.e., more powerful patron to quasi-independent client) to a mix of patronage and what Lave and Wenger (1991) call 'legitimate peripheral participation' (i.e., more powerful master and subordinate apprentice). This transformation of interaction between panellists, their commissioned researchers, and the HO (i.e., the latter's success in bringing the former into its 'community of practice' (ibid.) – will be shown in the next part of this section – following Wolf – to be a micro-level expression of the broader systemic process by which 'political-economic relationships […] underlie, orient, and constrain interaction'.

4.4.2. MARS, the New Labour government, and capitalism

In this section I first describe in greater detail than I have thus far in this chapter the financial dependency of MARS academics. Then I discuss the field's production of knowledge for exchange. Finally, I contextualise these phenomena by providing a narrative of the field's growth as part of the capitalist mode of production.

4.4.2.1. Financial dependency

The field's material basis is primarily the funding it receives through exchange with governmental organisations. Its leading figures make this clear in their published work. Recall the statements by Professors Castles and Black quoted above (Chapter Three discussion of 'motivations') that 'many migration sociologists have become dependent on government consultancies and policy-linked funding' (Castles 2007:363) and that the growth of the academic field of refugee studies has depended upon its production of research that 'is capable of attracting funding from major government and private donors' (Black 2001:61). Perhaps the clearest published statement of this relation of production is made by Castles, who observes that when studying forced migration from a sociological perspective, 'researchers often have no choice but to seek their funding from policy bodies (like the Home Office or the European Commission)' (2003:26). Even at the large and well-established MARS centre of the RSC, I was told by one of its faculty members that only three of its members were paid with 'hard' – i.e., university – funding; the rest were supported by 'soft money' – i.e., that which the members and the centre's development officers were responsible for acquiring from external sources as grants, research contracts, and donations.

This financial dependency on governmental agencies is indicated, as well, by my analysis of the external funding that had been received by the MARS centres of COMPAS, SCMR, and the RRC (displayed in Appendices 4.6-9). All three received the majority of their external research grant funding from governmental agencies, as seen in the table below.

Figure 21: External grant income for selected MARS centres

MARS centre (years)	Percentage of external grant income from governmental sources
COMPAS (2005/06-2006/07)	90
SCMR (2003/04-07/08)	84
RRC (2003/04-07/08)	77

That COMPAS, a centre with 'policy' as part of its name, acquired nearly all of its external grant income from governmental sources is less surprising, perhaps, than the finding that the RRC, a centre perceived by the field's members as being that in which the aim to benefit the field's human subjects (see above) and which MARS MA student Frances described to me as having 'a lefty bent', receives more than three-quarters of this type of income from such agencies. In other words, even the MARS centre that has a reputation for having the least governmental politics of the field's centres acquires nearly all of its external grant income from governmental sources.

This financial dependency has strongly conditioned the behaviour of MARS academics. Again, the field's leading figures state publicly that this has been the case. According to Turton, in the case of the MARS sub-field of Refugee Studies, '[i]ts concern to be 'relevant' (and, it must be admitted, its need for funding) led it to adopt policy related categories and concerns in defining its subject matter and setting its research agenda' (2003:1). In his discussion of 'sociological studies of contemporary international migration', Castles stated the following:

> Research questions, methods and even findings may be shaped by the political interests
> of governments, local authorities and funding bodies. […] Ministers and bureaucrats
> still often see migration as something that can be turned on and off like a tap through

laws and polices. By imposing this paradigm on researchers, the policy-makers have done both social scientists and themselves a disservice' (2007:363).

4.4.2.2. Kinds of knowledge produced

I have found that in order to make a living together through exchange with their governmental agency exchange partners, MARS academics have produced mainly 1) surveillance on the primary targets of governmental migration controls; 2) analyses of immigration and integration policy, its implementation and effects; and 3) recommendations that legitimate these restrictive practices. The field's members have observed that surveillance on people identified by MARS researchers as migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees is the primary knowledge product of the field. A 'state of the art paper outlining current research on migration and integration in Europe' co-authored by three MARS academics who had been either a faculty member or a visiting fellow at the University of Oxford includes the following statement:

> State of the art reviews of migration and integration research also hint at the need to introduce new perspectives: the fact that nearly all research focuses primarily on migration, immigrants and their integration, while the societal systems into which the phenomenon of migration and the immigrants themselves are to be integrated is taken for granted (Penninx et al. 2008:12).

Landau notes this pattern, too: 'Instead of conducting ethnographies of UNHCR or other relevant bodies, IASFM members are much more likely to produce a further account of a longsuffering population and condemn UNHCR for not helping them' (2007:346). This narrow empirical focus is mentioned and decried by other MARS academics, as well (Castles 2007; Favell 2008; Scalettaris 2007).

The field's focus is not only on people who are mobile, but on specific mobile peoples, as Favell notes:

> The migration experiences of elite, educated, professional or highly skilled migrants in Europe are not yet a widely studied subject. This is most certainly not the case with the more familiar objects of migration studies: the ethnically distinct, non-European, ''third world'' or postcolonial immigrants at the lower end of the labour market, who are the inspiration for a by now huge literature in the contemporary social sciences (Favell 2003b:399-400).

Likewise, Castles observes in his essay on the state of the art of the sociology of migration that the current 'organisation of the research enterprise' is one in which 'first-world social scientists [are] going out to conduct studies of other peoples' (2007:267-368).

I have found that the field's faculty and students make visible the behaviour of mobile people primarily from Africa, the Caribbean, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America and/or those who are identified as being their descendants – i.e., the same groups who are subject to the most restrictive UK state agency migration controls. For example, the 2006 special issue of the *Journal of ethnic and migration studies* on 'Music and migration' had the following articles (I have added the (ascribed) identity of the human subjects where this is not made clear in the title):

- Songs, Discos and Dancing in Kiryandongo, Uganda ('Sudanese' people)
- Dancing Belonging: Contesting Dabkeh in the Jordan Valley, Jordan ('Palestinian refugees')
- 'I've Worked Longer Than I've Lived': Lesotho Migrants' Songs as Maps of Experience
- Mizwid: An Urban Music With Rural Roots ('Tunisian youth')
- 'Music Is In Our Blood': Gujarati Muslim Musicians in the UK
- Kurdish Lyrical Protest: The Terrain of Acoustic Migration
- Fuzhou Flower Shops of East Broadway: 'Heat and Noise' and the Fashioning of New Traditions ('Cantonese-speaking immigrants' and 'recent arrivals from the

Fuzhou region of Fujian Province')

The field's second main product for exchange with state agencies is the analysis of immigration and integration policy, its implementation and effects. When MARS academics do focus their attention on migration controls, the process by which such regimes are *produced and maintained* is usually omitted. Scalletaris recognizes this pattern, as well. She writes that the MARS sub-field of refugee studies 'needs to maintain analytical independence from the refugee regime; instead of remaining entangled in the refugee regime policy framework, it would be fruitful if Refugee Studies included this policy framework among its objects of study' (2007:37). She recommends that researchers study 'the way the [international refugee regime] functions, its foundations, its mechanisms of knowledge production, the way institutions appraise reality, and even the role of research for policy' (ibid.:48) and she considers her own study of these phenomena to be 'an occasion to start opening up the "black box" of international policy and look at the process of producing policy notions' (ibid.:41).

Evidence for the shaping of the *oeuvre* of MARS via its exchange with governmental agencies is the match between the content of this body of work as a whole and that of the research that was commissioned by the HO IRSS and produced by MARS academics. Recall that I have collected the 28 IRSS migration-related reports that were produced solely by authors who worked in universities (see Chapter Two). The table below shows the relative frequencies of reports and projects for each of the five different types of knowledge that I created (see Appendix 4.10 for descriptions).

Table 6: Kinds of knowledge produced by MARS academics for HO IRSS

Kind of knowledge	Frequency of reports and projects[50]
Behaviour of migrants	50% (n=14) and 48% (n=11)
Advice on methods and management of research	18% (n=5) and 22% (n=5)
Estimates of the numbers of immigrants following state policy interventions	14% (n=4) and 9% (n=2)
Evaluations of the UK 'asylum seeker dispersal' programme	11% (n=3) and 13% (n=3)
Migration policies of other states	7% (n=2) and 9% (n=2)

In both the field's complete *oeuvre* and that of its commodity exchange with governmental agencies, the phenomena that are made visible are 1) the behaviour of mobile people primarily from Africa, the Caribbean, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America and/or those who are identified as being their descendants, *not* those from North America, Western Europe, or Australia; and 2) immigration and integration policy, its implementation and effects, *not* the processes by which migration control is produced and reproduced.

This shaping is visible at the level of individual MARS academics, as well. For example, the following table displays selected academic publications of Professor Black alongside the IRSS-commissioned reports upon which these were based.

Table 7: Professor Black's academic publications that were based on HO IRSS-commissioned reports

IRSS-commissioned report title and year	Academic publication
Understanding voluntary return. Home Office Online Report 50/04, 2004	Sustainable return in post-conflict contexts, *International Migration*, 2006
A survey of the illegally resident population in detention in the UK. Home Office Online Report 20/05, 2005	Routes to illegal residence: a case study of immigration detainees in the United Kingdom, *Geoforum*, 2006

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[50] There are 28 reports, which I estimate to have been produced out of 23 separate commissioned projects. Percentages rounded to nearest whole number (i.e., up if greater than or equal to 0.5). One published title included.

Further evidence for the shaping of the field's *oeuvre* by its commodity exchange with governmental agencies comes from the passages from the online professional biographies of Professors Black and Zetter, which I quoted above. Four out of the five organisations that were credited with funding the latter's 'research, consultancy and publications' were governmental agencies. The former's biography was more explicit regarding the relation between his sources of funding and the kinds of knowledge he produced in his academic publications: 'Building on studies conducted for the UK Home Office, ESRC and the European Commission […] and for DFID […], he is developing a framework to understand how return affects different stakeholders'.

In sum, MARS academics acquired the great majority of their funding for new research from governmental agencies. These organisations funded research primarily on particular human subjects and processes. As a consequence, the field's academic publications tended strongly to make visible these phenomena, rather than others.

Another way that MARS sustained itself financially was through exchange with governmental agencies of a third kind of knowledge – i.e., its recommendations that legitimise migration control, *not* those that call for their abolition. I have already described the provision of such services by MARS academics to the HO via the APCI and the MAC and shown that nearly all of the MARS academics who make public statements regarding the legitimacy of the harmful (to the field's human subjects) migration control measures by governmental agencies – even those said by the members of the field to be its most 'critical' scholars – endorse the practices either explicitly or implicitly.

That these restrictionist recommendations are exchanged by MARS academics with governmental agencies for funding is further indicated by the statements that were made by Düvell, Anderson, Spencer et al., and Castles and Van Hear et al. in the publications listed above. While addressing audiences that included the representatives of several European state governments, the UK HO, and the UK DFID, these MARS academics argued that further research was required to inform good policy decision making. This was, of course, knowledge that they were well qualified to produce for these state agencies as commissioned researchers.

For example, the response by a COMPAS MARS academic (Anderson 2006) suggests that attention should have been paid in the HO consultation paper to the decision-making of migrants within the UK, rather than only within what the response refers to as 'source and transit countries'. After identifying two such research questions, it states, 'This is an area which perhaps needs further research and reflection'. The other COMPAS consultation response mentioned above (i.e., Spencer et al. 2005) discusses the HO's proposal to create an organisation that would become known as the Migration Advisory Committee, stating: 'We welcome the proposal to establish an advisory body which can provide guidance on skill shortages'. 'We suggest', the response's authors wrote,

> that it is crucial that [the advisory body] create its own evidence base. This would draw on the existing authorities on sector skill shortages but add value in identifying where migrant labour is genuinely needed to fill skilled and low skilled vacancies.

Again, members of COMPAS were well qualified to provide the advisory body with such an evidence base, and in fact *did so* three years later in the form of the report

referred to above (Anderson and Ruhs 2008) that was commissioned by the MAC from two of them – one of whom being a MAC member at the time that it was commissioned.

There are very few published calls for the abolition of migration controls by MARS academics. Those that I have located are Schuster (2003), Marfleet (2006), and Harris (2002). However, all three of these scholars *also* have been engaged in the production of either at least one of the field's two commodities or of the restrictionist recommendations that MARS academics produce for exchange. Schuster (2005) describes the behaviour of – among others – 'Kurds', 'a woman from the Congo', 'an undocumented male migrant from Bangladesh', 'Senegalese', and 'interviewees from Kenya and Ecuador'. Furthermore, in a book review, Schuster promotes a study on 'migrants from Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan' whom the book in question's title identifies as being 'Muslim' (2007): 'By allowing people to speak for themselves and refusing to judge, moralise or prescribe, Yaghmaian has written what will become a classic of migration literature' (ibid.:181). Marfleet similarly promotes the study of the experiences of people from these regions, as well, as co-ordinator of the UEL MA in Refugee Studies. The programme's website describes what it calls its 'refugee-centred approach' in the following way: 'A distinguishing feature of the programme is its emphasis upon the lived experience of refugees and of refugee communities' (University of East London n.d.b). And finally, although Harris has called for the abolition of migration control in the publication mentioned above, he also endorsed restrictionist immigration policy in his other activities (Harris chaired the RSA Migration Commission, which published its recommendations in 2005).[51]

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[51] Its report was titled, 'Migration: a welcome opportunity'.

4.4.2.3. Diachronic account

In my Introduction I showed that although MARS had its beginnings in the early
1980s, it began to 'rise' in 1997 and then began its 'age' around 2003. In Chapter
Three I interpreted a correlation between the growth of the field, whose members
have been strongly motivated to 'have an impact' and 'make a difference', and that of
the efficacy ethic in the USA and UK. I identified the UK New Labour government's
mantras of 'evidence-based policy' and 'what matters is what works' as being
expressions of this ethic.

I have gathered evidence that shows that MARS' 'growth spurts' were the effects of
injections of funding from New Labour governmental agencies. These are displayed
in the table below.

Table 8: Multimillion pound UK state funding for MARS

Year	State agency	Recipient(s)	Amount
1997	ESRC	TNCP, Oxford	£3.8m
2000	HO IRSS	Various	£1.2m[52]
2003	ESRC DFID	COMPAS, Oxford DRC, Sussex	£3.8m £2.5m
2005	AHRC	DMI, Leeds	£5.5m
2006	DFID	RSC, Oxford	£2.5m
2008	ESRC	COMPAS, Oxford	£4.8m
		Total:	£24.1m

When these exchange payments of over one million pounds are plotted (as vertical

dotted lines) on the chart of the field's growth that I presented in the Introduction – as

I do below – the field's financial dependency is visualized.

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[52] This figure is a conservative estimate for earnings during the six years covered by my sample. The director of IRSS wrote in March of 2001 that '[i]n the past (part) year we commissioned about £350,000 [sic] research contracts and funding for the coming year has been substantially increased' (UK Home Office 2001:10). I found that the IRSS commissioned as many as 43 reports by external authors. 28 (approximately 65 percent) of these belong to my sample of reports authored solely by academics. If we assume that the IRSS spent £400,000 per year to commission research and that academics received half of that amount (both conservative estimates), then we can estimate that academics received £200,000 per year, or £1.2 million over six years from the IRSS.

Figure 22: MARS institutional growth

That MARS 'rose' and entered into its 'age' beginning in 1997 is indicated, as well, by the following observation by Favell: 'Such has been the *explosion* of interest in international migration in the past decade or so that no scholar nowadays can feel adequate when confronting the avalanche of literature that has followed' (2008:259, emphasis added). Similarly, Vertovec wrote in 2007 that '[i]t is, in fact, a kind of *boom time* for the anthropology of migration' (2007:962, emphasis added). I have shown that the material basis of this post-1997 boom was New Labour government funding. Next I discuss the reasons for this outlay of capital.

As I showed above, the New Labour government had a mantra of 'evidence-based policy'. As it produced restrictive immigration, nationality and asylum law at a high rate, it needed the 'evidence' (i.e., surveillance on the primary targets of its migration

controls, information on the effectiveness of these measures and those by other states

and IGOs, and restrictionist recommendations) to use in Parliamentary debate (and

possibly its enforcement operations) in the ways I described above in Chapter Two.

The New Labour government produced restrictive legislation at a rate double (i.e.,

eight in 13 years) that of the Conservative one that preceded it (i.e., four in 13 years).

UK immigration legislation since 1971 is listed in the table below.

Table 9: UK immigration legislation 1971-2009

Immigration Act 1971
Immigration (Carrier's Liability) Act 1987
Immigration Act 1988
Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993
Asylum and Immigration Act 1996
Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997
Immigration and Asylum Act 1999
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006
UK Borders Act 2007
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008
Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009

The chart below plots this legislation on my chart of MARS growth as dotted vertical

lines.

Figure 23: Immigration legislation and MARS growth

MARS growth

I have demonstrated that governmental agencies dominate both MARS academics and the field's human subjects – the former through financial dependency and the latter through deterrence and physical violence (described in Chapter Two). I have shown, as well, that MARS academics harm and exploit their human subjects. They harm them via their participation in the APCI and MAC, and possibly through both their provision of surveillance to the HO through its IRSS and their restrictionist policy recommendations. They exploited them, as well, in the cases I described above in which IRSS-commissioned MARS researchers did not financially compensate their imprisoned informants for the information that they provided to the academics. Furthermore, I have never have observed nor been told of a MARS academic producing knowledge about his or her human subjects as part of a collective in which all co-producers (i.e., the researcher plus all of the people that he or she observed, surveyed, photographed, or interviewed) shared equally in the financial rewards of

their labour. Therefore, the relation between MARS academics and their human subjects in general is that which obtains between the former and governmental agencies: domination.

The co-optation of MARS academics into the UK state migration control project was facilitated by the New Labour government's intensification of the UK state agency control over the academy, a trend that can be traced to the abolition of the bloc grant funding regime for higher education under the Conservatives.

> The political history of British higher education in the 20th Century has two main stories to tell: the demise of the UGC [University Grants Committee] and with it the reformulation of the idea of university autonomy, and the wresting of control by central government over the public sector of higher education (the polytechnics and colleges of higher education, now often referred to as the new universities) from the local authorities (Salter and Tapper 1994:10).

'[T]he UGC represented a model of the hollowed-out state in action', Salter and Tapper observe, in that 'the state neither rowed nor steered, that it merely oscillated between benign neglect and frustrated rage' (ibid.:10). However, a new funding regime was established through legislation between 1982 and 1992, which restricted university autonomy. '[W]hilst the universities may formally retain their corporate independence' write Salter and Tapper, 'they have little choice but to work within the framework established by the funding councils' (ibid.:12). In contrast to the pre-1992 period in UK Higher Education, now 'the state has *more* of a part to play in steering, and even controlling, institutional behaviour' (ibid., emphasis in original). The table above demonstrates the importance of the UK research funding councils in providing the material base of MARS – these have provided the field with at least 24 million pounds of research funding.

Leys observes that the 'combined effect' of these changes in funding regimes 'has been to make research within [the neoliberal paradigm] well rewarded, and therefore highly valued by university administrators, while effective public criticism of government policies is to say the least not warmly encouraged' (2006:17). 'As a result', he continues, 'the topics chosen for study, and the questions asked, have undergone a significant shift' (ibid.). '[A] new generation of well-funded academics emerged', he writes, 'wielding considerable patronage among younger researchers willing to work within the neoliberal paradigm' (ibid.). A similar process took place in the emergence and rapid growth of MARS. Early career academics who were willing to cooperate with the New Labour government in controlling migration – such as Professor Vertovec, director of Oxford's TNCP and COMPAS – were supported financially and able to establish themselves as powerful patrons influencing the topics of research. But it wasn't just this 'new generation' that emerged well-funded: some of the 'old Marxists' did, as well – i.e., those I described above, including both APCI Chair Professor Castles and APCI member Professor Zetter, directors of Oxford's RSC.

The introduction of neo-liberal governance into UK higher education that is described above by Salter and Tapper and Leys is associated by Shore and Wright 'with changes in capitalism, not least the new international knowledge economy' (2001:760-761). The growth of MARS can thus be seen as being *enabled* by the emergence of the neoliberal capitalist mode of production. The field's *role* in this mode of production can be interpreted from the data I have presented thus far, as well. MARS academics make a living together with UK state agencies and the field's human subjects. They

do so at the intersection of the 'knowledge business' (Allen and Imrie 2010) and the

migration industry, as depicted in the diagram below.

Figure 24: How MARS makes a living

MARS academics both produce research about and use as a factor of production

people who move outside of the 'territory' that corresponds with their citizenship. My

definition of the migration industry differs from that used by MARS academics, for

whom it is the people and organisations that profit from the *facilitation* of people's

movement (i.e., Castles 2007:361 and Garapich 2008, among many others). Instead, I

see the industry as encompassing labour having either facilitative or restrictive effects.

The restriction of free movement of people across the globe benefits not only some of the sectors of the migration industry, but also the capitalist class (Meyers 2000). The role of MARS academics is to be a fraction of the managerial class: 'like workers, they are exploited by capitalists (who make a profit from managerial work), yet like capitalists themselves they dominate and control workers' (Scott and Marshall 2009b). MARS academics – as members of the managerial class – are exploited and dominated by UK state agencies acting on behalf of the capitalist class. In turn, these academics exploit and help the HO to dominate and control the field's primarily working class human subjects.

That MARS plays this role is also indicated by the pattern in citizenship of its students. As I showed in Table 4 above (see Chapter Three), the most frequent states of citizenship of MARS student new enrolments (i.e., those ranging from ten to 122) were – in descending order – the UK; the USA; Japan; Germany; Canada; and France, Italy, and Spain, with ten each. If Spain is omitted, the seven most frequent states of citizenship of MARS students are also the states that are members of the G7, a global organisation of capitalist states that 'has consistently dealt with macroeconomic management, international trade, and relations with developing countries' (University of Toronto 2005). Thus, the field can be understood as training 'managers' of the migration of people from 'developing countries' for not only a niche in the UK labour market, but also for that of the global managerial class that is part of a world-wide neoliberal capitalist mode of production.

4.4.3. Overall interpretation

In this section I have followed Wolf in providing 'an analytic account of the development of material relations, moving simultaneously on the level of the encompassing system and on the micro-level' (1997:23). I described the similar processes that took place at the micro and system levels by which the APCI (and its MARS academic participants) became more integrated into the UK state migration control project and the field of MARS developed through its exchange with governmental agencies, which included – crucially – production that facilitated migration control. The shift from greater autonomy to greater integration that characterized the APCI's position in the successive modes of knowledge production of which it was a part paralleled that of academics in UK universities in the transition to neoliberal capitalism. Put simply: a reason why MARS academics facilitated migration control was that it was their way of making a living.

4.5. Conclusion

In *The German ideology*, Marx and Engels claimed that the

> historical method which reigned in Germany, and especially the reason why, must be understood from its connection with the illusion of ideologists in general, e.g. the illusions of the jurist, politicians (of the practical statesmen among them, too), from the dogmatic dreamings and distortions of these fellows; this is explained perfectly easily from their practical position in life, their job, and the division of labour (1974:67-68).

The division of labour, they write,

> manifests itself […] in the ruling class as the division of mental and material labour, so that inside this class one part appears as the thinkers of the class (its active, conceptive

ideologists, who make the perfecting of the illusion of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood) (ibid.:65).

Implicit in these passages is the middle-range theoretical concept of *power*, with class rule being its explicit expression. MARS and the activities of its members can be understood as well using the middle-range theoretical concept of power, as well.

I have shown how the practical position in life (and the division of labour) – or, job – of MARS academics was to assist their governmental agency superiors in ruling – or exercising power over – the field's human subjects through their participation in the APCI and the MAC, and possibly through their production of surveillance on these actors and their endorsement of such rule. This position of MARS academics was essentially the same as that which Nicolaus described for sociology in the USA in the late 1960s – i.e., eyes down and palms up:

> [T]he eyes of sociologists, with few but honorable (or: honorable but few) exceptions, have been turned downwards, and their palms upwards. Eyes down, to study the activities of the lower classes, of the *subject* population – those activities which created problems for the smooth exercise of governmental hegemony. […] Sociology has risen to its present prosperity and eminence on the blood and bones of the poor and oppressed; it owes its prestige in this society to its putative ability to give information and advice to the ruling class of this society about ways and means to keep the people *down*. The professional eyes of the sociologist are on the down people, and the professional palm of the sociologist is stretched toward the up people. […] Unlike knowledge about trees, and stones, knowledge about people directly affects what we are, what we do, what we may hope for. […] So far, sociologists have been *schlepping* this knowledge that confers power along a one-way chain, taking knowledge from the people, giving knowledge to the rulers (1969:155, emphasis in original).

There is strong evidence that MARS academics assisted this rule, as well, as ideologists – i.e., by perfecting the image of the field's members about themselves.

The image I refer to is that which was made explicit in the title of the *Guardian Weekly* article on the field's postgraduate programmes that I referred to above (see Chapter Three) – i.e., that the field has a benign effect on its human subjects. The claims of the APCI's MARS academic members that they did not 'endorse' the materials used by the HO to criminalize the presence of the field's human subjects in the UK, the omission by MARS academics of themselves when describing the members of the 'migration industry', and the incidentalness of the contextualisations of MARS and migration control by Chimni, Black and Zetter (see above in my introduction) did nothing to challenge this benevolent image. A particularly politically savvy (experienced in UK parliamentary politics prior to enrolment) MARS student at UEL, Mr Nolan, responded to my question of whether or not his lecturers and supervisors had discussed the political or financial pressures that they felt as academics with him and his fellow students by stating, 'Not much. Not that I remember'. 'But yeah', he went on to say, 'they wouldn't sort of say… tell you the bad stuff'.

Perhaps the most apt example of the fulfilment of this ideological role by a MARS academic is Professor Zetter's statement about the RSC serving refugees that I described above (first in Chapter Three). This appeared in his article in *Forced migration review* titled 'Moving on, not settling down', which has the subtitle, 'In 2007, as the new Director of the Refugee Studies Centre, I will have the enormous pleasure of leading its 25th anniversary celebrations' (2007:79). The last paragraph of the article reads as follows:

> RSC has achieved remarkable impacts but, like *the refugees it serves*, it has always had a sense of restlessness, that there is more to be done. That is why we will continue to be moving on (ibid., emphasis added).

When presented with an opportunity to publicly reflect on the 'impacts' of the centre over a quarter century and contribute to the construction of the field's members' professional self-image, Professor Zetter states unequivocally that the centre 'serves' people he identifies as 'refugees', while providing no evidence to support this assertion – thereby reproducing the field's benevolent image of itself. Omitted from his public, celebratory account is the harm that befell the field's human subjects as a result of the participation of the centre's members (himself included!) with the APCI and their exploitation at the hands of the centre's researchers – both of which he was undoubtedly well aware by the time of his writing the piece. I will leave it up to the reader to judge if this statement qualifies as an illusion, a dogmatic dreaming, or a distortion; but I assert with great confidence that it is an expression of the MARS ideology.

The cumulative effect of statements regarding the role of MARS academics such as Zetter's is indicated by the response of Carol, a MARS DPhil student at the SCMR, to my question of, 'In your experiences here, have you… for example, met government officials or… in sort of the seminars… or in your relationships with your supervisors, does this issue of policy become part of what you're doing?', which was the following:

> Policy… that kind of clear relation that you would… you're making… that there would be government… kind of… politicians or policy makers actively involved in my research or in the… this dep… department, I haven't noticed. I know that we've had presentations from organi… from UN, for instance, organisations, and international non-governmental organisations, or people who are working for NGOs. And I know that some of our staff members, obviously, also are asked as experts on matters. But, as

> researchers, I think… my own person… personal view and what the view of most of our department is to be, obviously, the critical… those who will criticise the policies in the sense that would give… I think… the sort of maybe, also the self… identity. The kind of identity of migration studies in Sussex is to be kind of… a critic… doing critical research and questioning… I mean, questions such as migration manag… management, migration security… issues that are very topical now.

Here, MARS researchers in the SCMR are said to be 'critical' and 'those who will criticise the policies', rather than clients of DfID to the tune of two-and-a-half million pounds, some of whom facilitate migration control through participation in the APCI and provide surveillance on the field's imprisoned human subjects under contract to the HO IRSS. That both Carol and the author of the 'Migration learning to help' *Guardian weekly* article would portray the SCMR as free from the active involvement of governmental actors, critical of policies, and benevolent vis-à-vis the centre's human subjects testifies to the efficacy of public statements such as those by Professor Zetter, above, in shaping perception.

In my Introduction I described and classified the Marxist approaches taken by scholars who had found that MARS had facilitated migration control and stated that I would engage with these analyses in this fourth chapter. I found those of Malkki, De Genova, and Peutz to be Saidian; Zetter to be Althusserian; and Chimni and Black to be Classical Marxist. These approaches can be understood using my spectrum approach as being ones that are located at the more rationalist end of the Marxist range. These accounts – like the last two I presented above – are more determinist, about unconscious mental phenomena, and general than the chapter's first two analyses, which I positioned at the more empiricist end of the Marxist spectrum. These two – i.e., those of Davis and Bourdieu – are practice theory, proper: the agency of actors is explored as much as (or slightly more than) the context of power within which they operate. Thus, I have contributed to a Marxist understanding of the

facilitation of migration control by MARS academics by providing the more empiricist interpretations that the existing literature lacked.

5. MARS: enacting an elementary form of the religious life

In this chapter, I support my argument that MARS academics facilitated migration control because of *structure*. I do so in four sections. First, I describe the Durkheimian approach in detail and position it vis-à-vis the other two (i.e., Weberian and Marxian) that I use in this second half of my thesis. Second, I explain the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics following Mauss – i.e., as gift exchange. Third, I do so following Dumont – i.e., as a product of an underlying mental classificatory scheme of hierarchical opposition. Finally, I present a classical Durkheimian interpretation of the MARS facilitation of migration control – i.e., as functioning to police endogamy by keeping at a distance people classified as profane.

5.1. A Durkheimian approach

I consider Durkheim's approach to be the most rationalist of the four that I utilize in my thesis and therefore place it nearest to that pole on my spectrum of social theory (see diagram in Introduction). Durkheim's approach considers people's behaviour to be more determined by unconscious societal factors than do the other three.

Durkheim writes the following of religion:

> Before all, it is a system of ideas with which the individuals represent to themselves the society of which they are members, and the obscure but intimate relations which they have with it. This is its primary function (1976:225).

'The real characteristic of religious phenomena' – i.e., this system of ideas – is that

they always suppose a bipartite division of the whole universe, known and knowable, into two classes which embrace all that exists, but which radically exclude each other. Sacred things are those which the interdictions protect and isolate; profane things, those to which these interdictions are applied and which must remain at a distance from the first (ibid.:41).

Durkheim argues that 'between the logic of religious thought and that of scientific thought there is no abyss' (ibid.:239). 'Every time that we unite heterogeneous terms by an internal bond' – in scientific analysis – 'we forcibly identify contraries' (ibid.:238) – in essentially the same way as one does through the logic of religion. Thus, for Durkheim, 'science and philosophy' (ibid.:237) are based in 'religious conceptions' (ibid.:236), which are 'the result of determined social causes' (ibid.).

The middle-range theoretical concept that is focussed upon primarily by scholars using a Durkheimian approach is *structure*. Some, like Mauss, study the function of a particular element vis-à-vis the others that make up the structure of a society. Others, like Dumont, are concerned with the structures of thought – especially the ways in which we classify phenomena. As will be apparent below, Mauss shows greater concern for the *experience* of exchange than do more rationalist structuralists, such as Dumont (and Lévi-Strauss), who focus on its *regularities* (Bourdieu 1977:5). While Mauss is concerned with the function of the sentiment of obligation, Dumont focuses on the ranking of categories. Figure 25, below, visualises the relation between these Durkheimian approaches using my spectrum of social theory.

Figure 25: Durkheimian approaches

Marxian ├ ------------ Durkheimian ------------┤

    Mauss   Dumont

5.2. Gift exchange

Mauss claims that 'it is not individuals but collectivities that impose obligations of exchange and contract upon each other' (1990:5). He stresses – in rationalist fashion – obligation rather than choice or motivation, and social groups rather than individuals. I see his thesis as containing three related points: integration, obligation, and social and spiritual mechanisms.

The first point is that the function of gift exchange is to integrate a society – i.e., *kula* trade among the Trobriand islanders (ibid.:27). According to Mauss, this gift exchange 'form[s] the framework for a whole series of other exchanges, extremely diverse in scope, ranging from bargaining to remuneration', such as '*gimwali*, which are commonplace exchanges' (ibid.). Yet another function of the *kula*, writes Mauss, is the establishment of a social hierarchy through the gifts of the object of the trade – *vagyu'a* – '[b]etween chiefs and their vassals, between vassals and their tenants' (ibid.:74). Mauss' second point is that these transactions 'are committed to' in a disinterested or 'somewhat voluntary form by presents and gifts, although in the final analysis they are strictly compulsory' (ibid.:5).

Mauss' third point relates to the mechanisms by which total services operate; they are both social and spiritual. As stated above, individuals are obliged (in part) by their group membership to give and receive. Additionally, the obligation to engage in these activities is 'the most important feature among […] spiritual mechanisms' (ibid.: 7). This obligation is spiritual in the senses that 'to make a gift of something to someone is to make a present of some part of oneself' and 'to accept something from somebody

is to accept some part of his spiritual essence, of his soul' (ibid.: 12). In the following section I use these three points to interpret the materials presented earlier in this thesis and new information from my fieldwork.

5.2.1. Functions of APCI membership

In the next two subsections I follow Mauss in discussing the functions of the APCI. First, I show how some of the interaction that I have thus far described (and that which I recount below) between MARS academics and state agency officials constitutes gift exchange. Then I demonstrate how it has the integrative functions of forming a framework for a series of other kinds of exchanges and of establishing social hierarchy.

5.2.1.1. Gift exchange

The information that I have presented in the preceding chapters indicates that the highest-ranking members of MARS engaged in gift exchange with officials of UK state agencies. The former participated in state agency-sponsored panels, commissions, and public events, and the latter reciprocated by ensuring that the participants received funding for the centres that they directed. An image of disinterestedness and voluntarism was maintained by both groups: MARS academic participation was said to be unremunerated and awards were supposedly dispersed solely on the basis of merit.

For example, joining the APCI as a member was said by both those who did so and the HO secretariat to be voluntary. The minutes for the panel's thirteenth and final (October 2008) meeting included the following statement by its second chair:

> [He] recalled that he had been a member of the Panel since its second meeting, in 2004. Since then, a substantial amount of work had been carried out by Members and Observers, all of whom were unpaid. […] He said that the Panel had overseen a substantial and widely acknowledged improvement in the quality of reports produced by COI Service since 2004, and thanked Members and Observers past and present for their hard work. (APCI 11.M:§6.3)

The APCI website also contained a call for new members that stated that panel members were not paid fees or a salary by the organisation, but were only reimbursed for the expenses that they incurred as a result of their participation (APCI n.d.e).

Additional behaviours of MARS academics described above can be interpreted to be gifts to these officials. These include their abstaining both from criticising them at public events and from describing in detail the harmful effects of state agency policies in academic publications; providing them with restrictionist policy recommendations; and accepting HO commissions to do research at all (recall the hostility of many of the field's members to the agency).

My research into the process by which the field's multimillion pound state agency-funded centres were established, which has included interviews and analyses of press releases and of the centres' websites, has uncovered no evidence of a public *and* competitive bidding process. For example, the DMI website includes the following vague description of the process in the biography of its director: '[She] *was appointed* Director of the AHRC Diasporas, Migration and Identities Programme in January 2005' (DMI n.d., emphasis added). Especially murky is that which preceded the

award by DfID to the RSC in 2006. A MARS academic with knowledge of the

process told me that the arrangement was made directly between the centre's director

and officials at the agency. In another example, the TNCP Director's final report for

the programme provides a glimpse of the process by which funding council awards

were made:

> The director played a leading role in the commissioning process for TransComm [i.e., TNCP], which began in the summer of 1997. After national advertisement, the ESRC appointed as the Programme's Director […] (who in fact had played a leading role in developing the Programme proposal together with Martin Kender of the ESRC); he began his contract in September 1997 (TNCP 2003:6).

The 'national advertisement' appears to have been a token gesture made *en route* to

awarding the funds to the MARS academic who had *already* developed the proposal

with an agent of the agency that was making the award.

The table in Appendix 5.1 displays the kinds and frequency of interaction (of which I

have become aware) that seven MARS academics (the directors of the field's

multimillion pound state-funded centres plus one of the chairs of the APCI) had with

UK state agencies. The COIC (Commission on Integration and Cohesion), in which

(the future) COMPAS director Professor Keith participated as a commissioner, was

established by the government minister for the DCLG in July of 2006 (Keith 2007;

DCLG 2006). Its terms of reference included the following passage: 'The

Commission will undertake its work within the context of existing Government policy,

for example on managed migration and preventing extremism' (DCLG 2006). The

first director of COMPAS, Professor Vertovec, joined the HO-managed AIRAG

(Asylum and Immigration Research Advisory Group) in 2002 – a year before

COMPAS was founded. Evidence of Professor Knott's production of research under

contract to the HO Faith Communities divisions comes from her online professional biography (DMI n.d.) and the report that she produced under the contract (Knott and Francis 2004). Her commissioned research relationship with its Counter Terrorism division is described in several passages in the DMI 2006 annual report, one of which being the following, which was listed as one of the programme's 'key achievements': 'Collaboration with the Home Office in reviewing arts and humanities research and literature relating to issues of security and terrorism' (DMI 2006:2).

The table below displays the interaction that the directors of these centres had with UK state agencies *prior to* either their being made director of the centre while it was receiving the multimillion pound funding or the awarding of this funding during their directorship.

Table 10: MARS directors' interaction with UK state agencies

MARS centre director	Prior interaction with UK state agencies
Professor Castles	• Commissioned researcher (HO and DfID) • Member (Chair) of the APCI
Professor Vertovec	• Commissioned researcher (HO) • Member of the AIRAG • Director, ESRC-funded TNCP • Presenter, 'Bridging the information gaps' conference
Professor Zetter	• Commissioned researcher (HO) • Presenter, 'Bridging the information gaps' conference
Professor Knott	• Commissioned researcher (HO)
Professor Keith	• Commissioner of the COIC

Those who were commissioned researchers produced either surveillance on the primary targets of UK state migration controls (Castles et al. 2002 [Vertovec was a co-author]; Zetter et al. 2002) and people considered by MARS academics generally

to be their descendants (Knott and Francis 2004), or restrictionist policy recommendations (Castles and Van Hear et al. 2005).

Additionally, the interaction between Professors Black and Keith and the Labour party that formed a government in 1997 predate this landslide electoral victory. The former stood as Labour party candidate for Parliament in the 1997 and 2005 general elections (*Guardian* 2010; *Times Higher Education* 2005) and district elections in 2003 (*Sussex Express* 2003a) and was referred to in a local newspaper on more than one occasion as being the party's 'spokesman' (i.e., *Sussex Express* 2003b). The latter was elected as Labour candidate to the Shadwell area in the Tower Hamlets borough of London in 1994 (Myers 1994) and was 'Labour leader of the council' when defeated in a May 2006 election. These services to the Labour Party can be understood as (apparently disinterested) gifts, as well: one can be safe in assuming, I think, that these efforts were not accompanied by public statements by the candidates that they were undertaking them in order to secure future favours from Party superiors. In sum, all of the directors of multimillion pound UK state agency-funded academic centres had *cooperated* in one way or another with the Labour Party in either its Opposition (i.e., pre-1997) or Government phases prior to the awarding of these funds.

I have gathered further evidence for the sequential provision of inducements, giving of gifts, accepting of gifts, and reciprocation that Mauss sees as defining gift exchange. Invitations to participate in conferences, workshops and committees to MARS academics by the HO and other state agents were understood by these actors to be carrying implicit inducements: the potential for future research funding. Professor Zetter's concern (see Chapter Three) that if the statements he made about

his interaction with the HO at the Bridging the Information Gaps conference were not favourable, then he could be excluded from future invitations to bid on projects indicates that the HO's invitation to Zetter was understood by him not only as an invitation to participate in a conference, but also as containing inducements (the promise of future contracts) that were tied to his giving of the gift of participation in the conference in the form of a positive evaluation of his relationship with the HO. The calls by MARS academics in either their consultation responses to or their commissioned reports for governmental agencies for *further research* that these academics were qualified and prepared to carry out (see Chapter Four) can similarly be seen as inducements for their exchange partners. In sum, MARS academics gave gifts and the officials in UK state reciprocated by giving counter-gifts of their own.

5.2.1.2. Integrative functions

Having demonstrated that gift exchange took place between MARS academics and Labour Party officials (and their civil servant subordinates while in government), I next show how this exchange – including the participation of MARS academics as members of the APCI – had two integrative functions. One was to form a framework for a series of other exchanges. For Mauss, a feature of the social dimension of *kula* – the distribution of *vaygu'a* by chiefs among their vassals as well as among themselves – demonstrated the holism of total services. APCI membership can be interpreted as being a total service as well because it enabled panel members to distribute research contracts to their subordinate colleagues within the research institutes to which they both tended to belong. In Chapter Two I showed that the majority of the contracts that were awarded to researchers who belonged to a panel member's institution went to

those whose administrative relation to the panel member was one of subordinate to superior. APCI membership was a gift and total service because it integrated UK state agency officials, high-ranking MARS academics, and their MARS subordinates via the exchange of both gifts and commodities (i.e., commissioned analyses) – the latter being akin to the commonplace *gimwali* exchange described by Mauss.

Another function of the MARS gift exchange thus far described was that it helped to generate a social hierarchy. MARS APCI panel members tended to have what Mauss considers to be 'noble' status – i.e., many were the directors of their research centres (see Chapter Two) – or to be the administrative superiors of the panel's commissioned researchers. Panel membership provided MARS academics with opportunities to acquire and reward clients among their subordinates at their home institutions, further solidifying their positions as 'gatekeepers' in these hierarchies. My fieldwork also provides me with an example of the generation of hierarchy not only *within* academic institutions, as in the one that I have just described, but also in the field of MARS as a whole.

During a discussion I had with Professor Grimes, a MARS academic who had done IRSS-commissioned research, our conversation turned to the subject of the then recent award of £2.5 million to Oxford's RSC by DfID. She said that it would be 'impossible' for her research group to do the same. She was a member of a university that is referred to as a 'former polytecnic', and generally understood to be of a lower status than that of the University of Oxford. The limitation of multimillion pound grants from UK state agencies to MARS centres to primarily the high-status universities of Oxford and Sussex contrasts with the relatively broad distribution of

IRSS-commissioned research among universities with a wide range of statuses. Higher-status academics and universities are included in exchanges like *kula* that are more holistic (i.e. that integrate social, economic, and political dimensions), while those of lower status are limited mostly to only those like *gimwali*, or commodity exchange. Gift exchange between MARS academics and UK state agencies thus contributed to the maintenance of the status hierarchy of UK universities by providing centres at primarily the sector's high-ranking institutions (rather than those that were low-ranking) with millions of pounds of funding – a key component of status in the sector.

5.2.2. Apparently voluntary but nevertheless compulsory

In nearly seven years of experience as a MARS academic and ethnographer of the field I have heard only one public and explicit statement by a member of the field describing the giving of the gifts I described above as compulsory, not voluntary. This was an off-the-cuff remark that was made by Professor Merritt, the director of one of the multimillion pound UK funding council-funded centres, during the comment and question period at the end of one of the centre's weekly seminars, which was attended by faculty and students. Immediately preceding her statement that I cited above in Chapter Two, she referred to an event that the speaker had described as being one in which 'a range of policy makers' were 'brought together', and stated – more or less in passing – that 'it just... you know, reminds me that... you know, we... we have to talk a lot to Home Office people'. A few public statements by MARS academics that I recorded implied that these acts were compulsory, such as that by Dr Woodard at one of the FMSCs (see Chapter Three) in which he explained to the audience that his

acceptance of the HO invitation to do commissioned research was an effect of his university's need for money. However, the majority of the public statements by MARS academics explaining their engaging in the gift exchange that I have described were similar to that which I heard Dr Blevins make while describing her multimillion pound UK funding council-funded centre's activities to an audience of MARS students. She stated that the work of the centre was 'policy relevant, not policy driven' – i.e., that its researchers were not compelled to produce governmental research and make restrictionist recommendations, but rather did so voluntarily.

This public image of autonomy contrasted with those of these exchange practices that I was provided with on more private occasions (i.e., interviews) by a few especially candid lower-ranking members of the field (including students). Several made statements echoing the off-the-cuff remarks described immediately above. Recall Professor Zetter's colleague cited in Chapter Three who explained his joining the APCI upon becoming the director of Oxford's RSC in the following way: 'In some sense, because of your position, you have some tasks that go… that matter what you do. I mean, really. You are there. You have to do this'. As Mauss explained the participation of chiefs in *kula* trade: *noblesse oblige*.

Likewise, when I told Ms Armstrong that the director of both the RSC and the IMI in Oxford had also done commissioned work for IRSS, she reacted in the following way:

> Oh yeah. For sure. I mean, he's a great. He has to. If he hasn't said it, no one will believe the numbers. I mean, if I was looking for someone to be authoritative on the number of refugees in the UK, he'd be the first person to call.

My findings indicate that *another* part of what MARS academics omitted from their public accounts of the field's relations of production (recall the example of the IRSS-commissioned author omitting the 'burial' of his/her report while sharing a platform with an official of the agency and MARS student Mr Nolan's reporting that his instructors wouldn't 'tell you the bad stuff') was the obligation that they felt to exchange (i.e., give, receive, and reciprocate) total services with governmental agencies.

5.2.3. Spiritual dimension

For Mauss the obligation to give (or give back) is not only social, but also spiritual. He writes that even things that are sold in the markets of contemporary European societies contain the spiritual essence of the items' makers (see also Golub 2004) . 'They [the things] are still followed around by their former owner, and they follow him also' (Mauss 1990:66). One reciprocates, in part, because one is compelled by one's cosmology to not keep hold of the giver's soul (ibid.:12). The thing that is given and must be given back is spiritually loaded. I think that HO- and APCI-commissioned research and the online publishing of commissioned reports by these agencies can be seen as Maussian gifts (and counter-gifts) that are similarly loaded.

Why should the HO and APCI publish the reports that they commission online? The researcher receives payment for the research and the report they produce. The practice is not logically necessary if one accepts the official (stated by RDS and APCI) description of the reports' function as raw material for constructing policy; the findings from the reports could be used in the formulation of legislation and

departmental directives without the online publishing of the reports, themselves. And why include the names of the authors and their universities? If it is for legitimation purposes, as suggested by some migration scholars who do state-funded research, then wouldn't just the name of the institution be enough (as is sometimes the case with the reports that are produced for the IRSS by private consultancy firms)?

A Maussian interpretation of the online publishing of reports is that it is a counter-gift that fulfils a spiritual obligation, i.e., given in response to the gift of research bestowed by academics. For Mauss, 'Things sold still have a soul' (1990:66). The report itself can thus be seen not (only) as a commodity, but also (or alternatively) as a gift (recall the field's general hostility to the HO) that bears the inscribed spiritual essence of the producer(s) in the name of its author(s). Accordingly, the online publishing of the report by RDS IRSS and the APCI can be interpreted as a practice of the organisations' members, in which they are spiritually compelled to engage.

This interpretation also helps to make sense of the manner in which MARS academics describe the 'burial' of reports by government agencies: they found the practice irksome enough to mention to me and some other audiences – *even* in the cases in which the commissioned researcher had agreed to the 'gag order' in his or her contract for the work. Part of the reason why it is upsetting for them, I posit, is that when their governmental agency exchange partners 'bury' a report, they fail to fulfil their spiritual obligation to reciprocate – their duty to return part of the soul of the author. I have found that we academics do indeed put our 'heart and soul' into our work – even into small commissioned pieces. The trope of the commissioned report gathering dust on a shelf in some bureaucrat's office is evidence of the objection that

academics feel to the idea of having a piece of themselves held privately, rather than being returned to him or her via a public forum, such as a website or a publication.

5.2.4. Overall interpretation

From a Maussian standpoint, the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics can be interpreted as a gift or counter-gift given by the field's high-ranking members to their even higher-status exchange partners in the New Labour government. Furthermore, this exchange functions to reproduce social hierarchies both between and within institutions of the university sector of British society. My conclusion to this chapter discusses the function that the field of MARS has on an even larger socio-geographic scale. Thus, having presented my Maussian interpretation, I next turn to the second Durkheimian one that I use in this chapter – that of Louis Dumont.

5.3. Hierarchical opposition

Dumont's main argument in *Homo hierarchicus* is that the 'essential' features of the Indian caste system – i.e., a gradation of status or hierarchy, rules aimed at ensuring this separation, and the division of labour and the interdependence that it effects – 'rest on one fundamental conception and are reducible to a single true principle, namely the opposition of the pure and the impure' (1980:43). '*The whole*', he goes on to write, '*is founded on the necessary and hierarchical coexistence of the two opposites*' – i.e., 'the superiority of the pure to the impure' (ibid., emphasis in original). Purity encompasses – i.e., is superior and opposed to – impurity.

The two highest ranking divisions (i.e., varnas) in Indian society are Brahmans (priests) and Kshatriya (kings). The former encompass the latter because this varna is thought of by the members of this society to be both superior (i.e., more pure than) and opposed (diametrically) to the other *and* because it stands for the whole that the two form together when engaging with divinity (purity) through ritual. This classification obtains when people are thinking at the primary level of purity or status. But 'as soon as government or secular matters in general are involved' (ibid.:78), an inferior secondary level of classification – i.e., one of power – is triggered and the relation between Brahmans and Kshatriya is inverted: the latter are thought to be superior to the former.

'In theory', Dumont writes, 'power is ultimately subordinate to priesthood, whereas in fact, priesthood submits to power' (ibid.:71-72). 'Brahman authors', Dumont goes on to write,

> […] consider royalty within the theory of the *dharma*. […] [T]he king tends […] to appear as a quasi-providential instrument whereby the theoretical world of the dharma is linked with the real world here below. Although they lay down an absolute rule, these authors are keenly aware of its transcendant nature and of the impossibility of introducing it into the facts just as it is. Thanks to the king, and in particular to the king as the supreme judge, as the link between Brahmanic wisdom represented by his counsellors and the empirical world of men as they are, the dharma rules from on high, but does not have to govern, which would be fatal. (ibid.:78, emphasis in original).

The submission of priests to kings in matters of government can therefore be explained as being an effect of the underlying mental classification scheme that is shared by the members of the Indian caste system.

5.3.1. Status

My findings indicate that MARS academics and the other members of what might be considered British society think of the academy as encompassing government. I have found that when both MARS and other academics discuss the relevance of their research outside of the academy, they tend to invoke first (and often only) the object of policy. I described several examples of this phenomenon in the 'to assist government' and 'governmentality' sections of Chapter Three. The epitome of this tendency was the popularity of the 'how to make your research policy relevant' seminar; students at the FMSC flocked to this only example (the same title was used for at least two seminars given by two different faculty members) that I encountered during my fieldwork of explicit instruction in making research relevant to *anything in particular*.

Furthermore, MARS academics thought of themselves not only as being opposed to policy makers, but also as superior to them. They did so using the idiom of purity. For example, APCI panel member Professor Reilly answered my question of 'What do you see the state – university relationship to be?' in the following way (see Chapter Three for extended quote):

> We work with all sorts of government departments, with foundations, international organisations. I mean, you can't avoid it. Because, the dilemma is if you only criticise from outside, you can have a very pure critique. But it's not going to have any practical effects. If you actually want to achieve change, you have to take opportunities when people are willing to listen to you. And I mean, the reason policy bodies want outside advisors is partly, outsiders can be more critical than their own research sections.

MARS academics are 'pure' as long as they remain 'outside' of 'policy bodies'.

Similarly, MARS student Ms Herbert reacted (see Chapter Three) to my describing for her the extent to which MARS academics produced commissioned research for the IRSS and the content of these reports by stating, 'in that way it's a very dirty field, you know… just like, very dirty when you kind of enter that kind of…' She implied that as long as MARS refrained from doing commissioned research for the IRSS, the field would remain in its normal state of cleanliness – or, purity.

The idea of the academy as being pure is also indicated in the common use by academics of the metaphor of the ivory (read: 'white') tower to describe it. APCI panel member Professor Black did so in the following way:

> [R]esearch needs to remain close to those whose migration is categorised as illegal in order to build the trust and understanding that can allow frank, nonprejudicial exchange. That implies building up the research capacity of marginalised groups themselves as much as studying their experience from an academic *ivory* tower (2003:50, emphasis added).

The superiority of the academy vis-à-vis government on the basis of its greater purity was also expressed in the answer by MARS student Mr Harvey to my question of what the relationship should be between the state and the university. We need to be careful of working too closely with the state, he said, because it could put 'constraints on what you can say'. There has to be 'balance', he claimed, between 'being in bed with the state and complete detachment'. 'Being in bed' implied having sexual relations. Here he invoked another yet another symbol of purity – i.e., virginity – to symbolize the academy.

A last example of this phenomenon was the phrase that Professor Zetter used (see Chapter Three) to characterize his being asked by the HO to describe and evaluate his

relationship with its IRSS at the 'Bridging the information gaps' event. Recall that he likened it to having 'been passed a slightly poisoned chalice'. He understood the interaction to be an encounter with impurity (i.e., poison).

Not only was academy/research understood as being both opposed and superior to government/policy, but it could also stand for the whole that was composed of these two sets of hierarchically opposed pairs. MARS academics understood the term 'academic' to mean 'policy relevant', thereby implying government, as well. I have already demonstrated this phenomenon in my descriptions (in Chapter Three) of Ms Floyd's asking me if I would be bringing my findings to the attention of policy makers and Professor Vertovec's introduction of 'policy relevance' into his state-of-the-art account of a MARS sub-field.

Another example of 'academic' standing for the whole composed of 'academic' and 'policy' is the oft-cited article by Jacobsen and Landau, which is titled 'The Dual Imperative in Refugee Research: Some Methodological and Ethical Considerations in Social Science Research on Forced Migration' (2003). They provide the following explicit definitions of the dual imperative:

- 'be both academically sound and policy relevant' (ibid.:185);
- 'satisfy the demands of academic peers and to ensure that the knowledge and understanding work generates are used to protect refugees and influence institutions like governments and the UN (ibid.:186); and
- produce 'work' that is 'both academically rigorous and relevant to policy' (ibid.).

To say that a person is an academic is sufficient to communicate the idea that the person has both 'academic' and 'policy' duties; policy need not be mentioned in order to be invoked. Thus, in the thinking of MARS academics, 'academic' stands for the

whole that is made up of 'academic' and 'policy' – terms I have shown to be hierarchically opposed. Therefore, for these actors, academic encompasses policy.

5.3.2. Power

Many of the findings that I have presented thus far in this thesis appear to contradict this hierarchy in which the academy is meant to be superior to government. I have described many occasions upon which MARS academics submitted to the will of officials in governmental agencies. In Chapters Three and Four, for example, I described the governmentality of MARS academics; the domination of the field by such organisations; and the use by MARS academics of metaphors of violence – i.e., having one's hands tied behind one's back and being hit by a stick – to characterize their engagement with UK state agencies. Here I mention one more illuminative example of this subordination.

Dr Parrish told me during our interview that 'there are two interests involved' when he meets with people he identified as civil servants. First, he said,

> there is the research interest. So, a researcher is always researching. So you talk to them as informants on the one hand. In any meeting – at least that applies to me – also is of research relevance. So I'm taking out something. And then there is sort of the collaboration… the collaborative aspect of such a meeting when you provide something. But because they are in charge, and it's their job and sometimes they are democratically elected, and they are responsible and accountable, they obviously must make the decisions. It's not the academics. So, at the end of the day, it's their responsibility, what they do with any such information. And that's, I hope, what most academics know: that, sort of, we are a very limited power. And we are only listened to if they want to listen to us. And we are only taken into account if they want to take us into account.

Here, 'at the end of the day', governmental agency personnel 'are in charge' and MARS academics are a 'very limited power'.

The apparent contradiction of the simultaneous superiority and subordination of the academy vis-à-vis government can be explained à la Dumont as not being a contradiction at all, but rather as an effect of the operation of a single logical principle: hierarchical opposition. Structurally speaking, the relation of Brahmans to Kshatriya is the same as that which obtains between MARS academics and government officials. At the primary level – i.e., that of status (purity), which is ultimately superior to that of power – the former encompass the latter. At the secondary level – i.e., that of power, which is ultimately subordinate to that of status – the latter encompass the former.

The statements of Professor Black (recall his claim – quoted in Chapter Three regarding the role of academics) and Dr Parrish show great similarity with those that Dumont credits to Brahman authors regarding this relation at the secondary level. Black wrote that it is 'arguably *not* the job of academic researchers *to pass judgement* on the legitimacy of any particular asylum claim'[53] – implying that this task lies with the government agents who are the personnel for the asylum legal system. According to Parrish, it is not academics, but rather state agency officials who '*must make the decisions*'.[54] For the Brahman authors, it is not they, but rather the king who is 'the *supreme judge*'.[55] Government and king stand for the whole, which includes the opposing categories of academic and Brahman, in making the decisions *on behalf of* these latter social actors. Therefore, the simultaneous superiority and subordination of

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[53] Emphasis added.
[54] ibid.
[55] ibid.

the academy vis-à-vis government is not contradictory, but simply an inversion – i.e.,
the working out of the principle of hierarchical opposition at different levels.

5.3.3. Overall interpretation

The facilitation of migration control by MARS academics can be explained – as does
Dumont – as an aspect of British society that rests on the principle of the hierarchical
opposition of pure and impure. One of the main findings of my thesis is that most of
the MARS academics who became APCI members and both these and other MARS
academics who engaged in gift and commodity exchange with governmental agencies
did so either ambivalently or against their will. They submitted to the will of the
officials of these organisations in a matter of government – i.e., the control of people
without UK citizenship or those who were considered to be their descendents. This
submission can be understood not only as it was in Chapters Three and Four – i.e., as
an expression of governmentality and an act that is to be expected of a financially
dependent client, respectively – but also as an effect of a scheme of classification that
MARS academics share with both the officials of governmental agencies and other
members of British society (and perhaps both 'the West' and Hindu society).

There is of course irony in my using Dumont's approach to interpret materials
gathered from 21st century Europe. As readers familiar with *Homo hierarchicus* will
be well aware, Dumont's foil in the book to its main object – the hierarchical thinking
of Hindu society – is what he refers to as the 'European tradition' (1980:66) of
egalitarianism and individualism. I have shown this primarily rhetorical (it seems)
strategy to be an exaggeration of the differences between these collectives. I found

there to be no '*sociological apperception*' (ibid.:5, emphasis in original) of hierarchy among my human subjects, as he did among his colleagues. On the contrary, MARS academics – many of whom were indeed sociologists or strongly influenced by that discipline's literature – both perceived hierarchy and expressed it in their statements to me and to others; perhaps most illustratively, one of my informants told me that he inhabited an academic position 'at the bottom of the food chain'. My finding that the principle of hierarchical opposition can be seen as structuring the categories and practices of 'Westerners' as well as the members of the caste system calls into question Dumont's sharp distinction between the two. It also implies that this dichotomization and his claim that 'the Indian caste system *cannot*, by definition, change' (Graeber 2001:20, emphasis in original) might be explained as expressions of the essentialising Orientalism that I described in Chapter Three – i.e., West:East :: Egalitarian:Hierarchical :: Individualist:Collectivist :: Dynamic:Static :: Superior:Inferior.

5.4. Conclusion

In this chapter I have explained the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics using the Durkheimian middle-range theoretical concept of structure. It can be seen as an aspect of gift exchange that functions to create and maintain the social structure – i.e., hierarchy – of the field and its institutions. It also is intelligible as an effect of the hierarchical opposition of purity and impurity that is a fundamental principle of the structural logic of 'Western' society. In this conclusion to Chapter Five I combine the structural concepts of function and classification in a brief classical Durkheimian explanation of the field's facilitation of migration control.

Durkheim found in *The elementary forms of the religious life* that both the science of his day and 'family organization' (1976:106) were rooted in religious conceptions (i.e., the 'bipartite division of the whole universe […] into two classes': sacred and profane (ibid.:41)), which he saw as having their source in society. These conceptions are enacted through rites, he claimed, which function in two ways. One way is negatively: to realize the 'essential' separation of sacred and profane beings (ibid.:299). Another is positively: 'to bring ['the worshipper'] nearer to the sacred world' (ibid.:326) – i.e., the society to which he or she belongs. In the remainder of this section I will discuss the implications that Durkheim's grouping together of science and family organisation has for the way in which we understand the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics.

The restriction of migration limits sexual intercourse socially: it reduces significantly the likelihood that the people whose movement is restricted can produce offspring with those to whom their access is limited. In limiting the access of some, it increases the likelihood that those to whom access is restricted will produce offspring with one another, rather than with others. Schneider has found that for Euro-Americans, 'kinship is defined as having to do with human reproduction, and human reproduction is regarded as a biological process entailing sexual relations and some sort of biological or physical bonds between parents and offspring and siblings' (1984:195; see also Strathern 1992:52-53). These relations, referred to as 'blood ties' by the members of this 'culture', 'can be understood as the bonds of solidarity that are caused by or engendered by the actual biological connectedness, sometimes figured as genetic, sometimes hereditary, sometimes in

emotional terms' (Schneider 1984:194). Thus, when Euro-Americans control

migration they reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of sexual relations between

themselves and those whose movement they restrict, and thereby increase the

likelihood that *only* Euro-Americans themselves reproduce themselves as kin.

Migration control is the policing of endogamy.

Schneider also makes another statement that is relevant to the Durkheimian

approach I am taking here. He writes that Americans

> certainly believe that women have children, and that to do so they must have had
> sexual intercourse, regardless of what other conditions may be required […]. I certainly
> believe that Americans, and those sharing European culture generally […], believe that
> that relationship is, if not *sacred*, at least of immense value (ibid.:198, emphasis added).

Euro-American migration control is – in a Durkheimian sense – like a negative

religious rite: it separates people classified as sacred (i.e., Schneider's Euro-

Americans born of Euro-American mothers who had had sexual intercourse) from

those who fit the opposite category: profane (i.e., people other than Euro-

Americans). By facilitating these practices, MARS academics fulfil the role of the

Euro-American endogamy police, restricting the reproductive access of people

classified as profane to those who are sacred.

Favell has found – in a similar, Durkheimian vein – that MARS academics – i.e.,

those doing research 'on immigrants and integration' (2003a:19) – in Europe – are

'co-opted into politicized roles […] through the direct shaping of the research

agenda by public and institutional funding opportunities to do "applied" work'

(ibid.) and that '[t]his involvement clearly is linked to *society's functional need* for

someone to express political agency, with academics contributing through their research to the construction of both social problems (as they are perceived) and their solution' (ibid.:19-20, emphasis added). These academics, Favell claims, 'continue to speak of the integration of immigrants into bounded, nationally-distinct societal units […] because anything else threatens the basic political ordering of European culture and social diversity into state-centered, state-organized social forms' (ibid.:19; see also Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002) and that as a result, their research 'helps underwrite dominant nation-building ideologies' (ibid.:20).

What I have demonstrated in this section is that MARS academics help not only to underwrite nation-building ideologies in the way suggested by Favell, but also to enact nation-building, itself, through their exclusionary kinship practices. Therefore, it is not only the *indifference* of Europeans to the suffering of people identified as non-European citizens in their midst that 'is socially created through the selective deployment of a kin-based discrimination between selves and others' Herzfeld (1992:172), but also this suffering that Europeans – including MARS academics – cause, *per se*. Thus, the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics is structurally analogous to the taboos practiced by Durkheim's 'primitives'; both can be considered to be elementary forms of the religious life – i.e., those that separate the profane from that which is sacred.

6. Conclusion

This brief concluding chapter contains only two sections. I begin with a summary of my more empirical and more theoretical arguments and close with a discussion of the scholarly contributions that I understand my thesis to make.

6.1. Summary of arguments

Having defined MARS and migration control in Chapter One, I went on in Chapter Two to demonstrate that the former facilitated the latter. I described the symbolic, technical, and pedagogic means by which the field's members provided assistance to two non-departmental public bodies – the APCI and the MAC – in controlling migration. MARS academics did so for the APCI by 1) providing it with favourable (written and spoken) evaluations of CRs in commissioned analyses and at APCI meetings; 2) improving the accuracy of CRs; and 3) training students to do 1) and 2). MARS academics did so for the MAC by 1) providing the HO with recommendations that supported the agency's deterrence measures, 2) analysing the labour market to identify occupations for which there were either surpluses or shortages that could not be 'sensibly' filled with workers with citizenship in states outside of the EEA, and 3) training a student to do 1) and 2).

As actors located in migrant CODAR rings III, IV, and V, MARS academics assisted the HO in managing the process by which people were a) violently arrested, imprisoned, and forced to migrate; b) deterred from attempting to migrate in the first place; and c) made bureaucratically eligible for a) and b). They also contributed to the HO's formulation of new criteria by which people were subsequently made

bureaucratically eligible for violence and deterrence. Finally, they assisted the HO in acquiring authorisation for these new eligibility criteria.

In Chapters Three, Four, and Five, I supported my second, more theoretical thesis argument that MARS facilitated migration control in the ways I described because of *culture*, *power*, and *structure*. In Chapter Three, following Rabinow, I showed that MARS academics participated in the APCI and the MAC as members and commissioned researchers because they a) were able to divide up their personalities and therefore dissociate some of their selves from the socially stigmatised one (or ones) that did harm to the field's human subjects while wearing the hat of APCI or MAC participant, and/or b) judged that doing so would enable them to fulfil one, some, or all of their aims of making money, benefiting the field's human subjects, assisting government, being effective, and – for those who were aware of the harmful effects of the activities – thereby offset or compensate for the damage that would result from their participation. Then, following Geertz, I showed that MARS academics were Western in evincing a post-modern subjectivity, being Orientalist, and having a governmentality. Furthermore, the women among them acted in a way consonant with their femininity. Finally, MARS academics were Anglo-American in their efficacism. I concluded Chapter Three with the classical Weberian explanation of the facilitation of migration control by MARS as being a result of MARS academics' responding to their calling to 'make a difference'.

In Chapter Four I used Davis' power and meaning approach to show that the APCI panellists were confronted by a demand by the HO to acknowledge their political subordination to the agency and subsequently took discursive steps to save face and to

ensure that, as Davis puts it, 'all parties were more or less satisfied' (1992:55). MARS academic panel members 'trimmed' the meaning of endorsement so that it would not fall under the purview of a relation in their exchange repertoire that indeed prevailed between themselves and the HO: legitimation. Then I used Bourdieu's power and practice approach to show that the MARS academics who facilitated migration control through their participation with the APCI and MAC – and possibly the HO IRSS (i.e., through the provision of surveillance) – did so in large part because *their jobs depended on it*. These exchange practices – or, moves – were preceded (and followed) by others in series over years that determined to a large degree the academics' differential success in the field of MARS. Most acted in ways such that they were carried along by the game, thereby contributing as well to the reproduction of the domination of the field's members by the UK state agencies and IGOs that funded its research. Yet, these outcomes were always uncertain – as evinced by Dr Moran's excommunication, a rare case in which a MARS academic was carried away beyond the game. Next, I described the similar processes that took place at the micro and system levels by which the APCI (and its MARS academic participants) became more integrated into the UK state migration control project and the field of MARS developed through its exchange with governmental agencies, which included – crucially – production that facilitated migration control. The shift from greater autonomy to greater integration that characterized the APCI's position in the successive modes of knowledge production of which it was a part paralleled that of academics in UK universities in the transition to neoliberal capitalism. I ended Chapter Four with a classical Marxist interpretation that MARS academics assisted the rule of the field's human subjects by UK state agencies as ideologists – i.e., by

perfecting the benevolent image of the field's members about themselves vis-à-vis their human subjects.

I began Chapter Five by showing that, from a Maussian standpoint, the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics can be interpreted as a gift or counter-gift given by the field's high-ranking members to their even higher-status New Labour exchange partners. Furthermore, this exchange functioned to reproduce social hierarchies both between and within institutions of the university sector of British society. Then, following Dumont, I interpreted the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics as being an aspect of British society that rests on the principle of the hierarchical opposition of pure and impure. The submission by MARS academics to the will of the officials of these organisations in a matter of government – i.e., the control of people without UK citizenship or those who were considered to be their descendents – can be understood not only as it was in Chapters Three and Four – i.e., as governmentality and a practice of a financially dependent (and subordinate) client, respectively – but also as an effect of a scheme of classification that MARS academics share with both the officials of governmental agencies and other members of British society (and perhaps both 'the West' and Hindu society). I concluded the chapter with the classical Durkheimian interpretation that MARS academics helped to enact nation-building through their exclusionary kinship practices. The facilitation of migration control by MARS academics is therefore structurally analogous to the taboos practiced by Durkheim's 'primitives': both can be considered to be elementary forms of the religious life – i.e., those that separate the profane from that which is sacred.

6.2. Scholarly contributions

In this final section of my thesis I describe – chapter by chapter – its scholarly contributions. In Chapter One I provided a much more detailed institutional history and periodisation for the field of MARS than those in the existing literature. Also, I created a 'stateless' model of migration control – migrant CODAR – that offers an alternative to the statist ones of the process that are found in the literature.

In Chapter Two I showed *that* MARS facilitated migration control (in Chapter Two), thereby providing support for the existing literature that had found that this was the case. In describing *how* it was, precisely, that MARS did so, I began the process of filling in an 'ethnographic black hole' in the literature. Like *Anthropology and the colonial encounter*, I relied upon argument and example rather than assertion in discussing the relationship between intellectual production and social coercion. Furthermore, whereas the existing literature identified only symbolic and technical means by which MARS facilitated migration control, I found an additional one: pedagogic.

In Chapters Three, Four, and Five, I provided a more holistic understanding of the facilitation of migration control by MARS by explaining *why* the field did so using not only the Marxist approach of the existing literature, but those that are Weberian and Durkheimian, as well. More specifically, in Chapter Three I defended my eclectic, spectrum approach (and its constituent theoretical perspectives – i.e., the sociology of the social) against Latour's critique. It was also in this chapter that I discussed the 'sentiments, affects, intentions and aspirations' (Boyer 2008:45) of MARS academics,

thereby providing a rare existential supplement to the literature on 'experts and expertise', which 'tends to be strongly crypto-rationalist in its orientation, lingering on the logico-rational dimensions of expert practice and knowledge' (ibid.). In Chapter Four I contributed to a Marxist understanding of the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics by providing the more empiricist interpretations that the existing (more rationalist) literature lacked.

In Chapter Five I contributed to efforts to 'bring Durkheim back in' to anthropological analysis. It was during the postmodern turn in anthropology – a time then (1982) described by David Parkin as being one in which anthropology 'lets its informants speak for themselves rather than see[ing] the meaning by which their behaviour is guided as being generated by a cultural semiotic of underlying rules and classifications' (1982:vi) – that functionalist approaches (especially those of Lévi-Strauss and Mauss) were abandoned by the majority of anthropologists in favour of symbolic interactionism and historical materialism. The disfavour into which functionalist approaches have fallen was demonstrated to me during a seminar at ISCA in 2008 in which a faculty member of the institute stated that she preferred to use practice theory rather than a functionalist approach that she described as being 'a discarded theory'. My thesis goes against this trend. In Chapter Five I showed that the 'underlying rules and classifications' approach referred to by Parkin above does indeed provide insight into the facilitation of migration control by MARS academics.

A scholarly contribution of my thesis as a whole is that it fulfils the role posited for anthropology by Shore and Wright: 'to unsettle and dislodge the certainties and orthodoxies that govern the present' (1997:17). As described in Chapter Three,

MARS is seen by its members and represented by at least one mass media organisation as being primarily benevolent vis-à-vis the field's human subjects. My account of MARS destabilizes this dominant representation and thereby helps to open up the possibility of a future in which alternative representations might become relatively more salient.

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Appendices

Appendix 0

0.1: Description of project letter

Dear Potential Project Participant,

I am a Doctor of Philosophy candidate in the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology (and St. Antony's College) carrying out a study titled "Migration Studies in the United Kingdom: An Emerging Research Tradition and its Context." This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee.

The aims of the study are to find out how migration is conceptualized, taught and written about by academics in British universities; to describe the socio-political context in which this takes place; and to understand the meaning(s) that students and faculty members give to their participation in the field of migration studies. It is valuable research because it will provide rich ethnographic data for the use of other scholars and an holistic perspective on the development of an academic discipline in the U.K.

You are being invited to take part in this research project because of your participation in or relationship with migration research in the U.K. If you agree to become a research subject for this project, your statements and actions may be recorded by me (using my memory, handwritten notes, or an electronic device) during formal interviews and/or in informal settings.

You can choose whether you participate. I welcome you to ask questions about the study before you decide whether to participate. If you agree to do so, you may withdraw from the study at any time by advising me of this decision. If you are a student, please rest assured that there is no academic penalty for non participation or withdrawal.

Only I will have access to the personal data that you provide, and they will be stored by me digitally on my personal computer and/or as a hard copy at my residence or office at the University. At the end of the project the data may become part of the text of my D.Phil. thesis and possibly other publications for academic or public audiences and lecture material for teaching that I may do. I guarantee that I will not name you as the author of any statements or actor responsible for any actions that I include or describe in this project or in my future work.

A benefit of your participation in my study may be that it will enable you to reflect on your participation in or relationship with migration studies. I am happy to discuss with you any risk(s) that you may perceive regarding your participation in this project.

Sincerely,

Joshua P. Hatton
D.Phil. Candidate
Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology
St. Antony's College
joshua.hatton@sant.ox.ac.uk

0.2: Consent form

Joshua P. Hatton is a Doctor of Philosophy candidate in the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology (and St. Antony's College) carrying out a study titled "Migration Studies in the United Kingdom: An Emerging Research Tradition and its Context." He can be contacted by Email at joshua.hatton@sant.ox.ac.uk.

The aims of the study are to find out how migration is conceptualized, taught and written about by academics in British universities; to describe the socio-political context in which this takes place; and to understand the meaning(s) that students and faculty members give to their participation in the field of migration studies. It is valuable research because it will provide rich ethnographic data for the use of other scholars and an holistic perspective on the development of an academic discipline in the U.K.

I declare that I

- have read the participant information sheet
- have had the opportunity to ask questions about the study and have received satisfactory answers to questions, and any additional details requested
- understand that I may withdraw from the study at any time by advising the researcher of this decision
- understand that this project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the University of Oxford Central University Research Ethics Committee
- understand who will have access to personal data provided, how the data will be stored; and what will happen to the data at the end of the project
- agree to participate in this study

Participant:

_____   _____   _____
Signature   Printed Name   Date

Researcher:

_____   _____   _____
Signature   Printed Name   Date

0.3: Interview recordings

Informant	Informant's institution	Number of interview recordings
MARS student	University of Oxford	13
	UEL	7
	Kent	6
	Sussex	4
MARS staff	University of Oxford	6
	Other UK academic MARS centres	6
Social science student	University of Oxford	5
Social science staff	University of Oxford	4
Employee	UK state agency	3
	Total:	54

Appendix 1

1.1: UEL MA Refugee Studies student global region of origin (Reported by UEL as 'Country of origin')
(Continuing students of 03-04 plus new students of 03-04 to 07-08)

Region	Number
Africa	6
Americas	6
Asia	4
Australia & Oceania	3
Europe	121
Other	2
Total:	142

1.2: New enrolments in Oxford MSc Forced Migration and MPhil Migration Studies
(03/04 – 07/08 academic years for countries of origin with totals of three or less)

Country Name	Grand Total
India	3
Korea, Republic of	3
Norway	3
Spain	3
Sweden	3
Belgium	2
China	2
Greece	2
Liberia	2
Netherlands	2
Turkey	2
Australia	1
Austria	1
Bangladesh	1
Costa Rica	1
Croatia	1
Ethiopia	1
Finland	1
France	1
Ghana	1
Italy	1
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of	1
Mexico	1
Peru	1
Russian Federation	1
Slovakia	1
South Africa	1
Sudan	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Vietnam	1
Zimbabwe	1

1.3: MARS centres

Centre name	University	Year(s)
Refugee Studies Programme/Centre	Oxford	1982-
Migration Research Unit	UCL	1988-
Migration Unit	Wales, Swansea	1992-2006
Centre for the Study of Migration	Queen Mary, London	1995-
Transnational Communities Programme	Oxford	1997-2003
Sussex Centre for Migration Research	Sussex	1997-
Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees	Kings College, London (then City)	2001-
Centre on Migration, Policy and Society	Oxford	2003-
Centre on Race, Ethnicity and Migration	City	2003-
European Centre for the Study of Migration and Social Care	Kent	2004-
Refugee Research Centre	UEL	2004-
International Migration Institute	Oxford	2006-
Centre for Migration and Diaspora Studies	SOAS, London	2007-
Centre for Migration Policy Research	Swansea	2007-
Identity, Citizenship and Migration Centre	Nottingham	2007-
Migration Studies Unit	LSE	2007-

1.4: Number of MARS centres per university

University	# of centres
Oxford	4
City	2
Swansea	2
Kent	1
LSE	1
Nottingham	1
Queen Mary, London	1
SOAS	1
Sussex	1
UCL	1
UEL	1
Total:	16

1.5: MARS degree courses

Course name	University	First year offered
MA Refugee Studies	UEL	1997
MSc Forced Migration	Oxford	1998
MA Cultures of Migration, Diaspora, and Exile	Manchester	1998
MA Migration Studies	Sussex	1999
DPhil Migration Studies	Sussex	1999
MSc Migration	Queen Mary, London	2002
MSc Social Research Methods (Migration Studies)	Sussex	2002
MA Migration and Diaspora Studies	SOAS, London	2003
MA Migration, Mental Health, and Social Care	Kent	2003
MSc Refugee Studies	LSBU	2004
PgDip Refugee Studies	LSBU	2004
MPhil Migration Studies	Oxford	2005
MA Migration and Ethnic Minority Law	SOAS, London	2006
MA Migration and Law	Queen Mary, London	2006
MRes Migration	Queen Mary, London	2006
MSc Comparative and Cross-Cultural Research Methods (Migration)	Sussex	2006
PgCert Refugee Studies	LSBU	2006
MSc Ethnicity, Migration, and Policy	Birbeck	2007
MSc Population Movements and Policies	Swansea	2007
PgCert Ethnicity, Migration, and Policy	Birbeck	2007
PgDip Ethnicity, Migration, and Policy	Birbeck	2007
MA Migration and Transnationalism	Nottingham	2008
MA Refugee Studies and Community Development	UEL	2008
MA Migration and Citizenship	UEL	*2009*
MA Refugees, Representation, and Performance	UEL	*2009*

1.6: MARS journals

Title	Academic centre	Year founded
Journal of Refugee Studies	Oxford Refugee Studies Programme/Centre	1987
Journal of ethnic and migration studies	Sussex Centre for Migration Research	1998
Forced Migration Review	Oxford Refugee Studies Centre	1998
Global Networks	Oxford Centre on Migration, Policy and Society	2001
International journal of migration, health and social care	Kent European Centre for the Study of Migration and Social Care	2005

1.7: Courses without data

Course name	University	First year offered
MA Cultures of Migration, Diaspora, and Exile	Manchester	1998
MSc Population Movements and Policies	Swansea	2007
MA Migration and Transnationalism	Nottingham	2008
MA Refugee Studies and Community Development	UEL	2008

1.8: New enrolments by course

Course	New enrolments
Oxford MSc Forced Migration	119
UEL MA Refugee Studies	77
Sussex MA Migration Studies	77
SOAS MA Migration and Diaspora Studies	50
LSBU MSc Refugee Studies	44
Sussex DPhil Migration Studies	32
Queen Mary MSc Migration	25
Kent MA Migration, Mental Health and Social Care	22
Oxford MPhil Migration Studies	22
Sussex MSC Social Research Methods (Migration Studies)	16
Queen Mary MA Migration and Law	13
Birbeck MSc Ethnicity, Migration, and Policy	8
Sussex MSc Comparative and Cross-Cultural Research Methods (Migration)	4
SOAS MA Migration and Ethnic Minority Law	2
LSBU PgCert Refugee Studies	1
Queen Mary MRes Migration	1
Birbeck PgCert Ethnicity, Migration, and Policy	1
Total:	514

1.9: New enrolments by university

University	Number of new enrolments
Oxford	141
Sussex	129
UEL	77
SOAS	52
LSBU	45
Queen Mary	39
Kent	22
Birbeck	9
Total:	514

1.10: MARS timeline

	Centres	Courses	Journals	Associations
Pre-1982	0	0	0	0
1982	1	0	0	0
1983	1	0	0	0
1984	1	0	0	0
1985	1	0	0	0
1986	1	0	0	0
1987	1	0	1	0
1988	2	0	1	0
1989	2	0	1	0
1990	2	0	1	0
1991	2	0	1	0
1992	3	0	1	0
1993	3	0	1	0
1994	3	0	1	0
1995	4	0	1	0
1996	4	0	1	1
1997	6	1	1	1
1998	6	3	3	1
1999	6	5	3	1
2000	6	5	3	1
2001	7	5	4	1
2002	7	7	4	1
2003	8	9	4	2
2004	10	11	4	2
2005	10	12	5	2
2006	11	17	5	2
2007	14	21	5	4
2008	14	23	5	4
2009	14	25	5	4
Total:	14	25	5	4

Appendix 2

2.1: APCI participants

The following organisations were listed as members and observers in the first (September 2003) through its seventh (March 2006) meeting minutes:

Status	Organisation
Member	Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)
	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
	International Crisis Group
	Asylum and Immigration Tribunal
	Refugee Council
	International Organisation for Migration
	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Observer	HO CIPU/COI Service
	HO RDS
	HO Asylum and Appeals Policy Directorate
	UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office
	Immigration Advisory Service
	Refugee Legal Centre
	Immigration Law Practitioners' Association
	Medecins Sans Frontières
	Amnesty International

2.2: APCI meetings

Be aware that my numbering of the meetings is sequential and does not (always) match that which appears on the Panel's website. The table below displays the month and year for each meeting.

Meeting number (my numbering)	Month and year of meeting
1	September 2003
2	March 2004
3	September 2004
4	December 2004
5	March 2005
6	September 2005
7	March 2006
8	October 2006
9	January 2007
10	March 2007

2.3: APCI-commissioned researchers

Name	Institution	Number of reports
Prof. Kemal Kirisci	Boğaziçi University	1
Canan Karaosmanoğlu	Catholic University of Leuven	1
Dr Gareth Price	Chatham House	2
Charu Hogg	Chatham House	1
Mr Nadim Shehadi	Chatham House	1
Albert Kraler	ICMPD	1
Haleh Chahrokh	ICMPD	1
John/Jane Doe (see note below)	ICMPD	2
Christian Wolff	Freelance	2
Ms Miranda Vickers	Freelance	3
Dr Roy Behnke	Freelance	1
Professor Arnold Hughes	Freelance	1
Dr Gudrun Haraldsdottir	Freelance	1
Ms Martha Walsh	Freelance	1
Ms Awa Abdi	Sussex University, Centre for Migration Research	2
Professor Richard Black	Sussex University, Centre for Migration Research	2
Ceri Oeppen	Sussex University, Centre for Migration Research	2
Dr Richard Fanthorpe	Sussex University, Dept. of Anthropology	1
Dr Khalid Koser	University College London, Migration Research Unit	2
Dr Richard Jeffries	School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London	1
Dr Nicholas Van Hear	University of Oxford, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society	2
Mr Ukoha Ukiwo	University of Oxford, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity	2
Dr Abdul Raufu Mustapha	University of Oxford, Queen Elizabeth House	2
Dr Joann McGregor	University of Reading	2
	Total:	37

Note: There are two ICMPD commissioned essays that do not give the names of the authors. It could be that both were written by one of the ICMPD authors already listed. It could also be that both were written by the same unnamed author. Or it could be that two unnamed authors were responsible for the two essays. I have chosen to take a middle position and consider John/Jane Doe to be the author of these two works.

2.4: APCI Country Reports

Report	Researcher(s)	Position/Institution/Organisation[56]	Commissioning Panel Member	Number/name of meeting at which results were presented
Sri Lanka	• Christian Wolff • Dr Nicholas Van Hear	• 'independent researcher and graduate of the Refugee Studies Centre MSc on Forced Migration' • 'an Oxford University (COMPAS) researcher'	Stephen Castles	Second (March 2004)
Somalia	• Ms Awa Abdi • Professor Richard Black	Sussex Centre for Migration Research	Prof. Black	Second (March 2004)
The Structure and Functioning of Country of Origin Information Systems	None given	ICMPD	Gottfried Zuercher[57]	Third (September 2004)
Sri Lanka	• Christian Wolff • Dr Nicholas Van Hear	• 'independent researcher and graduate of the Refugee Studies Centre MSc on Forced Migration' • 'an Oxford University (COMPAS) researcher'	Stephen Castles	Third (September 2004)

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[56] All quotations come from the minutes of the Meeting number/name listed in the far right hand column, except for those for Ms Vickers in Meeting Three, which is taken from the minutes of Meeting Four.

[57] "5.27 Mr Zuercher said that ICMPD could undertake an updated comparative study of country of origin information units in different countries. This was agreed." Second meeting.

Afghanistan	• Ceri Oeppen, • Dr Khalid Koser	• 'a Phd student at Sussex University' • Migration Research Unit, University College London	Dr Khalid Koser	Third (September 2004)
Albania	Ms Miranda Vickers	'an independent consultant on Albanian affairs'	Charles Radcliffe	Third (September 2004)
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo chapter)	Ms Miranda Vickers	'an independent consultant on Albanian affairs'	Charles Radcliffe	Third (September 2004)
India	Dr Gareth Price	'Head of the Asia Programme at Chatham House'	None given	Fourth (December 2004)
Afghanistan	• Ceri Oeppen, • Dr Khalid Koser	• 'a Phd student at Sussex University' • Migration Research Unit, University College London	Dr Khalid Koser	Fifth (March 2005)
Serbia and Montenegro (Kosovo chapter)	Ms Miranda Vickers	'an independent consultant on Albanian affairs'	Charles Radcliffe	Fifth (March 2005)
Nigeria	• Dr Abdul Raufu Mustapha • Mr Ukoha Ukiwo	• 'a lecturer in Politics at the International Development Department (Queen Elizabeth House), Oxford University' • 'a researcher at the Centre for Research on Inequality, Security and Ethnicity (CRISE)'	Stephen Castles	Fifth (March 2005)
Somalia	• Ms Awa Abdi • Professor Richard Black	Sussex Centre for Migration Research	Prof. Black	Fifth (March 2005)
Zimbabwe	Dr Joann McGregor	Reading University	None given	Fifth (March 2005)
Ghana	Dr Richard Jeffries	'of the School of Oriental and African Studies'	None given	Sixth (September 2006)

Mongolia	Dr Roy Behnke	'the independent consultant'	None given	Sixth (September 2006)
Nigeria	• Dr Abdul Raufu Mustapha • Mr Ukoha Ukiwo	• 'a lecturer in Politics at the International Development Department (Queen Elizabeth House), Oxford University' • 'a researcher at the Centre for Research on Inequality, Security and Ethnicity (CRISE)'	Stephen Castles	Sixth (September 2006)
Zimbabwe	Dr Joann McGregor	Reading University	None given	Sixth (September 2006)
Democratic Republic of Congo	Albert Kraler	'ICMPD researcher'	Gottfried Zuercher[58]	Sixth (September 2006)
Iran	None given	ICMPD	None given	Sixth (September 2006)
Pakistan	• Charu Hogg • Dr Gareth Price	Chatham House	None given	Sixth (September 2006)
Turkey	• Prof. Kemal Kirisci • CANAN KARAOSMANOĞLU	• BOĞAZIÇI UNIVERSITY • CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN	None given	Sixth (September 2006)
Gambia	Professor Arnold Hughes	'formerly of the Centre of African Studies, Birmingham University'	None given	Seventh (March 2006)
Lebanon	Mr Nadim Shehadi	Chatham House	None given	Seventh (March 2006)
Malawi	Dr Gudrun Haraldsdottir	'an independent consultant'	None given	Seventh (March 2006)
Sierra Leone	• Ms Martha Walsh • Dr Richard Fanthorpe	• 'an independent consultant' • Sussex University	None given	Seventh (March 2006)

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[58] "3.32 The Chair expressed his gratitude to ICMPD for carrying out the evaluation of the April 2004 Report on Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and invited Godi Zuercher to introduce the paper." Minutes of Fifth Meeting.

Turkey	Haleh Chahrokh	ICMPD	None given	Seventh (March 2006)

2.5: Distribution of APCI contracts by organisation type

Type of organisation	Individuals	Contracts
Think-tank	6	8
Freelance	6	9
University	12	20
Total:	24	37

2.6: Recipients of APCI research contracts by relationship

Type of recipient	Individuals	Contracts
Panel member	2	4
Panel member's institutional colleague[59]	12	19
Other	10	14
Totals	24	37

2.7: Contracts awarded to UK academic authors

	Individuals		Contracts	
Panel member	2	20%	4	22%
Panel member's departmental colleague	5	50%	10	56%
Panel member's university colleague	1	10%	1	6%
Academic at another university	2	20%	3	17%
Totals	10		18	

2.8: Relations Between Panel Members and Commissioned Researchers

	Individuals	Contracts
Subordinate	9	14
Less subordinate/equal	3	5
Totals:	12	19

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[59] For universities this number includes both departmental and non-departmental colleagues.

2.9: Panel Members and their Subordinate Commissioned Researchers

Panel member	Position	Subordinate Researcher	Contracts
Dr Richard Black	Co-director, SCMR, Sussex University	• Ceri Oeppen, DPhil student • Awa Abdi	4
Rosemary Hollis	Director of Research, Chatham House	• Dr Gareth Price, Head, Asia Programme • Charu Hogg • Mr Nadim Shehadi	4
Gottfried Zuercher	Director General, ICMPD	• Albert Kraler, Research Officer (part time) • Haleh Chahrokh, Research Officer • John/Jane Doe	4
Stephen Castles	Co-Director and Senior Researcher, QEH, University of Oxford	• Ukoha Ukiwo, Research Student CRISE, QEH, University of Oxford	2
	Totals	9	14

2.10: Authorship types for RDS IRSS-produced and -commissioned research

Authorship	Number of reports
Academic only	28[60]
Academic-State	5
State only	5
Not yet determined	2[61]
State-Private sector	3
Academic-Private sector	2
State-Think-tank	1
Academic-State-Private sector	1
Private sector only	1[62]
Total	48

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[60] Includes three released reports and one released title
[61] Includes one released title
[62] A released report

2.11: RDS IRSS-commissioned reports authored solely by academics

Year	Title	Series	Author(s)	Authors' institution
2005	A survey of the illegally resident population in detention in the UK	Home Office Online Report 20/05	Richard Black Michael Collyer Ronald Skeldon Clare Waddington	Sussex Centre for Migration Research University of Sussex
2005	A survey of the illegally resident population in detention in the UK	Findings 224	Richard Black, Michael Collyer, Ronald Skeldon and Clare Waddington	Sussex Centre for Migration Research University of Sussex
2004	Indicators of Integration final report	Home Office Development and Practice Report 28	Alastair Ager and Alison Strang	Queen Margaret University College, Edinburgh
2004	Sizing the illegally resident population in the UK	Home Office Online Report 58/04	Charles Pinkerton Gail McLaughlan John Salt	Migration Research Unit University College London
2004	Understanding voluntary return	Home Office Online Report 50/04	Richard Black Khalid Koser Karen Munk with assistance from: Gaby Atfield Lisa D'Onofrio Richmond Tiemoko	Sussex Centre for Migration Research
2004	Information dissemination to potential asylum seekers in countries of origin and/or transit	Findings 220	• Alan Gilbert • Khalid Koser	• University College London • Migration Research Unit, University College London
June 2003	An assessment of the impact of asylum policies in Europe	Home Office Research Study 259	Professor Roger Zetter, Dr David Griffiths, Ms Silva Ferretti and Mr Martyn Pearl	Brookes (presumably)
February 2003	Asylum Policy and Process in Europe: an In-Depth Analysis of Current Practices	Released via FOIA	Prof Roger Zetter Silva Ferretti Dr David Griffiths	School of Planning, Oxford Brookes University

	for the Reception of Asylum Seekers: Final Report		Martyn Pearl Kate Romer Nando Sigona	
2003	Integration: mapping the field volume II - distilling policy lessons from the "mapping the field" exercise	Home Office Online Report 29/03	Claire Fyvie Alastair Ager Gavan Curley Maja Korac	Queen Margaret University College, Edinburgh (presumably, because of Alastair Ager)
2003	The impact of EU enlargement on migration flows	RDS OLR 25/03	Christian Dustmann Maria Casanova Michael Fertig Ian Preston Christoph M Schmidt	UCL (presumably)
2003	An assessment of the impact of asylum policies in Europe 1990-2000 part 2	RDS OLR 17/03	Roger Zetter David Griffiths Silva Ferretti Martyn Pearl	Brookes (presumably)
2003	English language training for refugees in London and the regions	RDS OLR 14/03	David Griffiths	Brookes (presumably)
2003	The labour market outcomes and psychological well-being of ethnic minority migrants in Britain	RDS OLR 07/03	• Dr Michael A. Shields • Dr Stephen Wheatley Price2	• Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, and Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn • Department of Economics, University of Leicester and Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
2003	The local labour market effects of immigration in the UK	RDS OLR 06/03	Christian Dustmann, Francesca Fabbri, Ian Preston, Jonathan Wadsworth	UCL (presumably – see note for RDS Occasional Paper No 82)
2003	Labour market performance of immigrants in the UK	RDS OLR 05/03	Christian Dustmann, Francesca Fabbri, Ian Preston, Jonathan	UCL (presumably – see note for RDS Occasional Paper No 82)

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	labour market		Wadsworth	
2003	Asylum seekers in dispersal - healthcare issues	RDS OLR 13/03	Mark Johnson	De Montfort University
2003	An assessment of the impact of asylum policies in Europe 1990–2000	Findings 168	Roger Zetter, David Griffiths, Silva Ferretti and Martyn Pearl	Oxford Brookes University
July 2002	Understanding the decision-making of asylum seekers	Home Office Research Study 243	Vaughan Robinson and Jeremy Segrott	Migration Unit, Department of Geography University of Wales, Swansea
September 2002	Dispersal: Facilitating Effectiveness and Efficiency	Released via FOIA	Prof Roger Zetter Dr David Griffiths Martyn Pearl Dr Paul Allender Liz Cairncross Dr Vaughan Robinson	Oxford Brookes University University of Wales, Swansea
October 2002	Sizing the Illegally Resident Population	Released via FOIA	Dr Michael Samers	School of Geography, University of Nottingham
December 2002	Integration: Mapping the Field	RDS OLR 28/03	Stephen Castles Maja Korac Ellie Vasta Steven Vertovec with the assistance of Katrin Hansing, Fiona Moore, Emma Newcombe, Lucy Rix and Soojin Yu	Centre for Migration and policy Research Refugee Studies Centre
2002	Refugee integration: Can research synthesis inform policy? Feasibility study report	RDS On-line Report 13/02	• Yongmi Schibel • Mina Fazel • Reive Robb and Paul Garner	• Free University of Berlin, Department of Political Science • Oxford University Department of Psychiatry • Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine
2002	The social networks of asylum seekers and the	RDS OLR 08/02	Dr Khalid Koser Charles Pinkerton	Migration Research Unit University College London

	dissemination of information about countries of asylum			
March 2002	MIGRATION POLICIES TOWARDS HIGHLY SKILLED FOREIGN WORKERS REPORT TO THE HOME OFFICE	RDS OLR 01/02	GAIL MCLAUGHLAN & JOHN SALT	MIGRATION RESEARCH UNIT GEOGRAPHY DEPARTMENT UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
2002	Understanding the decision-making of asylum seekers	Findings 172	Vaughan Robinson and Jeremy Segrott	Migration Unit, Department of Geography, University of Wales Swansea
2002	The social networks of asylum seekers and the dissemination of information about countries of asylum	Findings 165	Khalid Koser and Charles Pinkerton	Migration Research Unit, University College of London
December 2001	International migration and the United Kingdom: Recent patterns and trends Final report to the Home Office	RDS Occasional Paper No 75	Janet Dobson, Khalid Koser, Gail Mclaughlan and John Salt with the assistance of James Clarke, Charlie Pinkerton and Isobel Salt	UCL (presumably)

2.12: RDS IRSS research co-authored by British academics

Year	Title	Series	Author(s)	Authors' institution
2005	Khat use among Somalis in four English cities	Home Office Online Report 47/05	Shilpa L. Patel Sam Wright Alex Gammampila	Policy and Practice Research Group, Middlesex University Nacro Research and Evaluation
2005	Khat use among Somalis in four English cities	Findings 266	• Shilpa L. Patel • Rosemary Murray	• Policy and Practice Research Group, Middlesex University • Home Office Crime Reduction and Community Safety Group/Research, Development and Statistics • Nacro
2004	The experience of integration: a qualitative study of refugee integration in the local communities of Pollokshaws and Islington	Home Office Online Report 55/04	Alastair Ager Alison Strang	Queen Margaret University College, Edinburgh On behalf of Michael Bell Associates
September 2003	Country of origin information: a user and content evaluation	Home Office Research Study 271	Beverley Morgan, Verity Gelsthorpe, Heaven Crawley and Gareth A. Jones	IRSS and LSE (presumably)
2003	Information on asylum seekers' country of origin: an evaluation of its content and usefulness	Findings 211	• Beverley Morgan, Verity Gelsthorpe and Heaven Crawley • Gareth A. Jones	• HO IRSS • Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics" (4).
December 2002	Migrants in the UK: their characteristics and labour market outcomes and impacts	RDS Occasional Paper No 82	compiled by Jeremy Kempton	Home Office DWP UCL Leicester
2000	Stopping Traffic: Exploring	Police Research Series	• Liz Kelly, Linda Regan	• Child and Woman Abuse

	the extent of, and responses to, trafficking in women for sexual exploitation in the UK	Paper 125	• Editor: Carole F. Willis	Studies Unit (CWASU) at the University of North London • Home Office Policing and Reducing Crime Unit Research, Development and Statistics Directorate
1997	MEETING REFUGEES' NEEDS IN BRITAIN: THE ROLE OF REFUGEE–SPECIFIC INITIATIVES	Occasional Paper	• Jenny Carey-Wood • Edited by Claire Nee and Tony Marshall	• Salford University • Home Office Research and Statistics Directorate

2.13: RDS IRSS-commissioned and solely academic-authored 'Behaviour of migrants' reports

Year	Title	Series	Author(s)	Authors' institution
2005	A survey of the illegally resident population in detention in the UK	Home Office Online Report 20/05	Richard Black Michael Collyer Ronald Skeldon Clare Waddington	Sussex Centre for Migration Research
2005	A survey of the illegally resident population in detention in the UK	Findings 224	Richard Black, Michael Collyer, Ronald Skeldon and Clare Waddington	Sussex Centre for Migration Research
2004	Understanding voluntary return	Home Office Online Report 50/04	Richard Black Khalid Koser Karen Munk with assistance from: Gaby Atfield Lisa D'Onofrio Richmond Tiemoko	Sussex Centre for Migration Research
2004	Information dissemination to potential asylum seekers in countries of origin and/or transit	Findings 220	• Alan Gilbert • Khalid Koser	• Geography, University College London • MRU, UCL
2003	The labour market outcomes and psychological well-being of ethnic minority migrants in Britain	RDS OLR 07/03	• Dr Michael A. Shields • Dr Stephen Wheatley Price2	• Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, and Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn • Department of Economics, University of Leicester and Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
2003	Labour market performance of immigrants in the UK labour market	RDS OLR 05/03	Christian Dustmann, Francesca Fabbri, Ian Preston, Jonathan Wadsworth	UCL (presumably)
2003	Integration: mapping the field	Home Office	Claire Fyvie	Queen Margaret University College,

	volume II - distilling policy lessons from the "mapping the field" exercise	Online Report 29/03	Alastair Ager Gavan Curley Maja Korac	Edinburgh (presumably, because of Alastair Ager)
July 2002	Understanding the decision-making of asylum seekers	Home Office Research Study 243	Vaughan Robinson and Jeremy Segrott	Migration Unit, Department of Geography University of Wales, Swansea
December 2002	Integration: Mapping the Field	RDS OLR 28/03	Stephen Castles Maja Korac Ellie Vasta Steven Vertovec with the assistance of Katrin Hansing, Fiona Moore, Emma Newcombe, Lucy Rix and Soojin Yu	University of Oxford (COMPAS and RSC)
2002	The social networks of asylum seekers and the dissemination of information about countries of asylum	RDS OLR 08/02	Dr Khalid Koser Charles Pinkerton	UCL MRU
2002	Understanding the decision-making of asylum seekers	Findings 172	Vaughan Robinson and Jeremy Segrott	Migration Unit, Department of Geography, University of Wales Swansea
2002	The social networks of asylum seekers and the dissemination of information about countries of asylum	Findings 165	Khalid Koser and Charles Pinkerton	UCL MRU
2001-2002	Study of flows of irregular migrants across Europe	FOIA released title	John Salt and/or Khalid Koser (presumably)	UCL MRU
December 2001	International migration and the United Kingdom: Recent patterns and trends Final report to the Home Office	RDS Occasional Paper No 75	Janet Dobson, Khalid Koser, Gail Mclaughlan and John Salt with the assistance of James Clarke, Charlie Pinkerton and Isobel Salt	UCL (presumably)

Appendix 3

3.1: Skoll Centre text file

ResearchThe Skoll Centre is committed to making a difference, being relevant, responding to real gaps in knowledge and expertise, and developing a strategic research programme. To that end, we are currently consulting numerous different interest groups in the field – small ventures, large transforming charities, social enterprises, funders and financiers, academics and researchers, and policy makers both here in the UK, and internationally.
We believe in the importance of co-creation and partnership in order to maximize existing resources. This means thinking imaginatively about how we work with practitioners and other agents, as well as how we can excite our colleagues at Oxford University and beyond. We encourage you to contact us with your insights and ideas.

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    EventsRead more

3.2: SOAS text file

SOAS: Study Asia, Africa & Middle East at University of London, SOAS

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Message from the RAE Director (Internal)
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Objects of Instruction: Treasures of SOAS
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Tel: +44 (0)20 7637 2388 begin_of_the_skype_highlighting   +44 (0)20
7637 2388   end_of_the_skype_highlighting Fax: +44 (0)20 7436 3844

3.3: RSC 'Make a difference' image

3.4: Hertford college 'Make a difference' image

3.5: Oxford Brookes 'Make a difference' image

3.6: Manchester Metropolitan 'Make a difference' image

3.7: Degree of completion of data set for country or origin or nationality by university

Rows organised from highest to lowest total enrolment

University	Enrolments w/o data	Total enrolments	% complete
Oxford	0	141	100
Sussex	69	129	47
UEL	77	77	0
SOAS	1	52	98
LSBU	1	45	98
Queen Mary	0	39	100
Kent	0	22	100
Birbeck	0	9	100
Total:	148	514	71

3.8: UEL- Country of Origin- MA Refugee Studies
New enrolments, 2003/04 – 2007/08

Country of origin	Enrolments
Europe	59
Americas	5
Africa	4
Asia	4
Australia & Oceania	3
Other	2
Total	77

3.9: Degree of completion of data set for country or origin or nationality by course:

Course	# of enrolments w/o data	Total enrolments	% complete[63]
Oxford MSc Forced Migration	0	119	100
UEL MA Refugee Studies	77	77	0
Sussex MA Migration Studies	49	77	36
SOAS MA Migration and Diaspora Studies	1	50	98
LSBU MSc Refugee Studies	1	44	98
Sussex DPhil Migration Studies	4	32	88
Queen Mary MSc Migration Studies	0	25	100
Kent MA Migration, Mental Health, and Social Care	0	22	100
Oxford MPhil Migration Studies	0	22	100
Sussex MSc Social Research Methods (Migration Studies)	16	16	0
Queen Mary MA Migration and Law	0	13	100
Birbeck MSc Ethnicity, Migration, and Policy	0	8	100
Sussex MSc Comparative and Cross-Cultural Research Methods (Migration)	0	4	100
SOAS MA Migration and Ethnic Minority Law	0	2	100
LSBU PgCert Refugee Studies	0	1	100
Queen Mary MRes Migration Studies	0	1	100
Birbeck PgCert Ethnicity, Migration, and Policy	0	1	100
total	148	514	71

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[63] Rounded to nearest percentage

3.10: Country of origin or nationality by university

Rows and columns from highest to lowest enrolment (no column for UEL, due to lack of data)

Country of origin or nationality	Oxford	Sussex	SOAS	LSBU	Q Mary	Kent	Birbeck	Total:
UK	26	15	22	18	17	15	9	122
USA	44		6			1		51
Japan	4	9	2		2			17
Germany	6	8						14
Canada	9	1	2					12
France	1	1	5	2	1			10
Italy	1	4	3		2			10
Spain	3	4	1	2				10
Netherlands	2	4	2	1				9
India	3	1			2			6
Ethiopia	1			3		1		5
Greece	2		1		1	1		5
Sweden	3				2			5
Brazil	4							4
Finland	1	1			2			4
Ghana	1	1		2				4
Ireland		2	1		1			4
Korea, Republic of	3	1						4
Norway	3		1					4
Sierra Leone				4				4
Zimbabwe	1			1	2			4
Australia	1			1	1			3
Bangladesh	1	1		1				3
Mexico	1	1				1		3
Slovakia	1			1	1			3
Switzerland	1		1		1			3
Thailand	1				2			3
Albania		2						2
Austria	1		1					2
Belgium	2							2
China	2							2
Eritrea				2				2
Liberia	2							2
Nigeria				1		1		2
Singapore			2					2
Somalia				1		1		2
Sudan	1			1				2
Turkey	2							2
Cameroon				1				1

Costa Rica	1							1
Croatia	1							1
Egypt				1				1
El Salvador		1						1
Iceland		1						1
Jamaica			1					1
Korea, DPR of	1							1
Lithuania					1			1
Malta		1						1
Mauritius					1			1
Peru	1							1
Romania		1						1
Russian Federation	1							1
Rwanda						1		1
South Africa	1							1
Uganda				1				1
Vietnam	1							1
Grand Total	141	60	51	44	39	22	9	366

3.11: Country of origin or nationality by course

Columns from oldest to most recent introduction (other than Oxford courses, which includes Mphil with MSc F.M.).
Rows from states with most to fewest enrolments

Country of origin or nationality	Ox courses [1]	Sussex MA migstud [2]	Sussex dphil migstud [3]	Q. mary msc migration [4]	Kent ma mig, m.h., s.c. [5]	SOAS ma mig and diaspora [6]	LSBU msc refstud [7]	Sussex msc cccrm mig [8]	LSBU pgcert refstud [9]	SOAS ma mig and e.m. law [10]	Q. mary ma mig and law [11]	Q. mary mres migr [12]	Birbeck msc ethnic, mig, policy [13]	Birbeck PgCert ethnic, mig, policy [14]	Total:
UK	26	8	7	11	15	21	18			1	6		8	1	122
USA	44				1	6									51
Japan	4	6	1	2		2		2							17
Germany	6	2	4					2							14
Canada	9	1				2									12
France	1	1		1		5	2								10
Italy	1	3	1	1		3					1				10
Spain	3	2	2			1	2								10
Netherlands	2		4			2	1								9
India	3		1	1							1				6
Ethiopia	1				1		3								5
Greece	2			1	1	1									5
Sweden	3			1							1				5
Brazil	4														4
Finland	1		1	2											4
Ghana	1		1				2								4
Ireland		1	1	1		1									4
Korea, Republic of	3	1													4
Norway	3					1									4
Sierra Leone							3		1						4

Country													Total
Zimbabwe	1						1				2		4
Australia	1			1			1						3
Bangladesh	1		1				1						3
Mexico	1	1			1								3
Slovakia	1			1			1						3
Switzerland	1					1						1	3
Thailand	1			1							1		3
Albania			2										2
Austria	1									1			2
Belgium	2												2
China	2												2
Eritrea						2							2
Liberia	2												2
Nigeria					1		1						2
Singapore						2							2
Somalia					1		1						2
Sudan	1						1						2
Turkey	2												2
Cameroon							1						1
Costa Rica	1												1
Croatia	1												1
Egypt							1						1
El Salvador		1											1
Iceland		1											1
Jamaica						1							1
Korea, DPR of	1												1
Lithuania										1			1
Malta			1										1
Mauritius				1									1
Peru	1												1
Romania			1										1

Country	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	Total
Russian Federation	1														1
Rwanda					1										1
South Africa	1														1
Uganda							1								1
Vietnam	1														1
Grand Total	115	20	28	25	22	49	43	4	1	2	13	1	8	1	366

1 Country of Origin

2 Nationality; I.e., 'British'; reported for only 28 out of 77 new enrolments

3 Nationality; I.e., 'Britsh'; 28 out of 32 new enrolments reported

4 Nationality 'United Kingdom'

5 Nationality 'american'

6 Nationality; I.e., 'France'; 49 out of 50 reported

7 Nationality; I.e., 'Ethiopia'; 43 out of 44 reported by uni

8 Nationality; I.e., 'Indian'

9 Nationality; as in 7 above

10 Nationality; As in 6 above

11 Nationality; As in 4 above

12 Nationality; as in 4 above

13 Reported as 'UK nationals'

14 Same as 13 above

3.12 'Like a migrant' lyrics

I made it through the MA
Somehow I made it through
Didnt know how lost I was,
until i found the migration crew

As a convenor, he was neat
as a guy, he was super sweet
and he made us feel,
Oh he maa-aade us feel
shiny and new!

Like a migrant, HEY
abroad for the very first time,
like a migrant
with your passport, next to mine.

Gonna give you all my fees, school
career is fading fa-ast
going to see convenor Ben,
in his den of zen.

Wednesdays long
but we're strong
9 oclock, 8 hours non-stop
Marie's Law drawn out,
Yeah, her laws drawn oooooo-uuuut.
yukta fell asleep!

Like a student,
writing for the 15th time
like a stu-uuudent,
forgetting the deadline.

There was Ben, but few men
Loads of girls,
yea girls on girls.
They made us feeel
Yea they made us feel,
we've got nothing to hide

MA students...
ooooh oooh MA students
feel so good inside..
and lucky

and happy

oooo oooo oooooo
oooo baby
writing dissertations
for the very first time.

3.13: Sex or gender of new enrolments by university

In descending order of highest to lowest female to male ratio

University	Sex or Gender			
	Female	Male	total	Female:male[64]
Sussex	107	22	129	4.9
Queen Mary	31	8	39	3.9
Oxford	112	29	141	3.9
SOAS	41	11	52	3.7
Kent	17	5	22	3.4
UEL	50	27	77	1.9
Birbeck	5	4	9	1.3
LSBU	14	31	45	0.5
Total:	377	137	514	2.8

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[64] Value rounded to nearest tenth

3.14: Sex or gender of new enrolments by course

(descending order for total number of enrolments)

Course	Sex or Gender		
	Female	Male	Total
Oxford MSc Forced Migration	96	23	119
Sussex MA Migration Studies	62	15	77
UEL MA Refugee Studies	50	27	77
SOAS MA Migration and Diaspora Studies	39	11	50
LSBU MSc Refugee Studies	14	30	44
Sussex DPhil Migration Studies	28	4	32
Queen Mary MSc Migration	22	3	25
Kent MA Migration, Mental Health and Social Care	17	5	22
Oxford MPhil Migration Studies	16	6	22
Sussex MSC Social Research Methods (Migration Studies)	13	3	16
Queen Mary MA Migration and Law	9	4	13
Birbeck MSc Ethnicity, Migration, and Policy	5	3	8
Sussex MSc Comparative and Cross-Cultural Research Methods (Migration)	4	0	4
SOAS MA Migration and Ethnic Minority Law	2	0	2
LSBU PgCert Refugee Studies	0	1	1
Queen Mary MRes Migration	0	1	1
Birbeck PgCert Ethnicity, Migration, and Policy	0	1	1
	377	137	514

3.15: Female to male ration for courses with total new enrolment of 8 or more (12 of 17)
Arranged in descending order of highest to lowest female to male ratio

Course	Sex or Gender			Female to male ratio
	Female	Male	total	
Queen Mary MSc Migration	22	3	25	7.3
Sussex DPhil Migration Studies	28	4	32	7.0
Sussex MSC Social Research Methods (Migration Studies)	13	3	16	4.3
Oxford MSc Forced Migration	96	23	119	4.2
Sussex MA Migration Studies	62	15	77	4.1
SOAS MA Migration and Diaspora Studies	39	11	50	3.5
Kent MA Migration, Mental Health and Social Care	17	5	22	3.4
Oxford MPhil Migration Studies	16	6	22	2.7
Queen Mary MA Migration and Law	9	4	13	2.3
UEL MA Refugee Studies	50	27	77	1.9
Birbeck MSc Ethnicity, Migration, and Policy	5	3	8	1.7
	357	104	461	

3.16: 'Make a difference' in newspapers

	Guardian	Times	NYT
1982	0	1	0
1983	0	0	1
1984	0	0	3
1985	0	0	2
1986	0	2	7
1987	0	0	2
1988	0	0	3
1989	0	1	5
1990	1	0	1
1991	0	0	4
1992	1	1	1
1993	5	1	4
1994	2	0	1
1995	2	0	2
1996	1	0	5
1997	2	1	5
1998	3	3	5
1999	3	5	2
2000	5	0	7
2001	6	4	0
2002	6	3	5
2003	5	6	5
2004	12	8	4
2005	12	10	1
2006	17	9	4
2007	15	7	4
2008	10	11	8
2009	7	5	2
1982-2009 total	115	78	93

Appendix 4

4.1: Released migration reports

Title	Date	Author(s)	Institution
Sizing the Illegally Resident Population	31 October 2002	Dr Michael Samers	School of Geography, University of Nottingham
Asylum Policy and Process in Europe: an In-Depth Analysis of Current Practices for the Reception of Asylum Seekers: Final Report	February 2003	Prof Roger Zetter Silva Ferretti Dr David Griffiths Martyn Pearl Kate Romer Nando Sigona	School of Planning, Oxford Brookes University
Dispersal: Facilitating Effectiveness and Efficiency	September 2002	Prof Roger Zetter Martyn Pearl Dr David Griffiths Dr Paul Allender Liz Cairncross and Dr Vaughan Robinson	School of Planning, Oxford Brookes University and University of Wales, Swansea
IND Customer Satisfaction (Phases I and II)	November 2001 – January 2002 (Phase I), no date for Phase II	None listed	MORI Social Research Institute

4.2: Two-Tier Mode of Production

First Tier

APCI

Panel members

Second Tier

Consultation group

CIPU, HO

General public

4.3: Post-publication Commissioned Researcher Phase

APCI

IAS

UNHCR

CIPU, HO

Non-
organisational
consultant

Other
university

Pm's
university

Panel
member

PM'S
THINK
TANK

key

Flow of
information/knowledg

Flow of funding

4.4: Draft Stage Phase

4.5:Consultancy Phase

4.6: COMPAS grant income, 2005-2007

British state agencies	
ESRC Centre grant	1,514,629
Other ESRC grants	140,209
British Academy	5,546
Subtotal:	1,660,384
Non-governmental organisations	
Joseph Rowntree Foundation	79,976
Barrow Cadbury Trust	5,322
Nuffield Foundation	13,283
Atlantic Philanthropies	44,266
Volkswagen-Stiftung	53,196
Subtotal:	196,042
Intergovernmental organisations	
European Commission	83,452
Eurofound	10,828
Subtotal:	94,280
Total:	1,950,706

4.7: SCMR research grants and contracts from August 2003 until June 2008

Principal Sponsor	Project Title	Amount
AHRC	Home and away: experiences and representations of transnational South Asian children.	£244,567
AHRC	Cultural geographies of counter-diasporic migration: the second generation returns 'home'.	£296,644
BRITISH ACADEMY	Gender aspects of human capital in situations of internal displacement. [Visiting Fellowship]	£4,449
BRITISH ACADEMY	Illegal migration from Sri Lanka	£7,500
BRITISH ACADEMY	Post/colonial encounters: colonial and contemporary expatriates in comparative perspective	£1,318
BRITISH ACADEMY	Reconnaissance for a longitudinal study of the linkages between internal and international migration in and from Peru	£4,323
COFFEY INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT LTD	Future Trends in Migration and their Policy Implications	£16,000
DANISH INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES	Backstopping Mandate: migration and development (Consultancy)	£56,672
DEPT FOR INNOVATION UNIVERSITIES AND SKILLS	Motivations and Experience of UK Students to Study Abroad	£89,135
DFID	Synthesis report on the relationship between migration within and from Africa and pro-poor policies	£25,000
DFID	Migration and Inequality:Contribution to the World Development Report	£15,000
DFID	Understanding migration as a driver of poverty reduction in Europe and Central Asia.	£25,225
DFID	Centre for Research on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty	£224,652
DFID	Practice Paper: getting governments to recognise the contribution of migration	£13,750

ESRC	Migration Policy and Narratives of Societal Steering	£3,846
ESRC	Motivated identity construction in cultural context	£257,652
ESRC	Immigration, racism and acculturation: a three nation study	£149,320
ESRC	Psychological antecedents of majority members' acculturation preferences	£1,039
ESRC	Effects of the media priming asylum-seeker stereotypes on thoughts and behaviour.	£23,105
ESRC	Identities & Social Action Programme: Identities in transition: a longitudinal study of immigrant children.	£137,718
ESRC	Deprived white community? Social action in three Norwich estates, 1940-2005	£141,567
EUROPEAN UNION	Causes and Consequences: Migration and Development (IMISCOE: International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe)	£275,552
EUROPEAN UNION	Causes and Consequences: Migration and Development	£32,594
EUROPEAN UNION	Migration And Asylum Research Training Initiative – Training Site.	£60,690
EUROPEAN UNION	Marie Curie Fellowship: Immigration Following EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe	£68,020
EUROPEAN UNION	[Outgoing International Fellowship] Return to Sri Lanka.	£179,370
EUROPEAN UNION	Gender, Age and Generations (GAG)	£32,594
EUROPEAN UNION	The integration of the second generation – TIES.	£132,328
HEFCE-HIGHER EDUCATION FUNDING COUNCIL FOR ENGLAND	International Student Mobility Study	£62,278
HOME OFFICE	Evaluation of CIPU Country Assessment	£4,935
HOME OFFICE	Evaluation of Sunrise (Matrix)	£2,804

JOINT COUNCIL FOR THE WELFARE OF IMMIGRANTS	Migrant workers in British agriculture: immigration status, employment relations and social exclusion	£15,000
JOSEPH ROWNTREE FOUNDATION	New European immigrants and social cohesion in Britain.	£78,300
NUFFIELD FOUNDATION	Career Development Fellowship: From the illusions of the emigrant to the despair of the immigrant	£110,566
NUFFIELD FOUNDATION	The southern European model of immigration: do the cases of Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia fit?	£7,473
OXFAM	Research and Analysis Report on Albania	£22,840
PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM SECRETARIAT	Increase in the labour forces of New Zealand and Australia.	£6,045
PRECISION PROSPECTING LTD	Study of employment practices in agriculture and horticulture industry and related packhouse and food processing sectors	£15,210
ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION	Exploring Quantitative data on Children and Migration	£36,890
ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION	Understanding the Impacts of Mobility on Youth	£193,008
UNITED NATIONS	International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW) project 'Gender and Remittances: creating gender-responsive local development'	£17,485
UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA	Migrant working in West Norfolk	£950
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD	Changing status, changing lives? The socio-economic impact of EU Accession on low wage migrant labour in the UK	£13,092
WORLD BANK	Exploring the causes and impact of international labour flows in Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region from 1990-2004.	£8,636
	Total:	**£3,115,142**

4.8: Summary of SCMR income from research grants and contracts, 2003-2008

State agencies	
UK	
Home Office	7,739
DfID	303,627
DIUS	
General	89,135
AHRC	541,211
ESRC	714,247
HEFCE	62,278
Netherlands	
DIIS	56,627
Subtotal:	1,792,499
Non-governmental organisations	
Universities	
East Anglia	950
Oxford	13,092
Foundation with charitable status	
Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants	15,000
Joseph Rowntree Foundation	78,300
Nuffield Foundation	118,039
Rockefeller Foundation	229,898
Oxfam	22,840
Private company	
Precision Prospecting Ltd.	15,210
Coffey International Development Ltd.	16,000
Subtotal:	509,329
Intergovernmental organisations	
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat	6,045
United Nations	17,485
World Bank	8,636
European Union	781,148
Subtotal:	813,314
Total:	3,115,142

4.9: RRC grant income, 2003/04-2007/08

Type	Specific agency	Academic(s)	Amount
Governmental			
Local	Westminster City Council	Fabos	9,638
	Subtotal:		**9,638**
State	Home Office	Lane	26,300
	National Refugee Integration Programme	Lane	16,350
	British Council	Y-D	400
	British Academy	Y-D, Korac	600
	ESRC	Y-D	240,508
	DOH	Lane	24,850
	NELSHA	Lane	19,950
	Norfolk PCT	Lane	4,749
	Subtotal:		**333,707**
Intergovernmental	UNICEF	Doná	13,547
	European Union	Marfleet	10,932
	Subtotal:		**24,479**
	Total:		367,824
Charity	HARP Project	Lane	28,370
	Employability Forum	Lane	27,650
	Leverhulme Trust	Marfleet, Doná	41,878
	CARA	Doná	10,000
	Subtotal:		**107,898**
	Total:		475,722

4.10: Types of knowledge in the sample (five tables)

1) Behaviour of migrants

Behaviour	Migrant	Publication(s)	Primary method(s)
Means of migration and activities and experiences in the UK	'the illegally resident population'	Home Office Online Report 20/05 Findings 224	Semi-structured interview
Flow across Europe	'irregular migrants'	Released title	Impossible to ascertain
Migration decision-making process	'asylum seekers'	Home Office Research Study 243 Findings 172	Semi-structured interview
Transnational asylum information and social networks	'asylum seekers'	RDS OLR 08/02 Findings 165	Interview and literature review
Migration decision making	'potential asylum seekers'	Findings 220	Semi-structured interview
Decision making regarding the acceptance or rejection of state return incentives and the possibility of re-emigration after return	'refugees' and 'asylum seekers'	Home Office Online Report 50/04	Semi-structured interview and focus group
General issues, education and training, labour market, health and housing	'immigrants and refugees'	Home Office Online Report 29/03	Literature review
Psychology and labour market performance	'ethnic minority migrants'	RDS OLR 07/03	Survey analysis
Economic performance	'immigrants'	RDS OLR 05/03	Survey analysis
Quantity and labour market participation	'migrants'	RDS Occasional Paper No 75	Survey analysis
Labour market outcomes	'already resident workers' in immigrant settlement areas	RDS OLR 06/03	Survey analysis

2) Advice on methods and management of research

Advice regarding the kind(s) of research that should be done/commissioned to inform refugee integration policy	RDS On-line Report 13/02
Recommendations regarding method(s) for estimating the size of the illegally resident population in the UK	Home Office Online Report 58/04
The presentation of a 'viable methodology' for 'sizing the illegally resident population'	Released report produced by M Samers
An evaluative framework for use by state agencies that provide welfare services to 'refugees' in the UK	Home Office Development and Practice Report 28
A survey of existing research and research institutes in	RDS OLR 28/03

the area of 'immigrant and refugee integration' and recommendations on how the HO could expand and improve its policy related research.	

3) Estimates of the numbers of immigrants following state policy interventions

The relationship between asylum policy and the numbers and pattern of asylum applications to EU states	Home Office Research Study 259 RDS OLR 17/03 Findings 168
Estimation of 'the magnitude of potential migration flows to the UK after the enlargement of the European Union (EU)'.	RDS OLR 25/03

4) Evaluations of the UK 'asylum seeker dispersal' programme

The availability and quality of state-funded English language training services for state-dispersed 'refugees' and 'asylum seekers' in the UK	RDS OLR 14/03
The impacts of the state dispersal programme on 'asylum seekers and local communities'	Released report produced by Zetter et al.
Healthcare provision for 'dispersed asylum seekers'	HO OLR 13/03

5) Migration policies of other states

The highly-skilled migrant recruitment programmes of a selection of OECD countries	RDS OLR 01/02
'Reception policies' for 'spontaneous asylum seekers' in Denmark, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden	Released report produced by Zetter et al.

Appendix 5

5.1: Interaction between MARS directors and UK state agencies

Academic	University	State agency commissioned research			State agency-managed advisory panel (APCI, COIC, AIRAG)	Multimillion pound state agency funded centre	
		Home Office divisions					
		IRSS contractor (# of citations)	Faith Communities; Counter-Terrorism (# of citations)	DfID contractor (# of citations)	(position, # of contracts)	Director of ESRC- or AHRC-funded academic institute	Director of DfID-funded academic institute
A	Sussex	+ (3)	?	?	+ (Member, 2)	-	+[1] (SCMR)
B	Oxford	+ (1)	?	+ (1)	+ (Chair, 0)	-	+ (RSC)
C	UCL	+ (5)	?	?	+ (Chair, 2)	-	-
D	Oxford	+ (1)	?	?	+ (Member)	+ (TNCP; COMPAS)	-
E	Oxford Brookes; Oxford	+ (3)	?	?	+ (Member, 0)	-	+ (RSC)
F	Leeds	-	+ (2)	?	-	+ (DMI)	-
G	Goldsmiths; Oxford	-	?	?	+ (Commissioner)	+ (COMPAS)	-

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[1] Co-director